CI.3  lix'l  J)  Bk.Hl  \1  & 
TRINITY  COLLEGE 
LIBRARY 


DURHAM,  NORTH  CAROLINA 


J 


ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 


“MAKERS  OF  AMERICA 


ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 


BY 

WILLIAM  GRAHAM  SUMNER,  LL.D. 

PROFESSOR  OF  POLITICAL  AND  SOCIAL  SCIENCE  IN  YALE  UNIVERSITY 


(L 


Our  National  Government,  — the  Rock  of 
our  Political  Salvation 

Hamilton’s  Works,  VII.  248 


NEW  YORK 

DODD,  MEAD,  AND  COMPANY 

Publishers 


Copyright , 1890, 

By  Dodd,  Mead,  and  Co. 

All  rights  reserved. 


c* 


Slntbersttg  pvegs: 

John  Wilson  and  Son,  Cambridge. 


PREFACE. 


There  are  already  a number  of  good  biographies 
of  Alexander  Hamilton,  of  different  sizes  and  planned 
for  various  uses.  The  political  history  of  the  first 
three  administrations  has  also  been  carefully  studied 
and  well  described  from  various  points  of  view. 

I have  not,  therefore,  written  a biography,  nor  a 
history  of  the  times  of  Hamilton. 

The  notion  suggested  by  the  title  of  this  series, 
when  taken  in  its  most  positive  and  concrete  form, 
defines  my  task.  I have  undertaken  to  show  how, 
and  in  what  sense,  Alexander  Hamilton  was  one  of  the 
makers  of  this  America?i  State.  I have  constructed 
my  book  with  just  that  and  nothing  else  in  view. 

On  page  13  my  view  of  the  subject  is  stated  in  a 
proposition,  or  thesis. 

I have  spent  especial  care  and  pains  on  an  exposi- 
tion (Chapters  II.  to  VII.),  as  full  and  circumstantial 
as  space  would  permit,  of  the  defects  and  faults  of 
American  public  life  between  1765  and  1780.  This 


IV 


PREFACE. 


exposition  forms  the  background  of  the  picture.  I 
count  on  it  to  give  to  all  the  rest  the  effect  which 
I think  that  it  ought  to  have. 

On  page  102  I have  stated  the  propositions  about 
the  relation  of  the  man  to  his  work,  which  seem  to 
me  to  give  the  clew  to  Hamilton’s  career. 

Hamilton’s  work  went  to  the  making  of  the  Ameri- 
can State,  but  personally  he  may  be  said  to  have 
failed  ; for  when  death  overtook  him  he  had  no  poli- 
tical future,  and  could  have  had  none,  unless  he  could 
have  readjusted  himself  entirely  to  the  conditions  of 
American  public  life.  On  pages  238,  241,  244,  and 
245  I have  tried  to  show  why  this  was  so. 

I have  subjected  Hamilton’s  opinions  on  economic, 
and  more  especially  on  financial,  matters  to  a thor- 
ough examination  and  criticism.  His  attainments 
and  his  achievements  in  that  domain  have  been 
greatly  exaggerated. 

After  I had  finished  my  book  and  arranged  the 
citations  of  opinion  and  judgment  about  Hamilton  at 
the  end,  it  occurred  to  me  to  look  and  see  what 
Hildreth  had  said  about  him.  I found  that  Hildreth 
had  suggested  a view  of  Hamilton’s  career  which 
coincides  in  the  essential  point  with  that  presented  by 
me.  His  view  is  quoted  in  the  last  paragraph  of  this 
book. 


PREFACE. 


V 


In  order  to  use  the  briefest  possible  form  of  cita- 
tion of  authorities,  yet  give  the  reader  the  full  titles  in 
the  most  convenient  manner  for  reference,  I have 
put  at  the  end  of  the  volume  a list  of  books  cited,  in 
the  alphabetical  order  of  the  brief  forms  of  refer- 
ence used  in  the  course  of  the  work.  This  list  is  not 
a bibliography. 

W.  G.  SUMNER. 

Yale  University, 

October,  1890. 


CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER  I. 

PAGES 

Birth,  Parentage,  and  Youth 1-9 

CHAPTER  II. 

Features  of  American  Public  Life,  1765-1780.  I. 

The  Colonial  System.  — Relations  of  England,  France,  and  the 
American  colonies  under  it.  — The  significance  of  the  revolt 
in  world  history.  — The  English  Constitutional  Law  of  the 
colonists 10-36 

CHAPTER  III. 

Features  of  American  Public  Life,  1765-1780.  II. 

Taxation.  — Social  discord  and  mobs  resulting  from  quarrels  with 
the  mother-country.  — Social  revolution  combined  with  the 
revolt 37—52 

CHAPTER  IV. 

Features  of  American  Public  Life,  1765-1780.  III. 

Persecution  of  tories.  — Outrages.  — Spurious  patriotism  . . 53-61 


vm 


CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER  V. 

Features  of  American  Public  Life,  1765-1780.  IV. 

Defects  of  the  Measures  for  coercing  England  and  carrying  on 
war.  — Commercial  War.  — The  second  impulse  of  common 
sentiment.  — Continental  Currency 62—73 


CHAPTER  VI. 

Features  of  American  Public  Life,  1765-1780.  V. 

Tyranny  of  committees.  — Executive  committees  of  Congress.  — 

111  effects  on  military  and  financial  administration.  — Factions 
in  Congress.  — Factions  among  foreign  representatives  . . 74-91 


CHAPTER  VII. 

Features  of  American  Public  Life,  1765-1780.  VI. 

Lack  of  discipline  in  the  Army.  — Social  disintegration.  — Sec- 
tional dislike. — Youthfulness  a national  trait  ....  92-103 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

Hamilton’s  military  service  ; Earliest  financial 
schemes;  Service  in  Congress;  Assistance  in  the 
administration  and  reform  of  the  finances  . 104-125 


CHAPTER  IX. 


The  treaty  of  peace;  Tories;  Constitutional 

Coj£VjyiXHJN_jQF  IyS 7,i-_-T.H E _ STRUGg'le"fo'r"  THE  RiTF 
FICATION  OF  THE  CONSTITUTION;  HAMILTON  CHARGED 

wiT13~monarchisivlV\  126-143 


CONTENTS. 


ix 


CHAPTER  X. 

.yHATVTIT.TON’S  MEASURES:  FUNDING;  HlS  POLITICAL  ECON- 
OMY ON  DEBT,  ETC.;  ASSUMPTION;  PARTY  WAR;  THE 

sinking  fund;  Criticism;  National  bank  ; Polit- 
ical economy  of  banks  ; Bank  war  ; Mint  and 
Coinage 144-171 


CHAPTER  XI. 

The  Report  on  Manufactures;  The  political  econ- 
omy of  it  ; The  logic  of  the  position  of  the  United 
States  as  to  trade  172-183 


CHAPTER  XII. 

Hamilton’s  contests  with  Jefferson  and  MadI; 

son  ; Party  virulence  ; Hamilton’s  policy_^nb 
■ METHODS- 1S4-190 


CHAPTER  XIII. 

The  excise;  The  Whiskey  Rebellion 


191-199 


CHAPTER  XIV. 

The  standing  of  the  United  States  in  the  family 
of  nations  : Commerce  ; Resentment  toward  Eng- 
land ; Obligations  toward  France;  Difficulties 
of  neutrality  ; Grouping  of  parties  on  foreign 
relations;  Jay’s  mission;  Hamilton  a minister 

200-224 


without  portfolio 


X 


CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER  XV. 


State  of  war  with  France  ; The  provisional  Army  ; 
Hamilton’s  position  in  it  ...  225-230 


CHAPTER  XVI. 

The  election  of  1800  ; The  catastrophe  of  the 
federalists  ; Hamilton’s  latest  views  and  sen- 
timents   -231-245 

CHAPTER  XVII. 

The  antagonism  of  Hamilton  and  Burr;  The  duel; 
Hamilton’s  funeral;  Comments  on  the  duel  and 
duelling;  Comments  of  friend  and  foe  on  Ham- 
ilton's career 246-260 


List  of  Authorities 261-267 

Index 269-281 


ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 


CHAPTER  I. 

BIRTH,  PARENTAGE,  AND  YOUTH. 

Little  is  known  about  the  birth  and  parentage  of 
Alexander  Hamilton.  He  did  not  leave  a clear  and 
authentic  story  about  it  to  his  descendants.  Accord- 
ing to  their  tradition,  however,  he  was  born  in  the 
island  of  Nevis  in  the  West  Indies,  Jan.  n,  1757. 
When  he  was  killed,  Gouverneur  Morris,  noting  the 
event  in  his  diary,  remarked  that  he  was  of  illegiti- 
mate birth.  Among  his  contemporaries  this  was 
the  current  story.  By  some  notes  which  were  pre- 
pared by  Timothy  Pickering  for  a I ife  of  Hamilton, 
which  are  produced  by  Lodge  from  the  Pickering 
Papers,  this  story  is  traced  to  the  West  Indies.1  In 
a letter  to  Jefferson,  in  1813,  John  Adams  called  him 
the  “ bastard  brat  of  a Scotch  pedler.”  2 Callender 
called  him  “the  son  of  the  camp-girl.”  8 Such  were 
the  amenities  of  public  life  in  those  days. 

In  Hamilton’s  letters  there  are  several  family  letters. 
Although  they  show  that  he  was  by  no  means  in  con- 

1 Life  of  Hamilton,  Appendix. 

2 Historical  Magazine,  July.  1870.  8 Prospect,  82. 


2 


ALEXANDER  HAMILTON. 


stant  intercourse  with  his  family,  yet  they  are  affec- 
tionate, and  especially  show  strong  filial  regard  for  his 
father.  In  1785  he  wrote  to  his  brother  James,  who 
had  begged  his  assistance.  He  cordially  promises  it, 
and  goes  on  to  ask  about  his  father.  “ It  is  an  age 
since  I have  heard  from  him  or  of  him,  though  I 
have  written  him  several  letters.  Perhaps,  alas  ! he  is 
no  more,  and  I shall  not  have  the  pleasing  opportunity 
of  contributing  to  render  the  close  of  his  life  more 
happy  than  the  progress  of  it.  My  heart  bleeds  at 
the  recollection  of  his  misfortunes  and  embarrassments. 
Sometimes  I flatte  myself  his  brothers  have  extended 
their  support  to  him,  and  that  he  now  enjoys  tran- 
quillity and  ease  ; at  other  times  I fear  he  is  suffering 
in  indigence.  Should  he  be  alive,  inform  him  of  my 
inquiries.  Beg  him  to  write  to  me,  and  tell  him  how 
ready  I shall  be  to  devote  myself  and  all  I have  to  his 
accommodation  and  happiness.”  1 In  1792  we  find 
him  seeking  the  aid  of  a New  York  banker  to  send  a 
letter  to  his  father,  who,  as  he  has  heard,  is  in  dis- 
tress. In  a statement  of  his  affairs  which  he  pre- 
pared for  his  executor  in  1795,  he  mentions  that 
there  are  two  small  bills  drawn  on  him  by  his  father 
which  are  unpaid.  His  father  is  in  distress.  He 
adds  : “ Though,  as  I am  informed,  a man  of  re- 
spectable connections  in  Scotland,  he  became,  as  a 
merchant,  bankrupt  at  an  early  day  in  the  West  Indies, 
and  is  now  in  indigence.”  2 In  1797  he  writes  that 
he  has  urged  his  father  to  come  to  this  country,  but 
that  the  latter  fears  the  change  of  climate.  “ The 
1 Works,  viii.  166.  2 Ibid.  351. 


BIRTH,  PARENTAGE,  AND  YOUTH. 


3 


next  thing  for  me,”  he  says,  “ is,  in  proportion  to  my 
means,  to  endeavour  to  increase  his  comfort  where  he 
is.”  1 In  the  same  year  he  writes  a bit  of  autobiog- 
raphy to  a relative  in  Scotland  who  has  opened  a 
correspondence  with  him.  He  was  separated  from 
his  father  at  an  early  age,  by  the  latter’s  bankruptcy, 
and  thrown  upon  his  mother’s  relatives,  who  were  then 
well  off,  but  have  since  suffered  misfortunes.  He  came 
to  the  United  States  at  the  age  of  sixteen,  and  at  nine- 
teen took  the  degree  of  bachelor  of  arts  at  the  College 
of  New  York.2  The  last  letter  which  he  ever  wrote 
was  one  to  his  wife  recommending  to  her  a lady,  un- 
derstood to  have  been  his  mother’s  sister,  to  whom  he 
says  that  he  was  under  great  obligations  which  he  felt 
that  he  had  not  duly  discharged.  He  had  sent  for 
her  to  come  to  the  United  States,  and  he  begs  his 
wife  to  receive  her  as  a sister. 

According  to  the  family  tradition  his  mother  was  of 
French  descent,  and  died  when  he  was  very  young. 

The  reason  of  his  being  sent  to  the  United  States 
was  that  he  had  given  some  evidence  of  literary  ability. 
There  is  a very  amusing  letter  extant  written  by  him 
when  only  twelve  years  old.  It  has  a stilted,  eighteenth- 
century  style.  It  is  written  to  his  comrade  Stevens,  who 
had  already  gone  to  New  York  to  study.  In  it  he 
reveals  the  vanity  of  genius,  and  at  the  same  time 
seems  to  blush  and  apologize  for  it.  He  says  that  his 
ambition  is  his  predominant  trait,  “ so  that  I contemn 
the  grovelling  condition  of  a clerk  or  the  like,  to 
which  my  fortune,  etc.  condemns  me,  and  would 

1 Works,  viii.  465.  2 Ibid.,  463. 


4- 


ALEXANDER  HAMILTON. 


willingly  risk  my  life,  though  not  my  character,  to 
exalt  my  station.  ...  I mean  to  prepare  the  way 
for  futurity.”  He  wishes  there  was  a war.1 

In  October,  1772,  he  arrived  in  Boston,  and  went 
from  there  to  New  York.  As  a school  and  college 
boy,  he  was,  of  course,  intensely  interested  in  the  ex- 
citements of  the  day.  At  the  “ meeting  in  the  fields,” 
July  6,  1774,  to  consider  the  Boston  Port  Bill,  he  made 
a speech.  The  resolutions  of  the  meeting  were 
strongly  in  favour  of  a non-importation  agreement  or 
commercial  war. 

Immediately  after  the  session  of  the  Continental 
Congress  of  that  year,  Seabury,  afterward  bishop,  pub- 
lished, over  the  signature  “ A Westchester  Farmer,” 
a criticism  of  its  proceedings,  in  two  pamphlets,  — 
“ Free  Thoughts  on  the  Proceedings  of  the  Continen- 
tal Congress,”  and  “ Congress  Canvassed  by  a West- 
chester Farmer.”  They  were  very  able  pamphlets, 
and  set  out  that  side  of  the  question  with  great  power. 
The  “ Farmer  ” said  that  non- intercourse  would  fall 
first  on  ourselves.  “ It  will  be  more  severely  felt  by 
us  than  by  any  part  of  his  Majesty’s  dominions,  and 
will  affect  us  the  longest.”  English  merchants  would 
find  new  lines  of  trade  if  they  lost  the  American  trade. 
“ Our  malice  would  hurt  only  ourselves.”  In  this 
criticism  of  the  means  proposed  he  was  perfectly 
right.  Hamilton  replied  to  him  in  an  anonymous 
pamphlet,  which  was  ascribed  at  first  to  Jay.  It  is 
called  “ A Full  Vindication  ” of  Congress.  It  is  a 
summary,  by  a clever  school-boy,  of  the  leading 

1 Works,  vii.  472. 


BIRTH,  PARENTAGE,  AND  YOUTH.  5 

points  in  the  popular  discussion  of  the  day.  His 
second  pamphlet,  however,  in  the  same  controversy, 
“ The  Farmer  Refuted,”  is  far  more  strong.  He  is 
driven  back  to  a more  thorough  and  comprehensive 
defence  of  his  position.  According  to  the  fashion  of 
the  times,  he  seeks  this  in  natural  rights,  and  in  a 
construction  of  English  and  colonial  history.  “ The 
fundamental  source  of  all  your  errors,  sophisms,  and 
false  reasonings,”  he  writes,  “ is  a total  ignorance  of 
the  natural  rights  of  mankind.  . . . The  sacred  rights 
of  mankind  are  not  to  be  rummaged  for  among  old 
parchments  or  musty  records.  They  are  written,  as 
with  a sunbeam,  in  the  whole  volume  of  human 
nature,  by  the  hand  of  the  Divinity  itself,  and  can 
never  be  erased  or  obscured  by  mortal  power.”  It 
would  be  interesting  to  know  what  he  thought  of  this 
rhetorical  sophism,  if  he  ever  read  it  over  again,  — 
for  instance  in  the  days  of  Genet  and  Adet. 

He  goes  at  length  over  the  arguments  about  charters 
and  the  English  Constitution,  reaffirms  the  efficacy  of 
commercial  war,  and  declares  that  other  powers  would 
help  the  colonies,  being  induced  by  the  promise  of 
free  trade.  He  admits  the  right  of  England  to  regu- 
late trade  by  the  Navigation  Acts,  but  thinks  that  this 
is  why  she  should  not  tax  the  colonies  for  revenue. 
All  these  notions  were  commonplace  at  the  time 
among  the  whigs,  but  they  appreciated  the  vigour  and 
skill  with  which  Hamilton  set  them  forth.  In  the 
course  of  his  argument,  however,  he  was  led  to  more 
than  one  position  of  which  he  would  himself  later 
have  strongly  disapproved.  For  instance,  he  would 


6 


ALEXANDER  ILAMIL  TON. 


certainly  have  denounced  this  as  rank  jacobinism  if 
he  had  met  with  it  in  the  literature  of  the  Whiskey 
Rebellion  : “ When  the  first  principles  of  civil  society 
are  violated  and  the  rights  of  a whole  people  are  in- 
vaded, the  common  forms  of  municipal  law  are  not 
to  be  regarded.  Men  may  betake  themselves  to  the 
law  of  nature ; and  if  they  but  conform  their  actions 
to  that  standard,  all  cavils  against  them  betray  either 
ignorance  or  dishonesty.”  1 

The  next  year  he  wrote  a pamphlet  against  the 
Quebec  Act.  The  grievance  in  this  matter  was  one 
of  the  most  doubtful  among  those  of  which  the  col- 
onists complained.  The  Act  gave  to  the  Canadi- 
ans French  law,  and  an  endowment  for  the  Roman 
Catholic  religion.  The  Americans  objected  to  this, 
but  still  more  to  the  vast  extent  of  territory  west  of 
their  own  boundaries,  — all  between  Pennsylvania,  the 
Ohio,  the  Mississippi,  and  the  Lakes,  — which  was  thus 
in  a measure  shut  against  them,  in  disregard  of  claims 
which  they  entertained  under  their  charters.  On  the 
face  of  it  the  colonists  must,  on  their  own  principles 
of  local  self-government,  admit  that  if  the  Canadians 
were  satisfied,  right  was  done,  and  the  other  colonies 
had  nothing  to  say  in  the  matter ; 2 and  although 
there  might  be  dispute  about  the  title  to  the  land  be- 
tween different  provinces,  the  mere  size  of  the  terri- 
tory was  no  more  against  the  claim  of  Canada  than 

1 Works,  i.  129. 

2 In  the  “Address  to  the  People  of  England”  (1774,  by 
Jay),  it  is  said  that  England  had  no  right  to  set  up  the 
Romish  religion  or  arbitrary  government  “in  any  quarter  of 
the  globe.” 


BIRTH,  PARENTAGE,  AND  YOUTH. 


7 


against  that  of  Virginia,  but  there  was  an  intention  to 
shut  up  the  old  English  colonies  to  the  sea-coast.  It 
took  Wedderburn  to  blurt  it  out.  He  said  that  it 
was  necessary  to  restrain  emigration,  and  to  prevent 
the  Americans  from  spreading  into  the  continent, 
“ for  the  advantage  of  the  empire.”  1 Thus  it  was 
another  of  the  schemes  to  sacrifice  colonial  interests 
to  some  other  interests  foreign  to  themselves. 

The  next  spring,  1776,  when  Congress  sent  a com- 
mission to  Canada,  to  try  to  persuade  the  Canadians 
to  join  them,  the  latter  replied  that  they  had  been 
well  treated  by  the  English,  and  were  satisfied.  They 
had  before  them  the  address  of  the  colonies  to  the 
people  of  Great  Britain  in  which  very  offensive  epi- 
thets were  applied  to  the  Roman  Catholic  religion.2 

Hamilton’s  argument  on  the  Quebec  Act  was  the 
usual  one  of  the  Americans  at  the  time.  No  one 
developed  the  point,  for  public  discussion,  about  the 
subjection  of  the  interests  of  the  colonies  to  those  of 
the  mother-country,  although  the  Americans  had  a 
complete  instinct  of  it. 

We  next  find  Hamilton  acting  in  two  mobs  in  a 
manner  far  more  consonant  with  his  later  tone  of 
mind.  He  helped  to  save  the  President  of  the  Col- 

1 Cavendish,  57. 

2 Carroll’s  Diary,  30.  Hare,  who  was  in  Canada  in  1774, 
before  the  Quebec  Act  was  passed,  says  that  the  Canadians 
appealed  either  to  English  or  French  law,  according  to  which, 
for  the  moment,  would  best  suit  their  interests,  and  that  they 
hated  the  English.  The  Act  was  a good  stroke  of  policy  for 
England.  Cavendish  shows  that  it  was  treated  in  England 
entirely  as  an  English  party  struggle. 


8 


ALEXANDER  HAMILTON. 


lege,  who  was  a tory,  from  a mob  at  the  time  that  the 
“Asia”  fired  on  the  city,  and  he  interfered  against 
a mob  which  threatened  one  Thurman  for  conduct 
which  had  displeased  them.  He  also  expressed 
strong  disapproval  of  the  exploit  of  Sears  and  a 
party  from  New  Haven,  who  made  a raid  on  New 
York,  destroyed  Rivington’s  press,  carried  off  his 
types,  and  kidnapped  Seabury  and  two  or  three  other 
loyalists  on  their  way  home. 

According  to  the  dates  given,  he  should  have  grad- 
uated in  1776;  but  as  he  was  writing  for  the  whig 
newspapers,  and  became  more  and  more  occupied 
with  public  affairs,  he  began  to  study  artillery,  and 
was  made  captain  of  the  Artillery  Company,  March 
14,  1776.  In  this  capacity  he  earnestly  and  success- 
fully advocated  promotion  for  merit.1 

From  this  point  his  career  in  the  American  world 
began.  It  was  a great  career,  because  it  had  some 
pervading  ideas,  and  they  were  not  ideas  of  personal 
interest  or  ambition.  He  became  the  representative 
of  union  and  energy.  His  admirers  applauded  him, 
and  his  enemies  abused  him,  as  an  apostle  of  energy 
in  government.  Why  should  a man  find  a role  as  an 
apostle  of  energy?  The  answer  lies  in  the  most  im- 
portant features  of  the  social  and  political  situation 
in  this  country  at  the  time.  To  understand  this 
we  need  to  study  the  notions  of  the  parties  to  the 
colonial  system  about  that  system ; the  reaction  on 
the  Americans  of  the  doctrines  which  they  set  up  to 
justify  their  resistance  to  Great  Britain  without  going 
1 Proceedings  of  the  Provincial  Congress  of  New  York,  123. 


BIRTH,  PARENTAGE,  AND  YOUTH. 


9 


out  of  the  empire  ; the  social  disintegration  produced 
by  the  methods  which  they  adopted  to  secure  inde- 
pendence ; and  the  lack  of  discipline  and  organization 
in  colonial  life.  The  net  result  is  that  the  whole  civil 
organization  declined.  The  Union  exerted  a reme- 
dial and  disciplinary  influence,  but  was  for  that  reason 
forced  to  come  in  conflict  with  all  the  elements  of 
disintegration. 


£ 

X 


IO 


ALEXANDER  HAMILTON. 


CHAPTER  II. 

FEATURES  OF  AMERICAN  PUBLIC  LIFE,  1765-1780.  I. 

The  Colonial  System.  — Relations  of  England,  France,  and  the  Amer- 
ican colonies  under  it.  — The  significance  of  the  revolt  in  world 
history.  — The  English  Constitutional  Law  of  the  colonists. 

No  one  appears  to  have  examined  critically  the 
opinions,  pretensions,  and  methods  of  the  American 
colonists  in  the  pre-Revolutionary  period,  to  see  how 
far  they  were  right.  The  English  never  very  seriously 
debated  the  doctrines  put  forward  by  the  Americans 
before  the  war.  After  it  was  over,  they  had  no  inter- 
est ever  to  think  of  the  matter  again.  Americans, 
after  the  fight  was  won,  had  no  motive  to  go  over  its 
principles  again.  It  has  seemed  ever  since  enough 
to  indulge  the  patriotic  faith  that  the  principles  were 
sound  and  the  doctrines  correct. 

It  is  not  now  intended  to  make  any  such  critical 
examination.  In  truth,  the  literature  of  that  period 
is  indescribably  dull.  It  is  astonishing  how  far  the 
writers  kept  from  the  facts  and  the  evidence.  This 
is  so  much  the  case  that  it  is  often  impossible  to  learn 
what  was  really  the  matter.  They  set  traps  of  techni- 
calities for  their  adversaries,  but  took  license  for 
themselves  from  the  “ principles  of  the  English  Con- 
stitution ” and  the  all-embracing  theory  of  natural 


FEA  TURKS  OF  AMERICAN  PUBLIC  LIFE.  1 1 


rights.  It  would  be  a great  task  to  unravel  all  this, 
and  the  fruit  would  not  be  worth  the  labour.  Never- 
theless, the  neglect  to  discriminate  between  the  differ- 
ent notions  which  were  accepted  at  such  a critical 
period,  and  the  habit  of  treating  them  all  with  the 
same  sanctity,  does  mischief.  We  have  all  sorts  of 
political  and  social  conventicles  nowadays,  in  which 
declamation  and  dogmatism  avail  themselves  of  “ the 
great  principles  of  the  Revolution.” 

Every  great  social  movement  inevitably  presents  a 
mixture  of  noble  and  sordid  elements.  Its  methods 
are  very  often  impure,  and  its  watchwords  are  veiy 
sure  to  be  half-truths.  When  the  crisis  is  over,  how- 
ever, and  the  days  of  orderly  growth  come  again,  the 
sordid  element  must  be  eliminated,  the  methods  of 
agitation  must  be  laid  aside,  the  rhetoric  and  decla- 
mation must  be  toned  down,  and  the  half-truths  must 
be  dissolved. 

The  American  States  had  a great  deal  of  this  work 
to  do.  As  we  shall  see,  there  were  large  elements 
of  error  and  abuse.  We  desire  to  see  of  what  kind 
they  were.  It  will  be  a good  and  fair  test  of  politi- 
cal theories  to  ask:  Would  they  be  tolerated  now? 
Would  we  consider  them  good  law  and  good  state- 
craft now?  For  we  must  note  that  our  territories 
are  our  colonies.  It  is  singular  to  what  an  extent 
laws  and  political  devices  have  been  affected  by  the 
circumstance  that  regions  were  contiguous  or  were 
separated  by  water.  The  case  before  us  is  one  such. 
Our  new  territories  are  lands  owned  by  the  Union 
either  by  discovery,  purchase,  conquest,  contiguity,  or 


12 


ALEXANDER  HAMILTON. 


some  of  the  other  modes  in  which  states  have  taken 
possession  of  outlying  territories.  The  Union  pos- 
sesses both  the  property  in  the  soil  and  the  political 
jurisdiction,  and  it  asserts  its  right  and  authority  quite 
as  tenaciously  as  ever  any  monarch  did.  The  terri- 
tories are  open  to  new  settlement,  — that  is,  coloniza- 
tion. The  terms  are  liberal,  but  they  are  such  as  the 
sovereign,  the  Union,  sets  and  allows.  It  holds  a 
firm  veto  on  territorial  legislation  beyond  the  limits  of 
the  concession  which  itself  has  made.  It  appoints 
all  the  important  officers.  It  would  not  for  a moment 
tolerate  a movement  of  independence,  — that  is,  of 
secession.  It  grants  no  representation.  It  imposes 
taxes,  — both  protective  and  revenue  taxes.  In  our 
case  the  colonies  when  they  grow  up  are  incorpo- 
rated in  the  mother  body,  and  obtain  full  constitu- 
tional equality  of  rights  and  privileges.  No  doubt  we 
might  have  experience  of  some  of  the  difficulties  of  a 
colonial  system  if  it  were  not  for  this  last  fact. 

If  therefore  we  ask  whether  we  should  consider  a 
proposed  arrangement  practicable  and  expedient  as 
between  the  Union  and  a State,  or  as  between  the 
Union  and  its  colonies,  we  have  a good  test  for  the 
question  what  was  reasonable  and  practicable  between 
the  colonies  and  Great  Britain.  It  is  immaterial  to 
this  purpose  that  the  colonies  were  not  represented, 
while  the  States  of  this  Union  are ; for  what  we  want 
to  see  is,  what  was  consistent  with  the  integrity  of  the 
empire,  assuming  that  it  was  to  continue,  and  that 
some  adequate  constitutional  device  could  be  invented 
to  satisfy  the  demand  for  representation. 


FEA  TURES  OF  AMERICAN  PUBLIC  LIFE.  1 3 

For  our  present  purpose,  however,  this  test  has  a 
greater  value,  which  must  not  be  passed  over.  When 
the  States  got  their  independence,  they  had  broken  a 
restraint.  They  were  “free,”  in  the  sense  of  being 
left  without  any  other  political  ties  or  restraints  than 
those  which  they  put  upon  themselves,  in  their  own 
constitutions.  In  the  States,  then,  the  elements  of 
revolutionary  dissolution  and  decay  began  to  work; 
and  when  the  rectifying  operation  of  peace  and  order 
came  to  be  applied,  it  was  the  Union,  the  imperial 
unity,  the  great  political  body  which  could  figure  in 
history  and  in  the  family  of  nations,  through  which 
the  disciplining  and  organizing  wrork  went  bn.  There- 
fore the  Union  was  from  the  start  at  war  with  the 
turbulent , anarchistic  elements  which  the  Revolution 
had  set  loose. 

It  was  no  accident  that  the  integrity  of  public 
credit  was  involved  in  that  struggle  too.  Financial 
integrity  is  a test  of  political  institutions.  Whenever 
they  decay  or  are  corrupted,  the  evil  manifests  itself 
in  financial  abuses.  The  financial  vice  of  our  Revolu- 
tionary period  was  repudiation,  both  public  and 
private.  It  was  the  States  which  were  the  stronghold 
of  it : it  was  the  Union  which  had  to  combat  it. 
Therefore  the  contest  with  anarchy  and  repudiation 
was  the  great  work  which  went  to  the  making  of  this 
nation  at  the  end  of  the  last  century,  and  Alexander 
Hamilton  was  one  of  the  leading  heroes  of  it. 

This  may  serve  as  a thesis  of  what  we  have  to  show. 
We  state  it  here  in  order  that  the  reader  may  understand 
the  scope  and  pertinency  of  the  facts  we  bring  before 


14 


ALEXANDER  HAMILTON. 


him  to  the  purpose  in  view.  When  he  has  learned  to 
see  the  contests  of  that  day  in  their  true  significance, 
he  will  have  no  trouble  in  tracing  the  same  conflict 
down  through  later  history.  Shays’s  Rebellion,  the 
Whiskey  Rebellion,  New  England  disunion,  nullifica- 
tion, Dorr’s  Rebellion,  secession,  have  been  incidents 
in  the  process  by  which  constitutional  order  has 
gradually  extended  its  power  ever  the  lawlessness 
and  undisciplined  turbulency  which  prevailed  at  the 
beginning. 

The  first  task,  then,  is  to  see  what  the  real  state  of 
things  was. 

Life  in  the  colonies  in  the  middle  of  the  eighteenth 
century  must  have  been  dull  in  the  extreme.  The 
elements  of  intellectual  activity  were  few,  and  were 
confined  to  a small  circle.  Under  such  circum- 
stances trifles  become  magnified  to  great  importance, 
if  they  furnish  interest  and  a little  excitement  to  fill  the 
vacuum  and  relieve  the  tedium  of  a dull  existence. 
Therefore,  under  such  circumstances  gossip  is  an  im- 
portant engine,  personal  feelings  and  interests  enlist 
neighbours  and  friends.  Cliques  are  formed  ; feuds 
grow  up  ; quarrels  distract  church  and  town  meeting. 
The  fervor  is  due,  not  to  the  magnitude  of  the  stake, 
but  to  the  intensity  of  the  feeling  which  has  been 
aroused.  Such  a society  presents  very  strong  con- 
trasts, which  appear  quite  inconsistent  with  each 
other.  It  is  at  the  same  time  dull  and  apathetic  on 
the  one  side,  that  is,  upon  a matter  in  regard  to  which 
it  has  not  yet  been  awakened,  and  on  the  other  side 
in  the  highest  degree  volatile  in  regard  to  a matter 


FEA  TURES  OF  AMERICAN  PUBLIC  LIFE.  1 5 


to  which  its  nerves  have  been  quickened.  The  pre- 
Revolutionary  and  Revolutionary  periods  illustrated 
these  features  abundantly. 

The  first  common  sentiment  which  moved  a num- 
ber of  colonies  at  the  same  time  was  the  dread  of 
the  northern  and  middle  colonies  of  the  power  of 
Trance.  They  held  that  it  was  a struggle  to  the 
death  for  the  possession  of  the  continent ; 1 and  the 
one  thing  on  which  they  could  be  got  to  show  some 
sentiment  of  sympathy  and  common  interest  was  the 
conquest  of  Canada.  When,  in  the  Revolutionary  War, 
Canada  did  not  join  them,  and  they  saw  it  once  more 
under  a separate  interest  from  themselves,  we  have 
already  had  occasion  to  notice  how  they  undertook 
to  conquer  it,  following  therein  the  worst  traditions  of 
that  old  European  statecraft  against  which  they  were 
revolting.  The  same  feeling  was  active  still  in  the 
second  war  with  England. 

A war  between  England  and  France  was  therefore 
always  popular,  at  least  in  the  northern  colonies,  be- 
cause it  offered  chances  to  conquer  Canada:  It  is 

1 An  illustration  of  the  popular  opinion  is  afforded  by  a letter 
of  1758,  by  Shippen,  of  Philadelphia.  If  France  holds  Cape 
Breton,  she  will  one  day  drive  England  from  the  continent.  She 
must  be  completely  conquered.  (Balch,  Penn.  Letters,  12S.) 
“ It  has  been  said,  on  good  authority,”  that  Franklin  brought 
about  the  expedition  against  Canada,  and  Wolfe’s  victory.  “ In 
all  companies  and  on  all  occasions  he  urged  the  reduction  of 
Canada  as  an  object  of  the  utmost  importance.  It  would  inflict 
a blow  upon  the  French  power  in  America  from  which  it  could 
never  recover,  and  which  would  have  a lasting  influence  in  ad- 
vancing the  prosperity  of  the  British  colonies.”  (Franklin, 
i.  24S.) 


ALEXANDER  HAMILTON. 


16 

not  true  that  the  colonies  were  drawn  into  European 
disputes  against  their  will  and  interest.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  ideas  of  statecraft  and  political  economy 
which  prevailed  in  Europe  turned  about  the  same 
contest.  Since  the  beginning  of  colonization  the 
Europeans  had  been  elaborating  a system  of  policy 
with  regard  to  the  administration  of  colonies  which  is 
not  yet  by  any  means  exploded,  but  which  is  one  of 
the  leading  specimens  of  human  folly,  imposed  by 
authority  to  deprive  millions  of  men  arbitrarily  of 
chances  which  they  might  have  had  on  earth.  That 
system  of  policy  is  nowadays  passed  over  as  dead 
and  gone.1 

The  colonial  system  grew  out  of  the  application  of 
mediaeval  notions  of  trade  to  a system  of  commerce 
with  outlying  continents.  It  was  entirely  constructed 
from  the  European  standpoint. 

Europe  was  the  head  of  the  world.  The  outlying 
continents  were  to  be  organized  as  its  subordinate 
members,  and  governed  from  it  according  to  its  in- 
terests. At  the  same  time  there  was  a contest  between 
the  nations  of  Europe,  especially  between  England, 
France,  Holland,  Spain,  and  Portugal,  as  to  which  one 
of  them  should  get  and  enjoy  most  of  the  advantage 
to  be  won  from  the  exploitation  of  the  outlying  conti- 
nents. That  struggle,  of  course,  turned  into  an  effort 
on  the  part  of  one  to  get  supremacy,  sole  domin- 
ion, a “ sole  market,”  and  of  all  the  others  to  com- 

1 It  is  a remarkable  omission  that  there  is  no  chapter  on  the 
colonial  system  in  Winsor’s  History.  It  has  changed  its  form 
somewhat,  but  is  not  by  any  means  dead,  as  we  shall  see  below. 


FRA  TURES  OF  AMERICAN  PUBLIC  LIFE. 


*7 


bine  to  prevent  any  one  from  succeeding  in  that 
attempt.  As  Spain,  Holland,  and  Portugal  declined 
in  power,  this  contest  turned  into  a rivalry  of  France 
and  England.  The  doctrines  of  the  system  made  war 
always  popular  with  the  merchant  class.  That  class 
has  often  been  stigmatized  as  basely  fond  of  peace 
and  order.  They  were  not  so  in  the  eighteenth  cen- 
tury, and  they  allowed  only  short  intervals  of  peace. 

The  object  was  to  conquer  colonies  so  as  to  aggran- 
dize one’s  self  and  put  down  one’s  rivals  by  appro- 
priating and  monopolizing  “trade,”  — that  is  to  say, 
the  opportunity  of  exchanging  with  the  inhabitants  of 
a certain  part  of  the  earth’s  surface.  So  far  as  the 
system  succeeded,  therefore,  it  carved  up  the  globe 
into  portions,  attached  to  the  several  nations  into 
which  Europe  was  divided ; and  as  they  were  jeal- 
ously separated  from  each  other  by  prohibitions  and 
restrictions  on  trade,  as  each  of  them  was  constantly 
striving  to  increase  its  force  for  war  with  the  others, 
the  whole  body  was  made  up  of  warring  units,  each 
composed  of  a European  nation  and  its  colonial 
dependencies. 

The  value  of  colonies  was  supposed  to  consist  in 
the  power  to  coerce  them  into  selling  their  products 
only  to  the  mother-country,  and  buying  what  they 
wanted  only  from  the  mother-country.  Tire  notion 
was  carried  out  to  its  fullest  development,  namely,  that 
if  you  can  get  the  political  jurisdiction  of  a territory, 
you  want  to  trade  with  it,  not  simply  by  permitting 
absolute  freedom,  but  by  enforcing  absolute  freedom, 
and  you  must  not  let  it  trade  with  anybody  else  at  all ; 

2 


i8 


ALEXANDER  HAMILTON. 


but  if  you  have  not  the  political  jurisdiction,  you  can- 
not expect  to  trade  with  it,  because  its  sovereign  will 
not  let  you.  For  instance : While  France  owned 
Canada,  Canadians  must  trade  freely  with  France,  and 
not  at  all  with  Englishmen.  When  England  got 
Canada,  Canadians  must  trade  freely  with  English- 
men, not  at  all  with  Frenchmen.  Plainly,  it  might 
be  for  the  interest  of  Canadians  to  trade  with  both  all 
the  time.  If  it  was  so,  because  each  had  what  the 
other  wanted,  the  colonists  broke  the  system  so  as  to 
carry  on  illicit  trade  with  the  other  country.  Thus 
the  system  contained  two  obvious  absurdities.  The 
efforts  to  monopolize  trade  destroyed  production,  and 
constantly  made  less  and  less  for  anybody,  which  is  the 
result  of  all  violence  ; secondly,  each  nation  which 
maintained  the  system  for  itself  was  all  the  time  trying 
to  break  down  the  same  system  of  others.  In  fact, 
the  illicit  trade  must  never  be  lost  sight  of  in  discuss- 
ing the  matter.  If  the  system  ever  could  have  been, 
or  ever  had  been,  actually  enforced,  according  to  the 
laws  and  ordinances  on  the  books,  it  would  have  pro- 
duced ruin.  It  never  was  so  enforced  even  approxi- 
mately. It  was  broken  and  defeated  on  every  side  by 
bribery,  collusion,  and  chicane. 

The  navigation  system  was  an  adjunct  of  the  colo- 
nial system  or  a part  of  it.  It  is  plain  that  the  above- 
described  arrangement  could  only  be  enforced  by  a 
great  naval  power.  The  Navigation  Acts  had  for  their 
purpose  to  monopolize  the  carrying-trade  and  the 
shipping.  The  rules  of  it  were  elaborated  in  detail, 
with  the  object  of  maintaining  a mercantile  marine 


FEA  TURES  OF  AMERICAN  PUBLIC  LIFE. 


T9 


out  of  which  a naval  marine  could  at  any  time  be  re- 
cruited ; in  the  cant  of  the  system,  “ a nursery  for 
seamen.”  The  navy  was  to  defend  the  mercantile 
marine,  the  colonies,  and  the  products  during  trans- 
portation. This  operation  was  to  secure  the  national 
wealth,  and  the  national  wealth  was  to  be  taxed  to 
maintain  the  navy  and  all  the  rest  of  the  establish- 
ment. It  was  confidently  believed  that  this  total 
combination  produced  a wise  and  stable  system,  the 
parts  of  which  concurred  in  contributing  to  the  gen- 
eral wealth.  Its  fatal  defect  was  that  it  restricted 
growth.  The  parties  spent  their  strength  in  quarrel- 
ling for  the  possession  of  a sixpence,  when  they  might 
each,  by  the  same  effort,  have  produced  a pound. 

The  systems  of  policy  which  statesmen  adopt  are 
always  founded  on  some  assumed  doctrine  in  regard 
to  the  immutable  relations  of  things  on  this  earth, 
arising  from  the  facts  of  human  nature  and  of  earthly 
existence,  — that  is,  what  are  properly  called  natural 
laws  of  the  social  order.  A statesman  who  did  not 
have  some  theory  or  doctrine  of  human  welfare,  ac- 
cording to  which  he  supposed  that  he  was  planning 
his  arrangements  so  as  to  attain  his  purpose,  would 
not  be  a practical  man ; he  would  be  a fool.  It  is 
immaterial  that  the  theory  he  accepts  may  come  to 
him  by  tradition,  that  he  may  regard  it  as  ratified  by 
experience,  and  may  repeat  its  maxims  parrot-like. 
The  eighteenth-century  statesmen  had  adopted  a set 
of  economic  doctrines  deduced  from  the  notion  that 
only  one  party  wins  in  an  exchange  ; namely,  that  one 
who  gets  money  on  balance.  They  did  not  have  any 


20 


ALEXANDER  HAMILTON. 


doctrine  of  capital,  and  did  not  understand  what  capital 
was.  They  therefore  confused  money  and  capital,  as 
well  as  money  and  wealth.  They  believed  that  the 
way  to  increase  the  wealth  and  economic  power  of  a 
state  was  to  increase  its  stock  of  the  precious  metals, 
and  that,  to  do  this,  the  only  way  was  to  bring  it  about 
that  that  state  should  export  more  merchandise  than  it 
imported,  so  as  to  draw  from  other  nations  gold  or 
silver  for  the  difference.  Of  course,  on  this  theory, 
the  nations  won  wealth  only  at  the  expense  of  each 
other,  and  a system  of  economy  and  statecraft  founded 
on  war  and  national  hostility  was  the  inevitable  de- 
duction. In  their  social  affairs  men  have  almost  al- 
ways been  relentless  in  their  logic,  when  once  they 
have  fixed  their  big  dogmas  at  the  bottom.  They 
certainly  were  so  in  the  development  of  the  so-called 
mercantile  system. 

It  followed,  from  the  dogmas  just  stated,  that  a 
“state  ” was  the  real  agent  in  wealth  production.  The 
talk  was  all  the  time  about"  making  the  country  rich.” 
It  was  in  and  through  the  political  unit  that  an  individ- 
ual would  prosper.  The  political  unit  might  be  a pro- 
duct of  feudal  warfare,  royal  marriages,  or  any  other 
historical  accidents.  Nevertheless,  being  an  historical 
fact,  its  citizens  must  hope  only  by  and  through  it  to 
prosper.  The  welfare  of  all  therefore  hung  on  the  wis- 
dom and  power  of  the  kings  and  statesmen  who  admin- 
istered and  directed  the  action  of  the  state.  The 
functions  of  these  latter  were  of  transcendent  impor- 
tance. Their  art  was  elaborated  accordingly.  These 
theories  are  by  no  means  extinct.  They  have  been 


FEA  TURES  OF  AMERICAN  PUBLIC  LIFE.  23 


themselves  on  being  Englishmen,  and  on  their  loyalty 
to  the  King,  and  sacrificed  their  interests  to  a patriotic 
phrase  or  two,  just  as  the  system  assumed  that  they 
would  do.  Some  misgivings  of  course  arose.  The 
facts  and  the  doctrines  would  not  agree.  What  they 
saw  and  what  they  had  always  been  told  contradicted 
each  other,  but  in  that  case  they  sought  a bias.  They 
consented  to  the  restrictions  of  the  system  for  the  sake 
of  the  empire,  but  refused  to  be  taxed  for  revenue, 
and  demanded  that  any  incidental  revenue  should  go 
to  the  colony  in  whose  ports  it  was  collected.  The 
English  always  scouted  this  distinction  as  a sophistical 
refinement.1  The  colonists  had  first  objected  to  in- 
ternal taxes,  but  consented  to  import  duties.  Then 
they  distinguished  between  import  duties  to  regulate 
commerce,  and  import  duties  for  revenue.  They 
seemed  to  have  changed  their  position,  and  to  be 
consistent  in  one  thing  only,  — to  pay  no  taxes  and 
to  rebel.  We  may  be  able  to  discriminate  between 
duties  to  regulate  commerce  and  duties  for  revenue, 
which  the  English  said  that  they  could  not  do,  but  we 
cannot  understand  why  the  colonists  should  consent 
to  the  former,  while  they  objected  to  the  latter,  on  the 
ground  that  they  were  not  represented  in  Parliament. 
The  former  were  far  more  capable  of  abuse  against  the 
interest  and  welfare  of  the  colonies  than  the  latter,  and 

1 Pitt  said  (1765)  : “ I cannot  understand  the  difference  be- 
tween external  and  internal  taxes.  They  are  the  same  in  effect, 
and  only  differ  in  name  That  this  kingdom  has  the  sover- 
eign, the  supreme  legislative  power  over  America  is  granted. 
It  cannot  be  denied.  Taxation  is  a part  of  that  sovereign 
power.”  (Prior  Documents,  60.) 


24 


ALEXANDER  HAMILTON. 


they  therefore  needed  representation  for  defence 
against  the  former  even  more  than  against  the  latter. 

In  this  connection  the  English  formula  that  Parlia- 
ment “ gives  and  grants  ” taxes  to  the  crown  was 
extremely  important.  An  English  legislative  assem- 
bly, by  the  very  language  of  the  Act  (1767),  gave 
and  granted  to  the  crown  property  of  colonists  to  be 
taken  in  taxes  on  their  consumption  of  paper,  paints, 
and  glass. 

The  conquest  of  Canada  and  the  exclusion  of 
France  from  the  North  American  continent  was  the 
event  which  broke  up  the  old  order  and  led  to  its 
dissolution.1  In  fact,  the  old  system  ran  to  its  own 
dissolution  by  the  development  of  its  own  elements. 
In  the  seven  years’  war  France  and  England  joined  in 
another  grand  struggle  in  the  prosecution  of  their 
rivalry  with  each  other,  which  could  not  permit  a rest. 
The  war  ended  with  the  humiliation  of  France  and 
the  complete  success  of  England.  She  had  then 
won  the  object  of  ambition,  sole  dominion,  and  espe- 
cially control  of  the  sea.  Among  the  pet  maxims 
of  the  prevailing  system  were,  “Trade  follows  the 
flag,”  and  “ He  who  rules  the  sea  will  rule  the 
land,”  — good  illustrations  of  the  emptiness  and 
power  of  such  sayings.  It  then  remained  to  harvest 
the  advantage  of  what  had  been  won.  The  object  of 
sole  dominion  was  of  course  monopoly.  What  had 

1 T.  Townshend,  Jr.,  suggested  that  it  might  be  well  for 
England  to  give  Canada  back  to  France.  (Cavendish,  16.) 
Turgot  argued  that  it  was  a good  thing  for  France  that  she 
did  not  own  Canada.  (Turgot,  ii.  555. _) 


FEATURES  OF  AMERICAN  PUBLIC  LIFE.  25 


been  won  was  useless  unless  it  could  be  treated  in 
such  a way  as  to  exploit  it. 

The  best  students  of  current  events  had  foretold, 
even  before  the  seven  years’  war,  that  the  effect  of 
sole  dominion  would  be  utter  disappointment,  because 
it  must  defeat  itself.1  The  exploitation  of  it  would 
make  the  colonies  revolt  against  it.  The  English 
feared  this ; and  the  measures  which  they  adopted, 
which  constitute  the  detailed  grievances  of  the  colo- 
nists, were  of  three  kinds.  They  tried  to  stop  the 
illicit  trade,  to  get  a revenue  from  the  colonies  which 
should  make  the  latter  contribute  to  the  power  of 
Great  Britain,  and  they  planned  measures  to  reduce 
the  colonies  to  more  direct  administrative  depend- 
ence. The  measures  under  the  last  head  were  insidi- 
ous, and  their  real  aim  was  concealed  under  plausible 
pretexts  of  good  government  and  efficiency.  Such 
were  the  laws  to  make  the  colonies  support  troops,  and 
to  draw  taxes  from  them  out  of  which  the  mother- 
country  should  pay  judges  and  the  chief  civil  officers. 
On  the  face  of  the  matter  these  measures  were  all 
good,  and  the  colonies  appear  refractory  and  un- 
reasonable in  resisting  them.  It  is  in  their  hidden 
purpose  that  the  wrong  lies.  These  measures,  in  con- 
nection with  the  tax  measures,  would  have  reduced 

1 In  1750  Turgot,  then  twenty-three  years  old,  delivered  a 
discourse  at  the  Sorbonne,  in  which  he  said  : “ Colonies  are 
like  fruits  which  cling  to  the  tree  only  until  they  are  ripe. 
When  they  suffice  for  themselves,  they  do  as  Carthage  did, 
and  as  America  will  do  some  day.”  (Turgot,  ii.  602.)  There 
are  also  very  remarkable  passages  in  “ L’Ami  des  Homines  ” 
(1756),  pt.  ii.  181  ; pt.  iii.  6. 


26 


ALEXANDER  HAMILTON. 


the  colonies  to  satrapies.  Even-  step  in  regard  to  the 
colonies  alter  1 763  was  a matter  of  partv  struggle 
and  political  advantage  in  England,1  and  also  a 
matter  of  sordid  interest  on  the  part  of  those  who 
wanted  to  “ remove  the  burden  of  a tax  to  distant 
shoulders.”  2 

The  revolt  of  the  American  colonies  was  therefore 
an  incident  of  commanding  importance  in  the  history 
of  the  world.  It  was  a break  in  all  the  accepted 
traditions  of  political  economy  and  statecraft.  Fred- 
erick the  Great  spoke  of  it,  perhaps  with  greater 
significance  than  he  understood  himself,  as  “ this 
crisis  in  the  affairs  of  Europe .”  3 It  had  intimate  re- 
lations with  the  politics  of  all  the  nations  of  Western 
Europe,  and  even  of  Poland.  It  would  never  have 
taken  place  if  the  government  of  England  had  not 
been  suffering  from  rices  which  had  corrupted  King. 
Cabinet,  and  Parliament  all  at  once,  on  account  cf 
the  King’s  attempt  to  establish  personal  rule,  the  sub- 
serviency of  his  ministers,  and  the  corrupt  use  of 
monev  by  him  to  influence  elections  to  the  House  of 
Commons.  If  the  King  had  succeeded  in  the  con- 
quest of  the  colonies,  which  was  his  personal  meas- 
ure, his  power  would  have  been  established,  whereas 

1 Pownall,  Administration,  ii.  3. 

2 Walpole,  George  III.,  i.  27S.  See  also  ii.  26.  Speaking 
of  Grenville,  he  says : “ Thus  did  this  pedler  in  revenue  con- 
found the  tranquillity  both  of  America  and  Great  Britain.” 
In  “ Last  Journals,”  ii  360.  he  says  that  the  country  gentlemen 
had  connived  at  all  the  violence  against  America  in  the  hope 
that  a revenue  from  thence  would  lessen  the  land  tax. 

3 Circourt,  iii.  79  (in  March,  1777). 


FEATURES  OF  AMERICAN  PUBLIC  LIFE. 


27 


by  his  failure  it  was  rained.  Hence  it  is  no  fanciful 
idea  of  those  who  say  that  the  revolt  of  the  colonies 
saved  the  English  Constitution.  Frederick  also  noted 
this  element  at  issue  in  the  revolt.1 

The  Americans  were  therefore  admitting  the  theory 
by  \irtue  of  which  they  were  oppressed,  while  fight- 
ing the  applications  of  it.  Probably  this  is  the  reason 
why  they  never  could  make  any  rational  theory  of 
their  opposition.  They  claimed  the  rights  of  free- 
born Englishmen  and  the  guarantees  of  the  English 
Constitution,  but  they  were  forced  to  find  some  means 
of  defining  which  acts  of  Parliament  they  would  ac- 
cept, and  which  not.  This  it  was  impossible  to  do 
by  any  other  criterion  than  that  they  would  accept 
those  which  they  were  willing  to  submit  to,  and  others 
not.  In  order  to  evade  and  deny  the  authority  of 
Parliament,  they  sometimes  construed  the  relation  to 
the  empire  to  consist  in  a relation  to  the  King  only, 
as  if  he  had  been  King  of  England,  Ireland,  Massa- 
chusetts,2 3 etc.  However,  they  had  no  idea  of  thus 
making  crown  colonies  of  themselves,  and  so  they 
set  up  the  charters  against  the  King,  or  they  turned 

1 Circourt,  iii.  130,  176. 

2 “ George  III.  was  obeyed  in  Massachusetts  as  King  of 
Massachusetts,  not  as  King  of  Great  Britain.”  (Sec.  Joum. 
Cong.,  iii.  197  ; in  17S2.) 

3 Their  arguments  often  went  the  length  of  maintaining  that 
the  charters  were  perpetuities,  and  that  they  created  sovereign- 
ties, as  if  the  King,  in  a charter,  had  ceded  away  property  and 
jurisdiction  completely.  Franklin  tried  to  deduce  the  powers 
of  the  Pennsylvania  Assembly  from  those  of  the  House  of 
Commons,  but  he  was  told  that  the  Assembly  had  no  powers 


28 


ALEXANDER  HAMILTON. 


against  the  Ministry  as  the  party  at  fault.1  When  this 
argumentation  became  complicated,  and  was  found 
to  involve  consequences  on  one  side  and  the  other 
which  they  were  by  no  means  ready  to  accept,  they 
had  recourse  to  “natural  rights,”  which  invariably 
extricated  them  from  all  difficulty.2  These  same 
difficulties  appear  in  every  attempt  at  reconciliation 
which  was  made.  There  never  was  a proposition  of 
that  kind  made  by  either  side  to  the  other  of  which  a 
modern  student  could  say  that  the  other  side  ought 
to  have  accepted  it,  as  a fair  settlement  of  the  diffi- 

but  those  given  in  the  charter.  (Balch,  Penn.  Letters, 
iio.)  When  the  States  got  independence,  they  made  short 
work  of  some  charters  ; for  instance,  that  of  Pennsylvania. 
The  other  charters  had  to  be  set  aside  by  great  effort ; for 
instance,  in  the  matter  of  the  western  lands.  Pownall  thought 
that  the  charters  ought  to  be  respected,  but  he  ridiculed  the 
inference  that  Parliament,  the  great  council  of  the  empire,  had 
lost  “censorial  or  remedial  power  of  self-preservation.”  (Ad- 
ministration, ii.  105.)  In  1782  Shelburne  said  that  the  charters 
were  “ sottises .”  It  would  have  been  well  if  the  States  could 
have  considered  them  so.  It  would  have  saved  much  trouble. 
(Circourt,  iii.  46.) 

1 April  1,  1776,  Washington  wrote  “the  King’s  troops,” 
saying  that  he  would  no  longer  keep  up  the  distinction  of 
“ministerial.”  (Reed’s  Reed,  i.  180.) 

2 Bentham  opposed  the  independence  of  the  United  States 
on  account  of  the  badness  of  the  arguments  they  used.  “ The 
whole  of  the  case  was  founded  on  the  assumption  of  natural 
rights,  claimed  without  the  slightest  evidence  for  their  exist- 
ence, and  supported  by  vague  and  declamatory  generalities.” 
(Bentham,  x.  57,  1827.)  The  report  of  a debate  in  the  Com- 
mittee on  Rights,  Grievances,  and  Methods  of  Redress  in  1774 
(Adams,  II.  370)  shows  how  hard  it  was  to  agree  on  a theory 
to  which  to  refer  their  enterprise  for  justification. 


PEA  TURKS  OF  AMERICAN  PUBLIC  LIFE.  29 


culty.  This  is  especially  the  case  with  regard  to  the 
propositions  of  the  Americans ; for  they  never  made 
one  which  would  have  given  reasonable  hopes  of 
smooth  and  satisfactory  operation,  — never  one  which 
we  would  to-day  consider  as  free  from  objection,  if  it 
were  proposed  as  a system  for  the  relations  of  our 
States  and  the  federal  Union.  As  we  shall  see,  the 
federal  Union  has  had  to  establish  itself  by  overcoming 
the  very  notions  which  caused  those  conditions  to  be 
inserted  in  the  schemes  of  reconciliation  with  Great 
Britain. 

After  examining  all  their  discussions  and  disputes, 
we  throw  them  all  aside  as  really  unprofitable  and 
useless.  The  case  was  not  in  the  interminable  pam- 
phlets, addresses,  petitions,  and  negotiations.  The 
case  was  that  the  colonies  were  no  longer  afraid  of  a 
powerful  neighbour.  They  could  be  independent ; 
they  dared  to  be  independent ; the  time  had  come 
for  them  to  be  independent.  In  what  form  the  issue 
would  present  itself  was  not  essential.  The  question 
for  a colony  always  is  : Is  the  protection  and  patron- 
age worth  the  dependence  and  submission?  It  is 
sure  to  come  to  the  time  when  it  answers  in  the 
negative,  unless  the  relation  turns  so  that  the 
mother-country  suffers  injustice  by  it.  After  all  the 
argumentation  was  exhausted,  the  issue  which  did 
arise  was  one  of  “principle.”  The  English  main- 
tained a right  to  hold  the  colonies  subject  to  Parlia- 
ment as  the  supreme  legislature  of  the  empire, 
including  the  power  of  taxation ; and  the  Americans 
denied  the  right  of  Parliament  to  tax  them  at  all. 


3° 


ALEXANDER  HAMILTON. 


When  all  the  wrangling  about  rights  has  been  ex- 
hausted on  a political  question,  it  comes  down  to  this  : 
Has  any  one  the  means  to  prevent  you  from  doing 
what  you  want  to  do  ? or,  Have  you  any  power  at  your 
command  to  prevent  your  opponent  from  doing  what 
he  wants  to  do?  After  the  colonies  had  overcome 
the  sentimental  tie  of  loyal  tradition,  they  were  ready 
to  break  away  and  be  independent.1  Could  Great 
Britain  hold  them? 

Frederick  the  Great  and  other  wise  lookers-on 
thought  it  madness  to  provoke  the  quarrel,  or,  having 
provoked  it,  to  try  to  conquer  by  force.2  In  a paper 
which  was  thrown  into  Franklin’s  gate  at  Passy,  it  was 
described  as  the  plan  “ of  catching  two  millions  of 
people  in  a boundless  desert  with  fifty  thousand 
men.”  3 The  things  which  made  it  impossible  were 
the  ocean,  the  distance,  the  wilderness,  and  the 
climate.4 

The  most  important  point  to  note,  however,  is  that 
the  revolt  of  the  colonies  was  a reaction  of  the  pre- 
vailing system  against  itself.  We  have  seen  in  Hamil- 
ton’s pamphlet  against  the  “Farmer”  that  he  ex- 
pected other  powers  to  intervene  to  aid  the  colonies 
against  Great  Britain.  The  first  motive  for  this  lay  in 

1 In  1768  Kalb  reported  to  Choiseul  that  the  Americans 
were  loyal  to  Great  Britain  ; that  they  proposed  nothing  but 
commercial  war,  and  that  the  interference  of  any  other  nation 
would  drive  them  back  at  once  to  a reconciliation  with  the 
mother-country.  (Kalb,  288.} 

2 Circourt,  iii.  91,  165,  174. 

8 Durand,  279. 

4 Johnson's  Greene,  ii.  393. 


FEA  TURKS  OF  AMERICAN  PUBLIC  LIFE.  3 1 


the  hatred  which  was  felt  by  all  the  other  nations 
toward  Great  Britain  for  the  arrogance  of  her  be- 
haviour since  she  had  won  “ sole  dominion.”  Fred- 
erick was  extremely  bitter  against  her,  and  was  very 
eager  that  the  war  might  go  on,  to  keep  her  from  in- 
terfering with  his  own  selfish  and  unjust  schemes.1 
Spain  was  eager  to  do  England  an  injury,  and  France 
was  ready  to  seize  an  opportunity  to  throw  off  the 
humiliation  of  1763  (some  details  of  which,  such 
as  the  presence  of  an  English  commissioner  at  Dun- 
kirk, were  especially  galling  to  her),  and  to  recover 
her  place  among  nations.2  The  second  force  which 
was  expected  to  come  into  play,  and  which  was  also 
mentioned  by  Hamilton,  was  far  more  important.  It 
was  the  offer  of  free  trade  to  other  nations  as  an 
inducement  to  them  to  help  the  colonies.  All  this 
was  the  most  natural  application  of  the  received 
opinions.  The  English  had  always  said  that  their 
colonies  were  an  invaluable  possession.  They  be- 
lieved it.  The  colonies  had  therefore  come  to  be- 
lieve themselves  invaluable  to  Great  Britain.  The 

1 Circourt,  iii.  27,  209. 

2 France  watched  the  American  colonies  for  ten  years  before 
the  Revolution  broke  out,  anticipating  the  moment  when  they 
would  give  her  a chance  of  revenge  on  England.  In  1764 
Pontleroy  was  sent  over,  and  in  1768  Kalb,  to  report  on  the 
sentiments,  opinions,  and  resources  of  the  Americans.  A 
great  amount  of  information  was  obtained  and  stored  away 
which  came  into  use  in  1776.  In  1767  Franklin  wrote  to  his 
son  that  the  French  ambassador  was  courting  him.  He  hoped 
that  the  Americans  and  English  would  give  the  French  no 
opportunity  to  stir  up  trouble  between  them.  (Franklin,  vii. 
3S7-) 


32 


ALEXANDER  HAMILTON. 


other  nations  had  always  envied  Great  Britain  her 
colonies,  and  had  supposed  them  of  great  value  to 
her.1  This  was  not  true,  however,  except  upon  the 
grounds  of  the  received  political  economy,  and  it 
was  an  application  of  that  political  economy,  not  a 
denial  of  it,  when  the  colonies  said  : If  we  revolt, 
we  can  dispose  of  ourselves  (this  valuable  possession 
which  we  have  always  been),  and  we  will  offer  our- 
selves in  friendship,  alliance,  and  commerce  as  a 
means  to  get  aid.  Thus  they  and  all  the  other  par- 
ties to  the  affair,  while  reasoning  from  the  colonial 
system,  helped  to  ruin  it.2  The  Americans  used  that 
system,  instinctively  not  intelligently,  to  get  England 
to  drive  France  out  of  North  America  for  them. 
Then,  by  the  notions  of  the  same  system,  they  got 
France  to  help  them  win  independence  of  England. 
They  were  the  only  ones  who  were  not  duped,  not 
because  they  duped  the  others,  but  because  their 
situation  made  their  doctrinal  error  ineffective  for 
them,  while  it  remained  effective  for  the  others. 

1 George  Chalmers  (Strength  of  Great  Britain,  1804)  declared 
that  the  revolt  of  the  colonies  was  brought  on  largely  by  the 
factious  assertion  that  England  could  not  get  on  without  the 
colonies,  and  by  the  opinion  of  France  and  Holland  to  that 
effect. 

2 In  1768  Choiseul  was  planning,  with  Count  Chatelet,  to 
hurt  England  by  joining  Spain  in  overthrowing  the  colonial 
system  and  admitting  the  products  of  North  America  to  the 
French  and  Spanish  colonies.  That  would  have  been  a mas- 
terly assault  on  the  traditional  falsehood  of  the  situation,  by 
an  appeal  to  the  truth  of  the  situation,  but  it  involved  far  too 
wide  a breach  with  all  accepted  ideas.  Force  of  knowledge 
and  will  could  not  be  collected  to  carry  it  out.  (Kalb,  70.) 


FEA  TURKS  OF  AMERICAN  PUBLIC  LIFE.  33 

There  were  very  few  who  correctly  measured  the 
significance  of  the  revolt  in  the  light  of  the  new  ideas. 
If  it  meant  that  colonies  were  no  longer  to  be  treated 
as  plunder,  it  meant  that  the  globe  was  no  longer 
to  be  partitioned  out  among  themselves  by  the  na- 
tions of  Europe.  There  was  no  longer  to  be  a head 
with  dependencies,  but  America  was  to  be  a new 
member  of  the  family  of  nations,  having  equal  rights 
with  all  the  rest. 

One  man  at  the  time  saw  this  with  wonderful  dis- 
tinctness. That  was  the  French  economist  and  states- 
man, Turgot.  He  was  called  upon,  in  1776,  for  an 
opinion  on  a memoir  which  had  been  submitted  to  the 
King  by  Vergennes  on  the  policy  to  be  pursued  with 
respect  to  the  revolt  of  the  colonies.1  He  thinks  that 
the  colonies  are  sure  to  win  their  independence.  If 
the  English  should  conquer  the  sea-coast,  it  could  only 
be  by  devastating  it.  The  Americans  could  then  re- 
treat to  the  interior  and  harass  the  English  on  the 
coast ; or,  the  Americans  will  bend  while  force  is  on 
them,  only  to  spring  up  again  at  the  first  opportunity. 
Assuming  then  that  independence  is  inevitable,  he 
says  : “ This  event  will  certainly  be  the  epoch  of  the 
greatest  revolution  in  the  commerce  and  politics,  not 
only  of  America,  but  also  of  all  Europe.”  In  answer 
to  the  question  whether  the  Americans  will  become 
warlike,  if  the  war  lasts  a long  time,  he  answers  that  he 
thinks  not.  He  thinks  that  they  are  peaceful.  Wages 
are  too  high  among  them  for  manufactures  to  flourish, 
and  they  will  not  care  for  ships  unless  English  ideas 

1 Turgot,  ii.  551. 

3 


34 


A LEX  A NDER  HA  MIL  TON. 


prevail.  Then  he  takes  up  the  question  as  to  the  ef- 
fect of  the  independence  of  the  colonies  of  England 
upon  those  of  other  countries,  especially  those  of 
France,  of  which  the  only  important  ones  remaining 
were  the  sugar  islands.  All  European  states  which 
have  colonies,  said  he,  must  either  engage  in  constant 
war  to  keep  them,  or  the  colonies  must  be  allowed 
complete  freedom  of  commerce.  “ Then  the  illusion 
in  which  our  politicians  have  been  lulled  for  two  cen- 
turies will  be  dissipated.  Then  we  shall  appreciate 
the  exact  value  of  those  colonies  which  are  called 
* commercial  colonies,’  whose  riches  the  European 
nations  have  planned  to  appropriate  by  reserving  to 
themselves  the  exclusive  right  to  sell  to  them  and  buy 
from  them.  We  shall  see  how  precarious  and  fragile 
was  the  power  based  on  this  monopoly,  and  perhaps 
we  shall  see  by  the  smallness  of  the  change  which  we 
experience,  that  it  was  equally  empty  and  chimerical 
at  the  time  when  we  were  the  most  dazzled  by  it.” 

In  1 780  Thomas  Pownall  published  a pamphlet  on 
the  significance  of  the  American  Revolution,  which 
he  called  a “ Memorial  to  the  Sovereigns  of  Europe 
on  the  Present  State  of  Affairs  between  the  Old  and 
the  New  World.”  Pownall  knew  America  well.  He 
had  been  Governor  of  Massachusetts  and  New  Jersey. 
He  was  completely  emancipated  from  the  balance  of 
trade  notions,  and  in  this  pamphlet  thoroughly  ex- 
posed the  fallacy  of  the  notion  that  America  could 
never  grow  great  because  the  balance  of  trade  was 
always  against  her.  He  declared  that  the  sovereigns 
of  Europe  might  recognize  the  fact  or  not  as  they 


FEA  TURES  OF  AMERICAN  PUBLIC  LIFE.  35 


chose,  but  it  was  certain  that  the  Americans  would 
maintain  their  independence,  and  that  their  appear- 
ance on  the  stage  as  an  independent  nation  would 
force  an  entire  reconstruction  of  the  systems  of  policy 
hitherto  in  vogue.  He  said  that  England  and  France 
might  fight  as  to  which  of  them  would  hold  America 
in  its  dependence,  but  that  America  would  be  depen- 
dent on  neither.  He  had  sanguine  expectations  of 
the  glorious  consequences  which  he  thought  would 
ensue,  but  which  have  not  ensued.  He  did  not  doubt 
that  if  the  old  restraints  and  obstacles  with  which  he 
was  familiar  were  removed,  then  all  must  flow  on 
rightly  and  prosperously.  He  did  not  know  what 
new  restrictions  and  obstacles  would  grow  out  of  the 
new  movement  itself.  This  pamphlet  is  a magnificent 
forecast  of  the  possibilities  of  America.  As  we-  shall 
see  below,  Americans  did  not  cut  themselves  loose 
from  European  complications,  did  not  claim  an  equal 
place  in  the  family  of  nations,  and  did  not  appreciate 
their  own  destiny  until  after  the  second  war.  They 
have  never  yet  realized  that  destiny  in  the  simplicity 
and  with  the  power  with  which  this  man  perceived  it. 

These  are  the  wider  aspects  of  the  American  revolt 
which  present  its  majestic  features.  It  is  when  we 
turn  to  its  narrower  and  domestic  aspects  that  we 
meet  with  some  less  attractive  features.  Indeed,  eWl 
elements  were  not  wanting  in  the  grander  aspects. 
The  attempt  at  independence  provoked  surprise  and 
doubt.  An  outlying  continent  independent  of  Europe, 
but  possessed  of  an  inheritance  of  European  culture  : 
what  would  that  be  like  ? What  place  would  there 


36 


ALEXANDER  HAMILTON. 


be  for  it?  What  changes  and  dislocations  would  it 
produce?  There  was  much  speculation  on  all  these 
questions  in  camps  and  courts,  counting-houses  and 
academies.  Of  course  there  were  also  eager  thoughts 
on  the  question,  what  could  be  gained  from  it  for  this 
one  and  that  one.  The  new  state  was  not  yet  created 
when  it  began  to  be  beset  by  adventurers  and  specu- 
lators, who  were  eager  to  win  profit  from  it. 

For  our  present  purpose,  we  have  to  notice  that  in 
the  ten  years  before  the  Revolution,  all  the  traditional 
ideas  of  political  economy  and  all  the  traditional  doc- 
trines of  political  philosophy  and  constitutional  order 
were  thrown  into  confusion,  and  mixed  with  numerous 
crude  and  fallacious  notions,  without  reaching  any 
new  and  positive  results  in  either  field. 


TEA  TURFS  OF  AMERICA  JV  PUBLIC  LIFE.  3 7 


CHAPTER 


HE 


FEATURES  OF  AMERICAN  PUBLIC  LIFE,  1765-1780.  II. 


Taxation.  — Social  discord  and  mobs  resulting  from  quarrels  with  the 
mother-country.  — Social  revolution  combined  with  the  revolt. 


It  is  a difficult  thing  to  collect  taxes  in  any  com- 
munity where  the  industrial  organization  is  low. 
Modem  taxes  strike  the  products  in  transfer ; and  the 
greater  the  number  and  variety  of  the  relations  be- 
tween men  with  respect  to  goods,  the  greater  the 
number  and  variety  of  possible  taxes.  If  a man  lives 
on  his  own  farm,  consumes  his  own  products,  makes 
with  his  own  hands  most  of  his  necessary  utensils, 
etc.,  and  if  his  wife  spins  and  weaves,  he  need  have 
very  few  transactions  with  his  fellow-men.  Barter 
with  his  neighbours  will  suffice  for  the  personal  and 
mechanical  services  which  he  needs.  It  is  only  in 
case  he  wants  tea,  coffee,  sugar,  spices,  metals,  etc., 
that  he  goes  into  the  world’s  market  at  all.  The 
easiest  way  to  tax  him  is  by  import  duties  on  these 
last  things.  In  the  situation  described  he  needs  little 
money,  and  will  have  but  little.  If  he  is  taxed  on 
tea,  sugar,  etc.,  he  can  provide  for  the  payment  of 
the  tax  just  as  he  provides  for  the  payment  of  the 


3» 


ALEXANDER  HAMILTON. 


price,  however  that  may  be.  The  English,  therefore, 
tried  to  use  these  taxes  in  the  colonies.1 

The  next  way  to  tax  such  a community  would  be 
by  taxes  on  land  and  on  polls,  or  by  excises  on  spirits, 
tobacco,  or  other  domestic  products  which,  not  being 
universally  produced  in  households,  must  pass  through 
the  market.  These  taxes,  especially  the  first  two, 
bring  the  pressure  of  taxation  home  to  the  tax-payer 
with  great  directness,  and  they  call  for  the  use  of 
money.  The  mother-country  did  not  try  to  use  these 
taxes.  If  she  had  done  so,  it  would  have  brought  her 
authority  into  every  household.  The  colonists  never 
had  any  experience  of  her  power  or  authority  in  any 
immediate  and  personal  way.  The  colonies,  however, 
always  experienced  great  difficulty  in  raising  revenue 
for  their  own  internal  affairs,  and  one  of  the  reasons 
constantly  given  for  paper  money  was  the  need  of  a 
medium  in  which  taxes  could  be  paid.  Kalb  reported 
that  all  the  colonies  were  in  debt  after  the  seven  years’ 
war.2  This  made  more  taxation  necessary  than  for- 
merly. In  1766  Franklin,  in  his  examination  before 
the  House  of  Commons,  stated  that  there  were  taxes 
in  Pennsylvania  on  real  estate,  polls,  business  profits, 
an  excise  on  spirits,  a duty  on  negroes,  and  some 
other  duties.3  He  said  that  the  amount  of  revenue 
of  Pennsylvania  at  that  time  was  20,000  pounds  ster- 

1 Hamilton  argued,  in  the  “ Federalist,”  that  the  best  taxes 
for  the  United  States  were  import  duties  and  excises,  especially 
the  former,  which  he  thought  free  from  some  unpopular  features 
of  the  latter  (Works,  ix.  69,  124). 

2 Kalb,  291. 


3 Franklin,  iv.  162. 


FEATURES  OF  AMERICAN  PUBLIC  LIFE.  39 


ling,  and  that  there  were  one  hundred  and  sixty  thou- 
sand white  persons  in  that  province.  This  would  give 
a taxation  of  sixty-two  and  one  half  cents  per  capita, 
or  three  dollars  and  twenty-five  cents  for  a family  of 
five,  per  annum. 

The  English  then,  in  their  attempts  to  get  revenue 
from  the  colonies,  met  with  very  great  difficulties  in 
the  nature  of  the  case.  They  turned  from  the  indus- 
trial organization  to  the  operations  which  go  through 
the  courts,  or  require  legal  proceedings,  and  devised 
the  stamp  tax.1  It  was  the  best  tax  they  could  have 
devised  for  the  case  they  had  to  deal  with,  and  the 
purpose  they  had  in  view.  The  colonists  were  liti- 
gious. The  stamp-act  Congress  alleged  against  the 
stamp  tax  that  the  freeholds  were  small  and  the  trans- 
fers frequent ; hence  that  the  tax  would  be  very  bur- 
densome. If  there  was  to  be  a tax,  that  was  just  why 
this  one  would  solve  the  economic  difficulty  of  getting 
a revenue  out  of  that  community.  The  revenue  ex- 
pected from  the  tax  was  100,000  pounds  sterling.2 

The  methods  taken  by  the  colonists  to  resist  this 
tax  consisted  in  suspension  of  the  operations  which 
were  to  be  taxed,  refusal  to  pay  debts  to  Englishmen, 
and  a boycott  on  English  goods  ; also  a boycott  of  all 
persons  who  should  accept  the  office  of  stamp  distrib- 
utor. Walpole  says 3 that  the  first  three  were  effec- 

1 According  to  a note  by  Dawson  (The  Sons  of  Liberty  in 
New  York,  42),  a stamp  tax  was  proposed  in  New  York,  as  a 
means  of  revenue,  in  1734,  and  the  project  was  renewed  from 
time  to  time  between  that  date  and  1760. 

2 Prior  Documents,  38. 

3 George  III.,  303. 


40 


ALEXANDER  HAMILTON. 


tive.  They  were  all,  except  the  boycott  of  English 
goods,  anti-social,  and  calculated  to  encourage  dis- 
order and  a dissolution  of  civil  institutions.  If  any 
one,  or  a number,  chose  to  abstain  from  the  use  of 
English  goods,  in  an  effort  to  accomplish  an  object, 
no  objection  could  be  made  to  such  a course.  It 
might  prove  futile,  but  that  was  their  affair.  The  sus- 
pension of  all  the  functions  of  the  courts  was,  how- 
ever, quite  another  matter.  Debtors  found  license, 
The  experience  of  the  advantage  to  them  which  could 
come  from  social  disorder  was  not  thrown  away  upon 
them.  In  1768  John  Adams  noted  the  danger  aris- 
ing from  this  cause,  but  resolved  to  tell  the  people  the 
whole  truth  and  brave  the  danger.  A party  of  debtors 
was  forming  out  of  these  experiences.1 

The  refusal  to  pay  debts  to  Englishmen  had  the 
same  effect.  It  was  a welcome  experience  to  a great 
many  people  that  one  could  refuse  to  pay  debts,  and 
thereby  win  popularity  and  a reputation  for  patri- 
otism. The  riotous  destruction  of  stamps  and  the 
coercion  or  abuse  of  the  stamp  officers  were  modes 
of  mob  rule.  Those  proceedings  interested  and  occu- 
pied the  idle  and  irresponsible  people  in  the  towns. 
It  would  never  be  very  difficult  to  collect  a crowd,  for 
the  fun  of  inflicting  personal  annoyance  on  some  vic- 
tim, but  in  those  days  people  had  a great  deal  of 
leisure.  No  business  required  the  steady  occupation 
to  which  we  are  now  accustomed  in  almost  every 
occupation.  People  took  life  easily.  A little  excite- 
ment was  very  welcome.  The  serious  men  also  stood 
1 Adams,  ii.  214. 


PEA  TURES  OF  AMERICAN  PUBLIC  LIFE.  41 


back  and  allowed  the  mischief  to  go  on  for  the  sake  of 
the  cause.  One  is  astonished  at  the  whole  behaviour 
of  the  representatives  of  civil  order  and  authority 
in  all  these  cases.  They  acted  like  tutors  put,  with 
inadequate  authority,  in  charge  of  spoiled  boys.  We 
should  to-day  think  any  magistrate  criminally  guilty  if 
he  should  act  as  Bernard  and  Hutchinson  did  when 
the  latter  were  loaded  with  epithets  of  tyranny  and 
oppression. 

•There  was  no  police,  and  the  militia  either  partici- 
pated in  the  disturbance  or  sympathized  with  it.» 
Consequently,  when  disorder  broke  out,  it  ran  its 
course,  or  the  sober  people  tried  to  persuade  the 
others,  or  to  give  a turn  to  the  affair  which  should 
direct  the  mob  spirit  in  some  harmless  course. 

The  system  of  resisting  the  law  by  preventing  any- 
body from  accepting  an  administrative  office  under  it 
was  also  a notable  device  which  involved  not  a few 
social  dangers.®  The  correspondence  of  Ingersoll,  the 
tax-officer  at  New  Haven,  with  a committee  of  his 
fellow-citizens,  was  published  in  full.  It  shows  the 
temper  of  this  method  of  procedure.  He  was  met  at 
Wethersfield  and  forced  to  sign  an  abdication  of  his 
office ; but  he  reserved  the  right  to  take  it  up  again, 
if  the  efforts  to  secure  a repeal  of  the  law  should  fail, 
since  it  was  no  worse  that  he  than  anybody  else  should 
have  the  office,  if  the  tax  must  be  collected.1 

1 R.  H.  Lee  drafted  articles  of  association  for  the  citizens  of 
Westmoreland,  Virginia,  against  the  Stamp  Act,  threatening 
undefined  pains  and  penalties  against  any  abandoned  wretch 
who  should  contribute  to  introduce  the  Act.  He  established  a 


42 


ALEXANDER  HAMILTON. 


From  the  stamp-tax  riots,  then,  must  be  dated  a 
very  positive  relaxation  of  social  order  and  growth  of 
mob  spirit.  The  excuse  for  the  methods  employed  is, 
that  no  attention  could  be  won  in  England  in  any 
other  way.  This  excuse  may  stand,  although  it  is 
doubtful  how  far  the  abuse  of  tax-collectors  in  America 
affected  Englishmen.  The  social  effect  was,  in  any 
case,  an  incidental  evil. 

* The  destruction  of  the  tea  was  another  act  which 
had  no  rational  connection  with  the  purpose  in  view.  • 
It  was  the  destruction  of  the  property  itself,  about 
which  a tax  quarrel  was  pending.  It  was  an  act  of 
mob  violence,  and  destruction  of  property.  Its  effect 
to  secure  an  abolition  of  the  tax  was  not  apparent. 
The  only  excuse  for  it  that  could  be  made  was  that  it 
was  really  an  act  of  war,  a first  step  in  overt  resist- 
ance to  law,  against  which  it  was  intended  to  employ 
all  means,  even  military  resistance.  In  that  view, 
however,  it  ought  to  be  regarded  as  an  act  of  war, 
entirely  outside  of  constitutional  resistance,  or  any  of 
the  methods  of  peace  and  order,  and  ought  not  to  be 
held  up  to  our  children  as  a laudable  and  glorious  act 
in  the  heroic  period  of  our  history.  It  would  be  in- 
teresting to  know  how  many  times  within  a hundred 

sort  of  velungericht  for  enforcing  the  articles.  (Lee’s  Lee,  i.  34.) 

A case  is  described  of  a Virginian  who  said  that  he  would  use 
stamp  paper,  and  had  accepted  the  office  of  stamp-collector. 
R.  H.  Lee  summoned  the  associators,  went  to  the  house  of 
this  person,  and  coerced  him  to  swear  that  he  would  not  exer- 
cise the  office,  and  to  give  up  the  paper,  which  was  burned. 
(Ibid.,  36.)  See,  in  Life  of  Robert  Morris,  the  case  of  the  tax- 
officer  at  Philadelphia. 


FEA  TERES  OF  AMERICAN  PUBLIC  LIFE.  43 


rears  that  act  has  been  quoted  as  a precedent  by 
people  who  were  engaging  in  some  act  of  lawlessness. 

»The  Boston  Massacre,  likewise,  turns  out  upon  cool 
examination  to  be  anything  but  an  incident  to  be 
proud  of.*  If  we  should  hear  that  some  boys  and 
street-idlers  in  the  District  of  Columbia  (which  is 
taxed  without  being  represented)  had  insulted  a sen- 
tinel of  the  federal  army  on  duty  in  Washington,  had 
forced  him  to  leave  his  post  and  call  the  guard,  and 
that  in  the  resulting  melee  between  the  soldiers  and 
the  mob,  some  of  the  latter  had  been  shot,  we  should 
not  regard  the  latter  as  victims  of  a “ massacre.”  1 

The  habit  of  resistance  and  of  political  quarrelling 
grew.  To  the  modern  reader  the  bickerings  and 
quarrels  between  the  governors  and  the  legislatures 
very  often  seem  factious  on  the  part  of  the  latter. 
The  [Massachusetts  Assembly  wrote  to  their  agent, 
De  Berdt,  in  1 768,  in  alarm  at  the  proposal  of  an 
American  episcopate.2  Samuel  Adams  wrote  to  A. 
Lee  on  the  same  subject,  in  1771,  and  justified  his 
alarm  by  this  piece  of  erudition : “ The  junction  of 
the  canon  and  the  feudal  law,  you  know,  has  been 
fatal  to  the  liberties  of  mankind.”  Another  subject 
of  alarm  was  the  court  of  probate.3  The  Massachu- 
setts Assembly,  in  1767,  in  their  message  to  the  Gov- 
ernor, entered  into  an  argument  with  him  on  the 

1 Prior  Documents,  239 ; Kidder’s  Boston  Massacre.  In 
the  Massachusetts  Papers.  135,  is  a letter  of  Bowdoin  and 
others,  expressing  a fear  that  a false  report  of  the  massacre 
might  be  sent  to  England,  but  their  story  is  not  given.  See 
Historical  Magazine,  [anuarv,  1S69. 

Prior  Documents,  174.  3 Adams,  ii.  284. 


44 


ALEXANDER  HAMILTON. 


merits  of  certain  acts  of  Parliament.1  We  should 
not  think  it  a practical  plan  to  force  States  to  sup- 
port United  States  troops,  but  we  should  certainly 
be  very  indignant  with  any  State  which  should  treat 
United  States  troops,  shipwrecked  on  its  coast,  as 
Massachusetts  treated  British  troops  in  that  case.2 
The  incidents  of  the  growing  trouble  offer  occasion 
at  every  step  for  reserve  in  approving  the  proceed- 
ings of  the  colonists.  Burke  said  that  the  kind  of 
books  which  sold  best  in  the  American  trade  was 
tracts  of  popular  devotion,  and  next,  law  books.  He 
quoted  General  Gage,  that  “ all  the  people  in  his 
government  are  lawyers  or  smatterers  in  the  law,  and 
that  in  Boston  they  have  been  enabled  by  successful 
chicane  wholly  to  evade  many  parts  of  one  of  your 
capital  penal  constitutions.  . . . This  study  renders 
men  acute,  inquisitive,  dexterous,  prompt  in  attack, 
ready  in  defence,  full  of  resources.  In  other  coun- 
tries the  people,  more  simple  and  of  a less  mercurial 
cast,  judge  of  an  ill  principle  in  government  only  by 
an  actual  grievance.  Here  they  anticipate  the  evil, 
and  judge  of  the  pressure  of  the  grievance  by  the 
badness  of  the  principle.  They  augur  misgovern- 
ment  at  a distance,  and  snuff  tyranny  on  every  tainted 
breeze.” 3 

This  is  a very  fair  description  of  the  case,  only  that 
it  allows  of  an  ironical  or  unfriendly  interpretation, 
which  might  also  be  justified.  One  is  often  reminded, 
in  studying  these  proceedings,  of  the  faults  of  young 

1 Prior  Documents,  127.  2 Ibid,  236. 

3 Quoted  in  Correspondence  of  George  III.,  ii.  2. 


FEATURES  OF  AMERICAN  PUBLIC  LIFE. 


45 


lawyers ; and  it  was  a remarkable  characteristic  of 
the  colonists  that  they  were  fond  of  hanging  an  argu- 
ment on  the  remote  and  speculative  inferences  from 
a measure,  or  on  the  dogmatic  deduction  which  they 
called  a “ principle.”  Hence  their  discussions  had  an 
extravagant  and  unreal  character.  Quincy’s  “ Obser- 
vations on  the  Boston  Port  Bill”  are  disappointing  in 
this  same  way.  One  would  like  to  know  what  he  had 
to  say  about  the  destruction  of  the  tea,  speaking  as  a 
lawyer  and  responsible  man,  and  how  he  would  deal 
with  the  Port  Bill  as  a penalty,  directly  connected 
with  that  action  ; but  he  goes  off  into  a disquisition  on 
general  political  dogmas,  and  when  he  touches  on 
the  issue,  comes  down  to  the  technicalities  of  a town- 
meeting.1 If  men  have  absolute  natural  rights,  then 
any  regulation  of  those  rights  involves  the  possibility 
of  abuse.  This  gives  a very  broad  platform  for  political 
dissent  and  recalcitrancy. 

Passing  over  all  those  incidents  and  doctrines  which 
will  not  be  useful  to  us  further  on,  in  connection  with 
our  immediate  subject,  a few  words  must  be  given 
to  the  principle  or  maxim,  “No  taxation  without 
representation ; ” for  this  dictum  may  still  be  heard 
among  us,  and  it  is  put  forward  as  an  absolute  prin- 
ciple, having  the  sanction  of  revolutionary  practice 
and  profession.  It  is  one  of  the  formulas  which  came 
into  use  in  the  seventeenth  century  among  the  Eng- 
lish Republicans,  or  opponents  of  the  Crown,  and  was 
transplanted  to  America.  It  was  aimed,  not  at  the 
Parliament,  but  at  the  Crown.  It  meant  that  no 

1 Quincy’s  Quincy. 


46 


ALEXANDER  HAMILTON. 


taxes  ought  to  be  collected  when  parliamentary  in- 
stitutions were  suspended.  It  was  a part  of  the  fight 
against  a king  who  tried  to  raise  taxes  by  prerogative, 
without  calling  a Parliament.1  It  is  a good  illustra- 
tion of  the  way  in  which  political  maxims,  when  they 
become  stereotyped,  change  their  contents.  There 
always  were  whole  classes  of  people  who  were  not 
represented  in  Parliament,  as  there  are  such  classes 
now  among  us.  The  dictum  never  meant  that 
they  could  not  be  taxed.  The  dictum,  however,  as 
the  colonists  used  it,  exposed  them  to  be  answered 
in  just  this  way,  namely,  on  the  historical  and  legal 
sense  of  their  proposition,  and  it  obscured  to  them 
and  others  their  real  grievance  and  their  real  demand. 
They  never  wanted  to  be  represented  in  Parliament. 
They  wanted  self-government,  and  did  not  want  to 
have  their  property  taken  from  them  at  the  will 
of  another  commonwealth  across  the  ocean.  They 
gained  nothing  by  their  alleged  principle  of  the  Brit- 
ish Constitution.  They  would  have  gained  much  by 
a plain  statement  in  their  own  language  of  their  own 
case. 

One  inevitable  effect  of  mob  methods  and  lawless- 
ness was  that  the  people  of  established  position  were 
repelled  from  the  movement  of  the  whigs.  With 
very  few  exceptions  they  became  loyalists.  In  1774 
Gouverneur  Morris  was  eager  for  a reconciliation.  “ I 
see,  and  I see  it  with  fear  and  trembling,  that  if  the 

1 In  1764  R.  H.  Lee  tried  to  meet  this  contention  by  saying 
that  the  general  intention  of  the  dictum  was  that  the  people 
should  be  protected  from  all  imposition. 


FEA  TURKS  OF  AMERICAN  PUBLIC  LIFE.  47 


disputes  with  Britain  continue,  we  shall  be  under  the 
worst  of  all  possible  dominions,  — the  dominion  of  a 
riotous  mob.”  1 When  the  courts  were  closed  in 
1765,  John  Adams  wrote:  “Debtors  grow  insolent, 
creditors  grow  angry,  and  it  is  to  be  expected  that  the 
public  offices  will  very  soon  be  forced  open,  unless 
such  favourable  accounts  should  be  received  from  Eng- 
land as  to  draw  away  the  fears  of  the  great,  or  unless 
a greater  dread  of  the  multitude  should  drive  away 
the  fear  of  censure  from  Great  Britain.”  2 * Thomson 
also  wrote  from  Philadelphia  that  the  courts  and 
offices  of  government  were  all  shut.  “ Numbers  of 
people  who  are  indebted  take  advantage  of  the  time 
to  refuse  payment,  and  are  moving  off  with  all  their 
effects  out  of  the  reach  of  their  creditors.”  8 In  1774 
Adams  wrote  to  his  wife  describing  the  terror  and 
misery  of  a family  visited  by  a mob.  “ These  private 
mobs,”  he  writes,  “ I do  and  will  detest.  If  popular 
commotions  can  be  justified  in  opposition  to  attacks 
upon  the  Constitution,  it  can  be  only  when  fundamen- 
tals are  invaded,  nor  then,  unless  for  absolute  neces- 
sity and  with  great  caution.”  4 In  1775  he  was  very 
much  alarmed  about  the  effect  on  the  people  of  disre- 
spect to  the  judges.  He  says  the  people  rarely  know 
what  sets  them  in  motion,  or  what  the  effect  of  their 
action  will  be.  He  feared  that  Judge  Oliver  might 
be  tarred  and  feathered  for  taking  the  King’s  salary.5 

1 Morris’s  Morris,  i.  4.  2 Adams,  ii.  155. 

8 Thomson  Papers,  7. 

4 Adams’s  Letters  to  his  Wife,  i.  13. 

5 Adams,  ii.  328. 


48 


ALEXANDER  HAMILTON. 


He  was  very  much  dismayed  when,  upon  his  return 
from  the  Congress  of  1774,  an  old  client,  whom  he 
had  several  times  extricated  from  difficulty,  warmly 
congratulated  him  on  the  glorious  work  of  Congress 
in  once  more  suspending  the  courts.  “ Are  these, 
then,”  writes  Adams,  “ the  sentiments  of  such  people, 
and  how  many  of  them  are  there  in  the  country? 
Half  the  nation,  for  what  I know ; for  half  the  nation 
are  debtors,  if  not  more,  and  these  have  been,  in 
all  countries,  the  sentiments  of  debtors.”  1 He 
falls  back,  for  reassurance,  on  confidence  in  the 
majority. 

The  revolt  of  the  colonies  therefore  was  not  simply 
a separation  from  Great  Britain.  It  contained  a 
social  revolution  within  itself.  This  revolution  was, 
on  the  whole,  good  in  its  effect.  Every  colony  was 
under  the  dominion  of  a clique  of  pets  of  the  Crown, 
or  the  proprietor,  or  under  a coterie  of  families, 
which  held  together  and  controlled  patronage.  These 
cliques  were  obstructive.  They  held  the  offices,  kept 
down  rising  merit,  discouraged  all  new  men,  and 
restricted  the  growth  of  the  colonies,  lest  that  growth 
should  undermine  their  position.  Those  families 
which  had  power,  but  did  not  share  this  feeling,  be- 
came whigs.  The  Revolution,  therefore,  set  free  new 
and  very  vigorous  social  energies,  which  had  before 
been  repressed ; and  this  was  one  great  cause  of  the 
elan  with  which  the  country  sprang  up  after  the  war. 
However,  it  ought  always  to  be  a painful  thing  to  see 
social  storms  sweep  away  acquisitions  of  wealth  and 
1 Adams,  ii.  420. 


FEA  TURES  OF  AMERICAN  PUBLIC  LIFE.  49 


social  position.1  It  may  be  the  fault  of  the  sufferers. 
That  has  nothing  to  do  with  the  loss  to  society,  which 
sees  some  work  lost  which  had  been  accomplished, 
and  some  acquisitions  perish  which  cannot  be  re- 
placed without  new  expenditure  of  energy,  which,  if 
the  old  had  been  kept,  might  have  added  something 
new.  The  great  secret  of  social  progress  from  the 
bottom  of  civilization  to  the  top  is  to  keep  what  we 
gain  without  set-backs. 

The  persons  who  became  whigs,  then,  at  the  begin- 
ning of  the  Revolution  were,  as  to  the  mass,  those 
who  had  nothing  to  lose.  That  class  included  those 
who  had  something  to  gain.  Those  who  had  some- 
thing to  lose  took  the  other  side.  There  were,  how- 
ever, whole  districts  in  which  nearly  all  were  loyalists  ; 
and  Graydon  says  that  the  lower  ranks  of  the  people 
in  Pennsylvania  were  not  whigs  in  17 76. 2 He  says 
that  the  opposition  to  England  was  aristocratic.  In 
the  middle  and  southern  colonies  this  was  generally 
true  ; that  is,  the  people  of  education  and  wealth  first 
knew  what  measures  were  being  taken,  and  first  be- 
gan to  set  themselves  in  hostility  to  those  measures. 
The  men  of  those  classes,  therefore,  throughout  the 
colonies,  who  approved  the  measures  adopted  by  Eng- 

1 Madame  Riedesel  mentions  that  the  officers  of  Burgoyne’s 
army  were  quartered  in  a house  at  Cambridge,  Mass.,  one  of 
seven  formerly  owned  by  loyalists  who  had  lived  here  neigh- 
bours, in  splendid  mansions,  with  farms,  gardens,  and  orchards, 
being  in  the  habit  of  daily  social  intercourse.  The  war  had 
forced  them  all  to  fly,  and  the  places  were  left  desolate. 
(Memoir,  195.) 

2 Memoirs,  34. 


5° 


ALEXANDER  HAMILTON. 


land,  or  held  that  the  colonies  had  no  grievances,  were 
very  few  indeed.  They  formed  no  class.  Hence  the 
distinction  of  whig  and  tory  came  to  be  drawn  accord- 
ing to  the  point  at  which  different  persons  drew  the 
line  where  the  means  of  redress  proposed  were  con-.. — 
sidered  legitimate  and  expedient  or  not,  and  the  mob 
methods  weakened  the  cause  by  forcing  many  to  the 
conviction  that  although  the  grievances  were  real,  yet 
the  perils  of  revolution  were  greater. 

Hamilton  wrote,  in  1782,  that  half  the  people  of 
New  York  were  not  whigs  at  the  beginning,  and  that 
one  third  of  them  sympathized  with  the  enemy  at  the 
time  of  writing ; 1 but  he  had  written  to  Jay,  in  1775, 
that  the  whigs  were  in  the  great  majority  in  New 
York  City.2 3  Greene  wrote  to  Washington  urging 
that  that  city  should  be  burned.  He  said  that  two 
thirds  of  the  property  in  it  belonged  to  tories.8 

Sabine's  “ Loyalists  ” gives  one  a very  decided  con- 
viction that  the  loyalists  included  most  of  the  educated 
and  wealthy ; and  the  best  evidence  goes  to  show 
that  although  many  persons  who  began  as  whigs 
“went  in,”  in  the  first  years  of  the  war,  disgusted 
especially  with  the  lawlessness  which  we  are  noting, 
the  drift,  after  1777,  was  the  other  way.  Galloway, 
who  of  course  was  not  an  unbiassed  witness,  affirmed 
that  not  one  fifth  of  the  people  sustained  the  Revo- 
lution from  choice.4  His  notion  was  that  the  plotters 

1 Works,  viii.  69. 

2 Johnston’s  Jay,  i.  41.  Winsor  has  a long  note  on  the  pro- 
portion of  loyalists  (vii.  187). 

3 Amer.  Arch.,  v.  2,  182. 


1 Examination,  7. 


PEA  TURKS  OF  AMERICAN  PUBLIC  LIFE.  5 1 


had  raised  an  army,  disarmed  the  rest,  and  forced 
them  to  accede. 

On  account  of  this  social  division,  the  Revolution 
had  to  bear  the  weight  and  odium  of  a set  of  persons 
who  had  been  practising  riot  and  lawlessness  for  ten 
years.  The  years  1774  and  1775  were  spent  by  all 
in  a transition  from  the  schemes  and  hopes  of  recon- 
ciliation, to  the  conviction  that  independence  was  the 
only  solution.  Some  reached  that  point  a great  deal 
sooner  than  others.  In  this  period  all  the  bonds  of 
civil  order  were  necessarily  very  much  relaxed ; and 
the  agitation,  which  even  the  best  were  forced  to 
carry  on,  gave  a cover  to  the  worst.  In  1776,  after 
independence  was  determined  upon,  it  was  necessary 
to  reorganize  the  governments  of  the  States,  and  to 
do  this  in  the  midst  of  active  and  unfortunate  military 
operations.  In  the  interval  great  power  had  been 
intrusted  to  local  committees,  who  found  themselves 
for  a time  in  possession  of  irresponsible  power ; and 
to  these  committees  most  dangerous  functions  of  dis- 
ciplining tories,  enforcing  the  association,  and  the 
circulation  of  the  continental  money,  had  been  given, 
the  effect  of  which  we  will  now  proceed  to  notice. 

It  is,  however,  already  evident  that  all  the  circum- 
stances of  the  period,  1765  to  1776,  were  highly 
favourable  to  the  development  of  a lawlessness  and 
recklessness  which  in  a loose  colonial  society  needed 
no  encouragement  at  all  ; 1 also  that  there  was  one 

1 Hamilton,  in  the  “Farmer  Refuted,”  wrote  : “That  there 
have  been  some  irregularities  committed  in  America,  I freely 
confess,”  and  proceeds  to  apologize  for  them  (Works,  i.  149). 


52 


ALEXANDER  HAMILTON. 


interest,  the  debtor  interest,  which  had  a strong  mo- 
tive to  hope  that,  in  some  way,  out  of  the  commotion 
relief  for  them  would  come.  We  must  add  to  this 
the  current  declamation  about  liberty,  which  was 
plainly  calculated  to  heat  the  brain  of  all  untrained 
men,  who  eagerly  accepted  a theory  which  seemed  to 
mean  that  they  ought  to  have  their  own  way  in  the 
world.  Graydon,  who  went  through  it  all,  wrote, 
when  an  old  man : “ Notwithstanding  this  almost 
unanimous  agreement  in  favour  of  liberty,  neither 
were  all  disposed  to  go  the  same  lengths  for  it,  nor 
were  they  perfectly  in  unison  in  the  idea  annexed 
to  it.  Wilkes  had  just  rendered  the  term  popular  in 
America ; and  though  perhaps  there  is  not  any  one  in 
our  language  more  indefinite,  yet  the  sense  in  which 
it  was  doubtless  most  generally  received  was  that 
which  brings  it  nearest  to  licentiousness  and  anarchy, 
since  hallowed  by  the  phrases  of  equality  and  the 
rights  of  man.”  1 When  the  sober  men  of  that  day 
spoke  of  “ liberty,”  they  often,  almost  unawares,  meant 
independence,  for  they  meant  freedom  from  re- 
straints imposed  by  England.  A relaxation  of  civil 
order  and  of  the  authority  of  law,  together  with  the 
demoralization  of  debtors,  seduced  by  a hope  that 
through  civil  commotion  they  might  escape  from  their 
contracts,  were  among  the  first  domestic  effects  of 
the  quarrel  with  Great  Britain. 


1 Memoirs,  122. 


FEA  TUKES  OF  AMERICAN  PUBLIC  LIFE. 


53 


CHAPTER  IV. 

FEATURES  OF  AMERICAN  PUBLIC  LIFE,  1765-17S0.  III. 

Persecution  of  tories.  — Outrages.  — Spurious  patriotism. 

The  darkest  blot  on  the  history  of  the  Revolution  is 
the  treatment  of  the  loyalists.  This  revolution,  no 
more  than  others,  could  run  its  course  without  pro- 
scription, persecution,  and  confiscation.  As  we  have 
seen,  opinion  moved  over  from  unanimous  and  enthu- 
siastic loyalty,  to  the  case  in  which  a majority  favoured 
independence,  although  it  was  probably  a bare  ma- 
jority of  the  population  of  the  thirteen  colonies.  If 
some  did  not  advance  so  rapidly  on  this  line  as  others, 
they  were  subjected  to  abuse.  In  any  such  political 
change  there  is  a presumption  in  favour  of  what  is,  and 
against  revolution  or  innovation.  The  abuse  of  the 
tories  was  not  executed  under  martial  law,  or  in  the 
neighbourhood  of  the  seat  of  war.  If  such  had  been 
the  case,  our  judgment  upon  it  must  be  different.  If 
the  majority  had  forbidden  the  minority  to  take  up 
arms,  or  to  give  intelligence  and  aid,  or  to  organize  ; or 
if  their  stricter  measures  had  been  reserved  for  times 
and  places  where  there  was  much  at  stake ; or  if  even 
a regular  tribunal  had  been  charged  with  the  duty, 
even  though  it  might  be  a military  tribunal,  — the  case 


54 


A L EX  A NDER  HA  MIL  TON. 


would  have  been  far  different.  If  the  whigs  had  been 
exasperated  at  persons  who  were  by  turns  combatants 
and  non-combatants,  some  extreme  measures  might 
have  been  excused.  But  the  case  was  that  the  pro- 
scription was  made  general.  Tories  were  formally 
hunted  by  detachments.  They  were  exposed  to  the 
most  cruel  and  humiliating  personal  abuse.  They 
were  punished  for  opinions,  or  at  most  for  words. 
The  punishments  were  in  the  hands  of  utterly  irre- 
sponsible persons  or  committees. 

One  thing  which  forces  itself  on  the  notice  of  a 
student  of  a period  like  this  is  that  nobody  ever  starts 
out  with  malice  and  set  intention  to  perpetrate  a gross 
outrage.  When  the  truth  of  the  matter  comes  out,  it 
is  found  that  there  was  a series  of  antecedent  and  re- 
taliatory outrages,  which  led  up  to  the  great  one  which 
shocks  everybody  as  inconceivably  wicked.  For  in- 
stance : The  murder  of  Huddy  was  one  of  the  very 
worst  outrages  of  the  war.  It  is,  however,  possible 
to  trace  a whole  series  of  retaliations  between  the 
whigs  and  tories  in  East  Jersey,  Staten  Island,  and 
Long  Island,  throughout  the  war,  which  embittered 
the  parties  against  each  other  until  this  final  outrage 
capped  the  climax.1  The  burning  of  Falmouth  was 
an  outrage  which  it  is  hard  to  understand;  but  it 
seems  that  in  January,  1774,  a subordinate  custom- 
house officer  at  that  place,  for  conduct  in  the  line  of 
his  duty,  for  which  he,  as  a subordinate,  was  not  at 
all  responsible,  but  wlpch  was  in  the  administration 
of  the  obnoxious  admiralty  regulations,  was  most 

1 See  Moore’s  Diary,  i.  182,  198  ; ii.  255,  322. 

/ 

/ 


FEA  TURES  OF  AMERICAN  PUBLIC  LIFE.  55 


inhumanly  tarred,  feathered,  and  otherwise  abused.1 
The  suggestion  at  once  presents  itself  that  the  latter 
outrage  furnished  a motive  for  the  former.  Tryon’s 
descent  on  the  towns  along  the  Sound  in  Connecticut, 
up  to  New  Haven,  connects  itself  irresistibly  with  the 
exploit  of  Sears  and  his  party,  who  went  to  New  York 
to  destroy  Rivington’s  press.2  The  Wyoming  massa- 
cre was  preceded  by  long  conflicts  between  whigs  and 
tories  in  that  region.8  Brandt’s  expedition  was  alleged 
to  be  in  revenge  for  the  invasion  of  Canada. 

In  all  such  cases  the  question  is,  Who  began  it? 
That  is  very  difficult  to  learn,  because  the  beginnings, 
in  most  cases,  were  trivial.  It  seems  certain  that  the 
whigs  began  the  acts  of  violence,  as  between  them  and 
the  tories.  They  spoke  later  about  malignant  tories  ; 
and  the  tories  did  manifest  a very  malignant  temper. 
It  is  not  strange.  Inasmuch  as  there  was  no  declara- 
tion of  war,  there  was  no  moment  after  which  it  could 
be  said  to  be  treason  to  aid  the  enemy.  Inasmuch 
as  there  was  no  Union  until  March,  1781,  and  the 
State  governments  were  reconstructed  one  after  the 
other  during  1776  and  1777,  it  would  be  difficult  to 
set  a time  after  which  a man  was  guilty  of  rebellion, 
if  he  resisted  the  American  military  operations.  Con- 
gress, which  had  no  constitutional  authority  at  all, 
passed  a resolution,  Oct.  6,  1775  : “that  it  be  rec- 
ommended to  the  several  provincial  assemblies,  or 
conventions,  and  councils  or  committees  of  safety,  to 
arrest  and  secure  every  person  in  their  respective 

1 Prior  Documents,  254;  Almon,  1776,  part  iii.  89. 

2 Moore’s  Diary,  i.  173;  ii.  190.  3 Ibid.,  ii.  72. 


56 


ALEXANDER  HAMILTON. 


colonies  whose  going  at  large  may,  in  their  opinion, 
endanger  the  safety  of  the  colony,  or  the  liberties  of 
America.”  The  lack  of  constitutional  authority  was 
of  no  importance  for  the  political  and  military  work 
of  Congress,  but  it  may  reasonably  be  taken  into  ac- 
count when  their  acts  affected  personal  rights  and 
liberty.  March  14,  1776,  Congress  passed  a resolu- 
tion for  disarming  tories,  which,  as  John  Adams  said, 
“ left  all  the  powers  of  government  in  the  hands  of 
assemblies,  conventions,  and  committees,  which  com- 
posed a scene  of  much  confusion  and  injustice,  the 
continuance  of  which  was  much  dreaded  by  me,  as 
tending  to  injure  the  morals  of  the  people  and  de- 
stroy their  habits  of  order  and  attachment  to  regular 
government.” 1 

Long  before  this,  however,  the  work  had  begun. 
Feb.  27,  1775,  Dr.  Clark  was  ridden  on  a rail 
at  Hartford,  and  cruelly  injured.  The  doctor  who 
succoured  him  was  threatened.2  In  March  a writer 
in  Boston  addressed  the  Provincial  Congress  of  Mas- 
sachusetts in  a memorial,  five  pages  in  length,  in 
which  he  gives  a list  of  outrages,  with  names  and 
places.  Some  of  them  are  Ivu  Klux  outrages.3  In 
May,  1775,  the  tories  of  Worcester  were  disarmed 
and  forbidden  to  leave  town  or  to  meet  together.4 
In  June  two  men  were  tarred  and  feathered  in  South 
Carolina  for  “ indecent  and  daring  behaviour.”  6 Oc- 
tober 6,  occurred  the  case  of  Hunt  and  Kearsley  at 


1 Adams,  iii.  34. 

8 Moore,  5.  37. 

6 Ibid.,  90;  Drayton,  i.  273. 


2 Moore,  i.  26. 
4 Ibid.,  33. 


FEA  TURES  OF  AMERICAN  PUBLIC  LIFE.  5 7 


Philadelphia.  Hunt  was  a lawyer  who  had  under- 
taken the  case  of  a man  from  whom  a piece  of  linen 
had  been  sequestrated  under  the  association.1  He 
was  carted  through  the  streets,  accompanied  by  a 
drum,  and  followed  by  a rabble.  Dr.  Kearsley  had 
written  some  letters  which  were  intercepted.  They 
were  said  to  misrepresent  public  persons  and  public 
proceedings.  When  the  Hunt  procession  reached 
his  house,  he  denounced  it.  Thereupon  he  was  put 
in  the  cart,  and  Hunt  was  released  in  a submissive 
frame  of  mind.  He  went  to  Barbadoes,  became  a 
clergyman,  and  afterward  went  to  England.  He  was 
the  father  of  Leigh  Hunt.  Dr.  Kearsley  was  imprisoned 
at  Carlisle,  where  he  died  in  November,  1777.  Gray- 
don,  who  saw  Kearsley  carted,  says  : “ What  were  the 
feelings  of  others  on  this  lawless  spectacle,  I know 
not ; but  mine,  I must  confess,  revolted  at  it.  I was 
shocked  at  seeing  a lately  respected  citizen  so  cruelly 
vilified,  and  was  imprudent  enough  to  say  that,  had  I 
been  a magistrate,  I would,  at  every  hazard,  have  in- 
terposed my  authority  in  suppression  of  the  outrage.”  2 
Jan.  3,  1776,  Congress  passed  resolutions  against 
the  people  of  Queens  County,  New  York,  for  voting 
against  sending  deputies  to  the  Convention  of  New 
York.  They  were  put  out  of  the  protection  of  the 
united  colonies.  Trade  and  intercourse  with  them 
was  to  cease.  No  one  of  them  was  to  be  allowed  to 
travel  or  abide  in  any  part  of  the  colonies  without  a 

1 Amer.  Arch.,*iv.  3,  470. 

2 Memoir,  126;  Moore,  i.  14S  ; Marshall,  39,  143;  Amer. 
Arch.,  iv.  3,  470. 


58  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON. 

certificate  from  a convention,  or  committee  of  safety 
of  New  York,  that  he  is  a friend  of  the  American 
cause,  and  not  one  of  those  who  voted  against  send- 
ing deputies.  Colonel  Heard  of  New  Jersey  was 
ordered  to  take  five  or  six  hundred  men  and  march 
to  the  west  side  of  the  county,  and  Colonel  Water- 
bury  of  Connecticut  with  the  same  number  to  the 
east  side,  and  disarm  all  who  voted  against  sending 
deputies  ; also  to  arrest  the  principal  men,  whose  names 
were  appended.  February  8,  the  county  having 
elected  deputies,  the  interdict  was  raised,  provided 
a majority  of  the  inhabitants  would  sign  the  associa- 
tion. For  long  afterward  that  district  was  the  scene 
of  retaliatory  outrages  between  the  two  parties.1  In 
1776  there  was  a real  civil  war  in  South  Carolina 
between  whigs  and  tories.2  The  battle  of  Moore’s 
Mountain,  in  North  Carolina,  was  fought  between  two 
armies  of  the  domestic  factions.8  Sept.  14,  1776, 
the  Pennsylvania  Committee  published  an  order  for 
punishing  all  who  should  speak  or  write  against  the 
United  States  in  order  to  obstruct  the  measures  for 
securing  independence.4 

In  April,  1781,  Marshall  mentions  in  his  diary  that 
he  saw  at  the  barracks,  in  Lancaster,  five  or  six  hun- 
dred prisoners,  and  with  them  one  hundred  refu- 
gees or  tories,  “ whose  appearance  was  the  picture 

1 Onderdonk’s  Revolutionary  Incidents  of  Queens  County, 
43  et  seq.  ; Memoirs  of  the  Long  Island  Historical  Society,  ii. 
chaps,  ii.,  iii.,  iv.  See  especially  page  85. 

2 Laurens  Correspondence,  2S. 

3 Caruthers,  no. 

4 Marshall,  92. 


FEATURES  OF  AMERICAN  PUBLIC  LIFE . 59 


of  human  poverty  and  want,  both  in  clothes,  flesh, 
and  meagre  looks.” 

Speaking  of  the  Quakers  banished  from  Northum- 
berland May  18,  1780,  Reed  says  : “These  are  really 
distressing  cases,  when  suspicion  is  to  stand  for  proof, 
and  necessity  makes  the  law.  I am  fearful  that  an 
entire  discharge  will  have  a very  bad  effect,  and  yet  it 
seems  a stretch  of  power  to  hold  them  in  confinement 
when  no  cause  is  shown.”  1 

Nov.  27,  1777,  Congress  recommended  the  States 
to  confiscate  and  sell  the  property  of  tories,  and 
invest  the  proceeds  in  loan  office  certificates,  to  be 
appropriated  as  the  States  see  fit.  Very  large  con- 
fiscations took  place,  although  in  the  end  a great  deal 
was  restored.  One  of  the  most  singular  things  about 
all  this  matter  is  that  so  few,  if  any,  leading  whigs 
made  any  protest  against  it.  Hamilton  wrote  in 
1 7 7 7,  approving  of  the  rules  about  tories  adopted  by 
the  New  York  Convention.  “ Lenity  and  forbearance 
have  been  tried  too  long,  and  to  no  purpose.  . . . But 
in  dispensing  punishment,  the  utmost  care  and  caution 
ought  to  be  used.”  Power  to  do  it  should  be  trusted 
only  to  wise  hands.  Tories  should  either  be  made 
harmless,  or  won  by  clemency.2  April  29,  1777,  he 
wrote  to  Livingston  that  Washington  desired  that  ex- 
amples should  be  made  of  some  of  the  worst  of  the 
disaffected.3  At  the  peace  Franklin  was  especially 
fierce  against  the  tories.4  At  that  time  Adams  said 
that  if  the  States  should  indemnify  the  tories  “ it 

1 Reed’s  Reed,  ii.  199.  2 Works,  vii.  486. 

3 Works,  vii.  490.  4 Dip.  Corr.  Rev.,  vi.  491. 


6o 


ALEXANDER  HAMILTON. 


would  seem  an  implicit  concession  of  all  the  religion 
and  morality  of  the  war.”  1 

The  specimens  here  given  are  only  a few  from  those 
on  record  of  the  outrages  on  the  tories,  but  they  may 
suffice.2  Some  are  too  horrible  for  belief.8  A long 
list  of  tory  outrages  could  also  be  collected.4  The 
whole  subject  is  too  painful,  but  it  seems  necessary  to 
have  a few  facts  before  us  in  order  to  realize  the 
social  disorganization  which  attended  the  Revolution. 
The  Americans  themselves  were  in  a state  of  rebel- 
lion, and  those  who  adhered  to  the  old  government 
were,  by  construction,  in  rebellion  against  them. 
Graydon  says  that  in  the  summer  of  1777  the  country 

1 Dip.  Corr.  Rev.,  vi.  443. 

2 See  Dawson’s  “ Westchester  County  ” for  a long  narrative 
of  them.  The  Proceedings  of  the  Provincial  Congresses  of  New 
York  and  New  Jersey,  and  of  the  Council  of  Safety  of  the  latter 
State,  bear  witness  to  the  spirit  of  the  persecution,  the  nature 
of  the  alleged  offences,  the  character  of  the  evidence,  and  the 
sufferings  of  innocent  men  and  women.  Onderdonk’s  Revolu- 
tionary Incidents  of  Queens  County,  also  of  Suffolk  and  Kings 
County,  and  his  “Queens  County  in  Olden  Times”  contain 
numerous  cases  of  outrage  on  both  sides,  and  prove  the  social 
dissolution  which  existed. 

3 Saint  John  de  Crevecceur  (i.  322)  tells  a story  of  a man  who 
was  hanged  to  the  verge  of  strangulation  on  a charge  of  giving 
a night’s  lodging  to  a person  who  had  shared  in  the  Wyoming 
massacre,  but  it  is  permitted  to  believe  that  the  story  is  some- 
what embellished.  See  also  the  story  in  Madame  Riedesel’s 
Memoirs,  196. 

4 Caruthers,  159  et  seq. 

6 In  Kemble’s  Journal  (N.  Y.  Hist.  Soc.  1883,  p.  62)  is  a 
very  ingenious  antithetical  statement  of  the  attitude  of  the 
Americans  toward  the  English  on  one  side,  and  the  tories  on 
the  other. 


FEA  TURKS  OF  AMERICAN  PUBLIC  LIFE  6 1 

was  full  of  majors  and  colonels,  mostly  bar-tenders, 
brimful  of  patriotism,  which  meant  to  hate  and  perse- 
cute tories.1  He  implies  that  the  militiamen  stayed 
at  home,  talked  grandly,  persecuted  tories ; and  that 
such  men  got  all  the  glory.2  The  essence  of  the 
cause  for  which  the  whigs  were  contending,  he  says, 
was  freedom  ; “ and  yet  all  the  freedom  it  granted  was, 
at  the  peril  of  tar  and  feathers,  to  think  and  act  like 
themselves.”  He  had  been  in  the  army. 

We  turn  next  to  the  measures  adopted  for  mak- 
ing good  the  resistance  to  Great  Britain.  The  weak- 
ness of  these,  and  the  effect  of  the  mistakes  involved 
in  them  on  the  people,  will  set  before  us  other  social 
and  political  features  of  the  time  which  enter  into  our 
field  of  study.  We  are  seeking  in  this  period  of  con- 
vulsion the  germs  and  explanations  of  the  phenomena 
of  the  later  period,  when  American  institutions  and 
the  American  political  system  were  taking  shape.  If 
we  can  get  an  accurate  and  comprehensive  idea  of 
these  matters,  we  shall  be  able  to  understand  with 
ease  the  subsequent  developments.  We  have  already 
seen  that  there  were  powerful  influences  at  work  to 
educate  the  American  people  in  anarchism. 


1 Memoir,  283. 


2 Ibid.,  306. 


62 


ALEXANDER  HAMILTON. 


CHAPTER  V. 

FEATURES  OF  AMERICAN  PUBLIC  LIFE,  1765-1780.  IV. 

Defects  of  the  Measures  for  coercing  England  and  carrying  on  war.  — 
Commercial  War.  — The  second  impulse  of  common  sentiment.  — 
Continental  Currency. 

It  does  not  appear  that  the  Americans,  in  1774, 
expected  an  armed  collision  with  Great  Britain. 
They  believed  that  their  non-importation  agreement, 
in  1765,  had  been  very  effective  to  secure  the  repeal 
of  the  Stamp  Act.  They  had  tried,  in  1768,  1769, 
and  1770,  to  unite  in  other  agreements  of  this  kind, 
with  only  very  slight  success,  but  they  had  unabated 
confidence  in  the  efficacy  of  the  device.  They  be- 
lieved that  a congress  to  secure  a real  hearty  co-oper- 
ation of  all  the  colonies  in  this  measure  would  force 
attention  and  bring  redress. 

The  faith  in  commercial  war  is  very  persistent.  It 
is  by  no  means  dead  yet.  Commercial  war  may  be 
used  either  as  an  adjunct  of  military  war,  or  to  sup- 
plement military  coercion,  or,  without  going  to  war, 
to  force  concessions  in  tariffs  and  prohibitions.  In 
every  case  it  is  what  Daniel  Webster  called  it : “ Per- 
nicious as  to  ourselves  and  imbecile  as  to  foreign 
nations.”  The  retaliation  never  works  as  expected. 
All  experience  shows  that  the  effect  of  retaliation  is 


FEATURES  OF  AMERICAN  PUBLIC  LIFE.  63 


not  to  make  the  other  party  recede,  but  to  do  one  of 
two  things.  Either  he  does  not  know  that  retaliation 
is  intended  for  a wrong  previously  done  by  him,  or 
he  does.  In  the  former  case  he  regards  himself  as 
the  victim  of  a fresh  and  unprovoked  wrong.  In  the 
latter,  his  pride  and  stubbornness  are  aroused  not  to  let 
himself  be  coerced.  In  either  case  he  does  not  re- 
cede, but  answers  with  a new  attack,  stronger  than  his 
first  one.  Hence  it  is  in  the  inevitable  philosophy 
of  retaliation  that  it  leads  on  from  bad  to  worse,  and 
produces  destruction  and  loss  at  every  step. 

Tariff  wars,  embargoes,  non-importation  laws,  and 
the  whole  series  of  devices  of  this  character  prove 
over  and  over  again  the  statement  just  made.  They 
are  almost  utterly  ineffective  for  the  purpose  in  view. 
Then,  again,  it  is  necessary  in  them  always  to  hurt 
one’s  self  a great  deal  in  order  to  hurt  the  other 
party  a little.  All  trade  goes  on  for  mutual  advan- 
tage. It  is  a complete  mistake  to  regard  trade  as 
a favour  done  by  one  party  to  another,  or  as  a posses- 
sion or  property.  A merchant  treats  his  customers 
as  persons  who  have  done  him  a favour.  This  is  by 
courtesy  of  intercourse,  or  because  he  wants  to  attract 
the  customers  to  himself  from  a rival.  He  also  re- 
gards his  customers  as  a sort  of  clientage,  attached  to 
himself,  so  that  the  good  will  of  the  business  has  the 
character  of  a possession  or  property.  It  is  from  the 
extension  of  these  notions  to  the  entire  market  that 
the  notion  grew  up  that  the  trade  of  nations  is  a prop- 
erty of  nations,  and  that  buyers  do  favours  to  sellers. 

It  is  evident,  however,  that  the  merchant’s  notions 


64 


ALEXANDER  HAMILTON. 


just  mentioned  are  personal  only.  As  soon  as  we 
take  in  the  whole  market,  the  relations  which  are 
personal  to  him  disappear.  This  fallacy  is  one 
against  which  we  must  always  be  on  our  guard  when 
reasoning  from  individuals  to  the  society.  Some  re- 
lations accumulate  in  going  up  from  the  individual 
to  the  society ; others  cancel.  When  we  view  the 
market,  there  are  no  buyers  and  sellers,  but  persons 
exchanging  with  each  other.  Each  one  is  giving  and 
taking.  The  advantage  is  mutual.  No  one  is  under 
obligation  to  another.  Every  obligation  is  discharged 
and  finished  when  an  exchange  is  made.  The  oper- 
ation is  also  entirely  impersonal.  Exchanges  are 
made  in  immense  numbers  between  people  who  never 
meet,  and  never  know  anything  about  each  other. 
Even  the  personal  relation,  in  the  individual  cases, 
when  it  comes  to  the  surface,  rests  properly  on  noth- 
ing but  mutual  interest.  If  A makes  his  exchanges 
with  B rather  than  with  C,  it  is  properly  only  for  the 
reason  that  his  interests  are  better  served  by  B than 
by  C.  If  that  was  not  the  case,  he  would  be  making 
presents  to  B all  the  time.  If  then  he  transfers  his 
exchanges  from  B to  C,  out  of  anger  or  favour,  he  must 
sacrifice  the  advantage  which  he  had  with  A,  and  he 
will  be  making  presents  to  C.  If  he  goes  without 
what  he  used  to  obtain  from  A,  he  lowers  his  com- 
fort, and  exposes  himself  to  suffering.  If  we  take  the 
other  side,  and  consider  the  case  of  a man  who  re- 
fuses to  sell  his  products  to  somebody,  out  of  malice 
or  hostility,  we  see  that  he  may  expose  the  latter  to 
suffering,  but  he  must  recede  from  the  industrial  or- 


EE  A TURES  OF  AMERICAN  PUBLIC  LIFE.  65 

ganization.  He  has  to  face  the  question,  what  he  is 
here  for,  and  how  he  hopes  to  get  his  living.  Perhaps 
the  grandest  case  of  delusion  from  the  fallacy  of  com- 
mercial war  which  can  be  mentioned  is  the  South  in 
i860.  They  undertook  secession  in  the  faith  that 
“ cotton  is  king,”  and  they  had  come  to  believe  that 
they  had  a means  to  coerce  the  rest  of  the  world,  by 
refusing  to  sell  cotton.  As  soon  as  they  undertook 
secession,  their  direst  necessity  was  to  sell  cotton. 
Their  error  came  down  to  them  in  direct  descent 
from  1774,  and  Jefferson’s  embargo. 

These  are  the  fallacies  which  are  in  any  boycott,  big 
or  little.  There  is  a self-contradiction  in  the  device. 
We  are  here  to  exchange  with  each  other.  We  are 
absolutely  dependent  on  mutual  services.  It  is  social 
suicide  to  resolve  that  we  will  not  render  them.  For 
these  reasons  the  commercial  war  undertaken  by  the 
colonies  in  1774  was  futile  as  to  its  purpose.  It 
should,  however,  be  noted  that  if  we  count  the 
Albany  meeting  of  1755,  to  concert  plans  against 
Canada,  as  the  first  throb  of  common  interest  and 
united  action  between  a number  of  the  colonies,  then 
the  stamp-act  Congress  was  the  second  and  more 
powerful  one,  and  this  Congress  of  1774  was  the  third. 
It  showed  by  comparison  an  immense  increase  in 
vitality.  Franklin  said,  in  1760,  that  the  colonies 
were  not  able  to  unite  against  the  mother-country. 
In  proof  of  it  he  referred  to  the  meeting  of  1755,  at 
which  he  said  that  the  only  union  which  did  take 
place  was  due  to  the  authority  of  the  crown.1  In  the 
1 Franklin,  iv.  42. 

S 


66 


ALEXANDER  HAMILTON. 


two  later  congresses  the  colonies  had  at  least  reached 
the  point  of  being  able  to  adopt  a measure  of  spon- 
taneous union. 

It  was  common  interest  and  common  danger,  not 
sympathy  and  affection,  which  drew  them  together. 
The  latter  sentiments  were  conspicuous  by  their  ab- 
sence. It  is  one  of  the  points  which  we  have  to  note 
here,  that  every  step  toward  union  was  forced  by 
some  major  necessity  which  was  great  enough  to 
overcome  the  separatist  tendencies  which  all  the  sen- 
timents and  prejudices  contributed  to  strengthen. 
The  Congress  of  1774  sat  only  a few  weeks.  Few  if 
any  had  any  idea  that  it  would  stand  as  the  first  of 
the  sessions  of  a great  representative  and  legislative 
body  of  a great  State  composed  of  the  thirteen  colo- 
nies. It  was  nothing  more  than  a conference  to  or- 
ganize the  commercial  war.  If  their  petition  had  been 
heeded  in  England,  it  would  have  stood  as  isolated  as 
the  stamp-act  Congress. 

The  articles  of  association  were  a bond  of  voluntary 
agreement.  Besides  the  non-importation  and  non- 
exportation agreement,  they  included  a non-consump- 
tion agreement,  a renunciation  of  luxury  and  amuse- 
ment, and  an  attempt  to  regulate  prices  so  as  to 
prevent  effects  on  prices  which  were  obviously  to  be 
apprehended  from  the  other  measures. 

In  all  common-sense  and  right  reason,  if  the  colo- 
nies had  expected  to  have  war  with  England,  they 
should,  instead  of  breaking  off  trade  with  her,  have 
removed  any  and  all  possible  obstacles  to  trade  with 
her.  That  would  have  been  boldly  flying  in  the  face 


FEA  TURES  OF  AMERICAN  PUBLIC  LIFE.  67 

of  all  the  received  notions,  but  it  would  obviously  be 
the  only  wise  course.  When  the  war  began,  they  had 
scarcely  any  powder  or  lead,  few  guns,  little  cloth  or 
leather,  or  means  of  making  them,  and  were  in  gen- 
eral almost  destitute  of  supplies  for  an  army.  If 
these  things  were  to  be  got  cheaper  and  better  in 
England  than  anywhere  else,  there  was  the  place  to 
buy  them.  Instead  of  thinking  of  the  commercial 
profit  which  English  merchants  would  gain  (which, 
according  to  the  notions  of  the  time,  filled  their 
minds),  they  might  better  have  regarded  it  as  a 
sort  of  spoiling  the  Egyptians,  to  get  from  England 
the  cheapest  and  best  supplies  with  which  to  fight 
England. 

Instead  of  refusing  to  sell,  they  should  have  sold 
all  they  could ; and  if  England  was  the  best  market, 
they  should  have  sold  there  so  as  to  gain  as  much  as 
possible,  all  of  which  would  be  strength  for  war.  The 
reason  why  they  did  not  do  this  was,  that  they  re- 
garded the  commercial  war  as  an  independent  means 
of  coercion  without  war,  and  because  the  minds  of 
men  were  entirely  filled  then,  in  regard  to  commerce, 
with  the  notion  that  it  was  a power  and  a property  in 
some  sense  beyond  the  convenience  served  by  it  in 
the  supply  of  wants.  This  commercial  war,  however, 
like  very  many  others,  proved  only  a delusion  as  a 
means  of  avoiding  war ; it  only  introduced  war.  In- 
stead of  coercing  the  English  Government  it  was  taken 
as  an  act  of  rebellion;  and  in  February,  1775,  an  Act 
of  Parliament  was  passed  to  forbid  New  England  to 
trade  anywhere  except  to  Great  Britain,  Ireland,  and 


63 


ALEXANDER  HAMILTON. 


the  British  West  Indies,  and  to  exclude  the  same 
colonies  from  the  fisheries  of  Newfoundland.  This 
was  extended  in  March  to  all  the  colonies  except 
New  York,  Georgia,  and  North  Carolina.  The  first 
two  had  not  accepted  the  association,  and  it  was 
thought  that  the  third  would  not. 

Thus  the  response  to  the  American  resolve  not  to 
trade  with  Britain  or  her  dependencies,  was  a prohi- 
bition to  trade  anywhere  else.  On  the  supposition  of 
peace  and  continued  connection  with  Great  Britain, 
which  was  the  standpoint  of  the  association,  the 
commercial  war  had  issued  in  a deadlock. 

In  its  internal  aspects  it  was  no  more  fortunate. 
The  association  was  not  adopted  by  Congress  without 
developing  very  serious  dissensions  and  local  jealous- 
ies. In  South  Carolina,  the  rice  exception  came  near 
dividing  the  State,  and  may  have  had  a share  in  the 
actual  armed  division  which  arose  there.1 

It  never  was  enforced.  The  trade  went  on  between 
England  and  America,  but  through  Holland  and  the 
West  Indies.  The  money  which  Laurens  borrowed 
of  France  in  1781,  was  spent  in  Holland,  to  the  great 
dissatisfaction  of  the  French  Government,  and,  accord- 
ing to  Lord  Sheffield,  for  English  goods.2 

The  non-consumption  agreement  in  the  association 
was  a different  matter.  If  the  colonists  really  chose 
to  abstain  from  certain  articles  of  luxury,  at  a time  of 
solemn  undertaking,  it  might  be  very  honourable  and 
useful  to  do  so,  but  unfortunately  the  attempt  was 
made  to  enforce  this  by  those  who  wanted  to  do  it 

1 Drayton’s  Memoirs,  i.  168.  2 Observations,  10. 


FEA  TERES  OF  AMERICAN  PUBLIC  LIFE.  69 

against  those  who  did  not.  Also  the  restriction  of 
prices  was  a matter  of  inevitable  tyranny. 

The  enforcement  of  these  measures  was  intrusted 
to  local  committees  with  consequences  which  we 
shall  note. 

After  the  battle  of  Lexington  the  scene  changed. 

, The  case  was  then  one  of  armed  conflict.  Never 
was  a war  undertaken,  and  never  did  a people  find 
themselves  at  war,  if  that  statement  fits  the  case 
better,  so  illy  prepared.  Never  was  a contest  carried 
on  by  means  so  ludicrously  proportioned  to  the  en- 
terprise. It  is  possible  to  speculate  as  to  the  prob- 
able results,  if  the  Americans  had  made  no  military 
preparations,  and  had  simply  waited  for  the  English 
to  wear  themselves  out  in  a struggle  with  passive 
resistance,  or  if  the  Americans  had  carried  on  an 
energetic  war,  supported  by  adequate  organizations 
of  army  and  finance.  They  did  neither ; and  the 
result  was  that  the  enterprise  and  the  apparatus  were 
constantly  in  violent,  and,  if  the  matter  had  been  less 
serious,  ridiculous,  contrast  with  each  other. 

Instead  of  organizing  a conscription,  or  an  ade- 
quate militia  organization,  the  recruitment  was  left  to 
a volunteer  system  with  extravagant  bounties,  which 
exhausted  the  pecuniary  resources  without  putting 
them  at  the  disposal  of  the  Congress.  Instead  of 
laying  taxes,  taxes  were  really  reduced,  for  the  Con- 
gress got  none,  and  Great  Britain  had  formerly  ob- 
tained seventy-five  or  eighty  thousand  pounds.1  The 
real  reliance  was  on  paper  money.  Of  this  the  thir- 


1 Adams,  ii.  363. 


7o 


ALEXANDER  HAMILTON. 


teen  colonies  which  revolted  had  all  made  use.  They 
were  all  familiar  with  it.  It  was  a discovery  of  theirs, 
and  the  world  has  never  yet  understood  that  dis- 
covery at  its  full  value  and  true  significance.  They 
were  themselves  far  from  understanding  it.  It  was 
like  a genie  in  the  Arabian  Nights,  which  could  be 
evoked,  but  how  it  would  behave  they  were  by  no 
means  sure. 

The  scheme  of  the  continental  paper  was  by  no 
means  bad  financially.  It  was  proposed  by  G.  Morris 
in  the  New  York  Congress,  and  by  that  body  trans- 
mitted to  the  Continental  Congress.1  By  the  Reso- 
lution of  July  29,  1775,  each  colony  was  to  make  its 
arrangements  for  taking  in  its  share  of  the  notes 
issued  by  Congress  in  its  own  way.  The  proportion 
of  the  total  issue  which  it  fell  to  the  duty  of  each 
colony  to  redeem  was  allotted  according  to  total 
population  on  the  best  estimate  of  that  which  could 
be  made,  and  subject  to  ultimate  adjustment.  For 
instance,  out  of  a million  dollars  the  share  of  New 
York  was  $80,000.  If  Congress  paid  out  a million 
dollars  in  notes,  which  passed  into  circulation  in  all 
the  States,  including  New  York,  that  State  was  to  lay 
taxes  to  the  amount  of  $80,000,  which  would  be  pay- 
able in  the  notes.  This  would  bring  $80,000  into 
the  State  treasury,  where  they  could  be  burned.  Con- 
gress could  then  issue  more,  which  would  follow  the 
same  course.  As  long  as  it  was  kept  up,  Congress, 
which  had  no  power  to  tax,  could  use  the  State  power 
to  tax,  so  as  to  reach  the  people.  The  notes  also 

1 Sparks’s  Morris,  i.  38. 


FEA  TURES  OF  AMERICAN  PUBLIC  LIFE.  7 1 


would  be  cancelled  so  as  to  keep  down  their  amount. 
The  device  was  therefore  what  they  called  “ anticipa- 
tions ” at  that  time  ; and  it  was  a very  ingenious  adap- 
tation to  the  combination  of  States,  of  a device  which 
had  been  used  in  the  States  before. 

As  the  notes  bore  no  interest,  the  interest  paid  by 
a community  which  used  them  for  the  “ advance  ” 
of  the  year’s  revenue  was  very  heavy  ; but  it  was  con- 
cealed, and  they  never  knew  it.  The  device  was  set 
in  operation  with  one  mistake ; and  although  there 
was  no  important  financial  blunder  in  it,  there  was 
a fatal  political  blunder,  for  the  paper-money  diffi- 
culty is  always  political,  not  financial.  The  mistake 
was  that  the  time  set  for  the  States  to  take  in  this 
first  issue  was  not  within  the  year,  but  in  four  in- 
stalments, — on  the  last  day  of  November,  1779,  1 780, 
1781,  and  1782.  The  motive  of  this  plainly  was  to 
make  it  easy,  and  it  was  probably  expected  that  the 
war  would  last  only  a year  or  two.  The  real  effect 
was  that  there  was  an  immense  inflation  before  the 
time  set  for  the  first  redemption  was  reached. 

The  political  blunder  was  that  the  States  imme- 
diately saw  that  they  had  given  to  Congress  power  to 
levy  taxes.  On  the  scheme  Congress  could  decide, 
in  its  good  pleasure,  what  amount  to  issue ; and  each 
State  was  held  to  take  care  of  the  quota  assigned  to 
it,  whatever  that  might  be.  It  was  useless  to  hope 
that  they  would  do  that.  The  spirit  which  animated 
them  was  very  different  from  that  which  would  be 
required  by  that  arrangement. 

The  first  issue  was  made  on  the  “ pledge  of  the 


72 


ALEXANDER  HAMILTON. 


colonies.”  Later  the  current  phrase  became  that 
“ Congress  pledged  the  faith  of  the  continent.”  That 
phrase  was  used  until,  considering  what  it  ought  to 
have  meant,  and  the  solemnity  with  which  it  ought  to 
have  been  used,  it  was  a scandal.  They  appeared 
to  be  ready  to  get  anything  on  credit,  and  to  promise 
anything  by  pledging  “ the  faith  of  the  continent.” 

The  amount  issued  in  1775  was  ^ve  million  dol- 
lars, and  in  1776  nine  million  dollars.  The  current 
assumption  at  the  time  was  that  the  specie  value 
of  the  circulation  when  the  war  broke  out  was 
thirty  millions.  This  was  too  high.  P.  Webster, 
reckoning  from  the  rate  of  depreciation,  put  it  at 
twelve,  and  later  at  four.  The  States  were  issuing 
very  largely  at  the  same  time,  and  the  computation 
is  probably  impossible.  Depreciation  was  first  offi- 
cially acknowledged  in  January,  1777.  As  it  was 
always  understated,  it  probably  began  earlier. 

In  the  first  two  years,  then,  Congress  had  adminis- 
tered this  device  very  cautiously.  When  the  depre- 
ciation began,  they  became  more  reckless.  As  the 
depreciation  went  on,  they  set  the  opinion  of  the 
country  that  depreciation  was  unnecessary,  that  it 
was  a result  of  malice,  that  it  was  brought  about  by 
monopolists,  speculators,  forestalled  (persons  who 
bought  up  to  hold  for  a rise,  although  the  old  sense 
of  the  word  was,  one  who  went  out  to  meet  goods  on 
their  way  to  market  and  bought  them  before  they  were 
exposed  in  the  market),  and  engrossers  (persons  who 
bought  large  amounts,  to  win  a monopoly  in  the 
market)  ; furthermore,  they  adopted  the  opinion  that 


FEA  TURES  OF  AMERICAN  PUBLIC  LIFE.  7 3 


depreciation  could  be  prevented  by  police  regulations 
to  offset  these  devices,  by  legal-tender  laws,  and  by 
fixing  tariffs  of  prices. 

This  brings  us  to  the  point  of  interest  to  us  now 
in  connection  with  our  subject.  The  administration 
of  the  laws  against  tories,  and  in  support  of  the  asso- 
ciation, and  of  the  laws  to  enforce  the  circulation 
of  the  continental  paper  money  was  intrusted  to 
committees  of  safety  or  inspection. 


74 


ALEXANDER  HAMILTON. 


CHAPTER  VI. 

FEATURES  OF  AMERICAN  PUBLIC  LIFE,  1765-1780.  V. 

Tyranny  of  committees.  — Executive  committees  of  Congress.  — 111 
effects  on  military  and  financial  administration.  — Factions  in 
Congress.  — Factions  among  foreign  representatives. 

Gordon  represents  the  committees  of  correspond- 
ence as  having  taken  their  rise  in  an  effort  to  show 
that  Hutchinson  was  wrong  when  he  represented  the 
whole  trouble  as  resting  only  with  a few  busybodies. 
The  intention  was  to  unite  all  who  were  dissatisfied  in 
a way  to  make  their  number  and  importance  evident.1 
These  committees  began  to  be  formed  anew  in  1773. 
They  were  very  useful  and  effective  in  sending  informa- 
tion, and  in  bringing  about  sympathy  and  union.  The 
committees  of  correspondence  transmitted  the  news 
of  the  battle  of  Lexington  from  Wallingford,  Con- 
necticut, to  Charleston,  South  Carolina,  in  seventeen 
days,  by  expresses  and  relays.2  In  view  of  the  lack 
of  facilities  for  the  transmission  of  intelligence,  and 
the  great  need  of  transmitting  it  in  order  to  develop 
community  of  feeling  and  interest,  these  committees 
were  very  important. 

They  seem  to  have  set  the  example  for  other  com- 
mittees which  undertook  the  work  of  police  and  admin- 

1 History,  i.  312.  Dawson  claims  prior  invention  for  New 
York;  namely,  Oct.  18,  1764.  (Sons  of  Liberty,  60  et  seq.) 

2 Drayton,  i.  276. 


FEATURES  OF  AMERICAN  PUBLIC  LIFE.  75 


istration,  either  against  the  old  governments  or  in  the 
interval  between  the  old  and  the  new.  The  com- 
mittee at  Philadelphia  caused  Hunt  to  be  carted  in 
August,  x 7 75 -1  On  the  6th  of  October,  1775,  they 
sent  to  Chester  to  arrest  a person  supposed  to  be  on 
his  way  to  Europe  with  letters.  Such  letters  were 
brought  back,  opened,  and  being,  in  the  opinion  of 
the  committee,  “ calculated  to  inflame  the  minds  of 
people  in  England  against  the  colonies  in  general,” 
three  of  the  writers  were  arrested  and  imprisoned. 
Dr.  Kearsley  was  one  of  these.  On  the  7th  they 
arrested  more  persons  with  letters.  Congress  ordered 
these  prisoners  turned  over  to  the  committee  of  the 
State.2 * 

On  the  10th  of  June,  1776,  the  same  committee 
arrested  a J ew  for  cursing  Congress  ; but  being  some- 
what abused,  he  informed  against  another  who,  he 
said,  had  instructed  him  in  those  points.  The  mob 
went  to  the  latter’s  house.  He  ran  away.  They 
injured  his  house  and  property.®  In  June  Congress, 
in  order  to  limit  mob  violence  against  tories,  resolved 
that  no  one  should  be  molested  in  person  or  property 
unless  by  an  order  of  Congress,  or  a convention  of 
the  colony,  or  a committee  of  safety.4  In  July  the 
Philadelphia  committee  appointed  a sub-committee 
of  secrecy  to  examine  all  inimical  and  suspected  per- 
sons.6 In  that  month  the  committee  suspected  a 
Mrs.  Arrall,  who  was  about  to  leave  for  New  York,  of 


1 See  p.  57. 

2 Marshall’s  Diary,  39,  45,  48. 

4 Cong.  Joum.,  ii.  2x2. 


3 Ibid.,  76. 

5 Marshall,  81. 


76 


ALEXANDER  HAMILTON. 


carrying  on  a correspondence  with  the  enemy.  They 
arrested  her  and  brought  her  before  the  committee. 
It  appeared  that  she  had  only  been  guilty  of  some 
unguarded  language.1  On  the  4th  of  September 
William  Allen  declared  that  he  would  shed  his  blood 
against  independence.  This  led  to  an  altercation 
with  John  Bayard.  A complaint  of  Allen  was  sent 
to  the  committee.  He  belonged  to  the  leading 
family  in  Pennsylvania,  which  was  entirely  broken  up 
and  ruined  by  the  war.  In  the  Same  month  that 
committee  was  dissolved.2 *  In  1777  a person  writing 
to  Laurens  from  Georgia,  complains  of  the  extrava- 
gance and  lawlessness  of  the  whigs.  He  says  that 
the  community  is  ruled  by  tavern  meetings  and  “ noc- 
turnal societies.”  8 In  July,  1777,  a new  society  was 
formed  in  Philadelphia  to  help  in  compelling  every- 
body to  take  the  oath  of  allegiance  or  leave  the  State. 
Graydon  mentions  a Quaker  who  was  nearly  ruined  by 
the  patriots,  who  would  take  a horse  or  a cow,  sell  it 
for  taxes,  and  never  give  him  the  difference.4  Special 
taxes  and  exactions  were  quite  generally  laid  on  tories  ; 
and  as  the  Quakers  would  not  take  up  arms,  and  as- 
sumed, for  the  most  part,  an  attitude  of  neutrality  and 
indifference,  they  had  a great  deal  to  complain  of. 

In  March,  1775,  a county  committee  in  New  Jersey 
published  a man  for  drinking  tea.5  In  September, 
1775,  a man  was  before  the  Philadelphia  committee 
for  denying  their  authority  with  regard  to  some  tea. 

1 Marshall,  86.  2 Ibid.,  91,  93. 

3 Laurens  Correspondence,  39.  4 Memoir,  325. 

5 Marshall,  15. 


FEA  TURES  OF  AMERICAN  PUBLIC  LIFE.  77 

In  the  same  month  the  committee  fixed  the  amount 
of  salt  to  be  sold  to  each  county  out  of  a lot  which 
had  apparently  been  confiscated.1  Marshall  himself, 
having  moved  to  Lancaster,  was  informed  by  his  son 
that  the  price  of  sugar  was  rising.  He  hastened  to 
buy  as  much  as  he  could  of  his  neighbours  in  Lan- 
caster before  they  heard  of  it.  He  does  not  appear 
to  have  noticed  that  he  was  forestalling.2 3  In  August, 
1776,  some  women  at  Fishkill,  New  York,  seem  to 
have  thought  that  they  would  be  their  own  committee. 
They  seized  some  tea  which  was  held  at  a high  price, 
and  gave  the  continental  tariff  price  for  it. 

In  1779  Congress  seemed  to  become  affected  with 
the  recklessness  of  bankruptcy.  The  issues  were 
enormous,  and  the  depreciation  went  on  with  great 
rapidity.  The  faster  this  movement  ran  its  course, 
the  more  extravagant  were  the  attempts  to  stop  it  by 
force.  In  May  a meeting  was  held  at  Philadelphia, 
presided  over  by  Mr.  Roberdeau,  at  which  he  made 
a speech.  He  said  : “ The  way  to  make  our  money 
good  is  to  reduce  the  prices  of  goods  and  provisions. 
The  tax  that  has  been  laid  upon  us  by  monopolists 
and  forestalled  within  these  six  months  past,  for  it 
may  justly  be  called  a tax,  amounts  to  more  money 
than  would  carry  on  the  war  for  twelve  months  to 
come.”  The  next  day  a committee  which  had  been 
appointed  at  that  meeting  set  a tariff  of  prices.8  A 
cargo  arrived  consigned  to  Robert  Morris.  The 

1 Marshall,  90,  91 ; Amer.  Arch.,  v.  3,  185. 

2 Marshall,  120. 

3 Penn.  Packet,  May,  1779. 


73 


ALEXANDER  HAMILTON. 


committee  waited  on  him  to  see  if  he  would  com- 
ply with  the  tariff.  He  replied  that  the  goods  were 
for  the  French  army.1  May  31,  this  committee 
published  a set  of  rules,  but  they  declined  to  estab- 
lish or  execute  punishments.  “After  having  ascer- 
tained facts,  they  will  leave  such  persons  to  make 
their  peace  with  the  public  the  best  way  they  can, 
unless  they  [the  committee]  are  desired  to  interfere.” 
Marshall  mentions  cases  under  these  regulations  in 
which  goods  were  stopped  while  being  carried  out  of 
the  city  to  evade  the  rules ; also  cases  in  which  the 
price  of  boxes,  casks,  etc.,  was  raised,  although  that 
of  the  goods  was  not.  Flour  was  also  smuggled  out 
covered  with  earth.  “ To  such  mean  shifts  are  the 
disaffected  driven,  since  the  committee  has  been 
elected,”  says  Marshall.  He  mentions  a committee- 
man who,  although  elected,  had  never  served,  and  who 
charged  more  than  the  tariff.  When  expostulated 
with,  he  replied  that  he  would  sell  at  his  own  price  or 
not  at  all.  “The  committee  were  satisfied  that  he 
was  a friend  of  his  country  only  so  far  as  his  interest 
led  him.”  2 

Marshall  mentions  in  his  diary,  in  January,  1776,  a 
case  of  a hatter  who  refused  paper  money.  He  was 
remanded  under  censure  for  a week  to  think  it  over. 
Two  similar  cases  are  mentioned  the  next  day.  In 
December,  1776,  Rush  wrote  to  R.  H.  Lee  that  when 
Howe  approached  Philadelphia  the  people  refused 
continental  money.  Putnam  produced  only  a tem- 
porary remedy  by  imprisoning  them  and  declaring  the 

1 Penn.  Packet,  July  8,  1779.  2 Marshall,  218,  222. 


FEA  TURKS  OF  AMERICAN  PUBLIC  LIFE. 


79 


debt  void.  Those  who  had  goods  refused  to  sell,  and 
creditors  refused  to  give  up  the  bonds,  or  kept  out  of 
the  way  when  continental  money  was  offered.  He 
proposes  that  Congress  shall  recommend  the  States 
to  declare  the  debt  forfeited,  and  fine  the  creditors 
severely  for  refusing  the  money.  “ This  will  be  more 
effectual  than  imprisonment,  which,  from  becoming  so 
common  for  tory  practices,  has  now  lost  its  infamy. 
. . . I tremble  every  time  I think  of  the  danger  of 
the  further  progress  of  the  refusal  of  our  money.”  1 
Marshall  mentions  a case  of  a mortgage  in  which 
record  was  made  of  a tender  of  continental  money 
and  refusal  of  the  same.2  In  November,  1776,  he 
mentions  a case  where  a man  was  precluded  from  all 
trade  and  intercourse  for  refusing  the  paper.3 

In  all  this  struggle  the  constant  cry  was  that  credit 
ought  to  be  maintained,  and  that  it  was  criminal  not 
to  help  support  credit.  Here  we  have  the  notion 
that  credit  is  some  sort  of  successful  humbug.  It 
is  a notion  of  frequent  recurrence.  It  is  believed 
that  if  people  will  only  agree  to  affirm  that  some- 
thing is  true  which  they  know  is  not  true,  they  can 
get  just  the  same  effect  as  if  it  were  true.  Credit, 
however,  is,  above  all  things,  the  truth.  Falsehood 
kills  it.  It  has  no  relationship  with  swindling  or 
confidence  operations.  The  effect  of  all  compulsion 
is  to  excite  distrust  and  doubt.  It  suggests  to  the 
observer  that  truth  is  not  what  the  pretence  seems 
to  be.  The  truth,  however,  is  what  he  wants,  espe- 

1 Lee’s  Lee,  ii.  160. 

3 Ibid.,  101. 


2 Diary,  95. 


8o 


ALEXANDER  HAMILTON. 


daily  if  he  really  possesses  anything  which  he  can 
lose.  Therefore  his  faith  is  repelled,  and  credit  is 
destroyed.  Credit  is  belief  in  the  truth. 

The  committees  did  not  confine  their  regulation  of 
things  even  to  the  tories,  the  association,  and  the 
paper  money.  On  the  24th  of  November,  1775,  it 
was  proposed  to  hold  a ball  in  Philadelphia  at  a 
tavern.  It  was  expected  that  Mrs.  Washington  and 
Mrs.  Hancock  would  be  present.  The  city  com- 
mittee voted  that  there  ought  to  be  no  ball  in  those 
troublous  times.  They  visited  Mrs.  Washington,  and 
asked  her  not  to  attend.  She  thanked  them,  and  said 
that  she  would  not.  Otherwise  it  had  been  threat- 
ened that  the  tavern  should  be  attacked.1 

We  have,  then,  ample  evidence  that  these  irrespon- 
sible committees  exercised  a great  tyranny,  and  that 
they  helped  to  educate  people  to  unconstitutional 
methods.  P.  Webster  wrote  about  them,  in  1 790,  that 
it  was  an  obstinate  delirium,  in  the  war  time,  that  the 
credit  of  the  continental  money  could  be  sustained  by 
compulsion.  “This  ruinous  principle  was  continued 
in  practice  for  five  successive  years,  and  appeared 
in  all  shapes  and  forms,  — that  is,  in  tender  acts,  in 
limitations  of  prices,  in  awful  and  threatening  declara- 
tions, in  penal  laws  with  dreadful  and  ruinous  punish- 
ments, and  in  every  other  way  that  could  be  devised, 
and  all  executed  with  a relentless  severity  by  the 
highest  authorities  then  in  being,  — namely,  by  Con- 
gress, by  Assemblies  and  Conventions  of  the  State,  by 
committees  of  inspection  (whose  powers  in  those 

1 Marshal),  52. 


FEATURES  OF  AMERICAN  PUBLIC  LIFE.  81 

days  were  nearly  sovereign),  and  even  by  military 
force ; and  though  men  of  all  descriptions  stood 
trembling  before  this  monster  of  force,  without  daring 
to  lift  a hand  against  it  during  all  this  period,  yet  its 
unrestrained  energy  ever  proved  ineffectual  to  its 
purposes,  but  in  every  instance  increased  the  evil  it 
was  designed  to  remedy,  and  destroyed  the  benefits 
it  was  intended  to  promote.  . . . Many  thousand 
families  of  full  and  easy  fortune  were  ruined  by  these 
fatal  measures,  and  lie  in  ruins  to  this  day  without 
the  least  benefit  to  the  country,  or  to  the  great  and 
noble  cause  in  which  we  were  then  engaged.”  He 
writes  this  for  the  benefit  of  the  financiers  of  future 
generations.1 

If  we  turn  now  to  another  set  of  facts,  we  may 
see  what  were  the  needs  of  the  country  which  forced 
themselves  on  the  attention  of  leading  public  men. 

It  is  easy  to  see,  even  in  the  superficial  facts  of  the 
case,  that  what  the  United  States  needed  was  an  ad- 
equate organization.  This  is  the  fact  which  is  devel- 
oped by  the  whole  history  of  the  Revolution.  There 
was  an  exceedingly  low  social  vitality.  The  organs 
of  the  state  did  not  respond  quickly  to  stimuli. 
Those  who  carry  back  to  that  period  modern  ideas 
cannot  understand  that  the  social  movement  could 
have  been  so  sluggish.  If  we  realize  how  sluggish  it 
was,  we  can  hardly  understand  how  it  was  possible 
to  accomplish  anything.  There  was  no  state  of  the 
United  States,  properly  speaking.  The  Union  had  no 
proper  organs  3 it  started  on  a burst  of  spontaneous 

1 Essays,  128. 

6 


82 


ALEXANDER  LI  A MIL  TON. 


enthusiasm.  As  long  as  that  lasted,  the  authority  of 
Congress  was  respected  and  its  orders  were  obeyed, 
out  of  good  will,  although  it  had  no  authority  at  all 
by  any  constitution.  It  is,  indeed,  very  remarkable 
what  high  respect  Congress  enjoyed  for  the  first  three 
years.  Before  the  Articles  of  Confederation  were 
formed,  which  gave  Congress  constitutional  authority, 
the  burst  of  enthusiasm  had  long  worn  itself  out. 

Congress  made  the  great  mistake  at  the  beginning 
of  not  sitting  in  open  session.  Hutchinson  says  that 
opening  the  debates  of  the  Massachusetts  Assembly 
had  a great  effect  to  educate  the  people  to  “ sedi- 
tion.” 1 The  Journal  of  Congress  was  published,  but 
in  a way  to  have  no  popular  interest  and  win  no 
attention.2  If  the  debates  had  been  open,  it  would 
have  been  a powerful  means  of  educating  the  people, 
keeping  them  informed,  and  making  them  ready  to  re- 
spond to  the  public  needs.  There  was  no  newspaper 
press  suited  to  build  up  and  sustain  a true  public  opin- 
ion, or  maintain  an  interchange  of  ideas  and  informa- 
tion between  the  different  States.  The  newspapers 
were  strictly  local.  They  depended  on  private  cor- 
respondence for  news,  and  on  volunteer  essayists 
for  discussion.  The  lack  of  a true  newspaper  press 
explains  the  popularity  of  Paine’s  “ Common  Sense.” 
It  did  just  what  a good  modern  newspaper  would 

1 History,  iii.  166. 

2 A gentleman  wrote  to  Robert  Morris,  in  1777,  from  North 
Carolina,  that  he  wished  the  journals  of  Congress  might  be 
published  every  day  and  scattered  through  the  continent. 
(Letters  to  Robert  Morris,  428.) 


FEA  TURKS  OF  AMERICAN  PUBLIC  LIFE.  83 

do,  — crystallize  ideas.  Hamilton,  in  1783,  tried 
to  have  the  debates  of  Congress  made  public,1  and 
he  was  seconded  by  Wilson ; 2 but  they  were  not 
able  to  bring  it  about.  Hamilton  wanted  publicity 
on  financial  topics,  if  on  nothing  else.  As  long  as 
Congress  was  printing  paper  money  and  giving  it  out, 
it  retained  its  power.  Instead  of  drawing  money 
from  the  people  by  taxes,  we  find  Congress  giving 
out  money  to  the  States  during  1777  and  1778.  It 
had  no  real  money.  It  was  using  the  printing- 
machine.  Until  that  resource  was  exhausted  by  de- 
preciation, it  had  the  appearance  and  effect  as  if 
Congress  had  had  a magazine  at  their  disposal. 
Franklin  wrote,  in  1779:  “This  effect  of  paper 
currency  is  not  understood  on  this  side  the  water, 
and  indeed  the  whole  is  a mystery  even  to  the  poli- 
ticians, how  we  have  been  able  to  continue  a war 
four  years  without  money,  and  how  we  could  pay  with 
paper  that  had  no  previously  fixed  fund  appropriated 
specifically  to  redeem  it.  This  currency,  as  we  man- 
age it,  is  a wonderful  machine ; it  performs  its  office 
when  we  issue  it ; it  pays  and  clothes  troops  and  pro- 
vides victuals  and  ammunition ; and  when  we  are 
obliged  to  issue  a quantity  excessive,  it  pays  itself 
off  by  depreciation.” 3 He  ought  to  have  added, 
“ and  leaves  us  utterly  helpless  when  the  process  is 
ended.” 

Such  was  the  effect  on  Congress.  Their  prestige 
declined  very  rapidly  in  and  after  1779.  They  could 

1 Madison  Papers,  i.  341.  2 Journ.  Cong.,  viii.  1S4. 

3 Franklin,  viii.  328. 


84 


ALEXANDER  HAMILTON. 


not  then  adopt  any  real  adequate  measures,  because 
they  could  not  win  confidence  again.  Before  the 
Articles  of  Confederation  were  adopted,  they  were 
only  fit  to  be  superseded. 

In  their  system  of  administration  Congress  began 
with  a town-meeting  plan  of  executive  committees. 
They  were  under  the  dominion  of  a number  of  per- 
nicious prepossessions,  some  of  which  had  been  incul- 
cated by  the  notions  of  the  last  ten  years.  They 
were  afraid  of  a one-man  power.  They  held  personal, 
provincial,  and  sectional  ideas.1  They  were  afraid  of 
an  army.  They  were  afraid  of  the  States.  A feature 
of  the  times  was  an  over- fondness  for  popularity. 
There  was  always  a lion  in  the  way.  They  did  not 
seize  upon  their  chances  with  intelligent  energy. 
They  seem  to  have  gone  upon  the  doctrine  that  noth- 
ing should  be  done  against  which  any  objection  could 
be  raised,  and  that  the  duty  of  a good  citizen  was, 
not  to  throw  himself  with  all  his  might  into  the  great 
business  on  hand,  but  to  raise  objections.  John 
Adams  says  that  they  held  undigested  notions  'of 
liberty.2  They  would  not  do  anything  which  had 
ever  been  done  in  England  in  connection  with  which 
any  abuses  had  ever  been  perpetrated.  Hence  it 
took  six  years,  and  the  personal  authority  of  Robert 
Morris,  to  introduce  contracts.8  If  it  had  not  been 
for  the  personal  weight  and  reputation  in  finance  of 
Robert  Morris,  it  is  doubtful  if  heads  of  departments 
could  have  been  put  in  the  place  of  the  boards.  All 

1 Adams,  ii.  448.  2 Ibid.,  iii.  83. 

3 Morris’s  Morris,  i.  382. 


FEA  TURKS  OF  AMERICAN  PUBLIC  LIFE.  85 


the  mistakes  were  stubbornly  defended,  until  bitter 
experience  broke  them  down. 

The  methods  of  Congress  were  extremely  unbusi- 
nesslike, wasteful,  and  inefficient.  Time  was  wasted 
in  appropriating  sums  of  a few  dollars  each  for  petty 
expenditures.  Money  was  wasted  because  there  was 
no  proper  system  of  accounting.  The  paper-money 
system  did  not  admit  of  it.  So  much  paper  was 
printed,  and  it  was  given  to  some  persons  to  be  ex- 
pended for  goods  to  be  exported,  to  others  for  sup- 
plies, etc.,  etc. ; “ he  to  be  accountable,”  as  the 
phrase  ran.  Until  he  accounted,  which  it  seems 
that  in  very  many  cases  he  never  did,  there  was  no 
responsibility  possible  in  the  books.1  Supplies  were 
squandered.  The  quartermaster’s  department  and 
commissariat  were  conducted  on  a most  extravagant 
scale.2  Unwise  projects  were  undertaken.  At  first  it 

1 In  1783  Robert  Morris  reported  : “ Congress  have  before 
them  full  evidence  that  many  persons,  late  officers  in  the  civil 
department,  refuse  to  account  at  all.”  (Dip.  Corr.  Rev.,  xii. 
430.)  A few  months  later  he  wrote  : An  investigation  of  some 
of  the  accounts  of  the  old  commercial  and  secret  committee 
“has  not  only  discovered  some  balances  due  to  the  United 
States,  but  has  reported  other  matters  which  show  in  a strange 
point  of  light  the  necessity  of  examining  and  settling  those 
accounts.”  (Ibid.,  442.) 

2 “There  is  here  a series  of  officers  very  expensive  and 
totally  superfluous.  Every  brigade  has  its  commissary  of  sub- 
sistence, its  quartermaster,  its  wagon-master,  its  commissary 
of  forage ; and  each  of  these,  again,  has  his  deputies.  Each 
general,  again,  is  entitled  to  a special  commissary  of  subsistence 
and  three  commissaries  of  forage.  All  these  men  rank  as 
officers,  and  really  have  nothing  to  do.  My  blacksmith  is  a 
captain  ! ” (Kalb,  140  ; at  Valley  Forge.) 


86 


ALEXANDER  HAMILTON. 


was  proposed  to  conquer  Canada,  Nova  Scotia,  and 
Florida,  to  build  a navy,  and  to  help  Spain  against 
Portugal.  Small  results  were  achieved. 

Feb.  12,  1778,  a committee  of  investigation  re- 
ported from  Valley  Forge  to  Congress.  The  report 
was  kept  secret,  but  a copy  of  it  was  captured  with  H. 
Laurens’s  papers  in  1780.  It  was  first  published  by 
Stedman.  It  is  there  stated  that  the  property  of  the 
continent  is  dispersed  over  the  whole  country  : wagons 
are  abandoned ; intrenching  tools  left  at  random ; 
tents  and  tent-cloths  left  in  a farmer’s  barn,  and  lost 
sight  of ; no  straw  is  provided  in  the  huts ; there  is 
great  sickness  and  mortality  3 inoculation  cannot  be 
carried  on  under  these  circumstances ; there  are  con- 
stant new  cases  of  small-pox,  great  lack  of  wagons. 
If  the  enemy  should  make  an  attack,  they  would  cap- 
ture the  cannon  for  want  of  horses  to  move  it.  The 
troops  are  in  danger  of  perishing  with  famine,  or  dis- 
persing in  search  of  food.  The  commissaries  have 
bought  pork  in  New  Jersey  which  cannot  be  brought 
for  want  of  wagons.  The  commissary  and  quarter- 
master department  seem  to  be  in  a state  of  collapse.1 

At  about  the  same  time  Kalb  wrote  : “ The  war- 
fund  pays  a good  many  bills  that  could  not  well  be 
made  public.  I have  no  doubt  that  the  contractors 
make  fifty  per  cent  on  eveiy  contract,  not  to  speak  of 
the  other  defraudations,  the  mere  enumeration  of 
which  would  be  endless.”  3 The  same  officer,  being  a 
frugal  German,  thus  comments  on  the  general  hab- 
its of  waste  in  1779:  “The  consumption  of  meat  is 

1 Reed’s  Reed,  i.  360.  2 Kalb,  143. 


FEATURES  OF  AMERICAN  PUBLIC  LIFE.  87 


almost  incredible.  It  is  impossible  to  habituate  the 
people  of  this  country  to  anything  like  order  or  regu- 
larity of  living,  and  equally  impossible  for  one  who  has 
grown  up  in  the  midst  of  order,  discipline,  and  punc- 
tuality, to  accustom  himself  to  the  indolence  of  these 
people.”1  In  1780  the  French  Minister,  Luzerne, 
wrote : “ It  is  difficult  to  form  a just  conception 
of  the  depredations  which  have  been  committed  in 
the  management  of  war  supplies  and  foraging,  cloth- 
ing, hospitals,  tents,  quarters,  and  transportation. 
About  nine  thousand  men,  employed  in  this  service, 
received  enormous  salaries  and  devoured  the  subsist- 
ence of  the  army,  while  it  was  tormented  with  hunger 
and  the  extremes  of  want.” 2 

Tradition  has  fastened  upon  the  sufferings  at  Valley 
Forge  ; but  the  sufferings  of  the  next  two  or  three  win- 
ters were  not  less,  and  the  distress  and  nakedness  of 
the  Southern  army  up  to  the  end  of  the  war  were 
shocking  in  every  point  of  view.3 4  In  1780  the  French 
were  obliged  to  help  the  American  army  with  pro- 
visions. The  point  of  this  for  our  present  purpose, 
however,  lies  in  the  fact  that  there  was  plenty  all 
about,  and  the  people  were  not  paying  any  war-taxes 
at  all.  There  was  no  general  distress  or  poverty.  Ex- 
cept at  the  seat  of  war  for  the  time  being,  the  war 
did  not  press  on  the  people  in  any  way.  The  whole 
trouble  lay  in  the  lack  of  organization  by  which  to 

1 Kalb,  165.  2 Durand,  218. 

8 Kalb,  149,  183  ; Johnson’s  Greene,  ii. ; Reed’s  Reed,  ii.  201 ; 

Bancroft,  x.  415. 

4 Durand,  217. 


88 


ALEXANDER  HAMILTON. 


bring  the  resources  which  existed  in  ample  abundance 
into  application  to  the  necessities.1 

The  impression  which  all  this  makes  is  that  of  in- 
experience. It  was  the  work  of  men  who  had  not 
learned  by  experience  that  method  and  accuracy  pay, 
and  that  slip-shod  arrangements  waste  money,  time, 
and  strength.  The  impression  we  get  is  that  any 
strictness  of  system  was  irksome  to  people  in  those 
days,  and  irritated  them.  It  was  not  until  January, 
1779,  that  Congress  ordered  the  foreign  agents  to 
obtain  information  and  report  on  the  methods  em- 
ployed in  the  government  offices  in  Europe.2  The 
negligence  and  waste  repelled  support.  It  made  the 
States  less  willing  to  give,  or  gave  them  a welcome  ex- 
cuse for  not  giving,  and  annoyed  the  French  allies. 

In  1779  Congress  was  split  up  by  factions.  There 
were  two  leading  ones,  which  corresponded  with  the 
parties  for  and  against  Washington  in  the  cabal.  The 
party  for  Washington  was  considered  by  the  French 
their  party ; the  other  they  thought  English.  The 
latter  was  led  by  the  two  Adamses  and  the  two  Lees. 
The  other  Virginians  were  reckoned  in  the  Washing- 
ton party.  The  division  was  therefore  also  sec- 
tional. New  England  was  not  pleased  that  a Virginian 
was  put  at  the  head  of  the  army.  John  Adams 
was  not  attached  to  England,  as  the  French  thought. 
He  did  not  want  the  United  States  to  fall  into 
dependence  on  France,  and  he  told  the  truth  when 
he  told  King  George  that  he  was  attached  to  no 

1 See  the  Life  of  Robert  Morris  on  this  point. 

2 Sec.  Journ.,  ii.  130. 


FEA  TURES  OF  AMERICAN  PUBLIC  LIFE.  89 

country  but  his  own.1  A more  correct  and  important 
distinction  between  the  parties  was  that  one  was  con- 
tinental, the  other  state-rights.  In  1778  the  French 
Minister,  Gerard,  reported  to  Vergennes  about  these 
parties,  that  the  Southerners  wanted  rotation,  the 
Northerners  wanted  Congress  to  act  on  the  election 
for  Congress.  Most  members  owe  their  seats  to  zeal 
for  the  cause,  not  to  their  ability  for  business,  and 
they  do  not  put  a man  in  a position  for  which  he  has 
special  ability.  This  is  worst  of  all  for  the  finances. 
Congress  has  made  itself  the  universal  merchant  and 
supply-agent,  with  mischievous  consequences.  The 
birth  of  the  Republic  is  not  rendered  glorious  by  dis- 
interestedness. Ail  the  agents  have  won  exorbitant 
advantages.  The  spirit  of  gain  is  widely  active.  Cu- 
pidity is  one  of  the  distinctive  characteristics  of  the 
Americans,  especially  of  the  North.  “ A lack  of  or- 
der and  organization  in  details  has  existed  since  the 
beginning  of  the  Revolution,  and  has  more  than  once 
put  the  welfare  of  the  Republic  in  jeopardy.  If  the 
English  had  shown  themselves  in  America  as  bold  and 
energetic  as  we  have  seen  them  elsewhere,  they  would 
have  met  with  little  resistance.  The  more  one  ob- 
serves this  contrast  close  at  hand,  the  more  one  is 
forced  to  say  that  the  finger  of  God  can  be  seen  in 
this  fact.”  In  this  despatch,  referring  no  doubt  to 
Morris,  he  says  : “ A merchant  presided  over  the  Com- 
mittee of  Commerce.  They  transferred  him  to  the 
head  of  that  of  Foreign  Affairs,  and  he  has  quitted  this 
last  position  because  he  has  been  suspected  of  using 
1 Adams,  viii.  258. 


9° 


ALEXANDER  HAMILTON. 


the  secret  information  which  he  received  for  mer- 
cantile profit.”  1 

In  1776  John  Adams  wrote  to  his  wife  : “There  is 
too  much  corruption  even  in  this  infant  age  of  our 
republic.  Virtue  is  not  in  fashion.  Vice  is  not  in- 
famous. . . . The  spirit  of  venality  you  mention  is 
the  most  dreadful  and  alarming  enemy  America  has 
to  oppose.  It  is  as  rapacious  and  insatiable  as  the 
grave.  . . . This  predominant  avarice  will  ruin  Amer- 
ica, if  she  is  ever  ruined.  ...  I am  ashamed  of  the 
age  I live  in.”  2 Jay  wrote  to  Washington  in  April, 
1779:  “There  is  as  much  intrigue  in  this  State 
House  as  in  the  Vatican,  but  as  little  secrecy  as  in 
a boarding-school.”  8 

If  we  turn  our  attention  to  the  diplomacy  of  the 
period,  we  note  similar  weakness,  and  loss  from  simi- 
lar causes.  There  were  half-a-dozen  agents  at  Paris, 
who  were  certainly  not  suffering  anything  for  the 
cause.  They  were  living  on  2,500  pounds  sterling 
per  annum  each,  in  order  to  maintain  the  dignity  of 
their  country.  Only  one  of  them  was  useful.  Frank- 
lin was  the  man  on  whom  the  cause  hung  from  1779 
to  1782.  He  had  the  confidence  of  the  French  Gov- 
ernment, and  could  get  subsidies  and  loans.  Jay  and 
Adams  were  useful  men  in  the  later  years.  The 
looseness  of  the  business  methods  was  such  that  mil- 
lions were  spent,  and  no  one  had  any  vouchers  or 
records  to  show  for  what,  and  no  records  of  goods 
received  in  America  or  otherwise  accounted  for  by 

1 Doniol,  iii.  317.  2 Letters  to  his  Wife,  i.  166,  171. 

8 Johnston’s  Jay,  i.  210. 


FEA  TURES  OF  AMERICAN  PUBLIC  LIFE.  91 


which  to  control  the  record  of  the  expenditures. 
Goods  which  were  bought  and  paid  for  with  money 
which  had  been  begged  were  lying  in  warehouses  in 
France  or  at  Martinique,  when  the  American  army 
was  suffering  for  the  want  of  them.  This  proved  a 
lack  of  energy  in  administration. 

Franklin  was  old  and  indolent.  He  always  pro- 
tested that  he  was  not  a business  man,  and  he  was 
not  capable  of  keeping  accounts.  The  agents  were 
also  quarrelling  with  each  other  in  a way  which  was  a 
scandal  to  all  the  civilized  world,  for  they  did  not 
keep  it  a secret.  As  the  diaries,  letters,  etc.,  have 
come  before  the  public  during  the  last  century,  they 
have  revealed  a scene  of  jealousy,  backbiting,  and 
undermining,  on  the  part  of  those  men,  which  is 
shameful.  Details  of  all  this  may  here  be  passed 
over.  The  point  for  us  is  that  here  also  lack  of  dis- 
cipline and  energy  and  high-bred  self-control  was 
inflicting  deep  wounds  on  the  American  cause  and  on 
American  reputation. 

Deane  was  by  no  means  a wise  man  and  not  free 
from  blame,  but  in  the  main  he  was  a victim  of  the 
slack  methods  of  business  of  which  everybody  was 
guilty ; and  the  entire  scandal  connected  with  him, 
which  was  interwoven  with  many  of  the  most  im- 
portant political  movements  of  the  period,  may  be 
charged  to  those  methods. 


92 


ALEXANDER  HAMILTON. 


CHAPTER  VII. 

FEATURES  OF  AMERICAN  PUBLIC  LIFE,  1765-1780.  VI. 

Lack  of  discipline  in  the  Army.  — Social  disintegration.  — Sectional 
dislike.  — Youthfulness  a national  trait. 

If  such  were  the  general  characteristics  of  the 
people,  the  place  where  they  would  manifest  them- 
selves most  distinctly  must  be  the  army.  John  Adams, 
on  his  way  to  the  conference  with  Howe,  in  1776,  was 
shocked  at  the  number  of  stragglers  from  the  conti- 
nental army,  and  at  the  lack  of  discipline  in  it.  He 
came  back  earnest  for  a reform.1  As  President  of  the 
Board  of  War,  he  set  about  it.  He  describes  the  army 
as  “ a scene  of  undiscipline,  insubordination,  and  con- 
fusion.” 2 He  secured  the  adoption  of  the  English 
articles  of  war  without  change,  but  the  consequence 
of  that  seems  to  have  been  that  they  were  not  en- 
forced. Washington’s  general  orders  show  that  he 
was  constantly  approving  of  the  decisions  of  court- 
martials  on  cases  of  discipline,  against  his  will,  being 
dissatisfied  with  them  as  inadequate  to  discipline. 

There  was  constant  difficulty  during  the  war  with 
the  naval  commanders.8  The  discipline  on  the  ships 

1 Letters  to  his  Wife,  i.  213,  255. 

3 Adams,  iii.  200. 


2 Adams,  iii.  86. 


FEA  TURKS  OF  AMERICAN  PUBLIC  LIFE.  93 


seems  also  to  have  been  very  poor.  The  captain  of 
the  frigate  on  which  Adams  went  to  Europe  let  his 
officers  and  men  go  ashore,  and  was  obliged  to  go  / 
after  them  before  he  could  get  them  aboard  ship 
again.1  The  story  of  Paul  Jones  is  one  long  series  of 
woes  on  this  head.  An  American  frigate  seems  to  have 
been  a scene  of  mutiny  and  quarrelling.  The  story  of 
Gillon  and  the  South  Carolina  frigate,  although  it  was 
never  officially  investigated,  is  one  of  criminal  un- 
discipline, when  we  consider  what  suffering  was  in- 
flicted on  the  army  by  the  neglect  to  discharge  duty 
according  to  strict  principles.  Adams  came  home 
on  a French  frigate,  and  speaks  with  admiration  and 
surprise  of  the  good  feeling  and  the  smoothness  with 
which  things  went  on.2 

Kalb  says  that  an  officer  would  leave  his  post  at  the 
beginning  of  a battle,  with  or  without  an  explanation 
to  his  superior,  and  when  he  pleased  would  return, 
draw  pay  and  rations,  and  no  questions  were  asked.3 
Graydon  mentions  a Pennsylvania  colonel  who  went 
home  on  leave  and  never  came  back.4  It  is  almost 
impossible  to  form  an  idea  how  many  effective  troops 
were  at  any  time  under  arms,  because  the  evidence 
is  overwhelming  that  the  paper  returns  bear  only  a 
remote  relation  to  that  fact.  Washington  wrote  to 
Reed,  January,  1776,  that  the  total  number  of  his 
army,  on  paper,  was  10,500,  but  that  a large  number 
of  these  were  returned  “not  joined,”  whom  he  never 
expected  to  see.  It  does  not  appear  that  there  was 

1 Adams,  iii.  95.  2 Ibid.,  224. 

3 Kalb,  129.  4 Memoir,  181. 


94 


ALEXANDER  HAMILTON. 


any  method  of  discipline  for  this.1  Lee  and  Gates 
are  notorious  instances  of  officers  who  attempted  to 
carry  on  separate  operations  against  the  orders  of 
Washington. 

This  undiscipline  often  went  to  the  extent  of  civil 
crime.  Reed  wrote  to  Washington,  in  1781,  that  he 
had  sent  a sum  of  money  to  camp,  by  an  officer,  to 
be  paid  in  bounties  to  the  soldiers.  The  latter  com- 
plained that  they  had  never  received  it.  The  officer 
admitted  that  he  had  spent  it,  but  a court-martial 
failed,  on  account  of  the  unwillingness  of  the  officers 
to  serve  on  it.2  In  September,  1776,  Washington 
complained  of  plundering  by  his  own  troops,  on  pre- 
tence that  the  goods  belonged  to  tories.  He  men- 
tions a case  of  an  officer  who  led  in  this  business, 
taking  even  a pier-glass  and  woman’s  dress,  and  who, 
when  ordered  by  his  superior  to  desist,  refused.  It 
was  only  after  Washington  forced  a reconsideration 
of  the  finding  of  a court-martial  that  this  officer  was 
cashiered.3  Having  given  orders,  in  1777,  that  horses 
belonging  to  tories  should  be  taken,  he  found  that, 
under  cover  of  it,  general  plundering  went  on,  and  he 
was  obliged  to  rescind  the  order.4  The  case  of  Amy 
Darden’s  horse,  which  was  stolen  by  an  officer,  be- 
came famous.  It  occupied  Congress  far  down  into 
this  century  as  a “claim.”  6 

To  the  citizen  there  was  little  difference  between 
plunder  and  impressment.  Impressment  was  the  last 

1 Reed’s  Reed,  i.  143.  2 Reed’s  Reed,  ii.  300. 

8 Washington,  iv.  119.  4 Bland  Papers,!  71. 

6 Johnson’s  Greene,  ii.  327. 


FEA  TURKS  OF  AMERICAN  PUBLIC  LIFE.  9 5 


resource,  when  the  lack  of  organization  and  efficient 
administration  had  produced  their  ultimate  results. 
The  effects  of  it  were  ruinous  to  the  cause.  It  was, 
of  course,  anarchy  in  administration,  and  made  the 
people  hostile  to  the  cause.  It  was  exercised  first 
against  tories,  and  fell  in  with  the  general  abuse  of 
that  class ; but  then  also  against  whigs,  or  anybody 
who  had  what  was  wanted.  In  1777  Congress  passed 
some  very  angry  resolutions  against  woollen  manu- 
facturers who  would  not  deliver  goods  until  they  got 
their  pay,  “ thereby  adding  extortion  to  the  crime  of 
injuring  the  public  credit.”  They  ordered  the  clothier 
to  seize  the  goods.1  This  was  a good  way  to  make 
cloth  scarce  afterward.  In  1780  it  is  noted  that  the 
farmers  of  Pennsylvania  would  be  willing  to  submit  to 
England,  being  alienated  by  impressments.2  In  1780 
Reed  writes  that  the  number  of  wagons  has  amazingly 
diminished.  In  one  county  where  there  were  for- 
merly r,620  there  are  now  but  370.  The  reason  is 
that  wagons  have  been  impressed  without  payment.3 
Marshall  inveighs  against  the  impressment  of  horses 
in  harvest-time.  He  mentions  a horse-race,  and  says 
that  those  are  the  horses  which  should  have  been 
taken.4  In  1781  there  was  more  difficulty  to  get 
wagons  in  Pennsylvania.5 

The  abuse  of  the  tories  drove  many  of  them  to 
become  outlaws,  and  the  special  exactions  levied  on 
them  were  at  least  made  an  excuse  by  a number  of 


1 Journ.  Cong.,  iii.  466. 

8 Reed's  Reed,  ii.  215. 

6 Penn.  Arch.,  ix.  420. 


2 Reed’s  Reed,  ii.  2S4. 
4 Diary,  255. 


96 


ALEXANDER  HAMILTON. 


freebooters,  who  affected  to  rob  tax-collectors  or  to 
execute  reprisals.  One  of  the  most  celebrated  of 
these  was  Captain  Fitz,  in  Chester  County,  Penn- 
sylvania.1 Others  were  Fanning  and  McGirth  in 
North  Carolina.2 *  In  1779  there  was  a band  of  tory 
freebooters  in  Monmouth  County,  New  Jersey.8  In 
1781  the  Governor  of  New  Jersey  offered  a reward  for 
Moody,  who  with  a gang  had  twice  robbed  the  mail. 
Moody  offered  a reward  for  the  Governor,  delivered 
to  the  provost  in  New  York.4  These  cases  show  the 
disintegration  of  society  at  the  time.  The  methods 
of  the  outlaws  were  often  a queer  echo  of  the  methods 
of  the  committees. 

The  foreign  observers  were  most  astonished,  in  the 
American  army,  by  the  neglect  of  pickets  and  scouts, 
and  the  general  lack  of  means  of  intelligence.  Lack  of 
hard  money  was  one  great  cause  of  this,  because  intelli- 
gence could  be  got  only  for  money  which  would  pass 
in  both  camps.  It  is  evident,  however,  that  a deeper 
cause  lay  in  the  same  habits  and  disposition  which  we 
have  noted.  The  battle  of  Long  Island 6 and  the  forts 
in  the  Highlands  were  lost  for  lack  of  proper  pickets. 
Wayne  did  not  admit  that  he  was  surprised  at  the 
Paoli  massacre,  and  he  did  have  pickets  set ; but  in 
that  case  the  incident  must  be  attributed  to  the  bad 
method  of  encamping,  of  which  more  in  a moment. 
Kalb  often  expresses  his  wonder  at  the  neglect  under 

1 Futhey  and  Cope,  548 ; Penn.  Arch.,  ix.  596. 

2 Caruthers,  139  et  seq.  8 Moore’s  Diary,  ii.  125. 

4 Moore’s  Diary,  ii.  466. 

5 Long  Island  Hist.  Soc.  Mem.,  iii.  173  et  seq. 


FEA  TURKS  OF  AMERICAN  PUBLIC  LIFE.  97 

this  head.  “ They  have  no  idea  of  a system  of  pickets 
and  outposts.”  1 When  pursuing  the  English  through 
New  Jersey,  in  1778,  Hamilton  wrote  to  Washington 
showing  that  they  could  do  nothing  for  lack  of  ade- 
quate information.2 *  Anburey  says  that  the  English  did 
not  have  good  information.  Their  neglect  to  use  their 
opportunities  would  seem  to  prove  it  true.  D’Estaing 
complained  that  the  Americans  never  had  good  infor- 
mation. That  which  Washington  gave  him  was  always 
either  old  or  incorrect.  The  French  messengers  trav- 
elled at  night,  which  the  American  messengers  would 
not  do.4  De  Choin  told  D’Estaing  : “ Marches  are  not 
made  here  army  fashion,  but  like  hordes  of  Tartars. 
They  encamp  almost  without  precaution,  in  such  a way 
that  they  might  be  cut  off  or  captured  by  parties  such 
as  the  enemy  would  send  out.”  5 Speaking  of  Wash- 
ington’s army  in  New  York,  in  the  summer  of  1776, 
Graydon  says  that  the  numbers  were  exaggerated; 
“ and  the  irregularity,  want  of  discipline,  bad  arms, 
and  defective  equipment  in  all  respects  of  this  multi- 
tudinous assembly  gave  no  favourable  impression  of  its 
prowess.”  6 

It  is  a remarkable  fact  that  the  foreigners  at  that 
time  often  expressed  astonishment  at  the  slowness  of 
the  colonists.7  Kalb  blames  Washington  for  slow- 
ness.8 He  says  of  himself  that  he  had  to  do  all  his 

1 Kalb,  139,  141,  218.  2 Works,  vii.  548. 

3 Anburey,  ii.  240.  4 Doniol,  iii.  461. 

5 Doniol,  iii.  342.  6 Graydon,  147. 

" Anburey,  ii.  70;  Doniol,  iii.  382. 

8 Kalb,  125. 


7 


98 


ALEXANDER  HAMILTON. 


own  writing  because  his  aids  were  too  lazy.1  This 
trait  seems  to  be  connected  with  the  general  easy- 
going temper.  It  raises  an  interesting  question  as  to 
when  and  how  the  Americans  took  on  the  character 
of  highly  strained  nervous  energy,  which  has  marked 
them  in  later  times.  Traces  of  it  are  hardly  to  be 
found  until  after  the  second  war.  It  has  always  been 
presented  side  by  side  with  an  ability  to  spend  time 
in  absolutely  vacuous  idleness  which  no  other  people 
shows  in  the  same  degree. 

The  war  and  the  army  acted  as  great  educators  on 
the  people  in  the  way  of  rubbing  them  together,  cor- 
recting provincialism  on  all  sides,  and  gradually  mod- 
erating sectional  dislike.  This  last,  at  the  beginning 
of  the  contest,  was  intense,  and  as  it  was  an  obstacle  to 
union  it  deserves  attention.  In  1760  Franklin  argued 
that  the  colonies  could  never  be  united  against  Eng- 
land, because  they  all  loved  the  mother-country  much 
more  than  they  loved  each  other.2  Graydon’s  Memoir 
contains  extreme  expressions  of  contempt  for  New 
England  men.  “ I have  in  vain  endeavoured  to  ac- 
count for  the  very  few  gentlemen  and  men  of  the 
world  that  at  this  time  appeared  in  arms  from  this 
country  [New  England] , which  might  be  considered 
as  the  cradle  of  the  Revolution.  There  were  some, 
indeed,  in  the  higher  ranks,  and  here  and  there  a 
young  man  of  decent  breeding  in  the  capacity  of  an 
aide-de-camp  or  brigade-major,  but  anything  above 
the  condition  of  a clown  in  the  regiments  we  came  in 
contact  with  was  truly  a rarity.  Was  it  that  the  cause 
1 Kalb,  173.  2 Franklin,  iv.  42. 


FEATURES  OF  AMERICAN  PUBLIC  LIFE.  99 


was  only  popular  among  the  yeomanry?  Was  it  that 
men  of  fortune  and  condition  there,  as  in  other  parts 
of  the  continent,  though  evidently  most  interested  in  a 
contest  whose  object  was  to  rescue  American  property 
from  the  grasp  of  British  avidity,  were  willing  to  de- 
volve the  fighting  business  on  the  poorer  and  humbler 
classes?”1 *  This  sectional  feeling  had  very  great 
political  effect.  Perhaps  the  effects  of  it  can  be 
traced  down  to  the  civil  war.  We  have  already 
noted  that  the  first  parties  which  arose  in  Congress 
were  drawn  partly  on  this  line.  The  New  England 
officers  met  with  unfair  treatment^  There  was  a 
fear  of  the  “ levelling  ” principles  of  New  England.3 

One  subject  of  dispute  was  as  to  the  value  of  militia. 
John  Adams  favoured  a militia  system  with  short  en- 
listments.4 He  got  some  support  in  New  England, 
but  the  opinion  in  general  was  strongly  contemptuous 
toward  militia.  Greene  said  that  he  had  more  of 
them  than  he  wanted.3  Washington  complained  con- 
stantly of  the  system  of  short  enlistments  and  militia 
reinforcements.  The  Frenchmen  made  fun  of  the 
militia.6  Lauzun  says  that  they  ran  away  at  the  first 
fire.7  Lafayette  told  the  French  commander,  speak- 
ing from  his  knowledge  of  the  American  troops,  that 
if  an  energetic  attack  was  to  be  made,  he  should  desire 
to  see  the  French  troops  lead.8  On  the  other  hand, 
the  militia  defeated  and  captured  Burgoyne.  It  is 


1 Graydon,  157. 

3 Adams,  ii.  350. 

5 Reed’s  Reed,  ii.  344. 

7 Lauzun,  203. 


2 Adams,  iii.  67. 

4 Ibid.,  iii.  48. 

6 Doniol,  iii.  342. 
8 Doniol,  iii.  341. 


IOO 


ALEXANDER  HAMILTON. 


true  that  they  greatly  outnumbered  him,  but  the  Eng- 
lishman Anburey  shows  through  his  whole  narrative 
great  respect  for  the  American  troops ; Riedesel  like- 
wise. At  the  investigation  of  Burgoyne’s  campaign, 
in  England,  Lord  Balcarres,  who  had  been  an  officer 
in  the  expedition,  was  asked  why  the  Americans  did 
not  defend  their  intrenchments.  He  replied,  be- 
cause “ they  always  marched  out  of  them  and  attacked 
us.”  “ They  fought  at  all  times  with  courage  and  obsti- 
nacy.” The  attack  on  Stony  Point,  being  an  assault 
of  a fortified  place,  raised  the  confidence  and  reputa- 
tion of  the  troops.1  This  was  the  sort  of  work  which 
they  were  thought  incapable  of.  It  remained  an  open 
question  whether,  if  an  adequate  system  could  have 
been  devised,  suited  to  the  character  of  the  people 
and  their  habits  of  life,  for  organizing  the  militia,  and 
bringing  them  into  the  field  in  overpowering  numbers 
upon  special  occasion,  they  might  not  have  proved 
very  successful.  As  it  was,  the  American  army  was  a 
caricature  of  a European  army  in  the  style  of  Fred- 
erick the  Great. 

Unfortunately  the  medical  department  of  the  army 
presented  the  same  deplorable  features  which  we  have 
been  obliged  to  notice  elsewhere.  In  1776  the  sur- 
geons were  bickering  with  each  other.2  A letter  is 
printed  from  Dr.  Shippen,  in  1 777,  complaining  of 
neglect  and  fraud  in  the  medical  department  of  the 
army,  with  allegations  of  corruption  against  the  direc- 
tor of  it,  although  he  does  not  want  to  be  called  upon 


1 Kalb,  174. 


s Washington,  iv.  117. 


FEA  TURES  OF  AMERICAN  PUBLIC  LIFE.  I O I 


to  make  the  allegations  good.1  In  April,  1778, 
Washington  transmitted  to  Congress  a letter  from  Dr. 
Rush,  making  charges  against  Dr.  Shippen.2  When  he 
took  office,  in  1781,  Robert  Morris  told  a committee 
of  Congress  that  “ the  expenses  of  the  medical  depart- 
ment are  said  to  have  exceeded  those  of  the  like  kind 
in  any  other  country.”  8 

The  facts  which  have  now  been  presented  suffice  to 
show  that  the  great  faults  in  the  public  affairs  of  the 
United  States  at  this  time  were  indolence,  negligence, 
lack  of  administrative  energy  and  capacity,  dislike  of 


any  methodical  business- like  "system,  and  carelessness 


asTiTTCroney  responsibility  and  credit.  It  was  alleged" 
against  the  Americans  that  they  were  selfish.  In  thet 
relations  with  France  they  seemed  so.  £jhey  seemed 
to  lack  pride  and  self-respect  where  money  could  be 
got.^)  It  is,  however,  questionable  whether  this  was 
correctly  ascribed  to  selfishness.  It  was  rather  a lack 
of  generosity  and  magnanimity  ; and  upon  close  study 
it  seems  that  these  faults  are  not  correctly  described, 
in  the  case  of  the  Americans,  as  due  to  selfishness. 
The  ungenerosity  was  of  the  kind  manifested  by  chil- 
dren. It  arose  from  the  same  cause  as  the  ungener- 
osity of  children ; namely,  lack  of  sense  of  the  great 
law  of  equivalence.  A man  with  experience  of  the 
world  finds  that  there  are  few  things  to  be  got  for 
nothing.  His  mind  inevitably  reverts  to  the  cost  or 
equivalent.  He  reduces,  his  expectations  to  the  meas- 
ure of  the  equivalents  he  can  give.  Children,  on  the 

1 Lee’s  Lee,  ii.  171.  2 Journ.  Cong.,  iv.  133. 

8 Dip.  Corr.  Rev.,  xi.  356. 


102 


ALEXANDER  HAMILTON. 


I contrary,  expect  all  things,  or  are  ready  to  conceive 
Jof  the  possibility  that  things  may  come  for  nothing. 
(This  seems  to  have  been  the  American  trait,  and  it 
fell  in  with  all  the  youthful  circumstances  of  their  case. 
It  provokes  a smile  to  see  with  what  sublime  confi- 
dence they  planned  this,  or  asked  for  that,  without 
proposing  any  equivalent.  Laurens  argued  to  Ver- 
gennes  that  it  was  for  the  interest  of  France  to  help  the 
Americans  through  the  war,  at  a time  when,  as  he  and 
Vergennes  both  very  well  knew,  the  Americans  were 
subjecting  themselves  to  no  extraordinary  self-denial 
to  carry  themselves  through  it.1  The  Frenchman 
remonstrated  against  the  demands,  but  made  no  im- 
polite reference  to  the  comparison  which  was  possible  ; 
but,  in  effect,  Laurens’s  argument  put  France  in  the 
position  of  a dupe.  The  agent,  or  go-between,  of 
the  Spanish  Minister  at  last  replied  to  Jay : “ But  you 
offer  no  consideration."  2 

With  these  facts  of  the  situation  before  us  we  see 
that  the  first  statesman  of  the  period  would  be  the 
man  who  most  clearly  perceived  the  faults  and  needs 
of  the  country  in  civil  administration,  union,  armyj 
anxi~nnance.  We  can  also  easily  anticipate  that  the 
attempt  to  introduce  needed  reforms,  and  to  raise 
"lthe  tone  of  civil  and  political  affairs,  would  bring  the 
/author  into  sharp  collision  with  all  popular  prejudices, 
1 habits,  tastes,  and  notions.  Also  that,  if  the  attempt 
to  introduce  energy  into  the  administration,  discipline 
into  the  army,  cohesion  into  the  union,  punctuality 
into  the  finances,  was  pushed  faster  and  farther  than  the 
1 Dip.  Corr.  Rev.,  ix.  236.  2 Ibid.,  vii.  354. 


FEA  TURES  OF  AMERICAN  PUBLIC  LIFE.  103 

temper  of  the  people  for  the  time  being  would  permit, 
the  reforms  would  suffer  shipwreck  from  the  revolt  of 
the  masses  against  the  operation  to  which  they  were 
subjected.  In  these  observations  we  have  the  clew  to 
the  career  of  Alexander  Hamilton. 


104 


ALEXANDER  HAMILTON. 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

Hamilton’s  military  service  ; earliest  financial 

SCHEMES  ; SERVICE  IN  CONGRESS ; ASSISTANCE  IN 
THE  ADMINISTRATION  AND  REFORM  OF  THE  FI- 
NANCES. 

We  left  him  an  officer  of  artillery  at  the  beginning 
of  1776.  Near  the  end  of  that  year  he  was  appointed 
on  Washington’s  staff,  and  became  his  confidential  sec- 
retary. The  General  had  been  for  six  months  in  great 
need  of  an  officer  of  that  kind.1  He  found  one  who 
was  just  what  he  needed.  Hamilton  was  industrious. 
He  wrote  a clear  style,  although  prolix.  He  was  ca- 
pable of  taking  the  General’s  orders,  and  composing  a 
letter  to  publish  them,  which  would  rank  as  of  very 
high  literary  merit  among  the  writings  of  those  days. 
He  was  also  a studious  man,  and  was  studying  topics 
of  finance  and  administration.2  The  number  of  im- 
portant and  confidential  missions  on  which  he  was 
employed  is  proof  of  his  competency  in  a variety  of 
directions. 

Of  these,  one  of  the  most  important,  and  one  which 
brought  distinctly  before  him  the  evils  of  poor  disci- 
pline, was  the  errand  on  which  he  was  sent  to  Albany, 
in  November,  1777,  to  obtain  reinforcements  from  the 

1 Reed’s  Reed,  i.  127. 


2 Republic,  i.  122. 


HIS  MILITARY  SERVICE. 


I°5 

Northern  army  in  the  hope  of  driving  the  British  out  of 
Philadelphia.  This  boy  of  twenty  had  to  execute  a 
diplomatic  mission  of  great  delicacy  with  the  man  who 
at  the  moment  was  the  great  hero,  having  all  the  credit 
for  capturing  Burgoyne.  He  only  partially  succeeded, 
but  the  letters  which  he  wrote  are  very  extraordinary 
productions  from  a man  of  that  age.  He  also  on  the 
same  errand  had  a similar  difficulty  to  get  troops 
from  Putnam,  who  was  also  a great  man  by  age  and 
reputation. 

On  account  of  his  ability  to  speak  and  write  French, 
he  was  very  useful  in  the  conferences  with  the  French 
generals  after  the  French  army  arrived.  His  most 
intimate  friend  at  this  period  was  John  Laurens,  who 
was  perhaps  the  most  interesting  hero  of  the  war.  In 
1778  Hamilton  was  Laurens’s  second  in  a duel  with 
Gen.  Charles  Lee ; Laurens  being  the  challenger  on 
account  of  words  defamatory  of  Washington  which 
Lee  was  reported  to  have  used.  Lee  was  very 
slightly  wounded.  In  1780  Hamilton  was  in  attend- 
ance on  Washington  when  Arnold’s  treason  was  dis- 
covered. He  has  left  the  best  account  of  that  affair 
which  we  possess.  He  was  much  interested  in  Andr£, 
and  desired  that  his  request  to  be  shot,  not  hanged, 
might  be  granted.2 

Although  Hamilton  was  probably  aware  of  his  use- 
fulness on  the  staff,  for  he  never  lacked  self-apprecia- 
tion, he  was  eager  for  military  renown.  His  friend 
Laurens  had  the  same  passion.  Very  probably  they 
strengthened  each  other  in  it.  Hamilton’s  first  appli- 
1 Works,  vii.  562.  2 Works,  viii.  18. 


106  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON. 

cation  to  Washington,  in  1780,  for  an  appointment  in 
the  line  was  refused,  because  there  was  no  post  to 
which  he  could  be  assigned  without  calling  out  some 
of  the  jealousies  of  which  there  had  been  so  many. 

In  February,  1781,  he  quarrelled  with  Washington 
in  a way  which  manifested  bumptiousness  on  his 
part.  The  letter  which  he  wrote  to  his  father-in-law, 
Schuyler,  about  the  affair  is  also  disagreeable  reading. 
He  repelled  some  advances  made  by  Washington  to 
a reconciliation,  not  with  churlishness,  it  is  true,  but 
with  a rather  affected  dignity.  However  they  parted 
friends,  and  the  incident  produced  no  estrangement. 
It  does  not  appear,  however,  that  there  ever  was  a 
warm  personal  attachment  between  them,  as  there 
was  between  Washington  and  Laurens,  or  Washington 
and  Lafayette.  In  his  letter  to  Schuyler,  Hamilton 
says  that  Washington  is  not  delicate  or  good-tem- 
pered. He  had  long  been  determined,  when  the 
breach  came,  not  to  stay ; and  he  says,  with  some 
sense,  that  Washington’s  self-love  would  never  forgive 
him,  if  he  (Washington)  should  make  concessions. 
“ For  three  years  past  I have  felt  no  friendship  for 
him,  and  have  professed  none.  The  truth  is  our  dis- 
positions are  the  opposite  of  each  other,  and  the 
pride  of  my  temper  would  not  permit  me  to  profess 
what  I did  not  feel.  Indeed,  when  advances  of  this 
kind  have  been  made  to  me  on  his  part,  they  were 
received  in  a manner  which  showed  at  least  that 
I had  no  desire  to  court  them,  and  that  I desired  to 
stand  rather  on  a footing  of  military  confidence  than 
of  private  attachment.  You  are  too  good  a judge  of 


HIS  EARLIEST  FINANCIAL  SCHEMES.  107 


human  nature  not  to  be  sensible  how  this  conduct  in 
me  must  have  operated  on  a man  to  whom  all  the 
world  is  offering  incense.  With  this  key  you  will 
readily  unlock  the  present  mystery.” 

In  that  summer  he  found  the  opportunity  for  active 
Service  which  he  had  desired,  and  joined  the  expedi- 
tion to  Virginia,  which  ended  in  the  surrender  of 
Cornwallis.  At  the  final  assault  on  the  works,  he 
distinguished  himself  among  the  first.1  He  had  been 
married  on  the  14th  of  December,  1780,  to  Eliza- 
beth Schuyler ; and  the  two  letters  which  he  wrote 
to  his  wife,  to  inform  her  that  he  was  going  to  York- 
town,  show  a gentle  side  of  his  character  which  ap- 
pears but  little  in  those  letters  of  his  which  have 
been  preserved. 

The  first  attempt  made  by  Hamilton  to  act  on 
public  affairs  was  a letter  which  he  wrote  on  a plan  IS 
for  a bank.2  Mr.  Lodge  dates  this  letter  1780,  and 
says  that  it  was  written  to  Robert  Morris,  who  had 
just  undertaken  the  management  of  the  finances. 
Morris  was  not  elected  Superintendent  of  Finance 
until  1781.  The  letter  is  addressed  to  a member  of 
Congress,  who  is  not  mentioned  by  name.  Morris 
was  not  in  Congress  after  1778.  J.  C.  Hamilton  says 
that  the  letter  was  written  “ soon  after  the  army  en- 
tered winter  quarters  at  Morristown.” 8 The  finan- 
cial circumstances  mentioned  in  the  letter  carry  it  to 
the  month  of  November,  1779. 

1 Lee’s  Southern  War,  ii.  341.  He  had  also  won  military 
distinction  in  the  Brandywine  campaign.  (Ibid.,  i.  19.) 

2 Works,  iii.  61.  3 Republic,  i.  570. 


io8 


ALEXANDER  HAMILTON. 


The  importance  attaching  to  the  question  of  the 
date  is  that,  if  it  goes  back  to  1779,  it  was  earlier 
than  the  first  beginning  of  the  bank  at  Philadelphia. 
We  must  infer  either  that  the  letter  was  written  to 
some  other  member  of  Congress  than  Morris,  or  that 
Hamilton  supposed  Morris  to  be  in  Congress  when 
he  was  not.  The  letter  was  sent  without  signature, 
but  he  gave  an  address,  by  which  a reply  might  reach 
him.  In  his  letter  to  Morris  of  April,  1781,  he  does 
not  refer  back  to  this  letter.  It  is  not  therefore  prob- 
able that  a reply  was  made  to  it  by  Morris,  if  it  was 
sent  to  him,  as  the  whole  tenor  of  it  would  certainly 
lead  one  to  suppose. 

He  says  that  the  document  of  1779  is  “ the  prod- 
uct of  some  reading  on  the  subject  of  commerce  and 
finance.”  It  is  not  easy  to  see  what  he  could  have 
read. 

There  is  a tradition  that  he  read  Adam  Smith,  and 
made  a careful  commentary  upon  “The  Wealth  of 
Nations,”  in  1783,  which  is  now  lost.1  Nothing  in 
his  writings  goes  to  prove  that  he  ever  read  Adam 
Smith.  By  this  it  is  not  intended  to  say  that  a man 
who  had  read  Smith  with  care  must  accept  his  con- 
clusions. Many  men  have  read  him  without  agreeing 
with  him  at  all ; but  it  is  not  often  that  an  intelli- 
gent man,  eager  to  learn  all  he  can,  has,  after  reading 
Smith,  been  able  to  repeat  the  notions  of  the  mercan- 
tilists, as  Hamilton  did,  without  at  least  feeling  bound 
to  take  some  note  of  the  objections  which  Smith 
brought  against  them.  Neither  does  Hamilton  show 

1 Republic,  ii.  514. 


HIS  EARLIEST  FINANCIAL  SCHEMES.  109 


that  he  had  read  Hume’s  economic  writings  with  care 
and  profit,  although  Hume  was  the  chief  authority 
then  in  the  hands  of  people  who  busied  themselves 
with  economic  topics.1  Much  less  does  he  seem  to 
have  read  any  of  the  French  economists  who  were 
just  at  the  time  attracting  attention.  Dupont’s  “ Table 
Economique  ” was  published  in  1779,  and  was  in  the 
hands  of  Franklin  at  once,2  but  of  course  could 
not  have  been  used  by  Hamilton ; but  even  later 
he  does  not  appear  to  have  read  the  contempo- 
raneous French  writers.3  The  only  mention  of 
any  writers  of  that  school  in  his  works  is  in  his  re- 
view of  Jefferson’ s first  message,  in  which  he  refers 
contemptuously  to  Turgot  and  Condorcet.4  The 
writers  whose  influence  seems  to  be  traceable  in  his 
opinions  are  Montesquieu,  Melon,  and  Law,  espe- 
cially the  two  latter.5  He  refers  to  Law  in  this  letter 
of  1779,  and  in  the  one  to  Duane,  six  months  later. 

1 He  quotes  Hume,  in  “ The  Farmer  Refuted”  (1775),  on 
points  of  political  philosophy  (Works,  i.  70,  78)  ; also  in  the 
“Federalist”  (Works,  ix.  551).  In  the  “ Continentalist  ” 
(1781)  he  tries  to  interpret  Hume’s  doctrine  of  the  balance  of 
trade  (Works,  i.  256),  on  which  see  page  180.  In  the  conven- 
tion of  1787  he  quotes  Hume  as  to  the  utility  of  corruption 
in  the  English  system  (Works,  iii.  390).  In  his  paper  on  a 
national  bank  (1781),  he  quotes  Hume  as  to  the  amount  of 
the  circulation  in  Great  Britain  (Works,  iii.  86). 

2 Franklin,  viii.  405. 

3 In  his  letter  to  Morris,  1781,  he  once  uses  the  word 
“ numerary,”  which  would  seem  to  indicate  French  reading. 
(Works,  iii.  103.) 

4 Works,  vii.  245. 

5 He  does  not  mention  Melon. 


I IO 


ALEXANDER  HAMILTON. 


In  the  present  letter  he  credits  Law  with  “ more 
penetration  than  integrity  ; ” and  the  reason  for  cred- 
iting him  with  penetration  is  that  he  “ saw  that  no 
plan  could  succeed  which  did  not  unite  the  interest 
and  credit  of  rich  individuals  with  those  of  the  state, 
and  upon  this  he  framed  the  idea  of  his  project, 
which,  so  far,  agreed  in  principle  with  the  Bank  of 
England.”  1 

This  notion  of  holding  up  the  government  by  giv- 
ing rich  men  an  interest  in  it  is  one  which  has  often 
been  charged  upon  Hamilton,  but  it  plays  no  impor- 
tant part  in  any  of  his  later  discussions,  and  might 
rather  be  regarded  as  one  of  the  notions  in  this  docu- 
ment which  he  outgrew.  For  the  scheme  in  the 
letter  of  1779  is  crude  in  the  extreme.  It  is  not  a 
plan  for  a bank,  but  for  a trading  company,  in  which 
the  government  and  a company  of  rich  men  were 
to  be  jointly  interested.  It  reminds  one  of  the 
attempts  in  the  early  part  of  the  Revolutionary  War, 
through  the  Committee  on  Commerce,  to  carry  on 
trade  as  a means  of  raising  money  for  Congress. 
He  proposes  a foreign  loan  of  ten  million  dollars, 
the  need  of  a foreign  loan  being  at  the  time  one 
of  his  firm  convictions.  Then  he  proposes  to  take 
subscriptions  for  two  hundred  millions  of  continen- 
tal paper  at  twenty  for  one,  which  would  be  ten 
millions  more.  The  government  puts  in  the  former 
and  the  private  subscribers  the  latter.  The  notes 
were  to  bear  interest  at  two  per  cent,  payable  in 
three  months.  He  admits  that  he  is  not  clear  as 
1 Locke  is  barely  mentioned  in  Works,  i.  59. 


HIS  EARLIEST  FINANCIAL  SCHEMES.  Ill 


to  whether  the  principal  of  the  notes  should  be 
payable  at  the  three  months’  limit  or  not.  The 
scheme  presents  no  workable  device.  It  is  related  to 
those  which  every  other  man  had  in  his  pocket  in 
1875.  Unfortunately,  it  is  mutilated  at  the  part 
where  he  undertakes  to  set  forth  how  it  would  work. 
At  last  its  success  must  have  depended  on  the  success 
of  the  commercial  enterprises,  and  on  the  success  of 
the  government  in  getting  in  loans  and  taxes.  In 
this  letter  he  urges  that  there  should  be  a head  of 
the  treasury,  and  says  that  the  person  he  is  addressing 
is  the  one  for  the  place. 

In  August,  r 780,  a convention  was  held  at  Boston, 
one  of  the  series  of  price  conventions,  which  recom- 
mended a closer  union.  Hamilton  caught  up  the 
proposition,  and  wrote  to  the  president  of  the  conven- 
tion, in  Washington’s  name,  approving  and  expressing 
a hope  that  something  would  come  of  the  proposition. 
In  October  he  wrote  a letter  which  is  dated  at  Boston,1 
in  which  he  said  : “ We  must  have  a government  with 
more  power.”  In  February,  r78i,  he  said  that  the 
complete  ratification  of  the  confederation  would  be  a 
good  thing,  unless  it  made  the  people  think  that 
Congress  had  power  enough,  and  so  prevented  it 
from  getting  more.2  In  the  summer  of  that  year  he 
published  the  “ Continentalist  ” 3 papers,  describing  the 

1 Works,  viii.  29.  2 Ibid.,  34. 

3 The  word  “ continental  ’’  and  its  derivatives  sound  strangely 
to  modern  ears.  They  were  devised  to  get  a word  for  “ the 
whole  ” which  should  have  no  political  color,  like  Union, 

Confederation,  etc.  Therefore  continental  stands  in  the  sense 


1 12 


ALEXANDER  HAMILTON. 


forlorn  state  of  things,  blaming  State  particularism  for 
it,  and  urging  a revision  of  the  confederation  so  as  to 
make  a more  perfect  union.  He  was  led  on  to  dis- 
cuss the  whole  political  and  economic  situation. 

His  next  contribution  to  public  questions  was  a 
letter  to  Duane,  Sept.  3,  1780.1  This  letter  is  the 
document  which  shows  that  he  had  seized  the  main 
faults  and  difficulties  in  the  state  of  the  country, 
in  1 780,  and  traced  them  to  their  true  causes.  He 
urged  that  the  Union  was  defective,  although  the 
Articles  of  Confederation  were  not  yet  adopted. 
The  States  have  too  much  power,  especially  over 
the  army.  There  is  a want  of  energy  in  the  admin- 
istration. He  wants  a single  head  to  each  depart- 
ment, and  wants  a convention  called  to  meet  on 
the  first  of  the  next  November  to  settle  a “ con- 
federation.” 2 He  would  not  wait  for  the  States  to 
be  called  on  for  amendments.  [When  we  note  the 
impracticability  of  that  means  of  amendment,  as.  it 
was  afterward  developed  by  experiment,  we  must 
regard  this  as  a very  clear-sighted  judgment.]  He 
wanted  the  new  Constitution  to  give  Congress  com- 
plete control  of  the  army,  navy,  commerce,  diplomacy, 
etc.  He  enumerates  in  detail  all  the  important  func- 

which  we  now  give  to  national.  A man  who  held  continental 
views  was  the  precursor  of  a federalist,  and  the  “ continen- 
talist  ” meant  what  ten  years  later  was  called  a federalist, — 
that  is,  before  that  word  received  its  strict  party  application  ; 
when  it  meant  one  who  wanted  a confederation  of  the  States. 

1 Works,  i.  203. 

2 They  used  this  word  currently  in  the  sense  of  constitution 
for  a confederation. 


HIS  EARLIEST  FINANCIAL  SCHEMES.  113 


tions  of  a modem  state.  These  are  all  to  be  in  the 
federal  state.  Then  he  takes  up  ways  and  means. 
He  proposes  four,  — a foreign  loan,  which,  he  says, 
ought  to  have  been  obtained  long  ago,  taxes  in  kind, 
a bank  founded  on  public  and  private  credit,  and 
taxes  in  money.  He  sketches  his  plan  of  a bank 
briefly. 

April  30,  1781,  he  wrote  a letter  to  Morris  contain- 
ing a scheme  of  a real  bank.1  It  is  a very  elaborate 
paper.  He  starts  out  with  one  of  the  old  notions 
that  the  revenue  of  a country  is  in  some  relation  to 
its  circulation,  confounding  money  and  wealth.  By 
comparing  the  cases  of  England,  France,  and  America, 
he  reaches  the  conclusion  that  the  United  States  are 
capable  of  paying,  on  this  method  of  calculation,  a 
round  six  millions  annually,  for  all  purposes,  State  and 
federal ; but  the  needs  of  State  and  federal  expendi- 
tures are  ten  millions.  This  would  leave  four  millions 
to  be  borrowed  abroad.  So  much  cannot  be  expected 
from  France.  He  urges  a bank  to  supply  the  defi- 
ciency. “We  have  not  a sufficient  medium.”  Here 
again,  then,  he  has  gone  back  from  the  revenue, 
which  is  wealth,  to  the  medium  of  exchange,  which 
is  money.  His  bank  is  to  have  three  million  pounds, 
lawful  money  (six  shillings  to  the  dollar),  capital. 
His  reason  for  putting  it  in  “pounds”  is  that  the 
dollar  money  is  tainted  with  a prejudice  because  the 
continental  was  in  dollars.  The  capital  was  to  be 
paid  in  land  securities,  specie,  plate,  bills  of  ex- 
change, or  European  securities.  About  one  third 

1 Works,  iii.  86. 

8 


ALEXANDER  HAMILTON. 


114 

was  to  be  in  specie.  The  United  States  and  the 
States  might  subscribe  for  not  over  half  of  the  capi- 
tal. Notes  were  to  be  issued  in  pounds,  shillings,  and 
pence,  payable  at  sight ; those  under  twenty  pounds 
bearing  no  interest,  those  larger  four  per  cent.  The 
bank  was  to  buy  land  from  which  he  thought  that 
great  gains  might  be  made,  as  tories  would  put  much 
land  on  the  market  and  sell  it  cheaply.  Depositors 
were  to  pay  a fee  for  safe  keeping.  The  bank  was  to 
lend  Congress  twelve  hundred  thousand  pounds  at 
eight  per  cent,  for  the  interest  of  which  taxes  were  to 
be  laid  and  the  income  strictly  appropriated.  Other 
revenues  were  also  to  be  raised  sufficient  to  pay  the 
bank  two  per  cent  on  all  the  paper  outstanding,  at 
forty  for  one,  for  which  provision  the  bank  was  to 
guarantee  the  paper  and  retire  it  in  thirty  years. 
There  were  to  be  three  auxiliary  banks  in  Massachu- 
setts, Pennsylvania,  and  Virginia.  Finally,  he  wanted 
Congress  to  obtain  amendments  to  the  Articles  of 
Confederation,  giving  it  power  to  levy  import  duties, 
a land  tax,  and  a poll  tax,  and  to  collect  the  same  by 
its  own  agents. 

His  bank  was  a paper- money  machine,  and  the 
scheme  of  it  contained  financial  fallacies  which,  as 
we  shall  see,  he  never  conquered ; but  the  boldness 
of  the  scheme,  and  the  skill  with  which  it  was  aimed 
at  the  difficulties  of  the  situation,  are  most  remark- 
able. It  is  the  statesmanship  of  it  which  is  grand, 
not  the  finance.  He  had  seized  the  chief  faults  in 
the  existing  institutions  of  government.  He  says  that 
what  he  wants  is  “ system  and  vigour.” 


HIS  SERVICE  IN  CONGRESS. 


XI5 

Morris  replied  that  he  was  afraid  to  “interweave 
a security  with  the  capital  of  this  [his]  bank,”  lest 
the  notes  should  seem  to  be  circulated  on  that  credit, 
and  the  bank  would  fall,  if  there  should  be  a run  on 
it.  “ I not  only  think,  but  on  all  proper  occasions 
shall  say,  that  the  public  are  indebted  to  you  ” for 
this  plan.1 

In  1782  Hamilton  wrote  to  Laurens  that  to  make 
independence  a blessing  “ we  must  secure  our  Union 
on  solid  foundations,  — a herculean  task,  and  to  effect 
which  mountains  of  prejudice  must  be  levelled.”  2 

In  May,  1782,  Robert  Morris  asked  Hamilton  to 
take  the  position  of  receiver  of  continental  taxes  in 
the  State  of  New  York.  Hamilton  at  first  declined, 
but  afterward  consented.  Morris  had  great  difficulty 
to  find  any  person  for  these  offices  who  could  be 
relied  upon  to  put  any  energy  and  spirit  into  his 
work.  It  must  have  been  a great  encouragement  to 
him  to  have  somebody  take  hold  of  it  as  Hamilton 
did.  He  visited  the  Legislature  in  order  to  try  to 
persuade  them  to  conform  to  Morris’s  plans,  and 
also  made  strenuouS^-efforts  to  obtain  information 
and  report  upon  the  tax  system  of  New  York,  and 
the  state  of  the  relations  between  that  State  and  the 
federal  government.  He  held  this  position  until  he 
took  his  seat  in  Congress  in  November.3 

He  sat  in  Congress  in  the  year  1782-83,  and  there 
advocated  the  same  ideas ; although,  as  he  wrote  to 
Jay  in  July,  1 783,  “ The  road  to  popularity  in  each 

1 Dip.  Corr.  Rev.,  xi.  366.  2 Works,  viii.  72. 

8 Ibid.,  52-89. 


1 16  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON. 

State  is  to  inspire  jealousies  of  Congress,  though 
nothing  can  be  more  apparent  than  that  they  have 
no  power.1  As  early  as  1776  the  question  had  arisen 
in  his  mind  whether  Congress  ought  not  to  collect  its 
own  taxes  by  its  own  agents.2 *  This  is  one  of  the 
cardinal  features  of  an  adequate  federal  system,  and 
he  urged  it  strenuously  in  Congress.8  On  the  30th 
of  June,  1783,  he  offered  resolutions  setting  forth  in 
considerable  detail,  under  twelve  points,  the  defects 
of  the  confederation,  and  proposed  a resolution  for 
a convention  to  meet  and  revise  the  Articles.4 

In  many  respects  this  was  the  most  important 
session  of  the  Continental  Congress.  The  finances 
reached  a climax ; peace  was  concluded,  and  the 
army  disbanded.  But  these  affairs  did  not  run  their 
course  without  producing  a very  serious  crisis.  As 
the  time  approached  for  disbanding  the  army,  their 
complaints  became  louder  and  louder.  There  was 
a clear  disposition  to  get  rid  of  them  as  quickly  as 
possible  without  paying  them.  Many  wanted  to 
“ elude  the  just  pretensions  of  the  army.”  6 What 
was  an  army  one  day  would  have  been  turned  into 
the  same  number  of  tramps  the  next  day,  with  no 
means  of  obtaining  a dinner.  There  was  a project, 
which  was  construed  by  many  into  a conspiracy,  on 
the  part  of  the  two  Morrises  and  Hamilton,  to  unite 
the  interests  of  the  army,  as  creditors,  with  those 
of  the  other  creditors,  in  order  to  bring  pressure 

1 Works,  viii.  147.  2 Republic,  i.  122. 

8 Madison  Papers,  i.  288,  291,  380. 

4 Works,  i.  288.  5 Ibid.,  viii.  109. 


HIS  SERVICE  IN  CONGRESS.  1 17 

upon  Congress  to  adopt  a plan  of  revenue.  Wash- 
ington warned  Hamilton  that  this  was  suspected,  and 
that  it  would  defeat  their  own  object,  if  the  army 
should  think  its  rights  delayed  in  order  to  make 
capital  for  a project  of  congressional  policy.1  Ham- 
ilton, in  his  reply,  did  not  admit  the  objectionable 
colour  which  was  given  to  their  enterprise.  He  said 
that  there  were  in  Congress  two  classes  of  men,  — one 
attached  to  State,  the  other  to  continental  politics. 
“The  advocates  for  continental  funds  have  blended 
the  interests  of  the  army  with  other  creditors,  from  a 
conviction  that  no  funds  for  partial  purposes  will  go 
through  those  States  to  whose  citizens  the  United 
States  are  largely  indebted.”  2 

In  the  mean  time  Morris  had  become  very  tired  of 
his  position.  In  January,  1783,  he  wrote  to  Frank- 
lin: “ Imagine  the  situation  of  a man  who  is  to  direct 
the  finances  of  a country  almost  without  revenue  (for 
such  you  will  perceive  this  to  be),  surrounded  by 
creditors  whose  distresses,  while  they  increase  their 
clamour,  render  it  more  difficult  to  appease  them  ; an 
army  ready  to  disband  or  mutiny,  a government  whose 

1 Washington’s  Writings,  viii.  418. 

2 Letters  to  Washington,  iv.  17.  It  must  be  noticed  that  the 
words  “fund  ” and  “funding  ” at  this  time  were  going  through 
a change  of  meaning.  The  old  meaning,  which  is  here  em- 
ployed, was  that  of  a single  branch  of  the  revenue.  Thus  the 
income  from  a land  tax  would  be  a fund,  and  to  fund  was  to 
enact  a certain  tax  and  appropriate  the  income  from  it  to  the 
payment  of  a specific  obligation  of  the  government.  The  word 
“ fund  ” is  of  frequent  use,  however,  in  the  same  period,  for 
resources  or  means  on  hand  available  for  certain  purposes. 


Ii8  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON. 

sole  authority  consists  in  the  power  of  framing  recom- 
mendations. Surely  it  is  not  necessary  to  add  any 
colouring  to  such  a piece ; and  yet  truth  would  justify 
more  than  fancy  could  paint.” 1 Two  days  later  he 
wrote  to  Franklin  again  : “ If  one  bill  should  be  pro- 
tested, I could  no  longer  serve  the  United  States.”  2 
In  fact,  he  had  already  overdrawn  on  the  banker 
Grand  at  Paris,  but  it  had  not  as  yet  involved  a pro- 
test. The  fact  was  that  he  had  been  treated  with 
the  same  spirit  which  has  already  been  described  as 
pervading  the  treatment  of  public  affairs.  It  was 
the  custom  to  select  a man  for  some  arduous  posi- 
tion, and  then,  instead  of  giving  him  support  and 
furnishing  the  necessary  means,  to  take  an  attitude  of 
criticism  toward  him.  Morris  resigned  on  the  24th 
of  January,  1783.  “To  increase  our  debts  while  the 
prospect  of  paying  them  diminishes  does  not  consist 
with  my  ideas  of  integrity.  I must  therefore  quit 
a situation  which  becomes  utterly  insupportable.”  3 
When  he  informed  Washington  of  this,  in  February, 
he  said  that  the  Congress  wished  to  do  justice,  but 
“ they  will  not  adopt  the  necessary  measures,  because 
they  are  afraid  of  offending  their  States.”  January 
30  a committee  reported  on  the  finances,  stating 
that,  of  the  eight  millions  of  dollars  demanded  for 
the  service  of  1782,  only  $420,000  had  been  re- 
ceived. The  loans  obtained  in  Europe  had  produced 
for  that  year  only  $833,000,  so  that  Congress  had 
had  only  a little  over  a million  and  a half  of  dollars 

1 Dip.  Corr.  Rev.,  xii.  310.  2 Ibid.,  313. 

8 Ibid.,  326. 


HIS  SERVICE  IN  CONGRESS. 


IX9 


available  for  that  year.  The  estimated  expenditure 
was  $5,713,000,  without  counting  interest  on  former 
debts,  which  would  alone  exceed  all  the  money  at 
their  disposal.1 


/ 


As  soon  as  Morris’s  resignation  was  known  he  was  l' 
greatly  blamed.  He  was  said  to  have  ruined  the 
public  credit,  and  to  have  reflected  on  Congress. 
This  responsibility  was  evidently  the  fate  of  any  ex- 
ecutive officer  under  the  system.  He  wrote  to  the 
President  of  Congress : “ On  the  day  on  which  I 
was  publicly  charged  with  ruining  your  credit,  those 
despatches  arrived  from  Europe  which  tell  you  it  was 
already  at  an  end.”  “ It  can  no  longer  be  a doubt 
to  Congress  that  our  public  credit  is  gone.”  2 At  the 
same  time  he  wrote  to  Greene  : “You  and  every  good 
man  will,  I hope,  acquit  me  for  leaving  a post  in 
which  I am  totally  unsupported,  and  where  I must 
be  daily  a witness  to  scenes  of  poignant  anguish  and 
deep  injustice,  without  the  possibility  of  administering 
either  relief  or  palliation.”  3 Hamilton  sympathized 
completely  with  Morris,  both  of  them  being  anxious 
for  the  public  credit  and  for  the  Union.  Hamilton 
wrote  to  Washington  that  Morris  had  resigned  be- 
cause he  found  himself  in  a position  where  he  must 
either  resign  or  sacrifice  his  own  credit  and  character, 
together  with  that  of  the  public.  He  blames  Morris, 
however,  for  the  publication  of  his  resignation.4 


1 Journ.  Cong.,  viii.  84. 

2 Dip.  Corr.  Rev.,  xii.  342. 

3 Ibid.,  339. 

4 Letters  to  Washington,  iv.  20. 


I 20 


ALEXANDER  HAMILTON. 


In  April  it  became  necessary  to  make  some  arrange- 
ment with  the  army.  The  sum  necessary  to  give 
them  three  months’  pay  was  $750,000.  A committee 
of  Congress  was  appointed  to  confer  with  Morris  as 
to  what  could  be  done.  He  said  that  the  only  way 
was  “to  risk  a large  paper  anticipation.”  This,  in 
the  language  of  the  times,  meant,  issue  certificates  of 
indebtedness  and  run  the  risk  of  their  being  paid  by 
some  future  taxes.  If  this  step  was  taken,  he  would 
have  to  become  personally  liable,  on  leaving  the  office, 
for  about  half  a million,  depending  on  his  successor 
to  save  him  from  ruin,  and  risk  his  personal  credit.1 
In  the  conference  with  the  committee  he  agreed  to 
remain  in  office  until  this  enterprise  was  carried 
through,  provided  that  he  could  rely  upon  Congress 
for  such  support  as  would  make  it  sure  of  success. 
Whereupon  Congress  resolved  that  they  would  give 
him  this  support.  Hamilton  was  chairman  of  the 
committee  and  the  leader  in  this  arrangement.2 
Thereupon  new  notes  were  printed  and  distributed 
to  the  army.  In  May  Morris  wrote  to  Franklin  : “ If 
these  notes  are  not  satisfied  when  they  become  due, 
the  little  credit  which  remains  to  this  country  must 
fall,  and  the  little  authority  dependent  on  it  must  fall 
too.”  He  urged  him  to  obtain  another  loan  from 
France.®  Congress  failed  of  its  pledge  in  this  matter, 
or  perhaps  it  should  rather  be  said,  the  event  proved 
that  they  had  given  a pledge  beyond  their  power. 

1 Dip.  Corr.  Rev.,  xii.  346. 

2 Journ.  Cong.,  viii.  184. 

3 Dip.  Corr.  Rev.,  xii.  372. 


HIS  SERVICE  IN  CONGRESS 


121 


Morris  was  forced  to  draw  upon  the  bankers  in  Hol- 
land to  sustain  the  notes  which  he  had  issued,  and 
his  bills  went  to  protest  at  the  end  of  the  year.1 2 

Even  this  arrangement  did  not  run  its  course  in 
such  a way  as  to  avoid  trouble  with  the  army.  Some 
soldiers  at  Lancaster,  Pennsylvania,  who  had  never 
been  in  the  field,  marched  to  Philadelphia  on  the 
15  th  of  June  and  besieged  Congress  in  their  hall. 
They  also  directed  demands  to  the  authorities  of  the 
State.  The  mutiny  lasted  about  ten  days,  and  it  was 
necessary  to  send  for  troops  from  Washington’s  army 
to  suppress  it.  This  incident  led  to  a somewhat 
acrimonious  correspondence  between  the  authorities 
of  the  State  and  a committee  of  the  Congress,  of 
which  Hamilton  was  the  leader.  The  Council  of 
Pennsylvania  would  not  call  out  the  militia  until 
some  outrage  had  been  committed.  This  was  the 
old  method  of  dealing  with  riots,  and  was  in  the 
highest  degree  vexatious  to  Hamilton.  Congress, 
apparently  under  his  leadership,  manifested  indigna- 
tion that  the  State  had  not  given  them  adequate 
protection ; although  Hamilton  did  not  accept  the 
responsibility  for  the  removal  of  Congress  to  Prince- 
ton, which  immediately  took  place,  as  an  expression 
of  this  indignation.3 

Of  course  the  thing  upon  which  everything  turned 
was  taxation.  Hamilton  gave  the  most  earnest  effort 
to  the  projects  before  Congress  for  securing  federal 

1 See  further  on  this  the  Life  of  Robert  Morris. 

2 Journ.  Cong.,  viii.  206,  207,  260;  Dip.  Corr.  U.  S.,  i.  9; 

Works,  viii.  145. 


122 


ALEXANDER  HAMILTON. 


taxes.  A project  had  been  pending  for  some  time  to 
get  the  consent  of  the  States  to  a five  per  cent  import 
duty,  to  be  levied  for  the  use  of  the  Confederation. 
Oct.  io,  1782,  Rhode  Island  and  Georgia  were  called 
on  for  a definitive  answer  whether  they  would  agree  to 
the  five  per  cent  duty,  upon  which  they  had  not  yet 
acted.  On  the  6th  of  December  the  Superintendent 
of  Finance  was  ordered  to  represent  to  the  States  the 
necessity  of  their  paying  twelve  hundred  thousand 
dollars  to  meet  the  interest  on  the  debt,  also  two  mil- 
lions for  current  expenses ; and  it  was  voted  that  a 
deputation  be  sent  to  Rhode  Island  to  ask  that  State 
to  consent  to  the  five  percent  duty.  On  the  12  th 
a letter  from  the  Speaker  of  the  lower  House  of  As- 
sembly of  Rhode  Island  was  read,  stating  their  reasons 
for  refusing : first,  that  the  tax  would  bear  hardest  on 
the  most  commercial  States ; second,  that  it  would 
introduce  officers  into  the  States  unknown  and  unac- 
countable to  the  State ; third,  that  it  would  give  Con- 
gress power  to  collect  money  from  the  commerce  of 
the  State  indefinitely  as  to  time  and  quantity,  and  for 
the  expenditure  of  which  Congress  would  not  be  ac- 
countable to  the  State.1 

Here  we  have  a complete  echo  of  the  objections 
that  were  made  to  the  English  taxes  before  the  war. 
The  anarchical  elements  which  had  existed  in  the  pre- 
Revolutionary  agitation  began  to  make  themselves  felt 
against  the  Union  as  soon  as  the  dangers  of  the  war 
were  past.  They  also  intertwined  immediately  with 
the  questions  of  taxation  and  finance.  The  disposi- 

1 Journ.  Cong.,  viii.  25. 


REPLY  TO  RHODE  ISLAND  OBJECTIONS.  123 

tion  presents  itself  at  once  to  shirk  out  of  all  possible 
obligations  to  the  army  and  the  public  creditors,  and 
to  break  down  the  Confederation,  because  that  was 
the  organ  through  which  the  claims  of  these  classes 
could  be  presented.  The  authority  of  the  Confedera- 
tion was  also  denounced  as  taking  the  place,  in  the 
way  of  tyranny,  of  what  the  English  government  had 
been  before  the  war. 

In  the  answer  to  this  memorial,  which  was  drafted 
by  Hamilton,1  he  took  issue  in  the  most  positive  man- 
ner possible  with  all  the  doctrines  of  the  document. 
He  claims  for  Congress  “ an  absolute  discretion  in 
determining  the  quantum  of  revenue  requisite  for  the 
national  expenditure.  When  this  is  done,  nothing  re- 
mains for  the  States  separately  but  the  mode  of  rais- 
ing. No  State  can  dispute  the  obligation  to  pay  the 
sum  demanded  without  a breach  of  the  confederation  ; 
and  when  the  money  comes  into  the  treasury  the  ap- 
propriation is  the  exclusive  province  of  the  federal 
government.”  By  taking  issue  so  directly  and  openly, 
however,  he  enlightened  a great  many  persons  as  to 
what  the  issue  was  who  were  repelled  from  his  side  as 
soon  as  they  understood  it.  For  instance,  Jones  of 
Virginia  2 says  : “ Many  now  say  the  reasoning  of  the 
Pamphlet  of  Congress  determined  them  against  the 
measure  [the  impost] , disapproving  the  sentiment  con- 
veyed in  the  letter  to  Rhode  Island.”  We  shall  see 
hereafter  many  other  illustrations  of  this  same  fault  in 
Hamilton’s  methods. 

Immediately  after  this  report  was  made,  the  mem- 
1 Journ.  Cong.,  viii.  153.  a Letters,  118. 


124 


ALEXANDER  HAMIL  TON. 


bers  from  Rhode  Island  found  themselves  subject  to 
discipline  in  Congress  on  account  of  a letter  from  one 
of  them  which  was  published,  containing  a statement 
that  Congress  had  plenty  of  money  at  its  disposal  ob- 
tained by  loans  in  Europe,  and  that  the  tax  was  not 
needed.1  In  February  Hamilton  said  in  a speech  that 
it  was  useless  to  answer  the  arguments  of  Rhode  Isl- 
and, because  those  given  were  not  the  real  ones  which 
influenced  her ; that  the  real  motive  was  a desire  to 
tax  Connecticut. 

In  the  stress  of  the  negotiations  with  the  army  in 
April,  the  project  of  revenue  was  adopted  by  nine 
States,  Rhode  Island  alone  voting  no,  and  New  York 
divided,  because  Hamilton  voted  no.2  On  the  26th 
of  April,  1783,  an  address  to  the  people  of  the  States 
was  issued,  drafted  by  a committee  of  which  Hamilton 
was  one.  They  estimate  the  debts  at  forty-two  mil- 
lion dollars,  of  which  the  foreign  debt  was  seven 
million  eight  hundred  thousand,  and  the  interest  on 
the  whole  $2,415,956.  They  expect  that  the  imposts 
will  bring  in  not  quite  a million.  In  the  revenue 
scheme  which  had  just  been  adopted,  there  was  added 
to  the  five  per  cent  import  duty  certain  specific  duties. 
The  other  million  and  a half  for  the  interest,  the  States 
were  to  raise  in  such  way  as  they  deemed  best.8 

Hamilton  and  Morris  were  extremely  discontented 
with  this  plan,  and  the  latter  considered  it  as  falling 
short  of  the  promise  which  Congress  had  made  to 
him.  Out  of  two  millions  and  a half  necessary  for 

2 Journ.  Cong.,  viii.  139. 

3 Ibid.,  145. 


1 Staples,  412  et  scq. 


mS  ASSISTANCE  TO  THE  GOVERNMENT.  125 

interest,  barely  one  million  was  provided  for,  and  a 
million  and  a half  still  depended  upon  the  voluntary 
action  of  the  States.  Hamilton  wrote  to  Clinton  that 
he  voted  against  this  plan  because  it  had  little  better 
chance  of  being  accepted  by  the  States  than  a better 
one,  and  if  adopted,  it  would  fail  of  execution.1  In 
September  Massachusetts  refused  to  grant  the  impost, 
although  she  admitted  the  necessity  of  sustaining  the 
public  credit,  and  stated  her  reasons,  which  amounted 
really  to  a remonstrance  with  Congress,  because  the 
latter  had  agreed  to  the  half  pay  and  to  large  salaries. 
This  was  a new  development,  and  seemed  to  promise 
that  the  States  would  take  the  opportunity  of  granting 
taxes  to  review  the  action  of  Congress. 

Hamilton  also  proposed  at  this  session  a complete 
plan  for  a military  establishment  in  time  of  peace,  in- 
cluding a navy,  fortifications,  and  a military  academy.2 
His  idea  was  that  war  was  a contingency  always  to  be 
borne  in  mind,  and  that  the  United  States  should  not, 
when  the  next  war  occurred,  have  its  military  affairs 
in  such  a condition  as  that  they  had  been  in  during 
the  last  war. 

He  refused  a re-election  to  Congress,  and  went 
back  to  New  York  to  practise  law. 


1 Works,  viii.  1 17. 


2 Ibid  , vi.  71. 


126 


A L EX  A NDER  HA  MIL  TOM. 


CHAPTER  IX. 

THE  TREATY  OF  PEACE ; TORIES  ; THE  CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONVENTION  OF  1 78  7;  THE  STRUGGLE  FOR  THE 
RATIFICATION  OF  THE  CONSTITUTION ) HAMILTON 
CHARGED  WITH  MONARCHISM. 

It  was,  however,  impossible  for  him  to  abstain  from 
public  activity.  In  1 784  he  published  letters  with 
the  signature  “Phocion,”  in  regard  to  the  treaty  of 
peace,  and  against  the  attainder  and  persecution  of 
tories.  For  ten  years  England  and  the  United  States 
charged  each  other  with  breaches  of  the  treaty.  The 
treaty  was  undoubtedly,  as  Hamilton  declared,  favour- 
able to  the  United  States  beyond  what  anybody  could 
have  hoped.1  The  United  States  was  extremely  well 
served  in  that  negotiation.  The  French  were  aston- 
ished at  the  English  concessions,  especially  in  regard 
to  the  western  boundary,  the  fisheries,  and  the  Mis- 
sissippi.2 Franklin,  however,  was  justified  in  the 

1 England  “ has  ceded  to  us  a large  tract  of  country  to  which 
we  had -even  no  plausible  claim.”  (Works,  iii.  457.) 

2 Vergennes  to  Gerard,  Dec.  4,  1782,  says  that  the  con- 
cessions of  the  English  as  to  boundaries,  fishery,  and  loy- 
alists exceed  what  he  would  have  believed  possible.  “What 
is  the  motive  which  can  have  brought  about  a yielding  disposi- 
tion, which  might  be  interpreted  as  a species  of  surrender  ? ” 
(Circourt,  iii.  50.) 


THE  TREATY  OF  PEACE. 


127 


remark  which  he  made,  that  every  treaty  of  peace 
causes  clamour  and  discontent.  The  Americans  were 
unwilling  to  execute  the  stipulations  by  which  they 
conceded  that  there  should  be  no  hindrance  to  the 
collection  of  the  British  debts,  and  that  the  tories 
should  meet  with  a degree  of  toleration.1 

In  1787  Hamilton  was  a member  of  the  New  York 
Legislature,  where  he  endeavoured  to  obtain  the  repeal 
of  all  laws  against  the  treaty  with  England.  This  was 
in  accordance  with  a recommendation  of  Congress, 
that  a law  general  in  its  terms  should  be  passed  which 
would  make  the  treaty  a part  of  the  law  of  each  State. 
He  also  tried  to  have  the  federal  revenue  system 
adopted  by  the  State.  His  argument  upon  this  point2 
was  a patient  exposition  of  the  facts  which  made  this 
action  important.  New  York,  however,  was  willing 

1 Article  fifth  provided  that  Congress  should  earnestly  rec- 
ommend to  the  legislatures  of  the  several  States  to  provide  for 
the  restitution  of  confiscated  estates  to  real  British  subjects, 
and  of  all  property  to  other  persons  within  the  English  lines 
who  had  not  borne  arms  against  the  United  States  : and  that  any 
other  person  should  have  liberty  to  go  into  the  States  and  stay 
twelve  months  in  his  efforts  to  recover  property ; and  that 
they  should  also  recommend  to  the  States  a revision  of  all  laws 
in  a spirit  of  conciliation  ; and  that  property  should  be  restored 
upon  a payment  to  the  new  possessor  of  any  price  which  he 
had  actually  paid. 

Article  sixth  provided  also  that  there  should  be  no  more 
confiscations  or  prosecutions  for  the  part  taken  in  the  war,  and 
that  no  person  should  suffer  in  person  or  property  for  the 
same ; that  persons  in  confinement  on  such  charges  at  the  time 
the  peace  was  made  should  be  set  free,  and  that  prosecutions 
should  be  discontinued.  (Dip.  Corr.  Rev.,  x 113.) 

2 Works,  ii.  16. 


128 


ALEXANDER  HAMILTON. 


to  pay  the  money,  but  not  to  grant  the  power  to  the 
United  States.  “ Power  may  destroy  our  liberties.”  1 

In  the  matter  of  the  tories,  Hamilton  came  forward 
with  chivalrous  courage  to  their  defence.  In  the  case 
of  Rutgers  vs.  Waddington,  he  tested  the  law  of  New 
York  by  which  a whig  who  had  left  the  city  during  the 
British  occupation  could  collect  rent  of  a person  who 
had  occupied  his  property  during  his  absence,  although 
it  might  be  under  a military  order  from  the  English. 
This  was  an  extremely  unpopular  step,  especially  as 
he  succeeded  in  setting  aside  the  law  in  the  Mayor’s 
court.  He  afterward  said,  however,  that  neither  he 
nor  the  other  lawyers  in  New  York  ever  pleaded  the 
treaty,  and  that  they  could  not  get  a ruling  from  the 
Supreme  Court  on  that  point.2  Rutgers  vs.  Wadding- 
ton was  settled  by  a compromise.3 

1 Works,  ii.  37. 

2 The  most  celebrated  case  under  the  confiscation  system 
of  this  period  was  that  of  Astor  vs.  Carver.  The  estate  of 
Roger  Morris  and  his  wife  was  confiscated.  Mrs.  Morris’s 
estate  was  a part  of  the  Phillipse  property,  in  which  she  had 
only  a life  interest  by  a marriage  settlement.  It  was  in  Putnam 
County,  New  York.  John  Jacob  Astor  bought  the  right  of 
Mrs.  Morris’s  heirs  in  1819,  and  commenced  suit  of  ejectment. 
The  State  being  bound  by  warrant  to  defend  the  title,  Astor 
offered  to  take  $300,000  for  his  claim.  In  1829,  he  having  won 
his  suit,  the  State  agreed  to  pay  him  $450,000  for  the  claim, 
provided  that  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  should 
sustain  it  on  appeal,  which  they  did.  (Peters,  iv.  1.)  Sabine 
says  that  Mrs.  Morris,  Mrs.  Robinson,  and  Mrs.  Inglis  were 
the  only  ladies  attainted  for  treason.  (Sabine,  ii.  104.) 

3 Works,  iv.  335,  403.  In  the  biography  of  Hamilton  in  the 
suppressed  history  of  John  Adams’s  administration  it  is  said 
“The  American  tory,  against  whom  he  had  fought,  he  now 


THE  REGULATION  OF  COMMERCE.  129 

The  time  was  now  approaching  when  Hamilton 
was  to  see  public  opinion  advance  toward  the  position 
which  he  had  long  occupied  in  regard  to  the  Union. 
The  immediate  connection  in  which  it  came  about 
was  the  matter  of  regulating  commerce.  It  was  largely 
an  effect  of  the  geography  of  the  coast.  It  was  im- 
possible for  New  York  to  enforce  any  regulation  in 
which  New  Jersey  did  not  agree,  because  they  both 
abutted  on  New  York  Harbor;  but  if  New  Jersey 
made  any  regulations,  in  order  to  conform  to  New 
York  upon  the  one  side,  it  was  found  that  the  same 
regulation  would  produce  difficulty  with  Pennsylvania 
on  the  other  side,  at  Philadelphia.  Virginia  and 
Maryland  experienced  the  same  difficulty  with  regard 
to  the  borders  of  the  Chesapeake  and  the  great  Vir- 
ginia rivers,  and  Virginia  and  North  Carolina  on 
account  of  the  sounds  of  North  Carolina;  while  the 
Chesapeake  came  near  enough  to  Pennsylvania  to 
bring  the  northern  and  southern  systems  into  collision 
with  each  other. 

After  various  minor  negotiations,  a convention  of 
commissioners  from  Virginia,  Delaware,  Pennsylvania, 
New  Jersey,  and  New  York  met  at  Annapolis  in  1786. 
Hamilton  was  a member  of  this  convention,  and  wrote 
the  address,  which  it  adopted,  and  which  was  sent  by 
Dickinson,  the  chairman,  to  Congress  on  the  14th  of 

began  to  defend,  and  in  every  suit  where  a loyalist  was  con- 
cerned, Mr.  Hamilton  was  the  loyal  pleader.  It  is  a certain 
fact  that  a great  majority  of  the  loyalists  in  the  State  of  New 
York  owe  the  restoration  of  their  property  solely  to  the  exer- 
tions of  this  able  orator.”  (Cheetham’s  Narrative,  55. ) 

9 


J3° 


ALEXANDER  HAMILTON. 


September.  The  purport  of  it  was  that  the  federal 
government  was  inefficient,  and  that  further  provi- 
sions should  be  devised  to  render  it  adequate  to  the 
exigencies  of  the  Union.  They  proposed  that  a con- 
vention should  be  called  to  revise  the  Articles  of 
Confederation.1  This  led  to  the  convention  of  May, 
1787. 

Hamilton’s  share  in  this  convention  was  by  no 
means  proportioned  to  the  interest  which  he  had 
taken  in  the  government  up  to  this  time.  As  soon  as 
the  convention  met,  it  was  found,  very  naturally,  that 
there  were  different  groups  of  persons  in  it,  who  had 
in  their  minds  different  ideas  of  what  the  proposed 
Union  should  be,  especially  as  regarded  the  functions 
and  the  amount  of  power  which  should  be  given  to  it 
compared  with  what  should  be  reserved  to  the  States. 
We  have  seen  that  Hamilton  entertained  ideas  which 
would  have  transferred  all  the  most  essential  functions 
of  civil  life  to  the  Union.  He  was  therefore  on  the 
extreme  of  that  wing,  and  could  unite  very  few  fol- 
lowers. He  was  on  the  Committee  on  Rules  of  the 
Convention,  and  contributed  to  the  debate,  having,  as 
it  appeared,  important  influence  on  special  points, 
but  by  no  means  leading  in  determining  the  result. 
His  two  colleagues  were  strong  anti-federalists,  and 
threw  the  vote  of  the  State  against  him.  Unfortu- 
nately this  left  him  in  the  position  of  an  irreconcilable 
on  the  extreme  federal  side,  the  tradition  of  which 
position  followed  him  and  hurt  him  all  his  life.  It  is 

1 Journ.  Cong.,  xii.  12.  In  Madison  Papers,  ii.,  Introductory 
to  Debates  of  1787,  is  a history  of  previous  steps  toward  union. 


CONSTITUTIONAL  CONVENTION  OF  17S7.  13 1 


difficult  to  see  why  a man  should  have  been  exposed 
to  any  more  contumely  if  he  was  an  extreme  federal- 
ist, but  gave  the  result  his  hearty  support,  than  if  he 
was  an  extreme  anti-federalist,  and  gave  the  result  a 
grudging  support ; but  such  was  the  fact.  His  two 
anti-federal  colleagues,  being  extremists  on  the  other 
wing,  refused  to  sign  the  Constitution.  They  have 
never  suffered  any  odium  for  this.  It  is  true  that 
they  were  comparatively  obscure  men.  In  a speech 
to  the  convention  in  June,  Hamilton  urged  the  econ- 
omy of  doing  away  with  the  State  governments.  He 
expressed  fear  that  republican  government  was  im- 
practicable over  a great  extent  of  territory,  but  never- 
theless he  seemed  to  wish  to  reduce  the  States  to  some 
such  position  as  the  counties  now  occupy  in  the  State. 
He  expressed  great  admiration  for  the  English  Con- 
stitution, quoted  Neckar  that  it  “ unites  public  strength 
with  individual  security,”  and  quoted  Hume  that  the 
corruption  by  the  crown  in  England  was  an  essential 
part  of  the  weight  which  maintained  the  equilibrium 
of  the  Constitution.  He  also  told  them  that  liberty 
would  make  inequality.  He  was  free  from  the  terror 
of  the  big  States,  which  was  so  strong  among  them.1 

He  wanted  a senate  during  good  behaviour,  and  an 
executive  on  the  same  tenure  ; the  latter  to  be  elected 
through  two  sets  of  electors,  and  the  former  through 
one.  The  executive  was  to  have  a veto  on  all  acts 
about  to  be  passed.  The  government  of  the  Union 
was  to  appoint  the  Governors  of  the  States,  and  they 

1 Madison  Papers,  ii.  885,  886,  905,  907,  938,  966.  Cf  W orks 
ii.  270  ; viii.  607. 


i32 


ALEXANDER  HAMILTON. 


were  to  have  a veto  on  State  legislation  in  order  to 
keep  it  consistent  with  federal  legislation.  The  militia 
were  to  be  entirely  under  the  control  of  the  Federal 
Government.  He  expressed  great  admiration  for  the 
House  of  Lords.1  In  the  notes  for  his  speech,2 * * * * *  he 
says  that  his  scheme  was  presented  “ not  as  a thing 
attainable  by  us,  but  as  a model  which  we  ought  to 
approach  as  near  as  possible.”  If  government  is  in 
the  hands  of  the  many,  they  will  tyrannize  over  the 
few.  It  ought  to  be  in  the  hands  of  both,  and  they 
should  be  separated.  Gentlemen  say  we  need  to  be 
rescued  from  the  democracy,  but  what  is  the  means 
proposed  ? A democratic  assembly  is  to  be  checked 
by  a democratic  senate,  and  both  these  by  a demo- 
cratic chief  magistrate.  The  end  will  not  be  answered  ; 
the  means  will  not  be  equal  to  the  object.  “It  is  im- 
possible to  secure  the  Union  by  any  modification  of 
federal  government.  A league,  offensive  and  defen- 
sive, is  full  of  certain  evils  and  greater  dangers.”  He 
would  balance  advantages.  He  implies  that  his  idea 
was  consolidation.  The  States  and  the  Union  should 
each  have  a well-defined  sphere,  and  they  would  not 
interfere.8  In  a letter  to  Timothy  Pickering  in  1803 

1 Works,  i.  371.  See  Curtis  on  the  Constitution,  371  and 
381,  for  a very  careful  analysis  of  Hamilton’s  plan  and  very 
judicious  discussion  of  his  opinions. 

2 Works,  i.  357. 

8 When  John  Quincy  Adams  first  read  the  draft  of  Hamil- 

ton’s plan,  in  1837.  he  wrote  (Diary,  ix.  345):  “The  plan  was 

theoretically  better  than  that  which  was  adopted,  but  energetic 

and  approaching  the  British  Constitution  far  closer,  and  such 

as  the  public  opinions  of  that  day  never  would  have  tolerated. 


CONSTITUTIONAL  CONVENTION  OF  1787.  133 


he  said  that  the  propositions  thrown  out  in  debate 
were  understood  to  be  only  by  way  of  suggestions  for 
discussion.  His  final  judgment  was  in  favour  of  an 
executive  for  three  years,  and  he  modified  his  plan  to 
that  effect.1 

It  seems  plain  that  Hamilton’s  hearers  did  not  un- 
derstand him.  They  seem  to  have  listened  with 
astonishment  to  a man  who  contradicted  some  of  the 
current  commonplaces,  and  professed  opinions  which 
were,  in  their  terms,  political  heresies  of  the  worst 
kind.  As  nearly  all  of  them  did  their  thinking  in  the 
current  phrases,  they  could  not  understand  Hamilton’s 
criticisms  on  those  phrases,  and  his  analyses  of  political 
notions  which  broke  up  the  combinations  of  the  ac- 
cepted philosophy.  It  is  not  easy  to  seize  the  force 
of  criticisms  on  democracy  and  republicanism  so  as  to 
reproduce  them  fairly,  but  it  is  easy  to  say  of  a man 
that  he  “wants  a king,”  or  that  he  “does  not  trust 
the  people,”  or  that  he  is  an  “ aristocrat.”  When 
therefore  those  who  had  heard  Hamilton  came  to  re- 
port what  he  had  said,  the  reports  took  the  latter 
form.  He  would  have  been  wiser  to  be  silent  than 
to  allow  himself  the  idle  pleasure  of  uttering  opinions 
which  could  not  even  be  understood. 

' After  this  speech  he  left  the  convention,  and 

Still  less  would  it  be  endured  by  the  democratic  spirit  of  the 
present  age,  — far  more  democratic  than  that.  . . . If  Hamilton 
were  now  living,  he  would  not  dare,  in  an  assembly  of  Ameri- 
cans, even  with  closed  doors,  to  avow  the  opinions  of  this 
speech,  or  to  present  such  a plan  even  as  a speculation.” 

1 Works,  viii.  607. 


134 


ALEXANDER  HAMILTON. 


was  absent  from  June  29  to  August  13.  In  July 
Washington  wrote  to  him,1  despairing  of  the  conven- 
tion : “ The  men  who  oppose  a strong  and  energetic 
government  are,  in  my  opinion,  narrow-minded  poli- 
ticians, or  are  under  the  influence  of  local  views.” 
The  criticisms  of  Yates  of  New  York  and  Martin  of 
Maryland  on  the  work  of  the  convention  manifest  the 
persistency  of  the  old  whig  ideas  of  the  early  revolu- 
tion, and  show,  by  the  hostility  of  those  ideas  to  the 
Union,  how  inconsistent  they  were  with  any  civil  insti- 
tutions which  would  be  capable  of  satisfying  civil 
needs.  The  state  of  the  case  and  the  thing  required 
are  ignored,  and  the  attention  is  all  thrown  on  vague 
doctrines  of  political  philosophy. 

Upon  his  return  to  Philadelphia  Hamilton  gave 
earnest  support  to  the  adoption  of  the  Constitution 
which  had  been  prepared.  After  it  had  been  pub- 
lished, the  next  and  still  more  difficult  task  was  to 
bring  about  its  ratification  by  the  States.  We  have 
already  seen  what  very  strong  interests  existed,  which 
were  perfectly  conscious  that  they  were  threatened  by 
this  proposed  civil  organization,  and  which  immedi- 
ately drew  together  to  resist  it.  1 There  was  also  another 
which  has  not  yet  been  mentioned.  All  the  leaders 
of  the  second  order  in  the  different  States  felt  that  if 
a federal  system  was  established,  such  as  the  Constitu- 
tion proposed,  it  was  very  doubtful  whether  they  would 
ever  attain  to  its  great  offices.  While  therefore  they 
occupied  positions  of  importance  in  the  States,  if  there 
was  no  federal  system,  they  need  not  feel  that  there 
1 Washington,  ix.  260. 


STRUGGLE  FOR  THE  RATIFICATION.  135 


was  anybody  above  them ; but  if  there  was  a federal 
system,  their  State  offices  would  lose  in  comparative 
importance.  They  were  like  the  man  who  said  that 
he  was  willing  there  should  be  a peerage,  if  he  was 
sure  that  he  would  be  one  of  the  dukes ; but  as  he 
was  sure  that  he  would  not,  he  would  not  consent  to 
have  any  peerage.  All  the  old  alarm  about  liberty 
was  now  revived,  and  all  the  elements  of  anarchy  and 
repudiation  which  had  been  growing  so  strong  for 
twenty  years  were  arrayed  in  hostility.  Jay  wrote  to 
Jefferson,  Oct.  27,  1 786,  referring  to  Shays’s  Rebellion  : 
“A  reluctance  to  taxes,  an  impatience  of  govern- 
ment, a rage  for  property,  and  little  regard  to  the 
means  of  acquiring  it,  together  with  a desire  of  equal- 
ity in  all  things,  seem  to  actuate  the  mass  of  those 
who  are  uneasy  in  their  circumstances.”  1 He  wrote 
to  Jefferson,  April  25,  1787,  that  Vermont  was  not  in- 
clined to  be  the  fourteenth  State,  it  was  said.  “ Taxes 
and  relaxed  government  agree  but  ill.”  2 Trumbull 
wrote  to  Washington,  Nov.  15,  1783,  what  held  true 
throughout  the  period  : “ It  is  but  too  true  that  some ' 
few  are  wicked  enough  to  hope  that  by  means  of  this 
clamour  they  may  be  able  to  rid  themselves  of  the 
whole  public  debt,  by  introducing  so  much  confusion 
and  disorder  into  public  measures  as  shall  eventually 
produce  a general  abolition  of  the  whole.”  3 

Patrick  Henry  proposed  another  general  conven- 
tion, to  be  held  as  soon  as  possible.4  Lincoln  wrote 
from  Boston : “ We  find  ourselves  exceedingly  em- 

1 Dip.  Corr.  U.  S.,  iii.  114.  2 Ibid.,  226. 

8 Letters  to  Washington,  iv.  52.  4 Ibid.,  241. 


136 


ALEXANDER  HAMILTON. 


barrassed  by  the  temper  which  raged  the  last  winter 
in  some  of  the  counties.  Many  of  the  insurgents 
are  in  the  convention,  even  some  of  Shays’s  officers.”  1 
Another  letter  said  that  the  parties  opposed  to  the 
Constitution  in  that  State  were,  first,  friends  of  paper 
money  and  tender  laws ; second,  the  late  insurgents ; 
third,  a great  majority  of  the  members  from  Maine.2 
In  Pennsylvania  ratification  was  mixed  up  with  the 
politics  of  that  State,  which  had  been  extremely  bitter 
ever  since  the  beginning  of  the  Revolution.  The 
articles  of  “ Centinel  ” began  in  a moderate  tone, 
but  gradually  became  more  and  more  personal  and 
virulent,  and  then  degenerated  into  the  style  which 
was  used  later  by  Duane  and  Callender.3  The  con- 
stitutionalists — that  is,  supporters  of  the  Constitution 
of  Pennsylvania  — were  the  opponents  of  the  Federal 
Constitution.  Hamilton  thus  summed  up  the  elements 
of  expected  opposition  to  the  adoption  of  the  Constitu- 
tion : disinclination  to  taxation,  fear  of  the  enforce- 
ment of  debts,  democratic  jealousy  of  important 
officials,  and  the  influence  of  foreign  powers.4 

The  New  York  convention  met  in  June,  1788. 
Hamilton  was  a member  of  it,  and  exerted  himself 
with  remarkable  energy  to  secure  the  adoption.  The 

1 Letters  to  Washington,  iv.  206.  2 Ibid.,  207. 

3 McMaster  & Stone,  565.  These  articles  ran  for  over  a 
year  in  the  “ Independent  Gazetteer,”  and  are  especially  in- 
teresting on  account  of  the  comparison  with  the  “ Federalist  ” 
which  irresistibly  suggests  itself.  We  are  indebted  to  Mr. 

Paul  Ford  for  the  discovery  that  “ Centinel  ” was  Samuel 
Bryan.  (Work  quoted,  6,  note.) 

4 Works,  i.  401. 


NEW  YORK  ANTI-FEDERALISTS. 


x37 


opponents  of  the  Constitution  had  two  thirds  of  the 
convention,  and  numbered  four  sevenths  of  the  com- 
munity. Their  strength  was  in  the  country,  while 
New  York  City  favoured  the  Constitution.  The  oppo- 
nents were  restrained  somewhat  by  a fear  lest  the  city 
and  southern  counties  might  split  off.  Hamilton  said  : 
“ For  my  own  part,  the  more  I can  penetrate  the 
views  of  the  anti-federal  party  in  this  State,  the  more 
I dread  the  consequences  of  the  non-adoption  of 
the  Constitution  by  any  of  the  other  States,  — the 
more  I fear  an  eventual  disunion  and  civil  war.”  The 
idea  of  the  opposition  was  for  New  York  to  hold 
back  and  let  the  others  try  it.  If  the  Union  suc- 
ceeded, they  could  come  in,  although  they  expected 
that  revenue  difficulties  would  break  it  up  immedi- 
ately.2 The  fact  here  stated,  and  the  apparent  wil- 
lingness of  Hamilton  to  agree  to  a conditional 
ratification  by  New  York3  must  be  taken  as  com- 
plete demonstration  that  even  the  most  advanced 
federalists  did  not  suppose  that  the  States  were 
forming  an  irrevocable  union. 

Hamilton  arranged  with  Madison  for  an  express 
to  bring  news  of  the  Virginia  convention,  and  with 
Sullivan  for  an  express  to  bring  news  of  the  New 
Hampshire  convention.  As  soon  as  he  obtained  the 
news  of  ratification  by  New  Hampshire,  he  sent  it 
to  Virginia.  He  employed  his  utmost  eloquence  to 
carry  the  ratification,  emphasizing  the  point  about 
the  public  debt.  “ It  is  a fact  that  should  strike  us 
with  shame  that  we  are  obliged  to  borrow  money  in 
1 Works,  viii.  187.  2 Ibid.,  187.  3 Ibid.,  191. 


138  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON. 

order  to  pay  the  interest  of  our  debt.  It  is  a fact 
that  these  debts  are  accumulating  every  day  by  com- 
pound interest.”  1 He  appeared  to  be  afraid  that  he 
was  carried  away  by  his  own  zeal,  and  he  apologized 
for  it,  saying,  “ If  such  has  been  my  language,  it  was 
from  the  habit  of  using  strong  phrases  to  express  my 
ideas.”  2 He  declared  that  in  the  old  confederation 
the  idea  of  liberty  was  alone  considered,  but  that  there 
was  another  thing  equally  important,  — “I  mean  a 
principle  of  strength  and  stability  in  the  organization 
of  our  government,  and  of  vigor  in  its  operations.”  3 
This  passage  might  serve  as  the  text  of  his  work  in 
that  convention. 

The  “ Federalist  ” has  come  to  stand  on  our  shelves, 
next  to  the  Constitution,  as  the  first  great  text-book 
upon  it.  By  far  the  largest  part  of  it  was  written  by 
Hamilton,  in  the  practice  of  his  usual  method  of  act- 
ing on  the  formation  of  public  opinion  by  periodical 
essays.  In  the  last  number  of  this  series 4 he  said : 
“ The  system,  though  it  may  not  be  perfect  in  every 
part,  is  upon  the  whole  a good  one,  is  the  best  that 
the  present  views  and  circumstances  will  permit,  and 
is  such  an  one  as  promises  every  species  of  security 
which  a reasonable  people  can  desire.”  It  is  a strange 
fact  that  the  man  who  did  all  this  for  the  Constitution 
should  have  suffered  all  his  life  under  a popular  sus- 
picion that  he  was  not  loyal  to  it.  In  the  “ Federalist  ” 
nothing  is  said  about  the  debts,  and  comparatively 
little  about  the  Supreme  Court.  This  is  very  remark- 


1 Hamilton,  i.  491. 

8 Works,  i.  449. 


2 Works,  i.  495. 
4 Ibid.,  ix.  548. 


CHARGED  WITH  MONARCHISM. 


J39 


able,  in  view  of  the  subsequent  history  ; for  if  there  is 
any  “ sleeping  giant  ” in  the  Constitution,  it  has  proved 
to  be  in  the  power  of  the  Supreme  Court  to  pass  upon 
the  constitutionality  of  laws.  It  does  not  appear  that 
Hamilton  or  anybody  else  foresaw  that  this  function 
of  the  court  would  build  up  upon  the  written  Consti- 
tution a body  of  living  constitutional  law.  It  is  very 
possible  that  Hamilton  may  have  thought  that  the 
Constitution  of  T787  was  a step  of  gain  on  the  Articles 
of  Confederation,  but  that  it  would  be  superseded  as 
they  had  been  by  some  new  constitution  which  would 
go  farther  toward  converting  the  Union  into  an  im- 
perial state,  — that  is,  in  the  direction  of  what  the 
opposing  party  always  called  “ consolidation.”  The 
same  effect  has  been  produced  by  interpretation  on 
the  document  of  1787,  and  by  the  amendments. 

The  Congress  of  the  Confederation,  having  left  Phil- 
adelphia in  anger,  was  not  willing  to  return  thither, 
although  the  Philadelphians  were  very  eager  that  it 
should.  It  could  not  find  satisfactory  quarters  any- 
where else.  This  led  it  to  wander  about  from  place 
to  place,  — a fact  which  undoubtedly  lowered  its  pres- 
tige ; for  people  did  not  know  where  it  was,  or  what 
it  was  about,  and  almost  forgot  its  existence.  It  was 
able  to  obtain  a necessary  quorum  for  important  busi- 
ness, nine  States,  only  for  a few  days,  or  at  most  a 
few  weeks  at  a time.  Hence  those  who  wanted  to 
see  the  Confederation  dwindle  and  die  were  perfectly 
satisfied ; and  they  seized  upon  some  rumours  that 
there  had  been  aristocratic  and  monarchical  proposi- 
tions in  the  convention,  and  endeavoured  to  spread 


140 


ALEXANDER  HAMILTON. 


fears  that  there  was  a secret  intention,  hostile  to 
republicanism.  Although  these  fears  were  absurd, 
, they  were  very  far  indeed  from  lacking  effect,  and 
all  the  events  of  the  succeeding  ten  or  twelve  years 
were  taken  to  be  proof  of  their  truth.  There  never 
was  a time  when  a king  of  the  United  States  would 
not  have  been  perfectly  ridiculous,  and  his  position 
utterly  untenable ; not  because  of  any  laws  or  resolu- 
tions, but  in  the  very  circumstances  of  the  case. 
No  opera  bouffe  could  possibly  caricature  such  a 
personage.1  * ^ » 

If  now  we  look  back  for  a moment  at  the  course  of  the 
movement  toward  union,  we  can  form  an  idea  of  what 
the  Union  was  when  the  first  Congress  assembled  ; for 

1 In  1792  Hamilton  wrote  to  Washington,  commenting  on 
this  charge  that  there  was  a monarchical  faction  : “ The  idea  of 
introducing  a monarchy  or  aristocracy  into  this  country,  by 
employing  the  influence  and  force  of  a government  continually 
changing  hands  toward  it,  is  one  of  those  visionary  things  that 
none  but  madmen  could  meditate,  and  that  no  wise  man  will 
believe.  If  it  could  be  done  at  all,  which  is  utterly  incredible, 
it  would  require  a long  series  of  time,  certainly  beyond  the  life 
of  any  individual  to  effect  it.  Who,  then,  would  enter  into 
such  a plot  ? For  what  purpose  of  interest  or  ambition  ? ” 
(Works,  ii.  267.)  In  1800  it  was  one  of  the  campaign  stories 
in  Pennsylvania,  which  obtained  much  belief,  that  Adams  in- 
tended to  marry  one  of  his  children  to  one  of  George  the  Third’s 
children,  and  that  Washington  had  quarrelled  with  him  on  this 
account.  (Graydon,  392.)  At  the  same  time  the  story  of  the 
monarchical  faction  in  the  convention  of  1789  had  grown  into 
the  shape  that  Hamilton  and  others  had  a plot  to  bring  over 
the  second  son  of  the  King  of  England  and  make  him  King 
of  the  United  States.  Hamilton  tried  to  follow  up  this  story 
and  unearth  its  origin,  but  of  course  it  all  evaporated  at  the 
first  attempt.  (Works,  viii.  610.) 


CHARGED  WITH  MONARCHISM.  141 

if  we  have  an  idea  that  it  was  clearly  understood  what 
sort  of  thing  the  new  system  would  be  in  operation, 
and  that  people  who  read  the  document  would  obtain 
any  conception  of  the  modern  state  which  goes  under 
the  name  of  the  United  States,  we  shall  make  a great 
mistake.  We  have  seen  that  the  first  Congress  of 
1774  was  nothing  but  a conference  of  bodies  which 
were  entirely  independent  and  distinct.  That  of  1775 
differed  only  in  having  more  serious  business.  That 
of  1776  began  to  plan  a confederation  which  should 
have  a constitutional  definition.  Still  it  was  an  ab- 
straction created  by  convention.  The  States  held  the 
territory  and  were  States ; the  Confederation  was  an 
alliance,  and  it  came  near  becoming  obsolete  by  fall- 
ing into  desuetude.  Then  a new  effort  was  made, 
using  the  experience  of  the  past,  to  establish  a new 
creation  in  the  way  of  a unity  of  the  States  in  a 
political  body  which  should  be  a state,  having  a dis- 
tinct and  independent  existence.  The  question  still 
remained,  however,  how  much  of  a state  the  Union 
was,  and  what  the  limit  of  function  between  it  and 
the  States  would  be.  It  was  possible  to  argue  and 
reason  about  that  by  attempting  to  interpret  the  lan- 
guage of  the  document,  but  it  has  taken  a century 
of  national  life  and  a civil  war  to  actually  determine  it. 
At  the  beginning,  when  none  of  this  work  was  yet 
done,  every  step  which  was  taken  was  contributing, 
by  way  of  precedent,  to  mould  the  result. 

The  great  majority  of  the  people  disliked  the  idea 
of  a government  with  a large  body  of  splendid  officers 
living  on  salaries,  and  administering  an  army,  a navy, 


142 


ALEXANDER  HAMILTON. 


diplomatic  relations,  and  so  on,  like  the  great  nations 
of  the  Old  World.  They  knew  that  one  of  the  States 
never  would  grow  into  that ; but  it  seemed  that  the 
Union  was  created  expressly  for  it,  and  they  did 
not  see  any  necessity  for  it.  It  is  also  worthy  of 
particular  notice  that,  between  1783  and  1789,  the 
Continental  Congress  year  by  year  demanded  of  the 
people  sums  of  money  for  a peace  establishment  far 
beyond  what  was  necessary,  and  that  the  people,  by 
refusing  the  funds,  forced  the  retrenchment  or  aban- 
donment of  the  main  features  of  a great  civil  estab- 
lishment, which  in  fact  was  not  needed.  When  the 
Union  was  formed,  therefore,  everything  led  to  a 
struggle  between  two  tendencies  of  opinion.  In  the 
truest  sense  federalism  meant  the  system  and  phi- 
losophy of  union  into  a federated  state,  but  a true 
state,  having  unity,  independent  vitality,  and  ade- 
quate capacity.  Anti-federalism  meant  the  system 
and  philosophy  of  a group  of  States,  co-operating 
with  one  another  voluntarily  in  ways  and  for  pur- 
poses that  had  been  agreed  upon.  Callender  said 
that  the  Constitution  was  “ crammed  down  the  gullet 
of  America.”1  John  Quincy  Adams  said,  with  more 
elegance,  that  it  was  “ extorted  from  the  grinding 
necessity  of  a reluctant  people.” 

Until  after  the  second  war  with  England,  the  con- 
tinuity of  the  Union  was  always  in  question.2  In 

1 Prospect,  10. 

2 In  1796  the  Due  de  Liancourt  thought  that  the  Union 
would  break  up  before  one  tenth  of  the  federal  city  was  built. 
(Liancourt,  vi.  149.) 


THE  UNION  IN  QUESTION. 


M3 


every  excited  and  important  debate,  even  on  meas- 
ures of  the  second  or  third  order,  the  defeated  party 
uttered  murmurs  and  threats  against  the  Union.  The 
growth  from  a point  at  which  some  States  united  up 
to  the  point  at  which  there  is  a United  State,  con- 
stitutes the  history  of  the  Union. 


144 


ALEXANDER  HAMILTON. 


CHAPTER  X. 

HAMILTON’S  MEASURES  : FUNDING ; HIS  POLITICAL  ECON- 
OMY ON  DEBT,  ETC.  ; ASSUMPTION  ; PARTY  WAR  ; 
THE  SINKING  FUND;  CRITICISM;  NATIONAL  BANK; 
POLITICAL  ECONOMY  OF  BANKS  ; BANK  WAR ; MINT 
AND  COINAGE. 

The  Union  having  been  formed,  Hamilton  was 
immediately  called  to  the  head  of  the  Treasury,  which 
he  speedily  made  the  most  important  office  in  the 
government.  The  great  measures  which  he  brought 
forward  for  organizing  the  government  and  getting 
those  things  done  which  he  had  so  long  thought 
needed  to  be  done,  now  demand  our  attention. 

During  the  Revolution  the  constant  cry  was  “ Credit  ! 
credit  ! How  can  we  get  the  things  which  we  need 
now  for  the  purposes  of  winning  our  independence, 
and  have  the  payment  for  them  deferred  until,  having 
won  our  independence,  we  can  bring  our  resources 
to  bear  so  as  to  pay?”  The  debt  to  France  had 
been  arranged  so  that  the  instalments  might  become 
due  from  1787  on;  but  on  the  1st  of  January,  1790, 
not  only  had  the  instalments  not  been  paid,  but  the 
interest  had  not  been  paid  on  a part  of  it  for  six 
years,  on  a part  for  five,  and  on  a part  for  four.  The 
interest  on  the  debt  to  Spain  had  not  been  paid  for 


HIS  MEASURES. 


145 


seven  years.  Hamilton  took  up  this  matter  first. 
There  was  no  contest  about  the  payment  of  the 
foreign  debt.  As  to  the  domestic  debt,  a struggle 
arose  immediately  over  the  question  whether  the 
debt  should  be  paid  at  its  full  face  to  the  assignees 
who  had  bought  the  certificates  during  the  last  ten 
V years  from  the  persons  to  whom  they  were  first  issued. 
Hamilton  held  that  it  should  be  paid  to  the  assignee. 
The  government,  and  not  he,  was  guilty.  He  bought 
at  the  market.  Hamilton  shows  the  impracticability 
of  any  other  plan.  He  estimated  the  current  ex- 
penses at  six  hundred  thousand  dollars,  and  the  total 
interest  on  the  debt  at  $2,839,i62.1 

He  proposed  a system  of  import  duties  which  should 
be  made  to  produce  an  amount  of  revenue  to  meet 
these  expenditures.  An  opposition  to  this  proposi- 
tion was  immediately  developed.  There  were  those 
who  objected  to  funding  altogether,  and  those  who 
proposed  different  methods  of  dealing,  as  between 
the  original  holders  and  the  assignees.  Maclay,  for 
instance,  would  have  paid  three  per  cent  as  an  in- 
terim, “ and  place  it  on  the  footing  of  disability  to  do 
more.”  He  also  objected  to  funding  the  interest. 
He  wanted  a land  office  to  be  opened,  and  to  sink 
the  interest  now  due  and  to  give  indents  for  it,  receiv- 
able at  the  land  office.  He  declared  that  “ even  prod- 
■igals  abhorred  compound  interest.” 2 This  was  the 
most  popular  position  among  the  rank  and  file  of  the 
opponents.  It  was  simply  repudiation  on  the  footing 

1 Report  on  Public  Credit,  Folio  State  Papers,  Finance,  i.  15. 

2 Maclay,  225. 


10 


146 


ALEXANDER  HAMILTON. 


of  disability  to  pay,  and  the  land  office  was  to  throw 
the  public  creditors  into  a system  of  land  mongering, 
to  get  their  pay  if  they  could.  Maclay’s  argument 
was  that  Congress  was  not  a party  to  the  debt.  He 
says  that  the  people  are  the  debtors,  the  holders  of 
the  obligations  are  the  creditors,  and  Congress  is  the 
umpire  between  them,  j Law  should  rule  the  court, 
but  justice  should  be  the  guide  of  Congress,  as  it  has 
been  of  all  legislation  “ from  the  Jewish  jubilee  to  the 
present  day.”  1 He  could  not  get  anybody  to  second 
his  plan  of  a land  office  redemption  for  the  indents 
of  back  interest.  He  likewise  puts  forward  the 
objection  that  the  debt  should  not  be  charged  on 
posterity,  especially  irredeemable  debts.  “ I am  con- 
vinced that  they  will  one  day  negative  the  legacy.” 
He  ascribes  the  English  wars  to  the  funding  system, 
peculation,  and  jobs ; thinks  that  England  is  sure  to 
come  to  bankruptcy.  He  argued  that  the  revenue 
already  established  would  pay  interest  “ proportionate 
to  the  market  price  of  the  public  debt  until  the  whole 
is  extinguished  by  the  Western  sales.”  2 He  undoubt- 
edly represented  the  opinion  of  respectable  men,  not 
the  great  leaders  of  the  party,  nor  its  uneducated 
following. 

"In  a pamphlet,  “ Inquiry  into  the  Principles  and 
Tendency  of  certain  Public  Measures,”  ascribed  to 
John  Taylor,  Senator  from  Virginia  (1794),  it  was 
asserted  that  the  funding  system  was  intended  to 
effect  what  the  bank  was  contrived  to  accelerate,  — 
(1)  accumulation  of  great  wealth  in  a few  hands ; (2)  a 
1 Maclay,  229.  2 Ibid.,  257. 


FUNDING. 


*47 


political  moneyed  engine ; (3)  a suppression  of  the 
Republican  State  Assemblies  by  depriving  them  of 
the  political  importance  resulting  from  the  imposition 
and  dispensation  of  taxes. 

Of  course  the  immediate  effect  of  funding  was 
that  the  securities  advanced  in  value.  It  was  de- 
nounced as  speculation,  and  even  as  fraud,  although 
it  really  put  an  end  to  speculation.  There  can  be 
speculation  only  where  there  is  fluctuation  in  value. 
This  had  been  the  case  during  the  previous  ten  years, 
when  there  was  great  doubt  whether  the  certificates 
would  ever  be  paid,  and  how  they  would  be  paid. 
After  the  funding  they  were  elevated  to  the  character 
of  the  highest  securities  on  the  market,  in  which 
there  was  very  little  fluctuation  and  consequently 
very  little  speculation. 

Hamilton  wrote  two  papers  in  defence  of  the  fund- 
ing system,  after  he  left  office,  which  had  never  been 
published  until  Lodge’s  edition  of  his  works.  They 
are  both  extremely  able  papers,  the  second  being 
altogether  the  best  paper  which  we  possess  from  his 
hand.  He  says  that  there  were  two  sects  of  heretics, 
— one  who  wanted  to  discriminate  between  the  original 
holders  and  the  alienees ; second,  those  who  would 
provide  equally  for  all,  but  at  a lower  rate  of  interest 
than  that  in  the  bond.  And  there  were  subdivisions 
of  these.1  In  his  address  to  the  electors  of  New 
York  in  1801,  he  says  : “ What  is  the  funding  system? 

( It  is  nothing  more  nor  less  than  the  pledging  of 
adequate  funds  or  revenue  for  paying  the  interest,  and 
1 Works,  vii.  378,  414. 


/ 


148 


ALEXANDER  HAMILTON. 


for  the  gradual  redemption  of  the  principal  of  that 
very  debt  which  was  the  sacred  price  of  indepen- 
dence. . . . What  have  been  the  effects  of  this  sys- 
tem? An  extension  of  commerce  and  manufactures, 
the  rapid  growth  of  our  cities  and  towns,  the  conse- 
quent prosperity  of  agriculture,  and  the  advancement/ 
of  the  farming  interest.  All  this  was  effected  >y 
giving  life  and  activity  to  a capital  in  the  public  obli- 
gations which  was  before  dead,  and  by  converting  it 
into  a powerful  instrument  of  mercantile  and  other 
industrious  enterprise.”  1 

The  “ funding  system  ” was  a thing  of  English  tra- 
dition ; and  as  we  have  already  seen,  anything  which 
had  some  taint  of  English  abuse  upon  it  was- regarded 
with  superstitious  dread.  It  does  not  appear  that 
they  understood  very  well  what  the  funding  system 
was ; but  as  it  was  applied  here  by  Hamilton,  it  had 
none  of  the  vices  of  the  English  funding  system, 
which,  after  all,  could  be  resolved  into  allowing  the 
expenditures  to  exceed  the  revenue.  That  is  not  a 
system.  A great  deal  of  the  argument  against  fund- 
ing would  have  been  pertinent  at  the  time  of  contract- 
ing the  debt,  but  was  singularly  non-pertinent  when 
the  proposition  was  to  keep  a promise  already  made, 
and  to  take  the  poor  old  battered  “ faith  of  the 
continent  ” out  of  pledge.  At  that  point,  to  talk 
about  the  evils  of  a debt  and  the  woes  of  posterity 
seemed  absurd.  The  provision  for  it  was  indispen- 
sable in  the  public  interest.  It  was  a simple,  straight- 
forward duty. 


1 Works,  vii.  188. 


FUNDING. 


149 


It  is  desired  here,  in  connection  with  each  of  the 
great  financial  measures  proposed  by  Hamilton,  to 
make  some  examination  of  the  doctrines  enunciated 
by  him. 

In  a passage  from  Hamilton  which  has  been  quoted 
above,  it  may  be  noticed  that  he  puts  forward  a doc- 
trine with  regard  to  the  life  and  activity  given  to  a 
capital,  which  before  was  dead,  by  means  of  funding. 
In  his  bank  scheme  which  he  sent  to  Morris  in  1781, 
he  said  : “ A national  debt,  if  it  is  not  excessive,  will 
be  to  us  a national  blessing.  It  will  be  a powerful 
cement  of  our  union.”  He  added  that  Americans 
were  too  indolent,  and  that  taxation  would  be  a valu- 
able spur  to  them.1  In  the  report  on  the  manufac- 
tures, to  be  noticed  below,  he  says  that  a funded  debt 
is  capital.  Some,  fearing  accumulation  of  debt,  will 
not  allow  to  a debt  any  utility,  but  things  are  seldom 
unmixed  good  or  ill.  We  must  get  at  the  facts,  and 
find  out  how  far  they  are  either.  “ Neither  will  it 
follow  that  an  accumulation  of  debt  is  desirable  be- 
cause a certain  degree  of  it  operates  as  capital.  There 
may  be  a plethora  in  the  political  as  in  the  natural 
body.  There  may  be  a state  of  things  in  which  any  such 
artificial  capital  is  unnecessary.  The  debt,  too,  may 
be  swelled  to  such  a size  as  that  the  greatest  part  of  it 
may  cease  to  be  useful  as  a capital,  serving  only  to 
pamper  the  dissipation  of  idle  and  dissolute  indi- 
viduals,” or  the  interest  may  become  oppressive  to 
public  finance,  and  the  taxes  use  up  national  re- 
sources. In  a newspaper  article  in  1792,  he  replies 

1 Works,  iii.  124. 


15°  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON. 

to  those  who  have  charged  him  with  saying  that  public 
debts  are  public  blessings.  He  says  the  assertion  is 
that  funding  the  debt  will  render  it  a blessing,  and, 
referring  to  the  passage  just  quoted,  he  interprets  it 
to  mean  that  a funded  debt  operates  as  capital.  He 
says  that  before  the  Revolution  “ a great  part  of  the 
circulation  was  carried  on  by  paper  money ; ” that  this 
was  destroyed  during  the  war  by  events  which  also 
destroyed  “a  large  proportion  of  the  moneyed  and 
mercantile  capital  of  the  country,  and  of  personal 
property  generally.  It  was  natural  to  think  that  the 
chasm  created  by  these  circumstances  required  to  be 
supplied,  and  a just  theory  was  sufficient  to  demon- 
strate that  a funded  debt  would  answer  the  end.1  In 
the  “Vindication  of  Funding,”  written  about  1795, 2 
he  refers  to  the  same  passage  from  his  report  on 
manufactures  for  the  doctrine  that  a public  debt  is 
capital,  and  adds  that  if  a government  borrows  a 
hundred  dollars,  it  spends  it,  and  that  is  capital ; 
while  the  bond  may  be  sold,  and  is  another.  Thus 
the  credit  of  government  produces  a new  capital  of 
a hundred  dollars.  If  what  is  borrowed  is  spent 
abroad,  the  case  is  different.  In  the  next  paragraph 
he  dwells  on  the  disparity  between  the  sum  of  negotia- 
tions and  the  amount  of  money  by  which  they  are 
made.  These  notions  show  a remarkable  amount  of 
confusion  in  regard  to  money,  capital,  and  debt,  in 
the  mind  of  a man  who  has  a great  reputation  as  a 
financier.  Robert  Morris  had  once  put  forward 
some  of  the  same  ideas.  He  argued  that  a public 
1 Works,  ii.  321.  2 Ibid.,  vii.  407. 


FUNDING. 


I5I 

debt  locked  up  the  capital  of  the  public  creditor,  and 
that  these  debts  were  in  a manner  dead,  and  would 
be  brought  back  into  existence  by  funding.  This 
would  free  the  capital  of  creditors.  Capitalists  would 
buy  up  the  debt  of  the  holders.1 

So  far  as  the  destruction  of  the  old  paper  money 
was  concerned,  it  could  not  produce  any  chasm  in  the 
circulation.  It  is  as  impossible  to  make  a chasm  in 
the  circulation  as  to  dig  a hole  in  water.  We  have 
abundant  testimony  that  gold  and  silver  came  into 
circulation  in  1780  and  1781  as  fast  as  the  continental 
paper  fell  into  disuse.  The  specie  prices  were  ex- 
tremely low  compared  with  those  which  had  prevailed 
in  paper.  The  man  who  had  to  part  with  goods  or 
services  to  obtain  specie  with  which  to  pay  taxes  or 
debts,  might  well  think  that  the  “ medium  was  in- 
sufficient.” 

The  depreciation  of  the  continental  paper  inflicted 
a loss  on  the  different  holders  of  it  while  it  was  on 
the  way  down,  who  gave  goods  and  services  for  it  at 
a higher  rate  than  that  at  which  they  received  goods 
and  services  for  it.  They  therefore  parted  with  goods 
and  services  to  carry  on  the  war,  and  the  depreciation 
operated  as  a tax,  according  to  the  observation  of  all 
the  contemporary  writers.  It  was,  however,  the  most 
cruel,  insidious,  and  unequal  tax  conceivable,  for  it 
taxed  a man  in  proportion  to  the  time  that  he  held 
the  notes,  and  not  in  proportion  to  anything  else.  A 
man  of  large  means  could,  by  keeping  on  the  debtor 
side,  save  himself  from  all  loss ; but  a man  of  small 


1 Dip.  Corr.  Rev.,  xii.  222. 


r52 


ALEXANDER  HAMILTON. 


means,  on  the  creditor  side,  was  the  greatest  sufferer. 
Those  who  suffered  by  the  depreciation,  then,  had 
contributed  real  capital  for  the  work  of  the  war.  No 
subsequent  funding  could  reach  them,  unless  it  pro- 
vided payment  for  notes  still  in  their  hands,  which 
would  be  only  in  a very  small  degree.  No  funding 
nor  other  operation  of  any  kind  known  could  go  back 
and  unravel  such  a series  of  operations  and  defaults, 
to  undo,  in  any  degree  whatever,  the  injustice  pro- 
duced by  them ; for  its  only  possible  effect  would  be 
to  pretend  to  balance  them  by  a new  set  of  injustices. 

The  reason  for  funding  was  to  fulfil  contracts 
which  existed  in  full  legal  form,  and  therefore  needed 
to  be  performed  according  to  their  tenour.  The 
operation,  however,  could  not  revive  or  recall  a capital 
wasted  ten  years  before.  We  may  make  good  a 
capital,  but  capital  once  used  up  in  an  operation  not 
industrially  reproductive  is  gone  forever.  If  a hun- 
dred dollars’  worth  of  flour  was  consumed  by  soldiers 
in  1776,  while  in  the  field,  they  reproduced  no  capital 
to  replace  it.  If  the  producer  of  the  flour  had  a 
certificate  for  a hundred  dollars,  which  was  not  paid, 
it  might  lie  in  his  desk  as  a worthless  piece  of  paper, 
the  record  of  a dishonoured  claim,  which  had  no  market 
value.  If  he  found  a purchaser  for  it  at  ten  cents  on 
the  dollar,  and  sold  it,  the  transaction  concerned  no- 
body but  those  two,  because  they  made  a contract 
which  included  a consenting  judgment  between  them 
as  to  the  value  at  that  time  of  the  chance  that  the 
dishonoured  promise  might  some  day  be  kept,  in 
whole  or  in  part.  If  then  the  assignee  held  the  paper 


FUNDING. 


*53 


in  his  desk,  it  had  in  no  wise  changed  its  character, 
and  the  original  debtor,  the  United  States,  had  nothing 
to  do  witn  the  transfer. 

If  now  in  1790  the  government  determined  -to 
keep  its  promise,  it  provided  that  the  taxpayers  of 
the  United  States  should,  out  of  their  earnings,  re- 
constitute a capital  of  a hundred  dollars’  value,  and 
transfer  it  to  the  holder  of  the  certificate,  in  replace- 
ment of  the  capital  consumed  in  1776.  This  new 
capital  to  be  constituted,  in  some  years  subsequent  to 
1790,  was  evidently  not  a second  capital,  because 
there  was  no  first  one.  If  the  taxpayers,  after  1790, 
had  kept  their  products,  the  capital  would  have  been 
the  same  in  their  hands  that  it  was  after  it  was  trans- 
ferred to  the  bondholder,  and  the  certificate  burned 
up.  In  strictness,  therefore,  the  taxes  did  not  replace 
the  capital  of  1776,  but  only  the  property  of  1776, 
and  affected  the  personal  interests  of  individuals,  and 
not  at  all  the  wealth  of  the  country. 

The  promise  that  this  operation  should  be  per- 
formed brought  the  certificate  out  of  the  desk  of  the 
owner  and  gave  it  a market  value.  Let  us  suppose 
that  it  raised  it  to  par.  If  then  the  holder  parted  with 
it  to  some  one  else  for  a hundred  dollars,  that  was 
merely  a transfer  between  the  two  men  of  two  things 
previously  existing,  — the  certificate  on  one  side,  and 
the  hundred  dollars  on  the  other,  — and  could  not 
affect  the  wealth  of  the  country.  In  no  sense,  there- 
fore, did  funding  the  debt  create  a capital,  or  a new 
capital,  or  a second  capital,  or  in  any  way  add  to  the 
wealth  of  the  country.  Obviously  its  only  effect  could 


J54 


ALEXANDER  HAMILTON. 


lie  where  the  debt  lay;  namely,  in  the  field  of  con- 
tracts, property  rights,  and  personal  interests.  The 
only  way  in  wrhich  it  could  contribute  at  all  to  the  in- 
dustrial interests  of  the  community,  taken  as  a whole, 
was  in  case  it  affected  the  relations  of  this  community 
as  a whole  to  some  other  community  as  a whole.  In 
that  respect  its  effect  was  the  exact  opposite  of  what 
Hamilton  supposed.  It  was  only  in  the  case  that 
these  certificates,  which  had  formerly  been  destitute 
of  market  value,  but  now  had  obtained  market  value, 
should  be  exported  in  exchange  for  real  capital 
brought  into  the  United  States  to  be  employed  where 
it  could  earn  ten  or  twenty  per  cent,  while  the  inter- 
est paid  for  it  was  only  six,  that  the  funding  of  the 
debt  could  act  upon  the  industrial  and  commercial 
interests  of  the  American  people. 

The  next  enterprise  undertaken  by  Hamilton  was 
the  assumption  of  the  State  debts.  In  his  mind,  this 
enterprise  and  the  first  one  were  inseparable  parts  of 
the  same  whole ; but  assumption  stood  upon  a very 
different  footing.  It  was  a matter  of  political  expe- 
diency, not  of  simple  financial  rectitude ; and  its  ex- 
pediency remains  in  doubt  to  this  day.  Assumption 
I certainly  produced  great  political  disturbance  and 
bitterness.  It  was  not  absolutely  called  for,  but  was 
gratuitously  undertaken  by  the  Federal  Government ; 
and  it  has  always  remained  an  open  question  whether 
the  Federal  Government  might  not  properly  have 
allowed  the  whole  matter  of  the  State  debts  to  stay 
where  it  was,  leaving  the  States  to  manage  the  debts 
as  they  could. 


ASSUMPTION  OF  STAFF  DEBTS.  1 55 

In  March,  1783,  Congress  had  resolved:  “All 
reasonable  expenses  which  shall  have  been  incurred 
by  the  States  without  the  sanction  of  Congress  in  their 
defence  against  or  attacks  upon  British  or  savage 
enemies,  either  by  sea  or  land,  and  which  shall  be 
supported  by  satisfactory  proof,  shall  be  considered 
as  part  of  the  common  charges  incident  to  the  pres- 
ent war,  and  be  allowed  as  such.” 1 The  States  had 
all  held  back,  lest  one  should  do  more  than  another, 
because  they  had  no  confidence  that  they  could  re- 
cover from  each  other.  They  had  therefore  borne 
very  unequally  the  burdens  of  the  war.  It  had  always 
been  recognized  as  the  ideal  system  for  the  Confeder- 
ation that  it  should  have  a common  treasury,  out  of 
which  all  the  common  burdens  should  be  borne.  It 
was  now  proposed  to  consolidate  all  the  debts  of  the 
thirteen  States  into  a debt  of  the  Union.  In  a paper 
which  he  wrote  for  Washington  in  179 2, 2 to  meet  ob- 
jections which  were  brought  against  the  federal  sys- 
tem, Hamilton  gave  the  reasons  for  assumption.  The 
first  was  to  consolidate  the  finances.  He  speaks  of 
scramblings  for  revenue  between  the  States  as  if  he 
meant  to  have  all  the  State  finances  united,  so  as  to 
; have  only  one  system  of  revenue  and  expenditure  for 
the  entire  country,  and  that  one  federal ; but  else- 
where he  refers  to  State  finance  as  if  he  expected 
that  it  would  still  present  its  own  problems.  His 
next  reason  for  assumption  was  to  secure  to  the 
Union  resources  for  present  and  future  exigencies, 

1 Journ.  Cong.,  viii.  1 1 5. 

2 Works,  ii.  246. 


156  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON.  -- 

to  equalize  the  conditions  of  citizens  in  the  different 
States,  lest  some  should  have  heavy  burdens  and 
some  light,  on  account  of  their  different  exertions 
in  the  war,  or  because  some  had  chance  resources 
which  others  had  not.  This  led  to  the  necessity  of 
the  excise  taxes ; but  he  thinks  that  it  was  in  general 
expedient  that  the  Union  should  at  once  get  pos- 
session of  the  excises  as  a resource,  before  the  States 
seized  it.  . In  his  second  paper  on  the  funding  system, 
written  after  he  left  office,1  he  makes  a very  careful 
and  elaborate  defence  of  assumption.  According  to 
that,  the  leading  ideas  in  his  mind  were  as  follows  : 
He  put  himself  upon  national  ground  with  respect  to 
the  cost  of  independence,  and  its  value  to  every 
citizen  of  the  Union,  and  he  aimed  to  re-distribute 
the  cost  in  a way  which  would  satisfy  that  idea.  He 
likewise  wanted  the  Federal  Government  to  have  at 
its  disposal  the  entire  resources ; and  finally,  he  had 
a motive  of  political  expediency,  which  we  may  well 
believe  was  the  controlling  motive  in  1790,  although 
in  1795  he  thought  that  it  had  not  been  so.  He 
expresses  this  by  alleging  in  favour  of  assumption, 
“ its  tendency  to  strengthen  our  infant  government  by 
increasing  the  number  of  ligaments  between  the  gov- 
ernment and  the  interests  of  individuals.”  His  argu- 
ment under  the  first  of  these  heads  shows  that  he  was 
reaching  out  to  interfere  with,  and  correct  action  by 
the  States  which  seemed  to  him  either  negligent  or 
unjust,  and  that  he  could  not  bear  to  think  that  the 
Stales  were  not  behaving  as  he  thought  they  should 

1 Works,  vii.  423. 


ASSUMPTION  OF  STATE  DEBTS. 


r57 


toward  their  creditors.1  This  reasoning,  although  it 
was  creditable  to  his  sense  of  justice,  is  not  strong 
when  regarded  from  the  political  point  of  view.  It 
remained  true  that  he  was  reaching  out  for  a duty 
which  did  not  necessarily  devolve  upon  him,  and  was 
exposing  the  Federal  Government  to  a new  trial, 
when  he  thought  that  he  was  winning  strength  for  it. 
He  saw  that  it  would  be  necessary  to  fight  a great 
fight,  to  lay  vexatious  taxes,  and  incur  odium ; but  he 
'thought  that  it  would  have  been  pusillanimous  in  him 
to  give  it  up  on  that  account. 

This  matter  was  connected  with  the  adjustment  of 
the  outstanding  accounts  between  the  Federal  Gov- 
ernment and  the  States  for  requisitions.  That  also 
was  complicated  by  the  difficulties  of  justice.  .The 
accounts  had  not  been  kept  in  a similar  manner  in 
the  different  States ; there  had  not  been  uniformity  in 
the  book-keeping,  or  in  the  interpretation  of  the  details 
of  the  system,  so  that  for  instance  in  New  York,  as 
Hamilton  said,2  everybody  regarded  the  balance  of  the 
account  against  that  State  as  “ wholly  artificial,  . . . 
manifestly  unjust,  and  that  consequently  there  is  no 
justice  in  paying  it.”  That  was  the  point  at  which 
Gallatin  directed  his  criticism  of  assumption ; and  he 
showed  that  by  taking  into  account  the  balances  of 
the  accounts  between  the  States  and  the  Federal 
Government,  the  Federal  Government  might  have 

1 “This  [injustice  of  the  States]  may  seem  to  have  been  no 
concern  of  the  General  Government,  but  the  cause  of  credit 
and  property  is  one  throughout  the  States.”  (Works,  vii.  451.) 

2 Works,  viii.  444. 


ALEXANDER  HAMILTON. 


158 

done  as  much  for  the  States  as  it  did  do,  while  mak- 
ing the  federal  debt  only  half  as  great  as  it  did  make 
it.1  This  statement  was  true ; but  in  the  first  place,  it 
dealt  only  with  the  balances  of  the  actual  sums  paid 
by  the  States  on  requisitions,  and  left  out  of  account 
the  other  facts  with  regard  to  the  burdens  borne  by 
the  States  for  the  purposes  of  the  war,  which  filled  so 
large  a part  of  Hamilton’s  thinking  on  the  subject ; 
and  in  the  second  place,  Gallatin  was  looking  at 
the  matter  as  if  the  Federal  Government  was  trying 
to  help  the  States,  which,  as  he  said,  it  could  have 
done  to  a similar  degree  at  much  less  expense  to 
itself,  by  the  book-keeping  readjustments  which  he 
proposed ; while  Hamilton  was  not  thinking  of  it  as 
help  extended  to  the  States,  but  as  a consolidation  of 
public  obligations,  which  he  thought  would  produce 
great  political  and  financial  advantages.  The  real 
answer  to  Gallatin  would  be  that  there  was  no  reason 
whatever  for  assumption,  if  it  had  been  proposed  to 
do  it  on  the  ideas  which  he  adopted. 

Another  grade  of  objection  is  well  represented  by 
Maclay.2  He  referred  assumption  directly  to  the 
main  issue  involved  in  it : “ The  reduction  of  the 
State  governments  was  the  object  in  theory  in  form- 
ing both  the  Constitution  and  the  Judiciary,  and  in  as 
many  laws  of  the  United  States  as  were  capable  of 
taking  a tincture  of  that  kind  ; but  it  won’t  do.”  He 
says  that  the  court  party  have  assumption  much  at 
heart. 

The  measure  was  carried  at  last  by  a combination 
1 Gallatin’s  Writings,  iii.  121.  2 Maclay,  191. 


ASSUMPTION  OF  STAFF  DEBTS. 


159 

between  its  advocates  and  those  who  wanted  to  fix 
Lthe  federal  capital  on  the  Potomac.  The  intrigues 
on  this  point  were  numerous,  and  ran  in  many  direc- 
tions. In  the  sequel,  the  opposition  declaimed 
fiercely  against  the  corrupt  bargain  by  which  this 
combination  was  carried;  and  Jefferson,  who  really 
made  the  combination  with  Hamilton,  threw  the 
odium  of  it  off  himself  by  representing  himself  as 
the  dupe  of  Hamilton.  However,  the  fact  of  the 
case  was  that  this  was  the  combination  which  suc- 
ceeded where  a great  variety  of  others  were  proposed 
and  tried.1 

In  the  writings  of  Bache,  Duane,  and  Callender, 
assumption  was  denounced  in  the  most  vehement 
language,  as  fraudulent  and  corrupt,  intended  to  form 
a corrupt  cohort  in  the  Legislature,  which  should  be 
under  the  control  of  Hamilton.  They  regarded  it 
as  fraudulent  and  corrupt  for  a member  of  Congress 
to  own  bonds  of  the  State  or  nation,  since  it  was 
necessary  to  legislate  about  the  debts  in  a way  which 
would  affect  their  value  ; and  they  complained  that 
the  liberty  of  the  government  to  pay  off  the  debt 
was  restricted  by  the  terms  on  which  it  was  funded. 
They  also  maintained  that  the  volume  of  the  debt 
had  been  arbitrarily  and  unnecessarily  increased  for 
the  mere  sake  of  having  a big  debt,  as  if  it  were 
a blessing,  of  which  there  could  not  be  too  much. 
This  idea  they  borrowed  and  exaggerated  from  Gal- 
latin. They  also  put  forward  an  idea  which  was 
derived  from  some  of  the  book-keeping  intricacies  of 
1 Maclay,  226,  250. 


i6o 


ALEXANDER  HAMILTON. 


assumption,  that  the  debtor  and  creditor  sides  of  the 
account  had  been  added  together.  Their  argument 
about  this  rested  upon  the  fact  that  the  debt  of  the 
States  to  the  Federal  Government  on  the  balance  of 
account  was  a debt  of  honour,  and  one  for  which  no 
negotiable  securities  existed.  If  then  the  total  of 
existing  indebtedness  was  sought,  this  debt  could  be 
included ; but  if  this  debt  was  regarded  as  one  which 
never  could  be  collected,  then  it  might  be  thrown  out 
of  account.  The  difference  between  these  two  ways 
of  looking  at  the  matter,  of  course,  amounted  to  twice 
the  debt  of  the  States  to  the  Federal  Government. 

In  connection  with  his  system  of  funding,  Hamil- 
ton established  a sinking  fund.  He  was  under  the 
dominion  of  strong  English  ideas  with  regard  to  the 
value  of  a sinking  fund,  thinking  that  it  was  the  way 
to  make  public  credit  immortal,1  and  he  supposed  the 
fund  to  be  the  security  on  which  the  public  creditor 
would  fix  his  mind  for  confidence  that  he  would  be 
paid.  By  an  Act  of  the  4th  of  August,  1 790,  the 
proceeds  of  the  sales  of  land  were  appropriated  ex- 
clusively to  the  payment  of  the  debt ; and  on  the 
12th  another  Act  was  passed,  appropriating  surplus 
revenue  to  the  purchase  of  the  debt,  at  not  more 
than  the  par  value  of  the  bond.  The  Act  of  May 
8,  1792,  constituted  the  sinking-fund  commission  of 
the  Vice-President,  Chief-Justice,  Secretaries  of  State 
and  the  Treasury,  and  the  Attorney-General.  They 

1 The  report  of  Jan.  14,  1790,  that  on  manufactures,  and  that 
of  1795,  on  public  credit,  all  contain  strong  passages  to  this 
effect. 


'CRITICISM. 


161 


were  to  administer  the  redemption  of  the  debt  within 
the  limits  of  the  right  reserved ; namely,  two  dollars 
on  the  principal  of  each  hundred  dollars  per  annum. 
In  1795  they  were  charged  with  the  duty  of  adminis- 
tering the  payment  of  the  interest,  and  were  author- 
ized to  borrow  within  the  year  in  order  to  secure 
punctuality  in  these  payments. 

In  criticising  the  sinking  fund,  it  is  necessary  to 
distinguish  between  the  fallacy  of  a sinking  fund,  and 
the  incidental  mischiefs  which  may  arise  from  it.  The 
object  of  making  a fixed  appropriation  every  year 
to  the  sinking  fund  is  to  make  sure  that  the  amount 
of  provision  for  the  payment  of  the  debt  will  go  into 
each  year’s  tax  levy,  and  that  the  gain  from  the  pay- 
ments which  are  made  will  not  simply  be  absorbed 
in  a relief  from  taxation ; but  on  the  other  hand,  the 
fixed  appropriation  involves  the  danger  that  the  sum 
in  the  sinking  fund  will  be  taken  in  some  period  of 
financial  distress,  and  the  further  danger  that  on  ac- 
count of  some  necessity  of  borrowing,  the  Treasury 
will  be  borrowing  at  a high  rate  on  one  side  while 
paying  off  a debt  which  stands  at  a low  rate  of  inter- 
est on  the  other ; and  still  further,  if  the  gain  from 
the  payments  already  made  on  the  debt  is  taken  in  a 
remission  of  taxation,  all  the  advantage  is  won  which 
could  really  be  won  from  the  sinking  fund  under  any 
other  arrangement. 

These,  however,  are  incidental  evils  • for  there 
may  be  a strict  administration  of  the  finances,  and 
it  may  not  be  necessary  to  borrow,  and  the  public 
may  win  equal  advantage  from  a sinking  fund  with 


162 


ALEXANDER  HAMILTON. 


what  they  could  win  in  any  other  way.  The  real 
fallacy  of  a sinking  fund  is in  the  supposition  that 
there  is  any  device  under  that  name  by  which  any- 
thing more  can  be  accomplished  for  the  payment 
of  the  debt,  than  is  accomplished  by  simply  saving 
as  much  as  possible  from  the  current  revenue,  and 
applying  that  to  the  payment  of  the  debt  for  so  much 
as  it  may  amount  to. 

In  the  sinking  fund  of  the  United  States  there  was 
no  fixed  appropriation  until  1802,  but  in  1792  the 
commissioners  were  authorized  to  borrow  if  necessary 
a sufficient  sum  to  pay  any  part  of  the  principal  of 
the  debt  which  should  become  due.  Hamilton 
seemed  to  be  strenuous  about  the  faithful  appropri- 
ation of  specified  revenues  to  the  sinking  fund,  which 
was  a very  laudable  care.  He  wrote  a very  earnest 
protest  to  Washington,  against  the  sale  of  the  bank 
stock,  in  1796,  because  the  dividends  from  it  were 
pledged  to  the  sinking  fund.1  His  sinking  fund  was 
therefore  free  from  all  the  fallacies  of  the  English 
notions  on'  that  subject  of  the  period,  but  it  was  sub- 
ject to  incidental  evils,  which  in  its  later  history  were 
realized. 

Hamilton’s  next  proposition  was  for  a national 
bank.2  This  enterprise  also  was  not  essential  to  the 
work  of  the  Federal  Government.  It  had  the  char- 
acter of  an  independent  undertaking,  not  to  meet 
an  experienced  exigency,  but  to  accomplish  a benefi- 
cial result  conceived  of  and  anticipated  by  the  pro- 

1 Works,  viii.  401. 

2 Folio  State  Papers,  Finance,  i.  67. 


NATIONAL  BANK. 


163 


jector.  Of  course  it  was  a development  and  realization 
of  Hamilton’s  earlier  projects  of  the  same  kind.  The 
Bank  Act  was  passed  Feb.  25,  1791.  The  bank  was 
to  last  for  twenty  years.  It  had  a capital  of  ten  mil- 
lions, the  shares  being  four  hundred  dollars  each. 
The  United  States  subscribed  two  million  dollars,  for 
which  it  gave  its  bonds  to  the  bank.  One  fourth  of 
the  subscription  by  individuals  was  to  be  paid  in 
specie,  the  rest  in  bonds  of  the  public  debt.  The 
subscriptions  were  payable  in  four  instalments,  semi- 
annually, — an  arrangement  which  led  to  a great  specu- 
lation in  the  subscriptions  during  1792,  and  resulted 
in  a financial  crisis  at  New  York.1  Eight  branches 
were  established,  as  Hamilton  says,  without  his  co- 
operation, and  in  fact  against  his  judgment.2  The 
notes  were  receivable  in  all  payments  to  the  United 
States. 

This  bank  paid  more  than  eight  per  cent  per  annum 
dividend  during  its  existence,  and  its  stock  was  quoted 
at  from  twenty  to  forty  per  cent  above  par.3 

The  country  undoubtedly  needed,  at  this  period, 
some  banking  institutions  to  bring  into  full  activity 
the  capital  possessed  by  its  people.  This  was  a need, 
not  of  the  government,  but  of  the  people,  and  banks 
were  already  being  formed  to  satisfy  the  need.  The 
necessity  that  the  United  States  government  should 
proceed  to  provide  an  institution  of  this  kind  was 
never  established.  This  bank  was  very  much  more 
like  the  Bank  of  England  than  either  of  the  previous 

1 Works,  ii.  235;  viii.  227,  233,  240,  245. 

2 Ibid.,  viii.  237.  3 Seybert’s  Statistics,  520. 


164 


ALEXANDER  HAMILTON. 


projects  which  Hamilton  had  put  forward.  In  the 
fundamental  principles  of  its  constitution  it  was,  as 
the  Bank  of  England  originally  was,  a syndicate  of 
holders  of  the  public  debt  who  were  incorporated  and 
granted  a monopoly  of  issuing  notes,  as  far  as  the 
power  of  the  Federal  Government  could  control  that 
monopoly.  There  was  no  need,  in  the  case  of  the 
Bank  of  the  United  States,  of  allowing  subscriptions  in 
the  public  debt.  The  public  debt  was  all  provided 
for  independently  of  the  bank.  This  was  only  a 
measure  for  carrying  out  another  notion  which  was 
stigmatized  as  English,  with  more  reason  than  in 
other  cases ; namely,  that  of  interweaving  the  inter- 
ests of  wealthy  men  with  those  of  the  government. 
The  government  of  the  United  States  never  realized 
any  gain  whatever  from  this  device.  The  expectation 
was  unfounded  and  illusory,  and  the  opposition  were 
justified  in  saying  that  if  it  had  been  real,  it  would 
have  been  derogatory  to  the  government. 

Another  very  great  vice  in  Hamilton’s  bank  was 
the  arrangement  by  which  the  United  States  gov- 
ernment, being  itself  at  the  time  impecunious,  sub- 
scribed stock  in  the  bank  and  gave  its  note  for  the 
subscription.  This  example  was  imitated  with  ruinous 
effect  by  private  individuals  in  the  United  States  dur- 
ing the  next  fifty  years  or  more.  Very  naturally, 
impecunious  individuals  inferred  that  if  a number  of 
them  combined  and  put  in  their  stock  notes,  they 
could  make  a bank  and  win  the  same  advantages 
which  the  impecunious  government  had  won.  This 
bank  therefore  planted  the  seeds  of  the  wild-cat 


POLITICAL  ECONOMY  OF  BAJVJCS  165 

banking  with  which  the  United  States  was  cursed 
until  the  civil  war,  and  also  the  vices,  fallacies,  and 
political  disturbances  of  Jackson’s  bank  war  may  be 
traced  up  to  it  in  no  small  degree.  The  opposition 
party  paid  Hamilton  the  homage  in  1816  of  imi- 
tating his  bank  very  closely,  including  its  worst  faults ; 
that  is  to  say,  when  themselves  in  financial  straits, 
they  knew  of  no  better  measures  to  adopt  than  those 
devices  of  his  which  they  had  most  vehemently 
abused.  This  may,  in  fact,  be  said  of  the  entire 
financial  system  which  they  adopted  in  the  second 
war. 

Let  us  now  see  what  Hamilton’s  doctrines  were  on 
the  subject  of  banks  and  money. 

In  his  letter  to  Duane  in  1 780  he  said  that  a tax 
in  kind  was  necessary,  because  “ the  money  in  cir- 
culation is  not  a sufficient  representative  of  the  pro- 
ductions of  the  country,  and  consequently  no  revenue 
raised  from  it  as  a medium  can  be  a competent 
representative  of  that  part  of  the  product  of  the  coun- 
try which  it  is  bound  to  contribute  to  the  support 
of  the  public.”  In  1781  he  said1  that  land  ought 
not  to  be  heavily  taxed,  because  if  it  is,  it  will  drive 
population  to  the  new  land.  Labour  is  and  will  be 
dear,  “ to  reduce  which,  and  not  to  increase  it,  ought 
to  be  a capital  object  of  our  policy.”  He  also  main- 
tained that  taxation  on  goods  was  divided  between 
the  buyer  and  seller  according  to  supply  and  demand. 
In  his  bank  scheme  of  1781  he  said  : “The  tendency 
of  a national  bank  is  to  increase  public  and  private 
1 Works,  i.  265. 


i66 


ALEXANDER  HAMILTON. 


credit.”  And  again  : “ The  real  wealth  of  a nation 
consisting  in  its  labour  and  commodities,  is  to  be  esti- 
mated by  the  sign  of  that  wealth,  its  circulating  cash.” 
And  again : “ Our  paper  was  in  its  nature  liable  to 
depreciation,  because  it  had  no  funds  for  its  support, 
and  was  not  upheld  by  private  credit.  ...  No  paper 
credit  can  be  substantial  or  durable  which  has  not 
funds  [that  is,  taxes  or  other  revenues  provided  for 
its  redemption],  and  which  does  not  unite  immedi- 
ately the  interests  and  influence  of  the  moneyed  men 
in  its  establishment  and  preservation.  A credit  be- 
gun on  this  basis  will,  in  process  of  time,  greatly  ex- 
ceed its  funds.  But  this  requires  time  and  a well 
settled  opinion  in  its  favour.”  In  1782  he  wrote  to 
Morris 1 that  the  wheels  of  circulation  were  clogged 
for  want  of  commerce  and  a sufficient  medium.  Men- 
tor answered  to  Phocion,  in  1784:  “ Money  is  a 
conveniency,  not  an  article  of  trade.  Being  such, 
wherever  trade  centres,  money  will.”  In  his  reply  to 
Mentor,  Hamilton  took  no  notice  of  this.  In  the 
“ Federalist  ” he  speaks  of  “ the  real  scarcity  of  money 
incident  to  a languid  and  mutilated  state  of  trade.”  2 
In  his  report  on  the  public  credit  he  says  that  he 
wants  to  contract  a loan  abroad,  because  to  pay  the 
instalments  due  on  the  American  debt  abroad  would 
drain  off  specie.  In  his  report  on  the  national  bank 
he  tries  to  state  the  advantages  of  a bank.  He  men- 
tions the  “ augmentation  of  the  active'  or  productive 
capital  of  a country.”  “ Gold  and  silver,  when  they 
are  employed  merely  as  the  instrument  of  exchange 

1 Works,  viii.  70.  2 Ibid.,  ix.  69. 


POLITICAL  ECONOMY  OF  BANNS.  167 

and  alienation,  have  been,  not  improperly,  denomi- 
nated dead  stock,  but  when  deposited  in  bank  to  be- 
come the  basis  of  a paper  circulation  which  takes  their 
character  and  place,  as  the  signs  or  representatives  of 
value,  they  then  acquire  life,  or  in  other  words,  an  ac- 
tive and  productive  quality.”  He  explains  this  by 
saying  that  money  in  a merchant’s  chest  is  idle,  but 
put  in  a bank  yields  profit.  “ It  is  a well  established 
fact  that  banks  in  good  credit  can  circulate  a far 
greater  sum  than  the  actual  quantum  of  their  capital 
in  gold  and  silver.”  The  advantages  he  expects  from 
a national  bank  are,  loans  to  government,  and  facili- 
tation of  the  payment  of  taxes. 

In  these  passages  we  see  that  he  was  under  the  do- 
minion of  the  most  vicious  fallacies  with  regard  to 
money  and  banking,  and  that  his  idea  of  a bank  did 
not  go  beyond  some  of  the  most  vulgar  misconcep- 

(tions  about  it.  Banks  do  not  increase  capital  in  the 
slightest  degree.  They  make  nothing ; they  are  a 
part  of  the  industrial  organization,  and  their  utility, 
which  can  hardly  be  overestimated,  consists  in  height- 
ening the -circulating  movement  in  the  organization  in 
a way  which  makes  a certain  amount  of  capital  very 
much  more  effective.  They  therefore  affect  the  rela- 
tions of  capital  and  of  producers  in  the  way  of  credit. 
These,  however,  are  relations,  not  things.  The  idea 
that  a bank,  by  some  magic  or  other,  gives  validity  to 
a fiction,  must  ‘be  entirely  discarded.  This  is  the  no- 
tion which  lies  at  the  basis  of  the  devices  for  floating 
some  large  amount  of  paper  money  on  a small  basis, 
which  we  detect  in  the  above  passages.  If  there  were 


ALEXANDER  HAMILTON. 


1 68 

no  banks  and  no  paper  money,  and  if  everybody  who 
bought  anything,  handed  over  a bag  of  specie,  in  pay- 
ment for  it,  everybody  would  be  obliged  to  keep  on 
hand  a large  amount  of  specie  all  the  time.  This 
would  be  an  investment  of  so  much  of  his  capital,  and 
would  lessen  the  amount  which  he  could  employ  pro- 
ductively in  his  industry.  This  is  the  only  sense  in 
which  a specie  capital  could  be  said  to  be  “ dead.” 
It  is  evident  that  in  this  mode  of  doing  business  there 
would  be  a constant  carrying  backward  and  forward 
of  bags  of  specie,  while  it  would  also  be  found  that 
the  transactions  admitted  of  a cancellation,  so  that 
the  money  might  lie  still  and  not  be  carried  at  all, 
provided  only  that  some  record  could  be  made  of  the 
transactions,  so  as  to  find  out  where  the  cancellation 
would  fall.  Practically  it  would  be  impossible  for 
anybody,  even  if  he  had  the  record,  to  oversee  and 
comprehend  it  so  as  to  indicate  the  cancellations. 
The  first  automatic  device  for  accomplishing  them 
is  bookkeeping.  The  next  step  is,  not  only  to  carry 
the  accounts  on  a ledger,  but  to  put  them  in  current 
form,  so  that  they  can  be  negotiated.  When  this  is 
done,  the  negotiable  instruments  can  be  bought  and 
sold  any  number  of  times  during  a convenient  inter- 
val, and  then  be  brought  to  the  record  on  the  books 
for  cancellation  of  the  accounts,  whereupon  the  nego- 
tiable instruments  disappear.  The  bank  notes  a're 
simply  a very  convenient  and  universal  form  of  theslp 
negotiable  instruments,  and  their  amount  is  deter- 
mined by  the  necessities  and  the  convenience  of  the 
business  to  be  done.  The  thing  which  floats  them  is 


BANK  WAR. 


169 


the  equivalence  of  the  transactions  in  the  market, 
where  the  buyings  equal  the  sellings,  and  the  pay- 
ments equal  the  loans.  Banks  therefore,  whether  they 
issue  or  not,  economize  enormously  the  investment  in 


specie,  not  because,  if  they  issue,  they  put  a c1 


kind  of  money  in  place  of  it,  but  because  they  obv y 
ate  the  necessity  of  using  it.  They  also  greatly  ac- 
celerate all  the  transactions,  both  of  exchange  and 
production,  because  they  give  promptitude  both  to 
tire  advances  and  the  returns  of  capital,  and  render 
production  and  exchange,  in  effect,  continuous,  where 
they  would  otherwise  be  broken  by  intervals  at  the 
successive  steps  of  the  operation. 

The  bank  also  brought  out  a vehement  onslaught 
from  the  opposition.  It  was  regarded  as  containing 
a privilege  for  those  who  could  get  into  it,  and  we 
must  observe  that  there  was  always  present  a large 
element  of  envy  toward  any  superiority  or  advantage, 
which  led  a certain  party  to  aim  to  destroy  it  or  pull 
it  down,  rather  than  that  anybody  else  should  enjoy 
it  while  they  could  not.  Taylor,  in  the  pamphlet  pre- 
viously mentioned,1  stated  the  doctrine  which  he  held 
as  follows  : “ Debt  is  service  or  labour,  and  service  or 
labour  is  slavery.  . . . For,  money  being  the  represen- 
tative of  labour,  and  the  only  medium  by  which  debt 
can  be  paid,  the  creditor  is  in  fact  the  master  of  the 
debtor,  for  the  quantum  of  service  or  labour  necessary 
to  discharge  the  debt.  If  so,  the  United  States  are, 
by  the  bank  contrivances,  placed  precisely  in  the  sit- 
uation of  a slave  who  has  purchased  of  his  master 


1 Principles  of  Public  Measures,  77. 


170 


ALEXANDER  HAMILTON. 


about  four  days’  freedom  in  each  week  ; because  for 
more  than  one  day  in  each  week  they  owe  service 
to  the  Bank  of  the  United  States,  and  for  about  two 
days  to  the  several  banks  now  operating.  How  im- 
properly, then,  do  we  speak  ! Instead  of  saying,  ‘ The 
Bank  of  the  United  States,’  it  would  be  more  proper 
to  say,  ‘ The  United  States  of  the  Bank.’  ” He  says 
that  a design  exists  for  setting  up  a monarchy  and 
aristocracy.  The  proof  of  it  is  in  the  Secretary  of  the 
Treasury’s  bank  scheme.  “ The  bank  is  perpetually 
betting  one  hundred  to  one  hundred  and  six ; the 
wager  is  always  drawn,  and  the  bank  receives  the  six 
in  every  hundred  byway  of  forfeit.”  The  gain  of  the 
bank  implies  a loss  to  somebody,  because  it  is  a traffic 
of  ideas,  not  of  substances.  The  bank  has  a monop- 
oly of  the  circulating  medium.  Bank  profits  are  a tax 
on  the  community. 

The  next  of  Hamilton’s  enterprises  was  the  mint. 
He  entered  into  an  investigation  of  the  value  of  the 
Spanish  dollar.  He  found  that  changes  had  taken 
place  in  it  within  a century,  and  he  thought  that,  on 
account  of  these,  the  real  unit  of  account  had  been 
grains  of  fine  gold.  He  also  discussed  the  re- 
lation of  gold  and  silver,  and  seemed  inclined  to  make 
some  criticisms  on  the  acts  of  Congress  already  passed 
in  1785  and  1786  for  a gold  and  a silver  dollar,  which 
were  the  work  of  Jefferson.  He  was,  “ upon  the  whole, 
strongly  inclined  to  the  opinion  that  a preference 
ought  to  be  given  to  neither  of  the  metals  for  the 
money  unit.  Perhaps  if  either  were  to  be  preferred, 
it  ought  to  be  gold  rather  than  silver.”  He  declared  that 


MINT  AND  COINAGE.  17 1 

the  undervalued  metal  would  be  banished.  “ General 
utility  will  best  be  promoted  by  a due  proportion  of 
both  metals,”  gold  for  large,  silver  for  small  transac- 
tions. He  had  no  plan  for  securing  this.  He  reached 
the  conclusion  that  the  unit  in  the  United  States  ought 
to  correspond  with  24I  grains  of  pure  gold  and 
371 J-  grains  of  pure  silver.  The  latter  he  reached 
by  taking  the  average  of  the  last  two  Spanish  dollar 
coinages.  He  proposed  that  each  coin  should  be 
eleven  twelfths  fine,  which  would  make  the  gross 
weight  of  the  silver  dollar  four  hundred  and  five 
grains.  He  opposed  Jefferson’s  plan,  which  was  to 
make  the  silver  dollar  contain  three  hundred  and  sixty- 
five  grains  pure,  and  to  derive  the  gold  dollar  from  it 
at  the  ratio  of  fifteen  to  one.  His  discussion  of  this 
entire  subject  has  a superficial  aspect  of  learning  : but 
he  had  not  mastered  any  point  in  the  question,  and 
the  jealousy  between  himself  and  Jefferson  cannot  be 
overlooked.1  If  his  paper  was  to  pass  as  a production 
of  his  day  and  generation,  it  might  be  awarded  high 
merit ; but  if  it  should  be  presented  now  as  an  au- 
thority worthy  of  any  serious  attention  in  respect 
to  “bimetallism,”  its  pretensions  must  be  entirely 
rejected. 

1 Folio  State  Papers,  Finance,  i.  91. 


172 


ALEXANDER  HAMILTON. 


CHAPTER  XI. 

THE  REPORT  ON  MANUFACTURES  ; THE  POLITICAL 
ECONOMY  OF  IT  ; THE  LOGIC  OF  THE  POSITION  OF 
THE  UNITED  STATES  AS  TO  TRADE. 

The  next  subject  to  which  he  turned  his  attention 
was  “ manufactures.”  1 This  enterprise  again  pre- 
sented another  phase  of  statesmanlike  activity.  The 
funding  of  the  federal  debt,  with  the  sinking  fund,  and 
the  mint,  were  legitimate  tasks  which  presented  them- 
selves in  the  business  of  the  new  government.  The 
assumption  might  have  been  neglected.  The  national 
bank  was  a voluntary  enterprise ; it  was  not  im- 
posed upon  him.  The  report  on  the  manufactures 
was  a general  disquisition  on  government  policy,  in  a 
matter  in  which  it  was  questionable  whether  the  gov- 
ernment properly  had  any  policy.  A large  part  of  the 
document  is  occupied  by  an  attempt  to  prove  that  he 
had  any  right  to  take  up  the  matter,  or  that  there  was 
anything  to  be  proposed.  Of  course,  it  included  no 
project  for  meeting  any  exigency  or  dealing  with  any 
subject  matter  which  was  before  him,  but  it  undertook 
to  lay  down  the  grounds  in  justification  of  a line  of 
policy  to  be  pursued  by  the  government.  It  could 
therefore  never  be  put  in  practice  until  motives  were 

1 Folio  State  Papers,  Finance,  i.  123. 


THE  REFORT  ON  MANUFACTURES.  173 


called  into  play  which  must,  in  the  nature  of  the  case, 
be  interested  motives,  actuating  persons  who  would 
avail  themselves  of  the  vague  and  general  principles 
which  he  had  laid  down  to  win  selfish  advantages. 

The  document  is  marked  by  his  worst  faults.  It  is 
prolix  and  loose  in  construction.  It  refers  to  some 
of  the  doctrines  of  private  enterprise  and  non-inter- 
ference, but  in  a way  which  makes  it  seem  as  if  he 
must  have  taken  them  up  at  second  hand  and  in  the 
plump  and  crass  form  in  which  they  were  currently 
repeated.  He  thinks  that  the  argument  against  the 
“ zealous  pursuit  [which  is  a shifting  of  the  issue]  of 
manufactures  ” would  have  great  force  “ if  perfect 
freedom  of  industry  and  commerce  were  the  prevail- 
ing system  of  nations.”  He  did  not  see  that  all  the 
obstructions  put  by  foreign  nations  on  American  com- 
merce were  the  most  powerful  form  possible  of  the 
sort  of  encouragement  to  manufactures  which  he  was 
anxious  for.  ' His  further  argument  resolves  itself 
into  an  effort  to  force  manufactures  earlier  than  they 
: would  come  on  account  of  habit,  inertia,  etc.  He 
also  alleges  as  an  argument,  that  other  nations  have 
bounties,  premiums,  etc.,  which  we  must  offset.  The 
obstacles  in  the  United  States  which  have  to  be  over- 
come  are  scarcity  of  hands,  dearness  of  labour  [which 
\ is  the  same  thing] , and  want  of  capital.  He  did  not 
’ admit  the  high- wages  argument.  “ So  far  as  the  dear- 
ness of  labour  may  be  a consequence  of  the  greatness 
of  profit  in  any  branch  of  business,  it  is  no  obstacle 
to  success.  The  undertaker  can  afford  to  pay  the 
price.”  He  goes  at  large  into  the  facts  which  make 


174 


ALEXANDER  HAMILTON. 


manufacturing  impossible  in  the  United  States  with- 
out government  interference,  and  introduces  a long 
digression  about  public  debt  and  capital,  which  at  last 
he  brings  to  a distinction  between  “ an  absolute  in- 
crease of  capital  ” and  “ an  artificial  increase  of  capi- 
tal as  an  engine  of  business.”  Here  he  really  comes 
so  near  to  the  distinction  between  increase  of  capital 
and  greater  effectiveness  of  a given  amount  of  capital, 
that  it  seems  as  if  he  might  have  worked  his  way  out. 
A funded  debt  is  not,  he  says,  the  absolute  increase, 
but  the  artificial  increase.  He  construes  all  this 
argument,  however,  to  prove  the  error  of  those  who 
maintain  that  manufacturing  cannot  succeed  in  the 
United  States. 

He  has  a controversy  here,  not  with  those  whom 
he  started  out  to  refute,  who  maintained  the  doctrine 
of  free-trade  and  non-interference,  but  with  those 
who  dogmatically  maintained  that  the  United  States 
ought  to  be  an  agricultural  nation,  and  ought  not  to 
manufacture.  For  a critical  analysis  of  the  paper  it 
is  very  essential  to  unravel  the  confusion  which  he 
makes  all  the  way  through  between  these  two  classes 
of  antagonists.  Against  the  latter  he  has  a very  easy 
case.  He  then  brings  forward  three  notions  which 
have  become  traditional  in  the  United  States,  but 
which  were  not  in  the  old  protectionism,  and  have 
not  been  treated  with  much  attention  anywhere  else  : 
First,  that  internal  competition  on  protected  articles 
lowers  the  price  of  them  ; second,  that  manufacturing 
has  some  quality  or  merit  as  a form  of  industry,  to 
promote  political  and  social  well-being,  which  other 


THE  REPORT  ON  MANUFACTURES.  175 


forms  of  industry  have  not ; 1 and  thirdly,  that  trans- 
portation is  an  evil  which  ought  to  be  minimized,  as 
if  it  involved  a pure  waste.  He  then  specifies  eleven 
means  of  stimulating  manufactures,  among  which  he 
includes  inspection  laws,  means  of  facilitating  remit- 
tances, and  means  of  facilitating  transportation,  — 
which  show  that  his  analysis  is  not  correct,  since 
they  are  irrelevant.  Next  he  discusses  different  sorts 
of  manufacturing  industry  with  respect  to  what  he 
thinks  their  chances  in  the  United  States  might  be, 
and  makes  a chance  proposition  as  to  the  amount  of 
duty  which  would  suffice  to  start  them  here.  He  had 
no  authority  or  guarantee  for  these  propositions  at  all. 

The  system  of  protection  to  be  found  in  this  report 
of  Hamilton’s  is  the  old  system  of  mercantilism  of 
the  English  school,  turned  around  and  adjusted  to 
the  situation  of  the  United  States.  What  Hamilton 
especially  failed  to  see  was  the  reaction  of  the  system 
which  he  proposed.  Hence  he  did  not  at  all  reach 
the  philosophy  of  trade,  nor  even  any  philosophy  of 
trade ; but  all  that  he  said  on  the  subject  dealt  with 
the  few  groups  of  phenomena  which  he  had  hap- 
pened to  notice,  without  pursuing  them  up  to  any 
real  relation  with  each  other.  He  did  not  therefore 
become  conscious  of  the  confusion  and  contradiction 
of  which  he  was  guilty.  In  a review  of  Jefferson’s 
first  message,2  Hamilton  said  : “ There  is  hardly  any 

1 This  notion  is  the  exact  counterpart  of  the  one  mentioned 
above,  that  the  United  States  must  be  agricultural  and  ought 
not  to  manufacture. 

2 Works,  vii.  225. 


176 


ALEXANDER  HAMILTON. 


stronger  symptom  of  a pygmy  mind  than  a propensity 
to  allow  greater  weight  to  secondary  than  to  primary 
considerations.”  His  report  on  the  manufactures 
deals  entirely  with  considerations  of  the  third  or 
fourth  order  of  removal  from  the  controlling  facts 
and  generalizations.  This  has  contributed  very 
much  to  its  popularity  and  success  since  the  protec- 
tive system  was  introduced  here.  All  men  live  in 
assumptions,  traditions,  current  opinions,  etc.,  which 
are  in  the  third  or  fourth  derivative  from  the  truth. 
No  man  ever  penetrates  behind  these  to  get  at  the 
truth  in  more  than  one  domain ; namely,  that  which 
he  makes  his  specialty.  He  is  always  vexed  to  hear 
the  uninitiated  talk  about  his  specialty,  because  they 
treat  it  always  from  the  standpoint  of  the  third  and 
fourth  derivatives ; but  he  does  the  same  with  their 
specialties  when  he  comes  to  talk  about  them. 
Hence  a man  who  goes  remorselessly  to  the  bottom 
of  things  will  never  have  wide  influence.  He  leaves 
the  rest  behind  him,  and  appears  to  be  an  extremist. 

On  the  contrary,  one  who  deals  as  Hamilton  did 
with  the  phenomena  of  the  third  or  fourth  order 
moves  in  exactly  that  range  of  confused  and  unana- 
lyzed general  propositions  which  seem  to  be  prac- 
tical, at  the  same  time  that  they  have  an  attractive 
philosophical  aspect. 

For  the  time  being  this  report  and  the  propositions 
in  it  had  no  actuality.  There  were  demands  for  pro- 
tection, and  some  concessions  to  them  were  made ; 
but  interest  was  absorbed  in  other  directions,  and 
this  proposition  fell  out  of  notice.  It  was  brought  to 


HIS  DOCTRINES  OF  COMMERCE. 


I7^ 


light  again  after  the  second  war,  when  all  the  circum- 
stances concurred  to  favour  this  policy,  and  it  proved 
a welcome  arsenal  to  the  politicians  of  that  period. 
All]  its  notions  were  exploded  over  and  over  again  by 
''Webster,  Raguet,  Macduffie,  and  the  leading  South- 
erners of  the  nullification  period,  who  developed  ex- 
actly what  Hamilton  had  overlooked,  — the  crippling 
effect  of  the  cost  an£t'~re»efien"-<rf  protection.  / 

In  regard  to  the  doctrines  about  trade  which  Ham- 


ilton had  in  his  mind,  we  may  note  the  following  evi- 
dence. In  1782  he  wrote  : “ It  became  a cant  phrase 
among  the  opposers  of  these  attempts  [to  regulate 
prices  during  the  Revolution]  that  trade  must  regulate 
itself.”  1 “ To  preserve  the  balance  of  trade  in  favour 
of  a nation  ought  to  be  a leading  aim  of  its  policy. 
The  avarice  of  individuals  may  frequently  find  its  ac- 
count in  pursuing  channels  of  traffic  prejudicial  to 
that  balance,  to  which  the  government  may  be  able 
to  oppose  effectual  impediment.”  2 In  the  same  arti- 
cle he  made  the  historical  statement  that  trade  took 
its  rise  in  England  under  the  auspices  of  Elizabeth, 
and  that  its  rapid  rise  was  due  to  her  fostering  care. 
He  refers  to  Hume’s  “ Balance  of  Trade,”  and  affirms 
that  Hume  did  not  hold  government  interference  to 
be  useless  or  hurtful.  “ The  nature  of  a government, 
its  spirit,  maxims,  and  laws  with  respect  to  trade,  are 
among  those  constant  moral  causes  which  influence 
its  general  results,  and  when  it  has  by  accident  taken 
a wrong  direction,  assist  in  bringing  it  back  to  its 
natural  course.  This  is  everywhere  admitted  by  all 
1 Works,  i.  255.  2 Ibid.,  255. 


12 


178 


ALEXANDER  HAMILTON. 


writers  upon  the  subject,  nor  is  there  one  who  has 
asserted  the  contrary  doctrine.”  1 

The  last  statement  shows  that  he  was  very  little 
acquainted  with  the  literature,  but  the  proposition 
which  precedes  it  deserves  particular  attention.  It 
is  one  which  may  be  reached  by  several  different 
lines  of  economic,  political,  or  ethical  reflection,  and 
it  has  consequently  been  reached  by  a number  of 
very  sincere  investigators  at  one  time  and  another,  who 
have  congratulated  themselves  on  reaching  a theorem 
which  solved  all  the  riddles  in  this  domain.  It  is, 
however,  nothing  but  a pitfall,  the  peculiar  calamity  of 
which  is  that  the  exit  from  it  is  only  with  great  diffi- 
culty ever  to  be  found  by  anybody  who  has  fallen  into  it. 

It  was  impossible  that  a masterful  man  like  Ham- 
ilton should  consent  to  that  theory  of  statesmanship 
which  would  have  taught  him  to  confine  his  efforts  to 
an  intelligent  promotion  of  growth,  with  the  removal 
of  obstacles  and  gentle  impulses  at  critical  moments, 
in  the  direction  which  his  genius  indicated  as  . the 
paths  of  prosperity.  We  shall  see  that  herein  lies  the 
secret  of  the  catastrophe  which  he  brought  upon  his 
own  political  theory  and  his  own  political  enterprises. 
He  naturally  could  not  consent  to  a policy  which 
would  have  dictated  to  him  to  withhold  his  rash 
hands,  when  his  whole  being  was  in  a quiver  to  seize 
that  which  he  thought  was  going  wrong,  and  .mpress 
upon  it  at  once,  and  with  unshrinking  reliance  on  his 
own  judgment,  the  form  and  tendency  which  he 
thought  for  the  best. 

1 Works,  i.  256. 


HIS  OVER-GOVERNMENT. 


179 


The  statesman  of  later  times  who  most  nearly 
sympathized  with  Hamilton’s  view  of  the  duty  of  a 
public  man  in  an  executive  office  to  have  a “ policy,” 
and  to  try  to  carry  it  through  the  Legislature,  was 
John  Quincy  Adams.  His  Secretary  of  the  Treasury, 
with  his  approval,  tried  to  introduce  discussions  of 
“principles”  into  his  reports.1  This  second  and 
later  attempt  gave  the  final  proof  that  that  practice 
is  in  disaccord  with  American  ideas,  and  only  reacts 
disastrously  on  the  public  man  who  uses  it. 

In  the  answer  to  the  Rhode  Island  objections  to 
the  impost,  in  17S2,  Hamilton  wrote  : “The  principal 
thing  to  be  consulted  for  the  advancement  of  com- 
merce is  to  promote  exports.  All  impediments  to 
these,  either  by  way  of  prohibiting  or  by  increasing 
the  prices  of  native  commodities,  decreasing  by  that 
means  their  sale  and  consumption  at  foreign  markets, 
are  injurious.  Duties  on  exports  have  this  opera- 
tion.” Hence  he  argues  that  all  the  home  taxes  are 
far  more  injurious  to  commerce  than  any  impost 
duties.  In  1784  Mentor,  in  his  reply  to  Phocion 
(Hamilton),  laid  down  the  doctrine  that  the  balance 
of  trade  cannot  remain  adverse ; that  over  some 
short  period  there  must  be  an  equality.  In  his 
answer  Hamilton  noticed  this  doctrine  only  by  the 
following : ‘fAs  to  Mentor’s  commercial  reveries,  I 
shall  decline  bestowing  many  remarks  on  them ; not 
only  because  they  are  not  immediately  connected 
with  the  general  subject,  but  because  there  is  little 
danger  of  their  making  any  proselytes,  while  men 

3 J.  Q.  Adams,  vii.  347. 


i8o 


ALEXANDER  HAMILTON. 


are  convinced  that  the  prosperity  of  the  national  com- 
merce depends  as  much  upon  the  extent  of  its  capital 
as  that  of  any  individual.”  1 It  is  impossible  to  be- 
lieve that  the  man  who  wrote  this  had  carefully  studied 
Adam  Smith  within  the  previous  year. 

In  1791  he  wrote  to  Jefferson  : 2 “ My  commercial 
system  turns  very  much  on  giving  a free  course  to 
trade  and  cultivating  good  humour  with  all  the  world.” 
In  the  report  on  manufactures  he  says  : “ The  West 
India  Islands,  the  soils  of  which  are  the  most  fertile, 
and  the  nation  which  in  the  greatest  degree  supplies 
the  rest  of  the  world  with  the  precious  metals,  ex- 
change to  a loss  with  almost  every  other  country.” 

These  statements  show  that  he  was  completely 
befogged  in  the  mists  of  mercantilism,  for  they  are 
the  doctrines  of  the  first  quarter  of  the  eighteenth 
century. 

It  should  be  noticed,  however,  that  Hamilton  gave 
the  following  evidence  that  he  was  not  disposed  to 
press  his  notions  on  this  subject  to  any  application. 
His  tax  system  included  import  duties  and  excises, 
and  therefore  was  hostile  to  any  extravagant  rates  in 
the  former  with  a neglect  of  the  latter.  In  1794  he 
prepared  a project  for  a treaty  of  reciprocity  with 
England,  to  be  used  by  Jay,  according  to  w'hich  he 
would  have  agreed  to  stipulations  limiting  the  Ameri- 
can taxes  on  all  the  leading  manufactured  articles  to 
ten  per  cent.3  In  his  review  of  Jefferson’s  message, 
in  1801,  he  blamed  the  repeal  of  the  internal  revenue 

1 Works,  iii.  501.  2 Ibid.,  iv.  54. 

3 Ibid.,  313 


THE  LOGIC  OF  AMERICAN  TRADE.  181  • 


taxes,  saying  that  the  import  duties  were  high,  and 
that  it  was  doubtful  whether  they  were  not  too  high ; 
also  that  if  any  revenue  could  be  remitted,  it  ought 
to  be  some  tax  which  weighed  on  navigation  or 
commerce.  Still  he  objected,  in  the  same  paper,  to 
Jefferson’s  notions  of  free  commerce,  — that  although 
industry  ought  to  be  free  in  the  main,  “ practical 
politicians  know  that  it  may  be  beneficially  stimulated 
by  prudent  aids  and  encouragement  on  the  part  of  the 
government.1 

The  great  pity  about  Hamilton’s  position  in  this 
matter  was  that  it  helped  to  turn  the  current  of 
American  opinion  against  what,  according  to  all  the 
logic  of  the  American  situation,  it  ought  to  have 
been.  It  is  true  that  the  Americans,  as  we  have 
seen  above,  did  not  make  their  revolt  as  a revolt 
against  the  navigation  system,  but  rather  in  accord- 
ance with  it.  Nevertheless,  the  logic  of  their  posi- 
tion led  them  to  be  the  champions  of  free  trade  with 
all  the  world.  They  were,  therefore,  constantly  at 
loggerheads  with  themselves,  at  one  moment  grasping 
the  logic  of  the  situation  correctly,  and  at  the  next 
succumbing  to  the  dogmas  of  English  mercantilism, 
which  were  of  course  the  only  theories  on  commerce 
which  they  ever  had  heard.  Franklin,  in  an  essay 
on  wages,  written  about  the  end  of  the  Revolution, 
showed  that  his  ideas  had  been  much  cleared  up, 
although  he  had  twenty  years  before  begun  to  escape 
from  mercantilism.  “ We  must  not  conclude  that 
manufactures  cannot  prosper  unless  the  wages  of  the 
1 Works,  viii.  209,  216,  217. 


iS  2 


ALEXANDER  HAMILTON. 


workman  are  reduced  as  low  as  we  find  them  in 
Europe.”  Wages  will  rise  in  Europe  : first,  because 
of  the  “ greater  quantity  of  labour  that  Europe  will 
have  to  perform  in  consequence  of  the  existence  of 
another  great  nation  in  the  commercial  world,  and 
of  its  continual  increase  ; ” and  secondly,  because  of 
“ the  emigration  of  European  workmen,  or  the  mere 
possibility  of  their  emigrating  in  order  to  go  to  Amer- 
ica, where  they  will  be  better  paid.”  “ In  order  to 
raise  the  rate  of  wages,  it  is  enough  that  higher  can 
be  obtained  in  any  place  to  which  the  workman  who 
depends  upon  them  can  remove.”  1 Also  in  a pam- 
phlet of  information  for  immigrants  he  said  that  the 
American  States  had  not  encouraged  manufactures 
by  taxes,  etc.,  because  “ if  the  country  is  ripe  for  the 
manufacture,  it  may  be  carried  on  by  private  persons 
to  advantage,  and  if  not,  it  is  folly  to  think  of  forcing 
nature.”  There  are  few  poor  in  America  to  furnish 
labour.  They  “ will  not  be  found  in  America  till  the 
lands  are  all  taken  up  and  cultivated,  and  the  excess 
of  people  who  cannot  get  land  want  employment.”  2 
In  1780  the  Spanish  Court  asked  John  Jay  if  the 
United  States  had  power  to  protect  national  indus- 
tries. He  answered  : “ With  respect  to  the  protec- 
tion of  national  industry,  I take  it  for  granted  that  it 
[industry]  will  always  flourish  where  it  is  lucrative, 
and  not  discouraged,  which  was  the  case  in  North 
America  when  I left  it,  every  man  being  then  at 
liberty  by  the  law  to  cultivate  the  earth  as  he  pleased, 
to  raise  what  he  pleased,  to  manufacture  as  he 
1 Franklin’s  Works,  ii.  435.  2 Ibid.,  475. 


COLONIAL  DEPENDENCE  PERPETUATED.  1S3 

pleased,  and  to  sell  the  produce  of  his  labour  to 
whom  he  pleased,  and  for  the  best  prices,  without 
any  duties  on  importation  whatever.”  “ So  great  is 
the  extent  of  country  in  North  America  yet  to  be 
cultivated  and  so  inviting  to  settlers,  that  labour  will 
very  long  remain  too  dear  to  admit  of  considerable 
manufactures.”  1 

These  doctrines  and  others  to  the  same  effect  lay 
in  the  logic  of  the  American  situation.  With  them 
should  be  compared  the  enthusiastic  anticipations  of 
Pownall,  mentioned  above.2  The  protective  system 
which  Hamilton  advocated,  consisted  in  borrowing 
the  traditions  of  the  colonial  system  ; and  as  a fact, 
although  the  Americans  had  won  their  political  in- 
dependence, they  perpetuated  their  intellectual  de- 
pendence by  bringing  over  the  dogmas  of  the  colo- 
nial mercantile  system  and  regulating  their  affairs 
thereby. 


1 Dip.  Corr.  Rev.,  vii.  245. 


2 See  page  34. 


184 


ALEXANDER  HAMILTON. 


CHAPTER  XII. 

Hamilton’s  contests  with  jefferson  and  madison; 

PARTY  VIRULENCE  j HAMILTON’S  POLICY  AND  METHODS. 

We  have  now  examined  the  great  measures  which 
Hamilton  proposed  by  way  of  organizing  the  new 
government  and  starting  it  upon  its  career  as  nearly 
as  possible  according  to  his  ideas  of  what  it  ought  to 
be.  Of  course  he  put  his  personality  at  stake  on 
every  one  of  his  measures,  in  this  method  of  doing 
business,  by  the  recommendation  and  upon  the  pro- 
ject of  an  executive  officer,  to  which  the  legislature 
was  asked  to  consent.  He  provoked  antagonism  of 
every  kind,  sectional,  personal,  and  factional.  When  k 
the  Federal  Government  was  organized,  it  was  like  a 
prize,  to  be  scrambled  for.  If  a Union  was  formed] 
there  would  be  power  in  it ; and  the  question  would 
be,  Who  shall  have  it?  If  a Union  was  formed, "it 
would  be  capable  of  abuses  on  behalf  of  personal, 
sectional,  and  other  interests.  There  would  therefore 
be  beneficiaries  on  one  side,  and  victims  on  the  other. 
The  Virginians  seem  to  have  expected  that  Virginians 
would  of  course  stand  first  in  the  councils  of  a Vir- 
ginia president.  But  Hamilton  possessed  the  confi- 
dence of  Washington,  and  constantly  won  more  of  it. 
He  was  aggressive  and  arrogant ; and  it  may  well  be 


CONTESTS  WITH  JEFFERSON  AND  MADISON.  185 


believed  that  his  manner  to  a man  like  J efferson  must 
have  been  very  offensive  to  the  latter,  all  the  more 
because,  whenever  they  came  in  collision,  Hamilton 
won  a victory.  He  either  proved  himself  in  the 
right,  or  maintained  his  case  so  well  that  he  could 
not  be  proved  in  the  wrong.  The  sentiments  of  the 
two  men  were  also  as  wide  apart  as  the  poles.  Jeffer- 
son and  Madison  were  already  friends,  and  were  drawn 
together  against  Hamilton.  Madison  sided  com- 
pletely with  Jefferson,  and  led,  in  Congress,  the  at- 
tacks upon  Hamilton.  In  every  case  he  was  signally 
defeated,  which  seems  to  have  embittered  him  more 
and  more.  In  1793,  when  the  resolutions  to  inves- 
tigate the  treasury,  which  Giles  had  introduced  at 
their  instigation,  were  pending,  Madison  wrote  that 
there  appeared  to  be  “ blamable  irregularity  and 
secrecy.”  1 This  was  giving  a criminal  colour  to  ap- 
pearances for  which  Hamilton  was,  in  fact,  to  blame. 
He  had  not  properly  and  clearly  published  the  facts. 
His  operations  often  lacked  simplicity  and  clearness. 
In  1794  Madison  complained  of  Hamilton’s  “men- 
torship to  the  commander-in-chief.”  2 Madison  con- 
strued the  report  on  manufactures  to  mean  that 
“ Congress  can  do  whatever  in  their  discretion  can 
be  done  by  money  and  will  promote  the  general  wel- 
fare.” Jefferson  construed  it  to  the  same  effect.4 
Monroe  also,  who  was  a younger  man,  was  attached 
to  these  two,  and  completely  affiliated  with  them. 
Jefferson  seems  to  have  furnished  most  of  the  animus, 

1 Madison’s  Letters,  i.  575.  2 Ibid,  ii.  19.  * 

3 Ibid.,  i.  546.  4 Washington,  x.  519. 


1 86  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON. 

Madison  carried  on  the  congressional  fight,  and 
Monroe  made  himself  the  agent  in  a shameful  affair, 
in  which,  it  is  true,  the  great  shame  fell  to  Hamilton, 
but  in  which  Monroe  did  not  act  with  dignity  or  pro- 
priety. Behind  these  were  a second  order  of  party 
leaders  in  the  same  warfare,  like  Giles  of  Virginia ; 
and  behind  these  still  again  some  of  the  editors  of 
the  period,  who  carried  scurrility  and  vituperation 
to  a degree  of  which  we  nowadays  know  nothing. 
Although  Hamilton  resigned,  in  January,  1795,  this 
personal  warfare  upon  him  was  kept  up,  not  without 
reason,  as  we  shall  see,  and  lasted  until  his  death. 

In  1792  he  wrote  a letter  to  Carrington  of  Virginia,1 
complaining  that  Madison  had  turned  against  him, 
although  he  supposed  that  they  sympathized  on  all 
important  matters,  including  assumption.  He  now 
finds  Jefferson  and  Madison  leading  a party  against 
him,  and  acting  on  views  subversive  of  the  Union. 
Jefferson  questions  the  expediency  of  funding  at  all. 
He  reported  in  the  cabinet  against  the  bank  with 
asperity,  and  ill  humour  toward  Hamilton.  He  op- 
poses Hamilton  in  the  sinking  fund  commission.  He 
has  employed  Freneau  to  edit  a newspaper  against 
Hamilton.  Hamilton  thinks  that  Madison  is  intri- 
guing against  him,  and  opposing  funding,  calling  it  a 
mortgage  on  posterity.  Jefferson  and  Madison  “ have 
a womanish  attachment  to  France,  and  a woman- 
ish resentment  "against  Great  Britain.”  The  former 
“ came  here  probably  with  a too  partial  idea  of  his 
own  powers,  and  with  the  expectation  of  a greater 

1 Works,  viii.  248. 


COX  TESTS  WITH JEFFERSON  AXD  MADISON.  187 


share  in  the  direction  of  our  councils  than  he  has  in 
reality  enjoyed.”  “ A variety  of  circumstances  which 
took  place  left  Mr.  Madison  a very  discontented  and 
chagrined  man,  and  begot  some  degree  of  ill  humour 
in  Mr.  Jefferson.”  They  wanted  commercial  war  with 
Great  Britain,  which  Hamilton  opposed,  and  so  he 
incurred  their  displeasure.  On  other  matters,  except 
the  additional  assumption,  “my  views  have  been 
equally  prevalent  [predominant]  in  opposition  to 
theirs.  This  current  of  success  on  the  one  side  and 
of  defeat  on  the  other  has  rendered  the  opposition 
furious,  and  has  produced  a disposition  to  subvert 
their  competitors  even  at  the  expense  of  the  govern- 
ment.” Jefferson  is  eager  to  be  president;  Hamil- 
ton is  not  expected  to  support  him,  and  must  be 
broken  down.  The  spectres  of  monarchism  walk  in 
.Virginia.  Hamilton  thinks  that  the  danger  is  from 
x^tate  rights.  “ I am  affectionately  attached  to  the 
republican  theory.  I desire  above  all  things  to  see 
the  equality  of  political  rights,  exclusive  of  all  heredi- 
tary distinction,  firmly  established  by  a practical 
demonstration  of  its  being  consistent  with  the  order 
and  happiness  of  society.”  He  fears  that  the  United 
States  cannot  sustain  itself  against  the  States.  “ Hence 
a disposition  on  my  part  toward  a liberal  construc- 
tion of  the  powers  of  the  National  Government,  to 
erect  every  fence,  to  guard  it  from  depredations, 
which  is  in  my  opinion  consistent  with  constitutional 
propriety.”  He  confesses  doubts  of  the  success  of 
republicanism ; its  enemies  are  faction  and  anarchy. 
If  he  wanted  to  overthrow  the  State  governments,  he 


i88 


ALEXANDER  HAMILTON. 


would  seek  popularity,  and  talk  about  “danger  to 
liberty.”  Jefferson  is  “ a man  of  profound  ambition 
and  violent  passions.” 

In  that  year  Hamilton  was  provoked,  by  the  attacks 
of  Freneau,  which  he  regarded  as  instigated  by  Jef- 
ferson, into  writing  newspaper  articles  with  his  own 
hand  in  reply.  This  scandal  gave  great  pain  to 
Washington,  who  remonstrated  with  both  Hamilton 
and  Jefferson.  Hamilton  replied  that  he  was  on  the 
defensive,  and  only  aimed  to  defend  public  measures 
against  which  opposition  was  forming.  He  agreed 
to  peace,  if  Washington  should  bring  it  about.1  Jef- 
ferson, in  his  reply,  made  a resume  of  his  charges 
against  Hamilton.  The  letter  is  long ; but  the  chief 
points  are  that  he  complained,  not  without  reason, 
that  Hamilton  meddled  with  his  department,  but  he 
went  on  to  make  calumnious  assertions  that  Hamilton 
was  forming  a corrupt  squadron  in  the  legislature,  by 
interesting  members  in  financial  schemes,  and  that 
he  did  not  want  to  pay  the  debt,  but  to  use  it  to  cor- 
rupt the  legislature.2  In  August,  Hamilton  wrote  a 
long  reply,  for  Washington,  to  all  the  charges  brought 
against  the  administration.  He  says  : “ To  upholdX 
public  credit  and  to  be  friendly  to  the  bank  must  be 
presupposed  to  be  corrupt  things,  before  the  being 
a proprietor  in  the  funds  or  of  bank  stock  can  be 
supposed  to  have  a corrupting  influence.”  A stock- 
owner  is  not  a stock-jobber.3 


1 Works,  vi.  384. 

2 Washington,  x.  517.  Cf.  Jefferson,  ix.  96,  122,  126. 

3 Works,  ii.  265. 


PARTY  VIRULENCE. 


189 

Jefferson  charged  Hamilton  with  being  the  author 
of  a pamphlet  “Plain  Truth,”  in  reply  to  Paine’s 
“ Common  Sense.”  1 He  said  that  he  heard  Hamil- 
ton say  that  he  preferred  monarchy,  and  thought  the 
English  Government  the  most  perfect  ever  devised 
by  the  wit  of  man.  John  Adams,  who  was  present, 
interposed,  “ but  for  its  corruptions.”  Hamilton  said 
that  with  these  it  was  perfect,  and  without  them 
impracticable.2 

That  Hamilton  imposed  respect  upon  Jefferson  was 
proved  by  other  passages  in  his  writings,  which  we 
may  insert  here,  although  they  are  later  in  date.  In 
1795  he  wrote  to  Madison:  “Hamilton  is  really  a 
Colossus  to  the  anti-republican  party.  Without  num- 
bers, he  is  an  host  within  himself.”  In  1798  he 
wrote  to  Madison,  referring  to  two  papers  in  Fenno’s 
“Gazette,”  signed  “Marcellus”  : “They  promise  much 
mischief,  and  are  ascribed,  without  any  difference  of 
opinion,  to  Hamilton.  You  must,  my  dear  sir,  take 
up  your  pen  against  this  champion.  You  know  the 
ingenuity  of  his  talents,  and  there  is  not  a person  but 
yourself  who  can  foil  him.  For  Heaven’s  sake,  then, 
take  up  your  pen,  and  do  not  desert  the  public  cause 
altogether.”  4 

It  is  not  easy  to  estimate  the  extent  to  which  the 
rivalry  and  animosity  of  Hamilton  and  Jefferson  have  > 
affected  the  political  institutions  of  the  United  States. 
After  Jefferson  became  president,  his  action  in  more 
than  one  matter  betrayed  the  motive  of  counteracting 


1 Jefferson,  ix.  126. 
3 Ibid.,  1 21. 


2 Ibid.,  vii.  389. 
4 Ibid.,  iv.  231. 


190 


ALEXANDER  HAMILTON. 


what  had  been  Hamilton’s  pet  measures.  The  unfair 
abuse  of  Hamilton  by  the  other  party,  from  Jefferson 
down  to  Callender,  is  fitted  to  drive  one  too  far  in 
Hamilton’s  defence.  It  is  a bias  against  which  it  is 
necessary  to  be  on  one’s  guard. 

We  must  here  notice,  therefore,  that  Hamilton’s 
methods  were  calculated  to  raise  against  himself  very 
bitter  opposition.  He  forced  every  issue  in  its  most 
direct  form.  His  fearlessness,  openness,  and  direct- 
ness turned  rivals  into  enemies,  irritated  smaller  men, 
and  aroused  their  malicious  desire  to  pull  him  down. 
At  the  same  time,  by  the  mass  he  was  not  under- 
stood, and  in  them  he  inspired  a vague  sense  of 
alienation  and  distrust. 


THE  EXCISE. 


191 


CHAPTER  XIII. 

THE  EXCISE  ; THE  WHISKEY  REBELLION. 

That  one  of  Hamilton’s  measures  on  account  of 
which  he  came  into  the  first  and  most  distinctly  hos- 
tile collision  with  the  opposing  forces  which  have 
been  described,  was  the  excise.  In  this  collision  the 
logic  of  the  situation  was  distinctly  developed. 

Pennsylvania  had  an  excise  on  imported  spirits  in 
1756,  as  a “fund”  for  the  support  of  paper  money. 
It  was  revised  in  1772,  and  extended  to  domestic 
spirits,  but  appears  never  to  have  been  collected. 
During  the  war,  the  importation  of  rum  being  pre- 
vented, the  distillation  of  whiskey  became  very 
profitable.  At  that  period  there  were  in  western 
Pennsylvania  judges  who  held  commissions  from  both 
Virginia  and  Pennsylvania ; and  people  submitted  to 
either,  as  they  chose.  “ It  is  reasonable  to  believe 
that  by  many  neither  was  well  submitted  to.”  1 About 
1786  New  Jersey  tried  to  lay  an  excise  on  spirits,  but 
could  not  bring  it  into  operation.2 

In  the  second  report  on  the  public  credit,  in  1 790, 
Hamilton  proposed  an  excise  on  whiskey,  in  order  to 
pay  the  interest  on  the  State  debts  which  had  been 

1 Findley,  21,  26. 

2 Ibid.,  31.  “The  genius  of  the  people  will  ill  brook  the  in- 
quisitive and  peremptory  spirit  of  excise  laws.”  (Hamilton  in 
the  “ Federalist,”  Works,  ix.  69  ) 


ig2 


ALEXANDER  HAMILTON. 


assumed.  He  said  that  Massachusetts,  Connecticut, 
and  Pennsylvania  had  excises  on  spirits. 

Whiskey  had  not  yet  come  into  fashion.  The  spirit 
which  was  drunk  upon  the  coast  was  rum.  Whiskey 
was  a domestic  substitute  among  the  Western  people, 
and  was  very  largely  manufactured  by  them  in  house- 
holds. They  had  no  money,  and  used  whiskey  in 
barter.1  That  is  to  say,  they  could  not  produce  grain 
so  as  to  export  it  to  any  market  where  they  could  buy 
sugar,  tea,  salt,  spices,  etc.,  on  account  of  difficulties 
of  transportation ; but  if  whiskey  was  distilled  frorcf 
the  grain,  it  could  be  transported.  The  tax  on  whis- 
key was  a specific  tax ; and  as  the  commodity  was 
cheap  among  them,  the  ad  valorem  rate  was  high, 
and  they  could  not  pay  the  tax  with  the  whiskey.  In 
T792  Hamilton  reported  more  or  less  opposition  to 
the  excise  in  New  York,  New  Jersey,  Pennsylvania, 
Delaware,  South  Carolina,  North  Carolina,  and  Ken- 
tucky.2 In  that  year  a convention  at  Pittsburg  adopted 
the  following  resolution  : “ Whereas,  some  men  may 
be  found  among  us  so  far  lost  to  every  sense  of 
virtue  and  feeling  for  the  distresses  of  this  country  as 
to  accept  offices  for  the  collection  of  the  duty,  Re- 
solved, That  in  future  we  will  consider  such  persons  as 
unworthy  of  our  friendship,  have  no  intercourse  or 
dealings  with  them,”  etc.,  — a complete  boycott.8  This 
resolution  might  have  been  copied  from  an  old  Stamp 
Act  resolution.  Findley,  however,  says  that  they  never 
acted  upon  it.4 

1 Findley,  41.  2 Works,  ii.  248. 

8 Washington,  x.  247,  note.  4 Findley,  44. 


THE  EXCISE. 


*93 


In  August,  1794,  Hamilton  made  a report  on  “ Op- 
position to  Internal  Duties,” 1 in  which  he  gave  a 
history  of  the  rebellion  which  had  been  going  on  for 
two  years.  Inspectors  of  stills  were  tarred  and  feath- 
ered, whiskey-poles  were  set  up,  meetings  were  held, 
disguised  parties  perpetrated  violence.  Findley  ad- 
mits that  the  facts  alleged  in  this  document  were 
true  with  a single  exception.  A meeting  at  Pitts- 
burg, in  1792,  which  adopted  the  boycott  resolu- 
tion, had  put  in  the  preamble  that  a tax  on  spirituous 
liquors  is  unjust  in  itself  and  oppressive  to  the  poor, 
and  that  internal  taxes  on  consumption  destroy  lib- 
erty. They  resolved  to  oppose  the  law  by  all  legal 
measures.  Hamilton  drafted  a letter  to  the  Governor 
of  Pennsylvania,  to  be  signed  by  the  Secretary  of 
State,  objecting  to  the  Governor’s  proposition  for 
dealing  with  the  Whiskey  Rebellion.2  That  proposition 
“ seems  to  have  contemplated  Pennsylvania  in  a light 
too  separate  and  unconnected.  The  propriety  of  that 
course  in  most,  if  not  in  all,  respects  would  be  sus- 
ceptible of  little  question  if  there  were  no  Federal 
Government,  federal  laws,  federal  judiciary,  or  federal 
officers,”  and  if  such  and  such  acts  had  not  been 
committed,  reciting  the  features  of  the  resistance  for 
three  years  past. 

The  point  he  makes  against  the  Governor  is  that 
the  latter  admits  that  affairs  had  reached  a pass  at 
which,  if  the  authority  of  Pennsylvania  was  at  stake, 
coercive  measures  would  be  proper,  but  that  coercive 
measures  are  not  yet  proper  for  the  Federal  Govern- 
1 Works,  v.  489.  2 Ibid.,  vi.  4. 


13 


194  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON.  ■ 

ment  at  the  same  stage  ; which  Hamilton  disputes. 
At  the  same  time  (August,  1794)  he  began  to  write 
newspaper  articles  to  instruct  public  opinion  on  the 
rebellion.  He  stated  the  question  to  be  : “ Shall  the 
majority  govern  or  be  governed?  Shall  the  nation 
rule  or  be  ruled  ? Shall  the  general  will  prevail,  or  the 
will  of  a faction?  Shall  there  be  government  or  no 
government?”1  In  September  the  President  issued 
a proclamation,  which  was  written  by  Hamilton,  one 
of  the  most  important  points  of  which  was  the  asser- 
tion that  principles  of  anarchy  had  been  dissemi- 
nated.2 Twelve  or  fifteen  thousand  militia  had  already 
been  called  for  from  Pennsylvania,  New  Jersey,  Mary- 
land, and  Virginia.8 

At  this  time  Hamilton  was  carrying  on  the  War 
Department  as  well  as  the  Treasury.  He  proposed  to 
Washington  that  he  should  join  the  expedition,  on 
the  ground  that  the  adviser  of  a measure  which  in- 
volved danger  to  his  fellow- citizens  should  partake  in 
that  danger.4  In  1799  he  wrote  that  during  that 
expedition  he  trembled  at  every  moment,  lest  a great 
part  of  the  militia  should  take  it  into  their  heads  to 
return  home,  rather  than  to  go  forward.6  In  this 
expedition  he  found  himself  face  to  face  with  the 
things  which  he  had  so  long  detested, — lawlessness, 
anarchy,  hostility  to  taxation,  and  undiscipline  in  the 
army. 

In  the  whiskey  rebellion  we  meet  with  a queer  echo 

1 Works,  vi.  18.  2 Ibid.,  50. 

8 Ibid.,  15.  4 Ibid.,  49. 

6 Ibid.,  viii.  526. 


THE  WHISKEY  REBELLION. 


T95 


of  the  lawlessness  of  the  period  of  the  outbreak  of  the 
Revolution.  In  fact,  Findley  expressly  refers  to  it. 
The  people  “ considered  the  conduct  of  Congress  in 
seizing  the  British  posts,  arms,  etc.,  while  they  re- 
mained colonies,  petitioning  the  throne,  acknowledg- 
ing their  dependence  on  it,  and  endeavouring  to  have 
their  just  cause  of  complaint  removed,  to  be  a pre- 
cedent perfectly  applicable  to  their  case.” 1 They 
robbed  the  mail  in  order  to  intercept  letters  from 
Pittsburg,  which  they  supposed  would  carry  news  of 
their  proceedings,  just  like  the  proceedings  of  the 
committee  at  Philadelphia  in  1775.  Their  methods 
of  coercion,  boycotting,  whipping,  tar  and  feathering, 
were  the  same  as  those  employed  against  the  tories 
twenty  years  before.  They  thought  that  the  excise 
law  was  immoral.  “ This  theory  became  with  many 
a religious  principle.”  2 

/The  demand  which  was  made  on  the  government 
was  to  conciliate  the  people  by  yielding  to  their  de- 
mands, and  not  to  annoy  or  irritate  them  by  an  exer- 
cise of  authority.  Findley’s  plea  is  all  the  time  that 
outsiders  did  not  understand  the  proceedings ; those 
proceedings  did  not  mean  what  they  appeared  to 
mean.  There  was  always  an  incidental  or  construc- 
tive relation  of  things  which  explained  the  appear- 
ances, and  the  officers  were  to  blame  for  all  the 
trouble,  because  they  did  not  understand  the  appear- 
ances. The  collectors  and  the  inspectors  always  came 
at  the  wrong  time,  or  behaved  unwisely.  It  is  the 
chief  doctrine  of  anarchism  that  the  law  is  to  blame 

2 Ibid.,  300. 


1 Findley,  102. 


196 


ALEXANDER  HAMILTON. 


for  breaches  of  the  law,  and  that  the  police  are  the 
ones  who  cause  breaches  of  the  peace.  Findley 
says : “ It  is  an  undoubted  fact  that  the  manner  in 
which  the  execution  of  the  law  was  conducted,  while 
it  invited  opposition,  gave  alarming  apprehensions 
to  men  of  discernment,  for  they  could  not  otherwise 
account  for  it  than  by  supposing  that  the  disorders 
were  designedly  fostered  until  they  would  produce 
a more  serious  issue.  Many  of  them  knew  that  he 
who  stood  at  the  helm  of  the  revenue  department 
had  no  aversion  to  being  employed  as  a pilot  in  the 
storm.”  1 He  repeats  this  notion  many  times.  He 
attributes  the  trouble  to  Hamilton’s  delay  or  “ negli- 
gence ” to  enforce  the  law,  which  he  insinuates  was 
intentional,  in  order  to  produce  a rebellion. 

As  a specimen  of  Findley’s  mode  of  discussing  the 
matter,  the  following  may  suffice  : 2 “ That  resent- 

ment which  formerly  discovered  itself  by  casual  ex- 
cesses, in  which  comparatively  few  were  engaged,  and 
x those  few  generally  persons  of  violent  passion  and 
little  discretion,  now  assumed  the  tone  of  unreflecting 
madness,  and  drew  into  its  vortex  many  persons  of 
good  morals,  and  who  usually  discovered  a respectable 
measure  of  discretion  in  all  their  dealings  as  men  and 
citizens.”  Five  hundred  of  them  therefore  met  and 
organized  a military  attack  on  an  inspector,  and  his 
guard  of  United  States  troops.  “ Many  attended 
solely  because  they  had  not  firmness  sufficient  to 
refuse.”  They  only  demanded  to  send  a committee 
to  the  house  to  take  away  the  inspector’s  papers, 

2 Ibid.,  85. 


1 Findley,  75. 


THE  WHISKEY  REBELLION. 


197 


not  to  plunder  it.  Hence  this  was  a riot,  not  treason. 
The  defence  of  the  house  was  “rash.”  “True  bra- 
very is  always  connected  with  prudence.”  The  Uni- 
ted States  marshal  was  also  imprudent  to  be  seen  in 
company  with  the  inspector.  A volunteer  committee 
called  out  the  militia.  A meeting  was  held  which 
banished  two  persons.  It  was  not  understood  why 
judges,  attorneys,  and  a United  States  Senator  joined 
in  these  meetings,  but  it  gave  an  appearance  of  una- 
nimity. A committee  of  safety  was  formed,  and  a 
resolution  was  proposed  to  “ call  forth  the  resources 
of  the  Western  country  to  repel  any  hostile  attempts 
that  may  be  made  against  the  citizens.”  He  says 
that  it  required  great  fortitude  for  Gallatin  to  oppose 
this  resolution.  There  was  a real  terrorism  there,  and 
the  Mingo  Creek  Association  (as  we  see  from  his 
statements)  was  imitating  Jacobin  methods  of  intimi- 
dation. “No  man  thought  himself  safe  in  many 
places  in  telling  his  real  sentiments.”  The  resolution 
was  suppressed  by  referring  it  to  a grand  committee. 

Findley  says  that  it  is  mysterious  in  what  capacity 
the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  went  out.  He  was  with 
the  right  wing,  and  “ was  extremely  attentive  to  the 
wants  of  the  army.”  Fie  occupied  “ a superb  marquee,” 
Tnuch  finer  than  that  of  the  commander  of  the  expe- 
dition. “ To  him  has  been  ascribed  by  some  in  the 
army  the  measure  of  discipline  that  was  preserved  in 
it  [that  is,  in  the  right  wing,  for  the  left  wing  was 
marked  by  a lack  of  discipline]  ; 1 and  the  regularity 
of  the  supplies  they  received,  though  this  was  un- 


1 Findley,  143. 


ALEXANDER  HAMILTON. 


198 

doubtedly  ascribing  too  much  to  him,  as  a number 
of  valuable  officers  occupied  the  various  stations  in 
the  army.”  He  says  that  Hamilton  summoned  per- 
sons before  him,  and  browbeat  them,  in  order  to  extort 
confessions  or  evidence ; that  he  did  this  to  Findley 
himself,  and  expressed  resentment  against  him  for 
having  written  lies  about  himself  [Hamilton].2 * 

A very  essential  fact  to  be  noted  in  judging  of  this 
matter  is  that  the  whiskey  rebellion  had  extended  far 
east  of  the  mountains,  and  there  was  an  uprising  in 
Maryland ; 8 indeed,  according  to  another  account, 
down  to  the  suburbs  of  Philadelphia ; and  “ had  not 
the  government  anticipated  it,  a general  explosion 
would  speedily  have  ensued.”  4 Hamilton  says  that 
Governor  Mifflin  told  him  this.  Findley  also  states 
that  it  was  not  believed  in  western  Pennsylvania  that 
the  militia  would  really  march ; 6 and  he  does  not 
maintain  that  it  was  improper  for  the  President  to 
march  the  army  into  western  Pennsylvania. 

We  may  therefore  conclude  that  if  the  rebellion 
had  not  been  suppressed,  the  excise  would  no  longer] 
have  been  collected  throughout  the  United  States/ 
Whether  in  the  retrospect  it  can  be  regarded  as  a 
wise  step  to  have  adopted  the  excise,  and  forced  the 
issue,  is  very  doubtful ; but  after  the  excise  had  been 
adopted  by  law,  that  this  demonstration  that  the 
Federal  Government  had  force  at  its  disposal  which 
it  could  and  would  use,  was  a healthful  thing,  seems 

1 Findley,  chap,  xviii.  2 Ibid.,  241. 

8 Ibid.,  312.  i Works,  vi.  433. 

5 Findley,  184. 


THE  WHISKEY  REBELLION. 


199 


very  clear.  Such  is  the  judgment  of  a foreigner,  who 
may  be  regarded  as  a bystander,  who  thought  that 
the  authority  of  the  government  needed  vindication, 
and  that  the  charges  against  Hamilton  of  working 
up  the  whiskey  rebellion  in  order  to  use  force  were 
empty.1  In  a letter  to  Washington,  in  November, 
Hamilton  notices  Bache’s  criticism  of  him  for  going 
out.  He  says  that  his  presence  had  not  been  useless, 
and  that  he  has  learned  “ to  hold  popular  opinion  of  / 
no  value.”  2 It  may  have  no  value,  but  a statesman 
must  notice  that  it  has  power. 

On  the  trial  of  the  prisoners  taken  in  connection 
with  the  whiskey  rebellion  the  court  held  that  it  was 
high  treason  to  go  with  arms  to  the  house  of  an 
administrative  officer  of  the  law,  with  the  intention 
of  injuring  his  property,  or  otherwise  intimidating 
him  from  the  performance  of  his  duty.3  According 
to  that  ruling,  all  who  participated  in  the  Stamp  Act 
riots  were  guilty  of  high  treason. 

1 Liancourt,  viii.  82.  2 Works,  vi.  65. 

3 Dallas,  ii.  346. 


200 


ALEXANDER  HAMILTON. 


CHAPTER  XIV. 

THE  STANDING  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES  IN  THE  FAMILY 
OF  NATIONS  ; COMMERCE  ; RESENTMENT  TOWARD 
ENGLAND  ; OBLIGATIONS  TOWARD  FRANCE  ; DIFFI- 
CULTIES OF  NEUTRALITY  j GROUPING  OF  PARTIES  ON 
FOREIGN  RELATIONS  ; JAY’S  MISSION  ; HARnLTON  A 
MINISTER  WITHOUT  PORTFOLIO. 

When  the  War  of  the  Revolution  ended,  all  the  an- 
ticipations in  regard  to  commerce  with  which  it  had 
been  begun  proved  to  be  mistaken.1  England,  instead 
of  losing  the  trade  of  America,  found  that  it  came 
back  to  her.  Trade  is  governed  in  its  course  by  the 
cheapness  and  quality  of  the  goods,  the  facilities  of 
credit,  and  the  tastes  of  the  people.  As  these  were 
all  best  satisfied  in  England,  the  Americans  began  to 
buy  there.  The  French  merchants  who  had  supposed 
that  they  were  going  to  get  the  trade  of  the  American 
colonies  suffered  such  losses  in  connection  with  it  that 
they  abandoned  it ; and  when  measures  were  adopted 

1 The  first  part  of  this  chapter,  which  aims  to  connect  the 
earlier  struggles  about  commerce  between  England  and  France 
with  respect  to  the  American  colonies  with  the  struggles  of  the 
same  powers  as  belligerents  over  the  commerce  of  America  as 
a neutral,  is  necessarily  extremely  brief.  The  confusion  of  no- 
tions about  commerce  in  the  three  countries  between  1783  and 
1793  demands  full  and  separate  treatment. 


AMERICA'S  RELATIONS  WITH  EUROPE.  201 


for  opening  free  trade  between  the  United  States  and 
France,  the  annoyance  which  was  caused  to  a trade 
which  had  taken  a shape  conformable  to  the  previous 
French  restrictions  produced  a clamour  among  the 
merchants,  who  would  not  have  the  very  good  which 
they  had  hoped  for.  As  time  went  on,  also,  the 
Americans  were  not  sure  whether  they  wanted  treaties 
of  commerce  ; 1 and  when  the  peace  was  made,  there 
was  no  one  in  Europe  with  a commission  to  negotiate 
a treaty  of  commerce  with  England.2  Moreover,  the 
attention  of  Europe  was  now  drawn  away  from  America. 
France  and  England  were  very  eager  to  free  their 
hands,  so  that  they  might  notice  what  Russia  and 
Austria  had  been  doing  in  the  East. 

At  this  time,  also,  America  did  not  stand  well  before 
Europe.3  France  felt  that  she  had  been  duped  in  the 

1 Congress  “ are  still  anxious  not  to  engage  extensively  in 
commercial  treaties  till  experience  has  shown  the  advantages 
or  disadvantages  that  may  result  from  them.”  (Livingston  to 
Dana,  1783  ; Dip.  Corr.  Rev.,  iv.  455.)  In  the  Senate  in  May, 
17S9,  all  treaties  of  commerce  were  condemned.  (Maclay,  61.) 

2 Soon  after  the  peace  in  17S2  Hamilton  proposed  in  Con- 
gress to  renew  the  commission  to  make  a treaty  of  commerce 
with  England.  It  was  referred  to  a committee,  of  which  Madison 
was  a member,  and  never  reported.  (Works,  viii.  366.) 

3 Vergennes  to  Montmorin,  1778:  “I  am  beginning  to  have 
a less  idea  of  their  [American]  firmness,  because  the  idea  which 
I had  of  their  talents,  their  views,  and  their  patriotism  is  weak- 
ened in  proportion  as  I get  more  knowledge.”  (Circourt,  iii- 
314.)  Franklin  to  the  President  of  Congress,  Sept.  13,  1783: 
Reports  of  disunion,  contempt  of  authority,  refusal  to  pay  taxes, 
etc.,  have  greatly  injured  the  reputation  of  the  United  States. 
(Dip.  Corr.  U.  S.,  ii.  9.)  Reed  to  Greene,  London,  Feb.  12, 1784  : 
All  the  ruling  classes  in  England  are  mortified  at  the  war,  and 


202 


ALEXANDER  HAMILTON. 


affair,  and  the  matter  of  the  debt  lowered  the  stand- 
ing of  America  in  Europe.  The  disposition  in  England 
was  not  malicious  or  actively  unfriendly.  It  is  not  true 
that  the  legislation  and  executive  orders  were  arranged 
to  do  harm  to  America.1  The  disposition  of  the  Eng- 
lish seems  rather  to  have  been  to  ignore  America  and 
treat  her  with  indifference.  But  they  arranged  their 
navigation  system  so  as  to  hold  it  intact,  for  they  had 
not  lost  faith  in  it,  and  they  claimed  the  right,  as  a 
mere  matter  of  course,  to  adapt  it  to  the  United  States 
as  a foreign  nation.2  The  point  where  this  injured  the 

speak  ill  of  America,  reporting  all  unfavourable  gossip ; we  stand 
very  low  in  France  and  not  very  high  in  Holland.  French 
merchants  dealing,  with  America  have  been  ruined.  “ It  is  a 
prevailing  opinion  throughout  Europe  that  our  governments 
and  public  affairs  are  in  very  great  confusion  ” Feb.  21,  he 
writes  to  John  Adams  that  he  is  disappointed  at  not  finding  a 
conciliatory  spirit.  (Reed’s  Reed,  ii.  403.) 

1 In  1794  Hamilton  made  an  examination  of  the  trade  reg- 
ulations of  England  and  France  as  they  stood  in  1790,  and 
showed  that  those  of  England  were,  on  the  whole,  far  more  fa- 
vourable to  the  United  States.  He  furnished  a brief  for  a 
speech  by  Smith  of  South  Carolina,  on  Madison’s  resolutions 
for  discriminating  duties  in  favour  of  those  powers  with  which 
we  had  treaties.  (Works,  iii.  423  ; Annals  of  Congress,  1793-95, 
174.)  The  purpose  of  the  paper  was  entirely  political,  a part 
of  the  warfare  of  Hamilton  and  Jefferson.  It  showed  how 
silly  it  was  to  be  governed  by  the  fact  whether  there  was  a 
treaty  or  not,  instead  of  looking  to  the  facts  of  commercial  re- 
lations ; also  how  easily,  when  men  are  influenced  by  passion, 
facts  are  assumed  without  investigation. 

2 This  was  the  point  of  Lord  Sheffield’s  “Observations  on 
Commerce.”  Wraxhall  (Posthumous  Memoirs,  249)  quotes 
Jenkinson,  that  if  England  could  maintain  the  navigation  system 
she  might  be  said  “ to  have  gained  an  empire  ” in  spite  of  the 


TRADE  RELATIONS  WITH  ENGLAND.  203 


United  States  was  in  regard  to  the  carrying  trade  be- 
tween the  United  States  and  the  British  West  Indies, 
which  according  to  the  colonial  and  navigation  systems 
the  English  insisted  on  doing  in  their  own  ships.  In 
this  connection  John  Adams,  after  he  received  his 
commission  and  went  to  England  to  negotiate  a com- 
mercial treaty,  advocated  the  most  advanced  and  en- 
lightened doctrines  with  regard  to  commerce.  If  he 
could  have  persuaded  the  English  to  adopt  them,  and 
if  upon  plain  grounds  of  common-sense  they  had  said 
what  he  asked  them  to  say,  that  there  must  be  every 
gain  in  carrying  on  the  relations  of  commerce  between 
the  United  States  and  the  British  Empire  with  freedom 
in  1785  which  there  was  in  1765,  the  history  of  the 
world  since  might  have  been  different.  As  he  could 
not  do  this,  he  turned  around  and  tried  to  persuade 

loss  of  America.  Bingham  wrote  a reply  to  Sheffield,  saying 
that  the  Americans  would  retaliate  by  a navigation  law.  A 
large  part  of  the  bad  feeling  which  grew  up  may  be  reduced  to 
this  : the  English  were  delighted  to  find  that  they  had  lost  lit- 
tle or  nothing,  that  the  malicious  hopes  of  their  enemies  were 
to  be  disappointed,  and  that  the  Americans  would  lose  by  being 
outside  the  British  Empire.  Without  taking  hostile  measures 
they  were  w’illing  that  all  the  disadvantages  of  severance  from 
the  empire,  under  the  reign  of  the  Navigation  Act,  should  be 
realized.  The  Americans  were  vexed  that,  on  this  view  of  the 
matter,  they  and  their  trade  were  not  such  an  object  to  be  sued 
for  as  they  had  expected.  In  the  English  report  on  American 
trade  of  1791  the  position  taken  is  that  a Navigation  Act  is  a 
proper  measure  for  any  independent  nation  to  adopt,  and  that 
it  would  be  no  grievance  of  England  if  the  United  States 
should  adopt  one.  Here  is  one  of  the  weaknesses  of  retalia- 
tion. A retaliatory  act  is  not  recognized  as  such,  and  exerts 
no  coercion. 


204 


ALEXANDER  HAMILTON. 


the  Americans  to  adopt  navigation  laws,  himself  for- 
getting that  if  the  navigation  system  of  the  English 
had  been  injurious  to  the  colonies  when  imposed  upon 
them  in  1765,  it  must  be  equally  so  if  they  imposed  it 
upon  themselves  in  1785.  The  thing  which  appar- 
ently irritated  him  the  most  was  being  treated  with  in- 
difference ; 1 for  during  the  last  ten  or  fifteen  years  the 
whole  political  policy  of  the  civilized  world  had  turned 
upon  the  value  and  importance  of  the  American  set- 
tlements. He  therefore  urged  the  Americans,  in  letter 
after  letter,  to  adopt  a navigation  system,  as  a means 
of  forcing  the  Europeans  to  pay  attention  to  them  ; 
and  as  this  policy  of  irritation  and  commercial  war  fell 
in  with  the  popular  temper,  he  was  only  too  successful. 
Here  at  last  was  a case  where  the  demand  for  an  “ en- 
ergetic government  ” met  with  a response.2 

Adams  and  the  other  American  agents  in  Europe 
entirely  failed  to  make  a correct  diagnosis  of  the 
political  situation  there,  and  their  prognostications 
with  regard  to  France  and  England  were  entirely 

1 Jan.  26, 1787,  he  wrote  to  Jay  about  the  King’s  speech  and 
the  debates  : “ The  roost  remarkable  thing  in  them  is  that  the 
King  and  every  member  of  each  House  has  entirely  forgotten 
that  there  is  any  such  place  upon  earth  as  the  United  States  of 
America.  We  appear  to  be  considered  as  of  no  consequence  at 
all  in  the  scale  of  the  world”  (Dip.  Corr.  U.  S.,  iv.  481)  ; and 
again,  April  10,  1787  : “ The  members  of  Parliament  have  been 
so  long  irritated  and  tormented  on  that  subject  that  they  detest 
to  hear  the  name  of  America  mentioned,  and  the  political  system 
and  national  humour  seems  to  be  neither  to  speak  nor  think  of 
it.  A seemingly  total  inattention  and  silence  prevail,  and  will 
prevail  for  some  time  ” (Dip.  Corr.  U.  S.,  v.  233.) 

2 Secret  Journ.  Cong.,  iii.  395. 


VIOLATIONS  OF  THE  TEE  A TV. 


205 


erroneous.  It  was  believed  that  England  was  on  the 
verge  of  bankruptcy  or  revolution,  and  that  the  next 
century  would  see  her  fall  to  an  exceedingly  inferior 
position. 

On  the  whole,  therefore,  the  favourable  opportunity 
which  probably  existed  at  the  peace  for  establishing 
good  relations  with  England  was  lost.  There  were 
charges  on  each  side  that  the  treaty  of  peace  was  not 
kept  by  the  other  party.  These  recriminations  were 
extremely  strong  in  America.  Jay  made  a very  care- 
ful report  upon  the  points  in  which  the  United  States 
was  remiss,1  which  led  to  a circular  letter  issued  by 
Congress  in  the  next  year,  calling  upon  the  States  to 
provide  for  the  faithful  performance  of  the  treaty ; 2 and 
they  adopted  a letter  prepared  by  Jay,  dated  April  23, 
1787,  being  instructions  to  the  minister  in  England, 
candidly  admitting  that  the  fourth  and  sixth  articles 
of  the  treaty  had  been  violated  in  America,  and  the 
seventh  by  England,  and  proposing  mutual  fulfilment.® 
In  a letter  to  Adams,  Nov.  1,  1 786,  Jay  wrote  : “ The 
result  of  my  inquiries  into  the  conduct  of  the  States 
relative  to  the  treaty  is,  that  there  has  not  been  a 
single  day  since  it  took  effect  on  which  it  has  not 
been  violated  in  America  by  one  or  the  other  of  the 
States.”  4 England  did  not  open  diplomatic  relations 
with  the  United  States,  and  refused  to  give  up  the 
western  posts,  or  pay  for  the  negroes  taken  away. 
When  the  wars  of  the  French  Revolution  commenced, 

1 Secret  Journ.  Cong.,  iv.  244  (1786). 

2 Journ.  Cong.,  xii.  32.  3 Dip.  Corr.  U.  S.,  v.  114. 

4 Ibid.,  vi.  21. 


206 


ALEXANDER  HAMILTON. 


V 


the  relations  between  the  United  States  and  Great 
Britain  were  therefore  strained. 

As  to  France,  when  the  war  was  over,  opinions  in 
the  United  States  were  so  divided  as  to  the  behaviour 
of  France  and  the  duty  of  the  United  States,  that 
two  parties  were  formed.  The  division  really  began 
among  the  commissioners  at  Paris.  Adams  and  Jay 
^believed  that  France  had  acted  from  entirely  selfish 
motives,  that  the  United  States  owed  her  no  grati- 
tude, and  that  she  had  really  tried  to  hold  the 
United  States  down,  barely  giving  enough  support  to 
make  her  independent  of  England,  but  not  enough 
to  allow  her  to  become  a great  power ; also  that 
France  would  connive  with  England  to  restrain  the 
growth  of  America.1  In  1783  Adams  wrote:  “In 
the  last  ‘ Courier  de  l’Europe  ’ it  is  said  that  all  the 
commercial  powers  are  concerting  measures  to  clip 
the  wings  of  the  eagle,  and  to  prevent  us  from  having 
a navy.  I believe  it.”  2 Franklin,  on  the  other  hand, 
believed  that  France  had  acted  throughout  with  gen- 
erosity and  good  faith.  He  thought  that  the  acts 
which  bear  a contrary  colour  were  easily  explained  by 
the  fear  that  the  Americans,  relying  on  French  aid, 
might  continue  the  war  by  exaggerated  demands. 
He  cautioned  Congress  against  the  insinuations  of 
Adams,  which  he  attributed  to  a jealous  and  sus- 
picious disposition.3  The  issue  between  these  two 
parties  has  never  been  solved  to  this  day.  It  had 


1 Adams,  ix.  515:  Nov.  17,  1782. 

2 Dip.  Corr.  Rev.,  vii.  148. 

3 Ibid.,  iv.  138. 


RELATIONS  WITH  FRANCE.  207 

immense  political  importance  for  the  United  States 
in  the  next  twenty  years. 

The  course  of  events  in  France  speedily  wrought 
out  the  penalty  of  the  relationship  which  the  United 
States  had  formed  with  that  country  by  accepting  its 
aid.  The  relation  of  a money  debtor  developed  all 
its  evils.  As  soon  as  the  Revolution  commenced,  the 
United  States  found  itself  indebted  to  one  France, 
although  it  had  contracted  the  obligation  to  another ; 
and  it  came  about  in  the  end  that  the  Revolutionary 
Government  were  disposed  to  give  the  broadest  and 
most  extravagant  construction  to  the  obligations  of 
the  United  States,  on  account  of  the  relationship 
which  had  been  formed.  There  were  some  wise  men 
who  had  foreseen  this  and  had  objected  to  the 
relationship.  For  instance,  H.  Laurens  opposed  the 
plan  of  drawing  on  France  to  pay  the  interest  of 
the  debt.  He  called  it  “ giving  a mortgage  on  the 
national  honour  to  foreign  powers.”  The  result  proved 
that  he  was  correct.1  Also  as  early  as  1781,  Jay 
wrote  to  Thomson : “ I flatter  myself  that  Congress 
will  never  again  attempt  to  form  an  alliance  on  prin- 
ciples of  equality  in  forma  pauperis."  2 

Thus  the  position  of  the  United  States  between  the 
two  great  powers  of  Europe,  which  were  approaching 
a new  contest  with  each  other,  was  delicate  and  dan- 
gerous, while  its  relations  to  each  of  them  involved 
difficult  questions.  The  course  of  domestic  affairs  in 
the  United  States  had  seemed  to  prove  that  the  worst 
prophecies  of  the  English  in  regard  to  the  fate  of  the 
1 Doniol,  iii.  403.  2 Thomson  Papers,  40. 


2oS 


ALEXANDER  HAMILTON. 


United  States  under  independence  were  to  come  true. 
The  anarchistic  elements,  as  we  have  seen,  were  gain- 
ing strength,  and  the  effect  of  the  French  Revolution, 
as  soon  as  it  fairly  opened,  was  to  give  them  new 
vigour.  The  French  proceedings  seemed  to  a great 
many  to  prove  that  the  United  States  had  stopped 
short  in  the  pursuit  of  true  liberty;  that  the  federal 
Constitution  was  what  the  French  called  a counter 
revolution,  and  that  the  United  States,  having  given 
the  French  the  first  lesson  in  liberty,  might  very 
properly  take  a lesson  from  their  pupil  in  return. 
On  the  other  hand,  to  others,  of  whom  Hamilton  was 
one,  the  French  Revolution  from  its  very  beginning 
seemed  to  threaten  to  fall  into  anarchy,  and  to  miss 
altogether  the  idea  of  true  constitutional  liberty. 

The  Americans  had  somewhat  hastily  concluded 
that  when  they  got  their  independence  they  would 
be  relieved  from  the  danger  of  being  drawn  into 
European  disputes.  As  soon  as  the  war  in  Europe 
began,  they  found  that  their  perils  as  a neutral  and 
weak  nation  were  perhaps  greater  than  they  would 
have  been  if  in  dependence  on,  and  under  the 
protection  of,  one  of  the  belligerents.  It  was  there- 
fore an  undoubted  misfortune  for  the  United  States 
that  at  the  beginning  of  their  career  the  political 
questions  which  absorbed  their  interest  were  those  of 
foreign  policy,  that  domestic  parties  were  formed 
upon  questions  of  sympathy  with  one  or  the  other  of 
the  belligerents  in  Europe,  and  that  domestic  politics 
were  ruled  by  the  reflex  action  of  these  foreign 
questions. 


COMMERCE. 


209 


In  1 790  Gouvemeur  Morris  was  sent  to  England 
on  an  informal  mission,  to  see  if  a treaty  of  commerce 
could  be  obtained,  and  if  negotiations  could  be  opened 
for  the  fulfilment  of  the  treaty.  His  reports  of  his 
interviews  with  the  Englishmen  do  not  represent  him 
as  very  diplomatic  in  his  behaviour.  He  seems  to 
have  been  stiff  and  offish.1  Although  the  English 
at  first  received  him  cordially,  his  mission  seems  to 
have  been  frustrated  by  the  fact  that  he  had  felt 
bound  to  inform  the  French  Minister  of  it,  whose 
intervention  was  offensive  to  the  English.2  He  wound 
up  with  a threat  that  discriminating  duties  would  be 
laid  against  England,  and  left  the  country  in  bad 
humour.3 

In  the  same  year,  England  and  Spain  having 
quarrelled.  Lord  Dorchester,  Governor  of  Canada, 
asked  leave  to  send  troops  through  the  territory  of 
the  United  States  to  reach  the  Spanish  territories. 
Adams  advised  that  the  request  should  be  refused ; 
Jefferson,  that  no  answer  should  be  given,  so  that  if 
they  went  through  without  permission,  the  United 
States  might  be  in  a position  to  complain.  Hamilton  f 
advised  that  consent  should  be  given,  although  he 
was  by  no  means  clear  and  positive  to  that  effect. 

He  thought  that  a refusal  would  lead  to  bad  relations 
with  Great  Britain ; that  she  would  conquer  Florida 
and  Louisiana,  which  would  make  it  very  desirable 
for  the  United  States  to  be  on  her  side.4 

In  the  next  two  or  three  years  the  difficulty  of  the 

1 Morris’s  Morris,  i.  327.  2 Ibid.,  310. 

3 Ibid.,  370.  4 Works,  iv.  21. 


14 


210 


ALEXANDER  HAMILTON. 


relation  with  France  rapidly  developed.  The  United 
States  was  asked  to  pay  the  debt  in  various  ways  ; and 
in  1 793,  after  England  declared  war,  the  two  nations 
began  a commercial  war  upon  each  other,  having  in 
mind  all  the  time  the  advantage  which  each  desired 
to  get  from  the  neutral,  and  which  he  desired  to 
prevent  his  enemy  from  getting.  The  question  was 
therefore  forced  upon  the  American  Government  what 
policy  they  should  adopt  toward  the  belligerents.  In 
April,  1793,  Washington  submitted  this  question  to 
his  Cabinet,  who  were  unanimously  of  the  opinion 
that  a proclamation  of  neutrality  should  be  issued, 
warning  citizens  of  the  United  States  that  if  they 
rendered  themselves  liable  to  the  law  of  nations  by 
aiding  either  of  the  powers,  they  would  not  receive 
the  protection  of  the  United  States,  and  that  prose- 
cutions would  be  instituted  against  all  who  should 
violate  the  law  of  nations,  within  the  cognizance  of 
the  courts  of  the  United  States.1 

This  proclamation  was  the  signal  for  the  outbreak 
of  the  party  war.  The  opposition  declared  that  it 
put  us  in  the  position  of  cold  indifference  between 
the  parties  to  the  war  in  Europe,  when  in  truth  we 
ought  to  be  hostile  to  England  and  friendly  to 
France.  It  was  declared  that  the  proclamation  was 
without  authority ; that  the  President  had  no  right 
to  make  it,  since  Congress  had  the  power  to  declare 
peace  and  war;  that  it  was  contrary  to  the  treaty 
with  France,  contrary  to  the  gratitude  we  owed  her, 
and  untimely  and  unnecessary.2  The  arrival  of  Genet 
1 Wait’s  State  Papers,  i.  44.  2 Works,  iv.  136. 


OBLIGATIONS  TOWARD  FRANCE. 


2X1 


to  represent  the  French  Republic  offered  an  oppor- 
tunity for  denxonstrations  on  the  part  of  those  who 
found,  in  sympathy  with  the  French,  a means  of 
manifesting  their  hostility  to  the  drift  of  things  under 
the  Federal  Government.  The  swaggering  and  domi- 
neering demeanour  of  Genet,  and  his  attempt  to  use 
the  United  States  for  French  interests,  speedily  pro- 
duced a crisis  in  domestic  political  affairs.1 

The  drift  of  things  in  the  Federal  Government  was, 
not  without  reason,  called  Hamiltonism,  and  Hamil- 
ton immediately  took  up  its  defence.  Already,  in 
1 790,  he  had  maintained  that  gratitude  between  na- 
tions can  rarely  have  any  solid  foundation  ; gratitude 
being  due  for  something  done  for  the  sake  of  the 
beneficiary,  whereas  Spain  and  France  helped  the 
United  States  for  their  own  sakes.2  In  his  Cabinet 
paper  of  April,  1 793,  he  urged  that  the  United  States 
should  cut  loose  from  their  obligation.  He  admitted 
that  treaties  hold  good  through  all  changes  of  the  in- 
ternal constitution  or  government,  but  drew  the  essen- 
tial distinction  in  the  following  convincing  manner  : 
r treaties  ought  not  to  involve  other  nations  “ abso- 
lutely and  unconditionally  in  the  consequences  of  the 
changes  which  it  [one  nation,  party  to  a treaty]  may 
think  proper  to  make.” 3 In  May  he  pointed  out, 
in  another  paper,  that  France  had  entered  upon  an 

1 Even  as  late  as  1800  Callender  maintained  that  Washing- 
ton had  no  right  to  open  the  question  whether  the  French 
Minister  should  be  received  or  not ; for  the  Constitution  says 
that  the  President  shall  receive  ambassadors,  it  does  not  say 
that  he  shall  refuse  them.  (Prospect,  107.) 

2 Works,  iv.  29.  8 Ibid.,  75. 


212 


ALEXANDER  HAMILTON. 


aggressive  crusade  on  behalf  of  liberty  everywhere,  and 
showed  that  the  United  States  could  not  allow  them- 
selves to  be  dragged  into  such  an  enterprise.1  In  the 
summer  of  1793  he  began  to  write  newspaper  articles 
about  neutrality.  Defending  the  neutrality  proclama- 
tion, he  said  : “ It  only  proclaims  a fact  with  regard 
to  the  existing  state  of  the  nation,”  and  repeated  the 
same  criticism  of  “ gratitude.”  2 He  said  with  truth 
that  there  was  no  man  in  France  who  was  more 
friendly  to  the  United  States  than  Louis  XVI.,  and 
the  positive  point  which  he  urged  was  that  we 
should  learn  to  avoid  foreign  friendships.  In  August 
he  prepared  and  issued  instructions  to  the  collectors 
of  customs  as  to  their  duties  toward  the  ships  of 
belligerents.8  Jefferson  reports  him  as  having  said 
in  November  of  that  year:  “If  all  the  people  in 
America  were  now  assembled,  and  should  call  on  me 
to  say  whether  I am  a friend  to  the  French  Revolu- 
tion, I would  declare  that  I have  it  in  abhorrence.”  4 * 
In  the  course  of  the  next  few  months  the  proceedings 
of  England  against  neutral  rights  were  far  more  seri- 
ous in  their  practical  effects  than  those  of  France.  In 
March,  1 794,  Hamilton  proposed  to  Washington  to 
raise  an  army  of  twenty  thousand  men  and  put  the 
Country  in  a state  of  defence  against  England.6  At 
the  same  time,  in  the  “ Americanus  ” Papers,  he 

1 Works,  iv.  109.  2 Ibid.,  165.  3 Ibid.,  236. 

4 Jefferson’s  Writings,  ix.  177.  Cf.  Works,  viii.  303,  for  Ham- 

ilton’s view  of  the  French  Revolution  in  1793.  He  distrusted  it 

from  1789.  (Works,  viii.  206.) 

6 Works,  viii.  316. 


DIFFICULTIES  OF  NEUTRALITY. 


213 


was  discussing  the  question  how  far  love  of  liberty 
should  lead  Americans  to  take  sides  with  France. 
He  expressed  the  opinion  that  true  liberty  had  been 
■wounded  by  France,  and  discussed  the  question : If 
we  help  France,  how  shall  we  do  it,  and  to  what 
extent?  He  thought  that  “France  may  find  herself 
at  length  the  slave  of  some  victorious  Sylla.”  1 In  his 
writings  of  these  years,  1793  and  1794,  it  is  plainly 
evident  that  his  own  opinions  were  clearing  up,  so 
that  he  was  more  conscious  of  the  real  issue  between 
himself  and  the  noisy  friends  of  liberty.  It  was  that 
he  was  an  enthusiastic  believer  in  constitutional  lib- 
erty, or  liberty  under  law,  but  that  he  detested  the 
declamatory  phrases  and  empty  generalities  of  the 
French  revolutionary  school,  while  he  thought  their 
working  principles  anarchistic. 

In  April,  1 794,  he  wrote  to  Washington  that  there 
were  three  parties  : first,  those  who  wanted  peace  with 
all  nations,  if  possible ; second,  those  who  wanted 
war,  if  possible ; third,  those  who  did  not  want  war, 
but  were  anxious  to  keep  alive  hostility  with  England, 
even  at  the  risk  of  war.  The  first  party,  to  which  he 
belonged,  wanted  to  prepare  for  war  by  military  prep- 
arations, providing  revenue,  and  obtaining  power  to 
restrict  commerce,  but  to  negotiate  in  the  mean  time 
so  as  to  avoid  irritation.  He  disapproved  of  the  se- 
questration of  debts  at  any  time,  — a measure  which 
was  then  proposed  in  Congress.  He  thought  that  it 
would  now  be  a provocation  to  Great  Britain.  He 
also  disapproved  of  non-intercourse,  as  harmful  to  our  ;/ 
1 Works,  iv.  261,  263,  264. 


214 


A LEX  A NDER  HA  MIL  TON. 


revenue,  and  not  very  harmful  to  England.  This  was 
the  other  proposition  which  was  pending.  It  is  an- 
other example  of  faith  in  commercial  war.1  This 
letter,  which  is  very  long  and  contains  a discussion  of 
the  entire  situation,  which  was  extremely  grave,  ends 
with  a proposition  to  send  a minister  to  England.  He 
nominated  Jay,  declining  for  himself  if  he  should  be 
thought  of ; and  he  proceeded  to  draw  a memorandum 
for  instructions  to  the  minister,  and  heads  for  a treaty 
of  commerce.2  This  was,  in  fact,  his  method  in  all  his 
work.  He  sought  a device  to  meet  the  exigency, 
and  having  seized  upon  the  cardinal  idea  of  what  he 
thought  would  meet  the  purpose,  he  filled  it  out  in  its 
details,  and  proceeded  to  prepare  the  auxiliary  meas- 
ures, or  to  provide  for  the  incidental  necessities,  which 
would  present  themselves  in  carrying  it  to  a successful 
result. 

As  the  neutrality  proclamation  had  helped  to  crys- 
tallize parties,  by  giving  a positive  measure  on  which 
sides  could  be  taken,  the  appointment  of  Jay  furnished 
another  opportunity  of  the  same  kind.  The  opposi- 
tion in  each  instance  wer  extremely  perplexed  to  say 
what  they  would  have  done.  They  indulged  in  vague 
and  incoherent  declamations,  for  neither  then  nor 
since  has  anybody  been  able  to  bring  any  reasonable 

1 Callender  maintained  that  the  United  States,  by  cutting  off 
intercourse  with  the  West  Indies,  could  bring  England  to  sudden 
and  utter  ruin.  This  was  the  device  proposed  for  the  United 
States  to  adopt,  if  it  refused  to  negotiate  and  sought  to  enforce 
redress.  (History  of  1796,  261.)  The  “ Prospect  ” is  full  of  the 
same  notion. 

2 Works,  iv.  283. 


JA  FW  MISSION. 


2I5 


objection  to  the  policy  of  neutrality.  The  attempt, 
also,  in  Jay’s  mission,  to  have  peace  if  possible,  was 
too  plain  a dictate  of  common-sense  to  be  opposed 
with  any  sound  argument.  There  was  reason  to  sus- 
pect that  it  was  too  sound  and  wise  to  be  satisfactory  ; 
and  throughout  all  the  declamation  it  is  easy  to  per- 
ceive that  there  was  a comfortable  sense  of  security 
that  there  could  not  really  be  any  war,  and  that  the 
pleasure  of  indulging  hatred  of  England  and  love  of 
France  might  be  enjoyed  with  impunity,  while  the 
utility  of  it  for  domestic  party  purposes  might  be 
obtained  without  risk. 

In  January,  1795,  Hamilton  resigned  ; but  he  by  no 
means  ceased  to  be  the  principal  agent  in  public 
affairs.  The  position  which  he  held  was  a very  extra- 
ordinary one.  It  might  be  properly  described  as  a 
minister  without  a portfolio.  Wolcott,  who  succeeded 
him  in  the  treasury,  had  been  Comptroller  of  the 
Treasury  under  him,  and  leaned  upon  him  after  he 
resigned.  Washington  also  consulted  him  upon  every 
important  question  which  arose  ; and  later  his  corre- 
spondence with  Pickering  and  McHenry  shows  that 
his  relations  with  the  administrations,  and  his  power 
in  them  increased,  instead  of  declining.  In  1795,  as 
soon  as  Jay’s  treaty  was  received,  he  made  a study  of 
it.  In  July  he  wrote  a commentary  on  it  for  Wash- 
ington.1 Pie  objected  to  the  article  about  the  West 
India  trade,  and  approved  of  the  action  of  the  Senate 
in  reserving  it  from  the  ratification.  He  also  objected 
to  the  article  which  made  provisions  contraband. 

1 Works,  iv.  351. 


2l6 


ALEXANDER  HAMILTON. 


His  final  judgment  on  it  was  : “ The  truly  important 
side  of  this  treaty  is  that  it  closes,  and  upon  the  whole 
as  reasonably  as  could  have  been  expected,  the  contro- 
verted points  between  the  two  countries.”  He  advised 
that  the  ratification  should  be  sent,  with  orders  to  our 
agent  not  to  deliver  it,  if  the  provision  order  was  in 
force,  and  with  a careful  remonstrance  against  the 
principle  of  that  order.  He  had  already  begun  the 
work  of  defending  the  treaty  in  the  newspapers.  He 
affirmed  that  our  motto  should  be  “Peace  and  trade 
with  all  nations ; beyond  our  present  engagements, 
political  connection  with  none.”  He  said  that  an 
attempt  was  being  made  to  make  us  a satellite  of 
France,  and  entangle  us  in  all  European  broils.1 

The  public  feeling  had  been  so  excited  about  this 
treaty,  without  any  intelligent  knowledge  of  it,  and  for 
no  reason  which  one  can  now  understand,  unless  it  be 
a sentimental  unwillingness  to  have  any  friendly  rela- 
tions with  an  enemy  of  France,  that  the  attempts  to 
discuss  it  in  public  turned  into  riot.  At  a meeting  at 
New  York  which  Hamilton  tried  to  address,  he  was 
hit  by  a stone  and  obliged  to  desist ; but  he  began  an- 
other series  of  papers,  the  best  which  he  ever  wrote,  — 
an  enlargement  really  of  the  commentary  on  the  treaty 
for  Washington,  already  mentioned,  in  which  he  dis- 
cussed every  question  in  the  recent  history,  in  national 
and  international  law,  and  also  of  sentiment,  which 
was  raised  by  the  treaty,  or  in  connection  with  it. 
These  papers  really  form  a large  book.  They  com- 
pletely routed  the  opposition  on  every  argument  of 

1 Works,  iv.  363. 


JAY’S  MISSION. 


217 


fact  and  law  which  they  had  raised.  He  said  that  the 
other  party,  “ if  they  are  sincere,  must  think  that 
national  honour  consists  in  perpetually  railing,  com- 
plaining, blustering,  and  submitting.” 

The  battle  over  this  treaty  did  not  end  with  its  rati- 
fication. In  March,  1 796,  Livingston  moved  for  the 
Jay  instructions  in  the  House  of  Representatives. 
The  purpose  was  said  to  be  to  see  whether  impeach- 
ment would  be  advisable.  Callender  blamed  this, 
saying  that  it  was  not  the  real  reason,  and  that  it  was 
not  honest  to  allege  it ; that  the  real  reason  was  to  fix 
the  perfidy  of  Jay  in  breaking  his  instructions,  and  to 
draw  Hamilton  into  the  matter.1  It  is  difficult  to  tell 
which  of  these  grounds  would  excite  more  contempt 
from  a modern  point  of  view.  In  April  the  House 
resolved  : “ When  a treaty  stipulates  regulations  on 
any  of  the  subjects  submitted  by  the  Constitution  to 
the  power  of  Congress,  it  must  depend  for  its  execu- 
tion as  to  such  stipulations  on  a law  to  be  passed  by 
Congress.”  This  is  one  of  the  points  in  which  later 
opinion  and  practice  have  come  to  the  position  main- 
tained by  the  opposition  of  that  period.2 3 

Hamilton  said  that  the  real  objection  to  giving  Jay’s 
instructions  to  the  House  was  that  it  was  “ a crude 
mass,  which  will  do  no  credit  to  the  administration.” 
He  thought  so  at  the  time,  but  could  not  revise  the 
work  of  another  department.  It  appears  that  his  own 
memoranda  were  not  adopted.8  His  opinion  was 

1 History  of  the  United  States  in  1796,  322. 

2 Cf.  130  U.  S.  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  581. 

3 Works,  viii.  387. 


2l8 


ALEXANDER  HAMILTON. 


that  the  treaty  was  condemned  before  it  was  known, 
for  party  reasons.  Jay  was  mixed  in  New  York  pol- 
itics, and  it  would  not  do  to  allow  his  negotiations  to 
succeed,  if  it  could  be  prevented.  He  was  also  a 
candidate  for  the  presidency  with  Adams  and  Jefferson, 
which  heightened  the  same  necessity.1  Fisher  Ames 
said  that  “ if  a treaty  left  to  King  George  his  island,  it 
would  not  answer ; not  if  he  stipulated  to  pay  rent  for 
it.  . . . The  difficulty  is  not  to  overcome  the  objec- 
tions to  the  terms,  but  to  restrain  the  repugnance  to 
any  stipulation  of  amity  with  the  party.  . . . Any  for- 
eign influence  is  too  much,  and  ought  to  be  de- 
stroyed. ...  It  is  enough  to  be  Americans ; that 
character  comprehends  our  duties,  and  ought  to  en- 
gross our  attachment.  . . . This  instrument,  however 
misrepresented,  affords  to  America  that  inestimable 
security  [against  war  which  was  feared  in  1 794].  . . . 
Profit  is  every  hour  becoming  capital.  The  vast  crop 
of  our  neutrality  is  all  seed  wheat,  and  is  sown  again 
to  swell  almost  beyond  calculation  the  future  harvest 
of  prosperity.  In  this  progress  what  seems  fiction  is 
bound  to  fall  short  of  experience.”  2 

Dec.  16,  1796,  Hamilton  wrote  to  King:  “We 
are  labouring  hard  to  establish  in  this  country  prin- 
ciples more  and  more  national,  and  free  from  all  for- 
eign ingredients,  so  that  we  may  be  neither  ‘ Greeks  nor 
Trojans,’  but  truly  Americans.”8  The  following  from 
a letter  to  Wolcott,  April  20,  1 796,  in  the  height  of  the 

1 Works,  iv.  375. 

2 Annals  of  Congress,  1795-1796,  1249. 

3 Works,  iv.  436. 


JAY’S  MISSION. 


219 


contest  in  the  House,  shows  how  little  inclined  he  was 
to  truckle  to  England  : “ The  British  Ministry  are  as 
great  fools  or  as  great  rascals  as  our  Jacobins,  else 
our  commerce  would  not  continue  to  be  distressed  as 
it  is  by  their  cruisers.  ...  I hope  a very  serious  re- 
monstrance has  long  since  gone  against  the  wanton 
impressment  of  our  seamen.  It  will  be  an  error  to 
be  too  tame  with  this  overbearing  Cabinet.”  1 

The  French  Government  construed  Jay’s  treaty  as  a 
grievance  to  themselves.  Feb.  15,  1796,  the  French 
Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  told  Monroe  that  France 
considered  Jay’s  treaty  as  having  annulled  the  treaty 
of  alliance  with  France  from  the  time  of  its  ratifica- 
tion.3 On  the  nth  of  March  he  formulated  the 
complaints  of  France  in  connection  with  the  treaty. 
They  were,  (1)  Inexecution  of  treaties  ; (2)  The  out- 
rage committed  on  Fauchet  by  the  English  frigate 
“Africa ; ” (3)  The  sacrifice  of  the  connection  with  the 
French  Republic.  On  the  7th  of  July  he  added  to 
these  a complaint  that  the  United  States  had  entered 
into  an  alliance  with  the  enemy  of  France  during  war, 
and  of  the  abandonment  by  the  United  States  of  the 
doctrine  that  free  ships  make  free  goods.3  Monroe 
closes  his  introduction  with  a long  paragraph  containing 
a bitter  comparison  between  the  advantages  of  a close 
alliance  with  France,  and  the  situation  created  by  Jay’s 
treaty.  The  latter  he  describes  thus  : “ War  hanging 
over  us,  and  that  not  on  the  side  of  liberty  and  the  just 
affections  of  our  people,  but  of  monarchy  and  our  late 

1 Works,  viii.  393.  2 Monroe’s  View,  3x0. 

3 Ibid.,  321,  355. 


220 


ALEXANDER  HAMIL  TON. 


most  deadly  foes ; and  we  are  made  fast  by  treaty, 
and  by  the  spirit  of  those  at  the  helm,  to  a nation 
bankrupt  in  its  resources,  and  rapidly  verging  either  to 
anarchy  or  despotism.  Nor  is  this  all.  Our  national 
honour  is  in  the  dust.  We  have  been  kicked,  cuffed, 
and  plundered  all  over  the  ocean ; our  reputation  for 
faith  scouted,  our  government  and  people  branded 
as  cowards,  incapable  of  being  provoked  to  resist,  and 
ready  to  receive  again  those  chains  we  had  taught 
others  to  burst.  Long  will  it  be  before  we  shall  be 
able  to  forget  what  we  are,  nor  will  centuries  suffice 
to  raise  us  to  the  high  ground  from  which  we  have 
fallen.”1  This  final  prophecy  has  not  been  fulfilled. 
Monroe’s  “ View  ” ought  not  to  be  read  without  Wash- 
ington’s notes  on  it.2  They  are  the  most  acute  and 
sarcastic  thing  we  have  from  Washington’s  hand. 

Jan.  19,  1796,  Hamilton  wrote  to  Washington: 
“We  seem  to  be  [with  France]  where  we  were  with 
Great  Britain  when  Mr.  Jay  was  sent  there,  and  I 
cannot  discern  but  that  the  spirit  of  the  policy  then 
pursued  with  regard  to  England  will  be  the  proper  one 
now  in  respect  to  France.”  3 In  June  he  wrote  to 
Wolcott  that  Monroe  must  be  recalled,  and  he  pro- 
posed Pinckney  as  his  successor.4  On  the  2d  of  July 
a French  decree  was  published,  that  France  would 
treat  neutrals  as  neutrals  allowed  themselves  to  be 
treated  by  England.  This  was  in  retaliation  for  Jay’s 
treaty ; and  the  Americans  found  that,  having  secured 
living  terms  with  one  belligerent,  they  were  driven 

1 Monroe’s  View,  lxvi.  2 Washington,  xi.  504. 

3 Works,  viii.  377.  4 Ibid.,  403. 


RELATIONS  WITH  FRANCE. 


22  I 


over  into  a collision  with  the  other.  Hamilton  fol- 
lowed this  new  phase  of  the  subject  by  writings  which 
ran  through  the  winter  of  1796-1797. 

A new  element  of  danger  was  added  by  the  fact 
that  there  was  a presidential  election  in  1796,  and 
that  the  new  French  minister,  Adet,  was  disposed  to 
meddle  with  it.  In  February7,  1797,  Hamilton  ex- 
pressed the  opinion  that  the  French  resentment  was 
I very  much  levelled  at  Washington,  and  he  thought 
that  the  change  of  administration  might  afford  an  op- 
portunity for  better  relations.1  In  March  he  wrote  to 
Pickering,  urging  that  a special  commission  should  be 
sent  to  France ; that  it  would  be  good  policy  for  its 
effect  on  domestic  politics,  even  if  the  commission 
was  not  received.  He  was  not  willing  to  give  a con- 
struction to  the  refusal  to  receive  Pinckney  which 
should  seem  to  shut  the  door  against  explanation. 
He  thought  that  there  was  plenty  of  room  for  a com- 
mission to  inquire  what  the  position  of  France  was. 
“The  commission  should  be  instructed  to  explain,  to 
' ask  a rescinding  of  the  order  under  which  we  suffer, 
and  reparation  for  the  past ; to  remodify  our  treaties 
V under  proper  guards.”  He  was  especially  convinced 
of  the  necessity  of  the  last  point.  He  nominated  a 
commission,  to  consist  of  Jefferson  or  Madison  and 
some  conservative  Northern  man,  like  Jay  or  Cabot.2 

Thus,  although  he  was  properly  affected  by  the  re- 
jection of  Pinckney,  he  was  cool  about  it,  and  disposed 
to  proceed  very  carefully.  His  writings  were  suspended 
for  a year,  from  March,  1797,  to  March,  1798;  but 

1 Works,  viii.  449.  2 Ibid.,  452. 


222 


ALEXANDER  HAMILTON. 


when  he  knew  what  the  result  of  the  mission  to 
France  was  to  be,  he  began  again  the  series  of  pub- 
lic papers,  discussing  the  relations  between  the  two 
countries.  The  X Y Z papers  were  sent  to  Congress, 
April  3,  1798,  and  the  result  was  that  a state  of  war 
was  produced  between  the  two  countries. 

On  the  one  side  the  opposition  endeavoured  to 
palliate  the  corruption  of  the  proposition  that  the 
United  States  should  bribe  the  members  of  the 
French  Directory,  and  buy  a treaty.  Callender  said 
that  there  was  no  reason  to  be  so  angry,  if  France 
did  ask  for  money;  we  had  paid  the  Algerines  for 
a treaty.  He  said  that  the  X Y Z story  was  an  im- 
posture ; that  there  was  no  harm  in  a gift  to  the 
Directory,  and  that  the  money  would  have  been  well 
expended  to  obtain  their  friendship.1 

On  the  other  hand,  there  was  no  real  desire  for 
war.  It  was  difficult  to  imagine  that  the  United 
States  would  be  invaded,  so  that  a domestic  army 
would  be  necessary.  The  expense  was  a terror.  The 
Secretary  of  War  was  not  at  all  anxious  to  occupy 
his  office  during  hostilities.  The  Secretary  of  the 
Treasury  was  timid.2  There  were  only  a few  — and  it 
is  not  clear  that  Hamilton  was  one  of  them — who  re- 
joiced at  the  opportunity  for  establishing  an  army 
and  navy.  There  was  a disposition  to  use  the  en- 
thusiasm of  the  moment  to  accomplish  some  objects 
which  were  regarded  as  of  permanent  importance, 
and  it  may  be  that  Hamilton  sympathized  with  it,  but 
the  evidence  of  it  is  not  in  his  works.  When  he 

1 Prospect,  58,  no,  129,  131. 


2 Works,  vi.  167. 


FEDERALIST  FOREIGN  POLICY. 


223 


heard  of  Adams’s  message  of  Feb.  18,  1799,  nomi- 
nating Murray  to  be  joint  minister  to  France  with 
Pinckney,  he  wrote  that  Murray  was  not  strong 
enough  for  the  position,  and  that  there  ought  to  be 
three ; also  that  he  would  write  further,  but  no  later 
letter  exists. 

It  was,  then,  no  light  trial  which  befell  the  infant 
State,  to  maintain  neutrality,  defend  its  rights,  pre- 
serve peace,  and  grow  into  strength,  between  two  such 
belligerents  abroad  and  its  own  volatile  population  at 
home.  It  is  not  strange  that  it  did  not  succeed ; but 
the  foreign  policy  of  the  federalists  commands  far 
more  unqualified  praise  than  their  domestic  policy. 
They  met  a demand  for  sentimental  politics  in  foreign 
policy,  and  for  a connection  between  this  country  and 
a foreign  nation,  in  which  relation  this  country  would 
be  a very  inferior  and  dependent  party,  by  doctrines 
of  complete  national  independence  and  impartial 
neutrality,  which  we  would  to-day  regard  as  the  purest 
commonplaces  of  national  policy.  Both  in  and  out  of 
office,  Hamilton’s  mind  was  the  one  which  guided 
and  prevailed  in  that  policy.  He  had  the  initiative 
position,  and  he  contributed  the  creative  energy  to 
devise  measures  for  the  various  difficulties  as  they 
arose.  During  the  first  three  administrations  the 
federalists  were  not  in  any  active  sympathy  with  Eng- 
land. Their  opposition  to  entanglement  with  France 
produced  an  appearance  of  such  sympathy  which  was 
entirely  accidental.  After  the  nineteenth  century 
opened  the  case  changed.  They  came  to  believe 
that  England’s  contest  with  Napoleon  meant  a war 


224 


ALEXANDER  HAMILTON. 


of  liberty  against  military  depotism.  It  was  then  their 
turn  to  “ sympathize  with  liberty.”  It  is,  however, 
one  of  the  most  extraordinary  facts  in  history,  that 
the  Jeffersonians,  after  they  came  to  power  should 
have  all  the  questions  of  foreign  policy  which  arose 
under  the  federal  administrations  presented  to  them 
over  again,  and  should  have  an  opportunity  to  try 
their  policy  on  the  same  field  and  under  nearly  the 
same  conditions  as  the  federalists. 

' The  struggle  for  neutrality  lay  outside  the  main 
■current  of  Hamilton’s  career.  The  significance  of  it 
was  that,  by  bringing  to  a peaceful  settlement  the 
open  questions  in  the  peace  of  x 783  and  extricating 
the  country  from  its  entanglements  with  France,  the 
United  States  obtained  true  political  independence 
of  Europe.  In  Washington’s  Farewell  Address,  he 
helped  to  formulate  the  doctrines  of  international 
independence  and  internal  concord.1 


1 Binney,  Washington’s  Farewell  Address. 


STATE  OF  WAX  WITH  FRANCE. 


225 


CHAPTER  XV. 

STATE  OF  WAR  WITH  FRANCE  ; THE  PROVISIONAL  ARMY  ; 

Hamilton’s  position  in  it. 

The  matter  of  neutrality,  therefore,  had,  in  1 798, 
entered  on  a new  phase  ; and  the  United  States  found 
itself  in  a state  of  war.  Hamilton’s  work  in  this  new 
state  of  things  also  changed  in  form.  He  became 
second  in  command  of  the  army,  and  in  this  new 
field  of  activity  he  distinguished  himself  by  the  appli- 
cation to  military  affairs  of  the  same  energy  which 
he  had  displayed  in  the  literary  combats  of  the  pre- 
vious five  or  six  years.  Being  dissatisfied  with  the 
energy  of  the  Secretary  of  War,  he  wrote  urging  that 
himself  and  Knox  should  be  called  into  service,  in 
order  that  he  might  help.  He  wanted  in  this  way  to 
get  a chance  to  do  what  he  thought  that  the  Secre- 
tary was  neglecting.1  On  the  1st  of  November,  1 798, 
he  went  to  Trenton,  where  the  officers  of  the  govern- 
ment then  were,  on  account  of  the  yellow  fever  in 
Philadelphia,  to  confer  with  Wilkinson  and  McHenry. 
This  conference  was  with  regard  to  possible  enter- 
prises against  the  Spanish  possessions  on  the  south- 
west. Hamilton  always  had  the  interests  of  the 
United  States  in  that  quarter  distinctly  before  his 
1 Works,  vi.  91. 

*5 


226 


ALEXANDER  HAMILTON. 


mind.  In  January,  i 799,  he  wrote  : “ I have  been 
long  in  the  habit  of  considering  the  acquisition  of 
those  countries  as  essential  to  the  permanency  of  the 
Union,  which  I consider  as  very  important  to  the 
welfare  of  the  whole.  ” 1 Indeed,  it  appears  that  his 
ideas  went  even  further.  In  June,  1799,  he  wrote : 
“ We  ought  to  look  to  the  possession  of  the  Floridas 
and  Louisiana,  and  we  ought  to  squint  at  South  Amer- 
ica.” 2 3 It  was  charged  against  him  that  he  desired 
to  use  the  army  for  domestic  purposes,  in  order  to 
enforce  that  “ energetic  ” and  high-toned  administra- 
tion which  he  desired.  The  proof  of  such  a desire  on 
his  part  is  wanting,  but  he  did  believe  that  a war  with 
France  would  be  a war  with  her  ally,  Spain,  and  that 
it  would  open  an  opportunity  which  ought  to  be  used. 
For  this  purpose  he  wanted  to  carry  the  army  up  to 
its  proposed  limit,  fifty  thousand.  He  wanted  to 
think  of  classing  all  males  between  eighteen  and  forty- 
five  for  the  militia,  so  that  drafts  could  be  made  in 
case  of  invasion.  He  also  engaged  in  correspondence 
with  Miranda  in  furtherance  of  the  same  enterprise.8 

1 Works,  viii.  523. 

2 Works,  vi.  136,  185.  In  1802  and  1803  he  followed  with 
great  anxiety  the  transfer  of  Louisiana  to  France.  We  should 
negotiate  for  it,  and,  if  that  fails,  take  it  by  force.  “ Energy  is 
wisdom.”  He  would  not  have  joined  the  federalist  disunion- 
ists  whose  grievance  was  the  acquisition  of  Louisiana.  (Works, 
viii.  606  ; v.  465.)  There  is  a vague  report  in  J.  Q.  Adams’s 
Diary  in  1829,  that  Hamilton  wiote  to  Madison  in  order  to 
quiet  Jefferson’s  scruples  about  the  constitutional  power  to 
buy  Louisiana.  (Diary,  viii.  1x7.) 

3 Works,  viii.  505. 


THE  PROVISIONAL  ARMY. 


227 


But  the  most  interesting  thing  in  this  connection 
is  to  notice  his  indefatigable  industry.  Dec.  13, 
1798,  he  drafted  a letter  which  Washington  might 
send  in  reply  to  inquiries  of  McHenry,  which  really 
covered  all  the  important  points  of  army  business  at 
the  time,  including  details  of  organization,  discipline, 
and  uniform.1  He  drew  up  plans  of  defence,  includ- 
ing army,  navy,  military  academy,  loans,  taxes,  and 
secret  sendee  money.2  He  formed  plans  for  prevent- 
ing desertion,  and  reported  to  Washington  on  the 
state  of  recruiting  in  the  different  States,  hie  prepared 
plans  for  the  commissariat  and  quartermaster’s  de- 
partment, also  for  the  medical  department,  for  the 
organization  of  the  militia.8  As  to  the  latter  his  idea 
was  that,  “ in  case  of  domestic  insurrection,  no  man 
able  to  serve  shall  be  excused  on  any  condition.” 
One  who  refused  was  to  be  imprisoned  or  forced  to 
labour  on  the  public  works.  In  August  he  wrote  to 
McHenry,  urging  him  to  organize  a supply  depart- 
ment, and  warning  him  of  the  defects  of  the  account- 
ability in  the  service.  In  November  he  wrote  again, 
trying  to  put  some  of  his  own  vigour  into  the  Secretary  : 
“Confidence  must  sometimes  be  reposed  in  an  after 
legislative  sanction  and  provision,”  in  incurring  ex- 
pense. “ I commit  myself,  without  hesitation,  to  the 
consequences  of  this  opinion,  because,  as  far  as  I am 
concerned,  I would  rather  be  responsible  on  proper 
occasions  for  formal  deviations,  than  for  a feeble,  in- 
sufficient, and  unprosperous  course  of  business,  pro- 

1 Works,  vi.  97.  2 Ibid.,  138. 

3 Ibid.,  144,  148,  149. 


228 


ALEXANDER  HAMILTON. 


ceeding  from  an  over-scrupulous  adherence  to  general 
rules ; and  I have  no  doubt  that  a different  spirit  will 
ever  be  found  in  experience  injurious,  equally  to  the 
interests  of  the  State  and  to  the  reputation  and  success 
of  the  persons  whom  it  may  govern.”  1 

This  passage  expresses  the  temper  of  the  man  more 
completely  than  any  other  which  he  ever  wrote.  His 
mind  being  fixed  on  the  thing  to  be  done,  his  ener- 
getic striving  for  it  was  impatient  of  formal  obstacles 
and  unnecessary  difficulties.  It  is  evident  also  how 
the  principle  which  he  laid  down  must  involve  him  in 
responsibility.  One  of  his  most  remarkable  traits, 
contrasting  in  the  strongest  manner  with  his  contem- 
poraries, was  his  fearlessness  of  responsibility.  If  he 
went  upon  that  principle,  he  was  sure  to  bear  the 
brunt  of  every  contest  provoked  by  his  enterprises ; 
and  as  he  was  always  in  advance  of  other  people,  he 
was  sure  to  excite  their  wonder,  doubt,  and  suspicion 
by  his  enterprises.  His  notion  that  the  principle  he 
advocated  must  redound  to  the  “ reputation  and  suc- 
cess of  the  persons  whom  it  may  govern  ” was  most 
fallacious,  as  his  own  experience  proved.  Jefferson’s 
reputation  and  success  show  how  those  two  things  are 
to  be  won.  It  certainly  was  not  by  committing  one’s 
self  unreservedly  to  the  advocacy  of  such  measures  as 
one  considered  useful  for  the  public  good,  and  con- 
stantly spending  one’s  effort  in  devising  new  measures 
of  that  kind,  without  regard  to  the  interests,  personal 
feelings,  prejudices,  etc.,  which  those  measures  were 
sure  to  encounter. 


1 Works,  vi.  259, 


THE  PROVISIONAL  ARMY. 


229 


In  November  he  prepared  a complete  plan  of  a 
military  academy,  and  proposed  that  the  work  of  pre- 
paring improved  tactics  should  be  divided  up  among 
competent  persons.  In  December  he  sent  a plan  for 
uniforms,  and  wanted  a revision  of  the  articles  of  war 
undertaken.  In  1800  he  undertook  an  investigation 
of  the  “ step  ” which  would  be  most  advantageous 
for  army  marches,  and  prepared  a plan  for  the  pay 
department.1 

The  army  was  disbanded  in  June,  1800;  but  he 
continued  his  work  for  the  organization  of  the  peace 
establishment,  forts,  arsenals,  etc.,  etc.  He  was  badly 
needed  in  the  second  war,  when  things  fell  back  into 
all  the  evils  of  loose  and  negligent  administration. 

Before  the  disbandment  of  the  army  was  reached, 
however,  and  while  he  was  expending  the  energy  which 
has  been  described  upon  the  organization,  the  effect 
of  it  upon  the  public  was  to  make  them  wonder  why 
he  did  it,  and  what  he  was  preparing  for,  and  to  make 
them  suspect  that  he  had  some  ulterior  design.  They 
could  not  understand  why  he  should  leave  a lucrative 
profession,  to  accept  a position  on  a very  moderate 
salary,  and  devote  all  his  time  to  this  business ; and  it 
was  easy  for  the  opposition  to  interpret  this  action, 
especially  in  connection  with  Fries’s  rebellion,  as  a 
part  of  that  scheme  for  overthrowing  the  Republic 
with  which  their  leaders  had  been  charging  him  for 
seven  or  eight  years. 

The  accumulated  and  pent-up  rancour  of  years, 
the  inevitable  reaction  of  the  popular  temper  against 
1 Works,  vi.  91  et  seq. 


230 


ALEXANDER  HAMILTON. 


a disciplinary  regime  which,  although  called  for,  was 
undeniably  pushed  on  with  rigour  and  severity  beyond 
due  measure,  were  bringing  on  a crisis  in  which  party 
virulence  reached  a greater  height,  perhaps,  than  it 
has  ever  reached  since.  Callender  wrote,  in  1800: 
“ Every  Virginian  who  values  his  freedom  should  pre- 
pare himself  to  meet  the  worst  that  may  happen.  He 
should  perfect  himself  in  the  use  of  a musket  with  as 
much  diligence  as  the  devotee  learns  his  catechism.”  1 
Virginia  had  already  begun  to  arm.  When  Hamil- 
ton heard  of  it  he  wrote  that  the  government  should 
face  the  risk  that  “ the  opposers  of  the  government 
are  resolved,  if  it  should  be  practicable,  to  make  its 
existence  a questio?i  of  force''  He  proposes  measures 
to  strengthen  the  Union : ( 1 ) an  extension  of  the 
judiciary;  (2)  construction  of  roads  to  facilitate 
communication;  (3)  a society  to  reward  inventions 
and  improvements.  He  proposed  (in  a private  letter) 
a system  of  federal  justices  of  the  peace  to  reach 
petty  divisions,  to  build  more  ships  of  war,  to  cut 
up  the  great  States,  to  pass  laws  against  incendiary 
and  seditious  practices.  This  is  to  be  the  unpublished 
programme  of  the  federalists.2 


1 Prospect,  88. 


2 Works,  viii.  518. 


THE  ELECTION  OF  1S00. 


231 


CHAPTER  XVI. 

THE  ELECTION  OF  1800;  THE  CATASTROPHE  OF  THE 
FEDERALISTS  ; HAMILTON’S  LATEST  VIEWS  AND 
SENTIMENTS. 

We  have  described  Hamilton’s  position  after  his 
resignation  as  that  of  a minister  without  a portfolio. 
This  position  was  harmless  during  Washington’s  ad- 
ministration ; for  when  Washington  himself  was  con- 
sulting Hamilton,  and  knew  that  his  secretaries  were 
doing  so,  there  was  no  ground  of  complaint.  The 
Cabinet,  however,  continued  on  under  Adams;  for, 
according  to  the  notions  of  that  time,  the  Cabinet 
ministers  would  be  far  more  permanent  officers  than 
the  President,  and  it  was  conceivable  that  a set  of 
ministers  might  remain  for  a long  period  in  charge  of 
the  great  departments,  while  the  President  was  chang- 
ing every  four  years.  This  was  one  of  the  cases 
where  it  remained  for  experience  to  prove  how 
impracticable  a plan  of  this  matter  was,  which 
seemed  at  first  to  be  a matter  of  course. 

When,  now,  Hamilton  continued  under  Adams’s 
administration  to  give  advice  to  the  same  ministers, 
both  gratuitously  and  at  their  request,  upon  all  the 
important  public  questions,  not,  it  is  true,  under 
concealment  from  the  President  or  in  deception  of 


232 


ALEXANDER  HAMILTON. 


him,  but  still  without  the  knowledge  to  which  he 
certainly  was  entitled,  the  proceeding  seems  improper 
and  unjustifiable.  It  is  true  that  Mr.  Adams’s  per- 
sonal character  was  irascible,  jealous,  and  suspicious ; 
but  that  fact  is  entirely  irrelevant,  since  a President 
of  the  United  States  must  have  been  contemptibly 
meek  to  allow  any  such  arrangement  to  stand  without 
resenting  it.  It  is  also  true  that  the  long  absences  of 
Adams  from  the  seat  of  government,  on  account  of 
which  he  left  to  his  secretaries  a great  deal  of  inde- 
pendence and  responsibility,  were  the  cause  of  their 
seeking  advice  and  support  from  Hamilton,  and  it 
may  be  said,  by  way  of  excuse,  that  they  were  con- 
tinuing a habit  which  had  been  formed,  without 
probably  realizing  the  aspect  which  it  would  bear 
from  the  standpoint  of  the  President ; but  it  was  un- 
avoidable that  this  system  should  produce  a catas- 
trophe. It  is  to  be  noted,  also,  that  so  long  as  the 
war  was  anticipated  and  military  measures  were  being 
taken,  Hamilton,  as  real  head  of  the  army,  was  rising 
in  importance.  That  he  and  his  friends  should  be 
pleased  at  this  state  of  things,  but  that  it  should  be  a 
powerful  motive  for  Adams  to  seek  peace,  was,  to  say 
the  worst  of  it,  human  nature. 

In  1798  the  leading  federalists  were  carried  away 
by  the  momentum  of  their  own  ideas.  They  were 
unconsciously  trying  to  use  the  French  incident  as  a 
means  of  carrying  “ high-spirited  ” measures.  They 
had  fallen  under  the  fate  which  seems  to  beset  all  par- 
ties, that  in  the  course  of  time  their  own  best  tenets 
become  fixed  ideas,  which  rise  to  a dominion  over 


THE  ELECTION  OF  1800. 


233 


the  men  themselves,  enclosing  them  in  a network  of 
delusion,  from  which  they  cannot  deliver  themselves, 
so  as  to  see  the  real  facts  of  the  case,  and  the  attitude 
which  they  are  adopting  to  the  forces  at  work  about 
them.  The  federalists  became  stubborn  and  perti- 
nacious in  the  attempt  to  force  the  dominion  of  their 
ideas,  and  entirely  lost  touch  with  the  public  opinion 
of  the  country,  and  set  themselves  in  antagonism  to 
the  genius  of  the  people  and  the  ruling  forces  of 
American  life.  Their  task  had  been  to  soften,  mod- 
erate, and  school  down  to  regular  activity  the  wild 
forces  which  had  been  set  loose  by  the  Revolution ; 
but  their  faults  now  came  to  the  surface.  They  had 
not  patience  enough  for  the  tremendous  task  they  had 
undertaken.  They  did  not  appreciate  the  fact  that 
all  things  must  grow  ; that  the  fruit  cannot  be  obtained 
in  the  ploughing  season ; and  that  the  grand  results 
at  the  end  are  only  to  be  reached  by  a self-control 
which  will  prevent  headlong  progress  and  premature 
catastrophes.  We  have  seen  how  much  “energy” 
was  needed  in  the  period  of  the  Revolution  and  the 
Confederation ; but  the  people  had  never  appreciated 
the  need,  and  the  attempt  to  force  it  on  them  had 
made  “energy”  a synonym  for  tyranny  and  over- 
government.  That  word  had  become  a battle-cry  to 
rally  one  party,  and  to  stir  the  other  to  rage.  Here 
is  a grand  lesson  in  the  futility  of  all  those  notions 
which  regard  statesmen  as  moulding  nations  or  im- 
posing by  their  will  the  shape  which  institutions  shall 
take,  or  the  direction  which  civil  affairs  shall  follow. 

It  does  not  appear  that  Hamilton  was  a leader  in 


234 


ALEXANDER  HAMILTON. 


this  extravagance  and  excess,1  and  Adams  certainly 
felt  the  mistake  which  was  being  made.  His  rage 
was  boundless  when  he  came  to  realize  the  fact  that 
his  administration  had  been  wrecked  by  passing  out 
of  his  control  into  that  of  a set  of  men  who  had 
committed  it  against  his  judgment. 

As  the  election  of  1800  approached,  however, 
Hamilton  committed  himself  more  and  more  to  the 
view  of  the  extremists,  if  he  had  not  sympathized  with 
it  before.  In  June,  1800,  he  made  a tour  through 
New  England.  He  reported  that  the  first-class 
leaders  there  were  “right,”  — that  is,  opposed  to 
Adams,  — that  the  second-class  leaders  were  too  much 
disposed  to  be  wrong ; and  said  that  he  had  deter- 
mined to  inform  them  of  the  objections  to  Adams.2 
In  September  he  wrote  to  Wolcott : “ The  facts 
hitherto  known  have  very  partially  impaired  the  con- 
fidence of  the  body  of  federalists  in  Mr.  Adams, 
who,  for  want  of  information,  are  disposed  to  regard 
his  opponents  as  factious  men.”  8 In  the  summer  of 
that  year  he  prepared  a pamphlet  for  circulation, 
among  the  leading  federalists,  in  secret.  Burr,  how- 
ever, obtained  a copy  of  it  and  published  it.4 
In  this  perverse  and  mischievous  enterprise  Hamilton 
undertook  to  win  a federal  victory  and  defeat  Adams 

1 He  thought  the  alien  law  deficient  in  guarantees  of  per- 
sonal liberty  (Works,  viii.  526) ; wrote  to  Pickering  in  respect 
to  it,  expressing  anxiety  as  to  how  it  would  be  executed  : “ Let 
us  not  be  cruel  or  violent  ” (Ibid.,  490) ; and  again  to  Wolcott, 
“ Let  us  not  establish  a tyranny”  (Ibid.,  491). 

2 Works,  viii.  523,  555,  560. 

3 Ibid.,  563.  4 Ibid.,  392. 


THE  ELECTION  OF  1S00. 


235 


at  the  same  time,  which  he  could  only  do  by  really 
playing  a trick  upon  the  body  of  the  party,  who,  as 
he  himself  had  just  testified,  were  loyal  to  Adams. 
The  movement  in  which  this  pamphlet  was  the  most 
important  incident  was  carried  on  by  a diligent  cor- 
respondence between  the  leading  federalists  in  differ- 
ent States.  It  is  astonishing  that  this  correspondence 
itself  did  not  open  their  eyes  to  the  folly  of  their 
enterprise.  It  is  evident  that  they  had  quite  lost  the 
idea  of  “leading”  a party  by  due  measures,  and  had 
come  to  the  point  of  trying  to  command  it  by 
authority.1  As  soon  as  they  proposed  their  plan  to 
any  one  who  was  not  in  the  secret,  they  met  with 
wonder,  doubt,  protest,  and  difficulty. 

The  pamphlet  is  long,  and  must  be  construed  as  a 
partisan  attack  on  Adams.  Hamilton  begins  with  a 
critical  discussion  of  Adams’s  character  and  career, 
and  of  his  own  personal  relations  to  him,  not  omit- 
ting incidents  which  are  trivial  and  the  interpretation 
of  which  was  at  least  questionable.2  He  then  comes 
to  the  matters  of  the  French  mission,  Fries’s  rebel- 
lion, and  so  on,  in  which  he  takes  the  extreme  view 
against  Adams,  although,  as  has  been  said  above,  we 

1 Gibbs,  ii.  366-430. 

2 On  page  397  the  compliment  of  the  French  lady  to  Adams 
is  incorrectly  quoted.  It  should  read  “ de  la  negotiation.”  She 
did  not  tell  him  that  he  was  “the  Washington  of  negotiation,’’ 
but  the  Washington  of  the  negotiation,  — namely,  that  of  1782. 
(Adams,  iii.  339.)  As  regards  the  extravagance  of  the  com- 
pliment and  Adams’s  vanity,  as  manifested  in  the  way  in  which 
he  took  it,  the  difference  is  essential.  The  error  is  in  the  ori- 
ginal pamphlet  of  1800. 


236  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON. 

have  not  evidence  that  he  shared  that  view  at  the 
time  when  the  events  occurred.  He  says : “ Much 
is  it  to  be  deplored  that  we  should  have  been  precipi- 
tated from  this  proud  eminence  without  necessity, 
without  temptation.  The  later  conduct  of  the  Presi- 
dent forms  a painful  contrast  to  his  commencement. 
Its  effects  have  been  directly  the  reverse.  It  has 
sunk  the  tone  of  the  public  mind ; it  has  impaired 
the  confidence  of  the  friends  of  the  government  in 
the  Executive  Chief ; it  has  distracted  public  opinion  ; 
it  has  unnerved  the  public  counsels ; it  has  sown  the 
seeds  of  discord  at  home,  and  lowered  the  reputation 
of  the  government  abroad.”  The  President’s  resolu- 
tion to  send  another  embassy  to  France  was  “the 
groundwork  of  the  false  steps  which  have  succeeded.” 
He  blames  Adams  for  not  taking  the  advice  of  his 
ministers.  “ A president  is  not  bound  to  conform  to 
the  advice  of  his  ministers,  he  is  even  under  no 
positive  injunction  to  ask  or  require  it ; ” but  he  ought 
to  do  it,  in  order  to  make  the  place  of  a minister 
influential  and  desirable.  He  shows  great  disap- 
pointment at  the  disbandment  of  the  army.  He 
explains  that  his  visit  to  Trenton,  which  excited 
Adams’s  suspicions  and  resentment,1  was  innocent 
and  proper.  He  blames  Adams  for  the  pardon  of 
Fries,  because  it  was  necessary  that  an  example 
should  be  made,  especially  in  the  State  of  Pennsyl- 
vania. Yet  he  does  not  advise  that  votes  should  be 
withheld  from  Adams.  His  point  here  is  not  so  ab- 
surd as  it  has  sometimes  been  represented.  He  did 
1 Adams,  ix.  299. 


CATASTROPHE  OF  THE  FEDERALISTS.  237 

not  argue  against  Adams,  and  then  tell  people  to  vote 
for  him.  His  point  was,  that  all  the  votes  of  the  East 
should  be  given  to  Pinckney  with  Adams ; that  none 
should  be  thrown  away,  in  order  to  secure  to  Adams 
the  first  place ; but  that  if  some  opposition  votes  in 
the  South  should  be  given  to  Pinckney,  he  ought  to 
have  all  those  of  New  England,  so  that  he  would 
come  in  first.1  He  states  his  own  reasons  for  writing 
this  letter  as  follows  : “ To  promote  this  co-operation, 
to  defend  my  own  character,  to  vindicate  those 
friends  who  with  myself  have  been  unkindly  aspersed, 
are  the  inducements  for  writing  this  letter.”  He 
recognizes  the  inexpediency  of  the  enterprise  in 
which  he  is  engaged,  and  expressly  recognizes  the 
fact  that  “the  body  of  federalists,  for  want  of  suffi- 
cient knowledge  of  facts,  are  not  convinced  of  the 
expediency  of  relinquishing  him ; ” yet  he  says  that 
“ to  suppress  truths  the  disclosure  of  which  is  so 
interesting  to  the  public  welfare,  as  well  as  to  the 
vindication  of  my  friends  and  myself,  did  not  appear 
to  me  justifiable.” 

The  gravamen  of  this  opposition  to  Adams  rested 
chiefly,  therefore,  on  the  embassy  to  France.  In  the 
retrospect  it  seems  clear  that  Adams  was  right  to  send 
the  second  embassy  to  France,  just  as  Washington  was 
right  to  send  Jay  to  England.  A little  concession  and 
conciliation  overcame  a difficulty,  and  set  aside  hos- 

1 J.  Q.  Adams  asserted  that  the  object  of  the  conspiracy 
was  to  get  the  vote  of  South  Carolina  for  Pinckney  and 
Jefferson,  while  holding  all  Northern  federal  votes  to  Pinckney 
and  Adams.  (Federalism,  1 51.) 


238 


ALEXANDER  HAMILTON. 


tilities,  where  the  exaggerated  federalist  policy  would 
have  cultivated  a misunderstanding  and  nursed  a con- 
flict to  large  proportions.  As  to  Fries,  the  sacrifice  of 
a human  life  to  make  an  example  does  not  command 
our  approval ; and  if  it  was  possible,  as  it  was,  to  treat 
the  rebellion  with  neglect  and  dismiss  the  culprit,  few 
now  would  be  found  to  say  that  it  was  not  right  to 
do  it. 

Adams  wrote  a review  of  this  pamphlet  in  1809.1 

It  precipitated  the  catastrophe  of  the  federal  party. 
On  account  of  it,  Hamilton  lost  the  leadership.  When 
the  election  went  into  the  House,  and  the  federalists 
entered  into  a plan  to  put  Burr  over  Jefferson,  he  re- 
monstrated and  advised  against  it,  but  his  influence 
could  not  control.  The  federal  party  lost  power  and 
disappeared.  There  was  a coarse  justice  in  the  epi- 
taph which  an  opponent  proposed  for  it : — 


“ We  were  well  ; 


W ould  be  better, 
And  here  we  are.”2 


From  this  time  Hamilton  was  on  the  outside  of  the 
administration  of  public  affairs.  His  policy  of  rigour 
and  vigour,  and  his  too  relentless  methods  of  pursuing 
it,  although  they  had  undoubtedly  contributed  to  the 
strengthening  of  civil  order  and  discipline  which  was 
imperatively  needed,  had  not  only  produced  a ran- 
corous opposition,  but  had  also  broken  up  his  own 
party,  and  left  him  without  direct  influence  on  public 
affairs. 


It  will  be  interesting  to  put  together  some  of  the 


1 Adams,  ix.  241. 


2 Hamiltoniad,  52. 


Ills  LATEST  VIEWS  AND  SENTIMENTS.  239 


most  pointed  expressions  which  we  possess  from  him 
in  the  last  four  years  of  his  life. 

In  February,  1800,  he  obtained  a glimpse  of  one 
truth  which  set  in  clear  light  his  greatest  mistake. 
“America,  if  she  attains  to  greatness,  must  creep  to 
it.”  1 “ Grow  ” would  have  been  better  than  “ creep.” 

In  March,  1800,  he  says  : “ I feel  no  despondency  of 
any  sort.  As  to  the  country,  it  is  too  young  and  vigor- 
ous to  be  quacked  out  of  its  political  health  ; and  as  to 
myself,  I feel  that  I stand  on  ground  which  sooner  or 
later  will  insure  me  a triumph  over  all  my  enemies.”  2 
In  August  he  addressed  a letter  to  Adams,  men- 
tioning reports  that  the  latter  had  spoken  of  a 
“British  faction,”  and  had  named  leading  federalists, 
especially  Hamilton,  as  belonging  to  it.  Hamilton 
asked  if  this  was  true,  and  if  so,  what  his  grounds 
were  for  such  an  assertion.  Adams  did  not  reply. 
In  October,  Hamilton  again  addressed  him,  declar- 
ing that  any  such  report  was  “ a base,  wicked,  and 
cruel  calumny.”  3 He  who  reads  many  of  the  diaries 
and  letters  of  early  statesmen  is  forced  to  ask,  Who 
were  the  evil-disposed  men  and  wrong-doers?  Each 
man,  in  his  writings,  reveals  a strong  disposition  to 
do  right,  and  to  pursue  an  honourable  and  patriotic 
policy,  while  he  refers  to  some  others,  his  opponents, 
as  ill  disposed  and  dangerous.  The  true  inference 
is  that  there  was  no  British  faction,  no  men  sold  to 
France,  no  subverters,  evil  plotters,  or  unpatriotic 
men  among  all  whose  names  stand  high  on  the  roll 
of  statesmen.  All  suggestion  of  that  sort,  by  whom- 
1 Works,  viii.  543.  2 Ibid.  8 Ibid.,  445,  564. 


240 


ALEXANDER  HAMILTON. 


soever  imported  into  the  record,  may  be  stricken  out 
as  due  only  to  the  passing  passion  of  party,  and  the 
ephemeral  ambition  of  individuals. 

In  December  Hamilton  expressed  dislike  of  the 
treaty  with  France,  but  thought  it  better  to  ratify.  hU 
In  January,  1801,  he  wrote  to  Bayard  that  Jeffer- 
son would  not  lower  the  executive  office,  would  not 
follow  his  theories  against  his  popularity  or  interest, 
would  temporize  and  maintain  what  is ; that  he  was 
not  violent,  and  favoured  France  only  for  popularity.1 2 * 
In  that  year  he  wrote  a series  of  eighteen  papers  in 
criticism  of  Jefferson’s  Message.  He  was  especially 
sarcastic  against  Jefferson  for  releasing  an  Algerine 
pirate  ship  which  had  been  captured,  on  account  of 
a doubt  as  to  the  right  of  seizing  it.8  He  expressed 
the  opinion  that  the  United  States  had  experienced 
evils  from  too  large  immigration.4  He  uttered  the 
sentiment  “ Our  National  Government ; the  rock  of 
our  political  salvation.” 5 In  February,  1802,  he 
wrote  to  G.  Morris  : “ Mine  is  an  odd  destiny.  Per- 
haps no  man  in  the  United  States  has  sacrificed  or 
done  more  for  the  present  Constitution  than  myself ; 
and,  contrary  to  all  my  anticipations  of  its  fate,  as 
you  know,  from  the  very  beginning,  I am  still  labour- 
ing to  prop  the  frail  and  worthless  fabric.  Yet  I have 
the  murmurs  of  its  friends,  no  less  than  the  curses  of 
its  foes,  for  my  reward.  What  can  I do  better  than 
withdraw  from  the  scene  ? Every  day  proves  to  me 

1 Works,  viii.  570.  2 Ibid.,  581. 

3 Ibid.,  vii.  200.  4 Ibid.,  242. 

5 Ibid.,  248. 


HIS  LATEST  VIEWS  AND  SENTIMENTS.  241 


more  and  more  that  this  American  world  was  not 
made  for  me.”1 

In  this  passage  he  distinctly  utters  his  own  con- 
sciousness of  the  discord  between  himself  and  the 
political  drift  of  the  country.  It  would  probably 
have  been  too  much  to  expect  of  human  weakness 
and  fallibility  that  he  should  have  been  able  to  exert 
those  influences  which  we  have  traced  in  his  career, 
upon  the  faults  of  American  public  life,  yet  should 
have  been  able  to  maintain  sympathy  with  the  in- 
vincible forces  which  predominated  in  it,  so  that  he 
could  co-operate  with  them. 

Hamilton  favoured  the  constitutional  amendment 
changing  the  mode  of  electing  presidents.2  The  re- 
peal of  the  Judiciary  Act  seemed  to  him  so  serious 
that  he  wanted  a conference  of  the  leading  federalists 
as  to  the  course  to  be  pursued.3  In  April,  1802,  he 
wrote  : “ It  has  ever  appeared  to  me  a sound  prin- 
ciple to  let  the  Federal  Government  rest  as  much 
as  possible  on  the  shoulders  of  the  people,  and  as 
little  as  possible  on  those  of  the  State  legislatures.”  4 
“ Men  are  rather  reasoning  than  reasonable  animals, 
for  the  most  part  governed  by  the  impulse  of  pas- 
sion. This  is  a truth  well  understood  by  our  adver- 
saries, who  have  practised  upon  it  with  no  small 
benefit  to  their  cause.  For  at  the  very  moment 
they  are  eulogizing  the  reason  of  men,  and  profess- 
ing to  appeal  only  to  that  faculty,  they  are  court- 
ing the  strongest  and  most  active  passion  of  the 


1 Works,  viii.  591. 

8 Ibid.,  593. 


16 


2 Ibid.,  592. 
4 Ibid.,  596. 


242 


ALEXANDER  HAMILTON. 


human  heart,  vanity.”  1 “ In  my  opinion,  the  pres- 

ent Constitution  is  the  standard  to  which  we  are  to 
cling.”  He  proposed  to  organize  the  Christian  Con- 
stitutional Society,  to  support  the  Christian  religion 
and  the  Constitution  by  means  of  pamphlets,  axid 
concerted  action  to  elect  fit  men. 

In  a letter  to  Timothy  Pickering  in  1803  he  gave 
a strikingly  correct  definition  of  a republican  form  of 
government : 2 “ The  essential  criteria  of  which  are 
that  the  principal  organs  of  the  executive  and  legis- 
lative departments  be  elected  by  the  people,  and  hold 
their  offices  by  a responsible  and  temporary  or  de- 
feasible tenure.”  8 This  definition  shows  that  he  had 
analyzed  this  and  cognate  political  notions  with  care, 
and  that  when  he  criticised  a republican  form  of 
government,  he  knew  what  he  meant.  Did  his  op- 
ponents know  what  he  meant?  Did  not  they  suppose 
that  a republican  form  of  government  includes  some- 
thing about  equality  and  majority  rule?  Already  in 
the  convention  of  1787,  in  answering  the  question 
whether  the  Senate  and  Executive  proposed  by  him 
were  republican,  he  had  said  : “ Yes,  if  all  the  magis- 
trates are  appointed,  and  vacancies  are  filled  by  the 
people,  or  by  a process  of  election  originating  with 
the  people.”  4 

1 Works,  viii.  597. 

2 His  definition  of  liberty  was  less  fortunate  : “ Its  true  sense 
must  be  the  enjoyment  of  the  common  privileges  of  subjects 
under  the  same  government.”  (Works,  iii.  453  [1784].)  On 
that  definition  the  Russians  have  liberty.  Hamilton’s  defini- 
tion, however,  shows  that  he  was  striving  to  define  liberty  in 
terms  of  constitutions  and  institutions. 

8 Works,  607.  4 Ibid.,  i.  373. 


HIS  LATEST  VIEWS  AND  SENTIMENTS.  243 


April  20,  1S04,  he  wrote  to  his  brother-in-law:  “ I 
say  nothing  on  politics,  with  the  course  of  which  I am 
too  much  disgusted  to  give  myself  any  future  concern 
about  them.”  1 On  the  day  before  the  duel  he  wrote 
a very  short  letter,  the  last  which  he  ever  wrote  ex- 
cept the  farewell  to  his  wife,  which  may  be  regarded 
as  his  political  testament.  “ I have  had  on  hand  for 
some  time  a long  letter  to  you  [Sedgwick]  explaining 
my  view  of  the  course  and  tendency  of  our  politics, 
and  my  intention  as  to  my  own  future  conduct.  . . . 
I will  here  express  but  one  sentiment,  which  is,  that 
dismemberment  of  our  empire  will  be  a clear  sacrifice, 
of  great  positive  disadvantages,  without  any  counter- 
balancing good,  administering  no  relief  to  our  real 
disease,  which  is  democracy,  the  poison  of  which,  by 
a subdivision,  will  only  be  the  more  concentrated  in 
each  part  and  consequently  the  more  virulent.”  2 His 
last  utterance,  therefore,  was  one  of  anxiety  for  the 
Union ; and  the  Union  to  his  mind  was  valuable  as 
putting  constitutional  restraint  upon  those  features  of 
democracy  which  were  always  present  to  his  mind 
when  he  used  the  term,  and  which  we  have  suffi- 
ciently indicated  throughout  the  course  of  this  work, 
as  presenting  great  social  and  political  dangers  in  his 
time. 

In  connection  with  the  controversy  which  arose  be- 
tween J.  Q.  Adams  and  the  sons  of  the  great  federal- 
ists in  1828,  a statement  was  made  by  Plumer  that  he 
was  informed  by  Tracy,  at  the  time,  that  Hamilton 
had  agreed  to  attend  a meeting  of  federalists  in  Bos- 
1 Works,  viii.  615.  2 Ibid. 


244 


ALEXANDER  HA  MIL  TON. 


ton  in  the  autumn  of  1804.1  The  meeting  was  un- 
derstood to  be  intended  “ to  recommend  the  measures 
necessary  to  form  a system  of  government  for  the 
Northern  States.”  The  death  of  Hamilton  prevented 
it  from  taking  place.2  King  told  J.  Q.  Adams,  in 
1804,  that  Hamilton  entirely  disapproved  of  the  pro- 
ject.8 His  last  letter  may  be  understood  to  have 
unexpressed  reference  to  this  project.  He  left  his 
last  word  against  any  disunion  enterprise  at  that 
meeting.4 

Hamilton  never  obtained  a conception  of  a gov- 
ernmental system,  under  a democratic  republican 
form,  such  as  the  United  States  has  developed  in  the 
nineteenth  century  out  of  the  antagonism  of  Hamil- 
tonian and  Jeffersonian  notions,  without  the  absolute 
predominance  of  either,  under  the  social  and  econo- 
mic conditions  of  the  country ; which,  in  his  time,  no 
one  had  ever  conceived  of,  and  which  Mr.  Bancroft 
has  described,  rhetorically  but  correctly,  as  follows  : 
“ As  the  sea  is  made  up  of  drops,  American  society  is 
composed  of  separate,  free,  and  constantly  moving 
atoms,  ever  in  reciprocal  action,  advancing,  receding, 
crossing,  struggling  against  each  other  and  with  each 
other,  so  that  the  institutions  and  laws  of  the  country 

1 Plumer’s  Plumer,  298.  2 Federalism,  145. 

8 Ibid.,  148. 

4 J.  Q.  Adams  mentions  a letter  of  J.  R.  Van  Rensselaer 
which  was  shown  to  him  in  a newspaper  in  1829,  “ to  rescue 
Hamilton’s  reputation  from  having  participated  in  the  disunion 
project  of  1804.  But  it  rivets  upon  him  the  passion  for  being 
at  the  head  of  an  army,  and  his  presentiment  that  he  should  be 
killed  by  Burr.”  (Diary,  viii.  115.) 


HIS  LATEST  VIEWS  AND  SENTIMENTS.  245 


rise  out  of  the  masses  of  individual  thought,  which, 
like  the  waters  of  the  ocean,  are  rolling  evermore.”  1 
The  growing  density  of  population,  the  greater  ac- 
tivity of  social  life,  the  greater  strain  of  the  struggle 
for  existence,  the  greater  wealth,  the  higher  intel- 
lectual activity,  the  drill  and  discipline  of  a more 
highly  developed  industrial  organization,  the  quickened^ 
ambition  of  all  classes  for  individual  success  and  hap- 
piness, the  universal  dissemination  of  ideas  by  litera- 
ture, producing,  as  it  were,  a greater  knowledge  of 
the  world,  an  indescribable  sense  of  the  limits  within 
which  all  things  must  be  had  and  enjoyed,  and  per- 
haps also  the  solemn  experience  of  the  Civil  War, 
have  given  to  the  American  people  the  discipline 
which  they  needed  in  Hamilton’s  time,  and  which  he 
hoped  to  enforce  by  the  devices  of  a statesman,  and 
by  institutions  arbitrarily  invented  and  enforced  against 
the  genius  and  temper  of  the  people. 

JO  ’ \ j 

1 Constitution,  ii.  324. 


246 


ALEXANDER  HA  MILTON. 


CHAPTER  XVII. 

THE  ANTAGONISM  OF  HAMILTON  AND  BURR;  THE  DUEL; 

Hamilton’s  funeral  ; comments  on  the  duel 
and  duelling;  comments  of  friend  and  foe 
on  Hamilton’s  career. 

From  1800  to  1804  the  causes  which  were  to  bring 
about  a collision  between  Hamilton  and  Burr  marched 
on  with  the  precision  of  a classical  tragedy.  Already 
in  1792  Hamilton  described  Burr  in  a letter  as  moved 
by  unprincipled  ambition,  bold,  intriguing,  and  in  debt. 
“ He  is  for  or  against  nothing,  but  as  it  suits  his  ambi- 
tion.” 1 He  called  him  “an  embryo  Caesar,  if  we  have 
one.”  A little  later  in  the  same  year  he  wrote  to  a mem- 
ber of  Congress  : “ My  opinion  of  Mr.  Burr  is  yet  to 
form  ; but  according  to  the  present  state  of  it,  he  is  a 
man  whose  only  political  principle  is  to  mount  at  ail 
events  to  the  highest  legal  honours  of  the  nation,  and  as 
much  further  as  circumstances  will  carry  him.”  2 In 
1800,  writing  to  Wolcott  against  the  support  of  Burr  by 
the  federalists,  he  calls  Burr  a Catiline  ; is  pained  at 
the  idea  of  his  elevation  by  the  federalists,  who  will  be- 
come responsible  for  him.  He  will  use  the  rogues  of 
all  parties.  He  repeated  these  ideas  very  many  times  in 
writing  to  public  men  in  that  year.3  He  charged  Burr 

1 Works,  vili.  283.  2 Ibid.,  289. 

3 Ibid.,  565  et  seq. 


ANTAGONISM  WITH  BURR. 


247 


with  having  talked  “ perfect  Godwinism,”  — which, 
by  the  way,  is  a revelation  of  what  Hamilton  meant 
by  the  republicanism  in  which  he  had  no  confidence. 
It  was  the  type  of  republicanism  advocated  by  God- 
win and  his  followers.1  “ With  great  apparent  cold- 
ness, he  is  the  most  sanguine  man  in  the  world.  He 
thinks  everything  possible  to  adventure  and  persever- 
ance ; and  though  I believe  he  will  fail,  I think  it 
almost  certain  he  will  attempt  usurpation,  and  the 
attempt  will  involve  great  mischief.” 

In  1804  Burr  sought  federalist  aid  against  the 
regular  democratic  nominee,  in  order  to  become 
Governor  of  New  York.  Hamilton  supported  his 
opponent.  The  federalists  were  divided ; Hamilton 
having  drawn  as  many  of  them  as  he  could  away 
from  Burr,  by  declaring  that  Burr  was  a democrat, 
and  would  go  against  all  their  principles.2 

It  is  a wonder  that  none  of  these  clear  and  explicit 
statements  of  opinion  about  Burr  ever  came  to  the 
latter’s  hands.  He  could  not  fail  to  learn  of  Hamil- 
ton’s efforts  to  enlighten  people  on  what  he  con- 
sidered Burr’s  true  character.  As  Burr  was  ambitious 
and  Hamilton  persisted  in  attempts  to  thwart  him  by 
unfavourable  reports  of  his  public  and  private  char- 
acter, it  was  certain  that  they  must  come  in  collision. 
If  Burr  was  the  man  Hamilton  said  that  he  was,  the 
two  men,  both  acknowledging  the  code,  could  not 
move  in  the  same  political  arena  without  a duel  sooner 
or  later.^  The  report  of  which  Burr  demanded  an 

/ 1 Works,  viii.  583. 

2 Republic,  vii.  770. 


248 


ALEXANDER  HAMILTON. 


explanation  from  Hamilton  was  only  a vague  reference 
to  the  fact  that  Hamilton  had  expressed  some  “ des- 
picable opinion  ” of  Burr.  This  Hamilton  could 
neither  confess  nor  deny. 

The  practice  of  duelling  at  the  time  amounted  to  a 
great  public  vice.  The  French  minister,  Gerard,  in 
1779,  spoke  with  astonishment  of  the  rage  for  duel- 
ling. Eight  or  nine  had  taken  place  in  a few  weeks, 
v all  bloodless.1  In  1801  Hamilton’s  oldest  son,  Philip, 
not  quite  twenty  years  old,  was  shot  in  a duel  about  a 
quarrel  at  a theatre.  The  party  newspapers  abused 
each  other  over  it  and  about  it.2  Coleman,  the  editor 
of  the  “ New  York  Evening  Post,”  tried  to  frown  down 
duelling;  but  in  1803  he  was  forced  into  a duel  with 
Thompson,  in  which  the  latter  was  killed.8 

In  his  farewell  to  his  wife  Hamilton  wrote  that  he 
would  have  avoided  the  duel  if  he  could,  “ without 
sacrifices  which  would  have  rendered  me  unworthy  of 
your  esteem.”  4 He  left  a paper  in  which  he  stated 
his  reasons  for  fighting,  against  which  moral,  religious, 
family,  and  business  reasons  were  as  strong  as  possi- 
ble. His  apology  is  : “ My  relative  situation,  as  well 
in  public  as  private,  enforcing  all  the  considerations 
which  constitute  what  men  of  the  world  denominate 
honour,  imposed  on  me,  as  I thought,  a peculiar  ne- 
cessity not  to  decline  the  call.  The  ability  to  be  in 
future  useful,  whether  in  resisting  mischief  or  effecting 
good,  in  those  crises  of  our  public  affairs  which  seem 
likely  to  happen,  would  probably  be  inseparable  from 

1 Durand,  187.  2 Hist.  Mag.,  Oct.,  1867. 

s Hudson,  Journalism,  218.  4 Works,  viii.  629. 


THE  DUEL. 


249 


a conformity  with  public  prejudice  in  this  particular.”  1 
If  we  understand  the  sentiment  of  that  time  aright,  a 
refusal  on  his  part  would  have  been  the  end  of  his 
usefulness  in  politics.  2 

J.  Q.  Adams,  in  1 82 8,  construed  Hamilton’s  reasons 
for  fighting  Burr  as  “ambition  ; ” that  Hamilton,  an- 
ticipating civil  strife,  must  not  tarnish  his  military 
honour,  lest  he  should  be  unable  to  share  in  that  strife 
by  military  command.  “ I would  hope,”  wrote  Adams, 
“ and  may  not  disbelieve,  that  Mr.  Hamilton’s  attach- 
ment to  the  Union  was  of  that  stubborn,  inflexible 
character  which  under  no  circumstances  would  have 
found  him  arrayed  in  arms  against  it.  But  in  the 
events  of  Mr.  Hamilton’s  life  a comparison  of  his  con- 
duct with  his  opinions,  in  more  than  one  instance,  ex- 
hibits him  in  that  class  of  human  characters  whose  sense 
of  rectitude  itself  is  swayed  by  the  impulses  of  the 
heart,  and  the  purity  of  whose  virtue  is  tempered  by 
the  baser  metal  of  the  ruling  passion.  This  conflict 
between  the  influence  of  the  sensitive  and  the  reason- 
ing faculty  was  perhaps  never  more  strikingly  exem- 
plified than  in  the  catastrophe  which  terminated  his 
life,  and  in  the  picture  of  his  soul  unveiled  by  this 
posthumous  paper.”  3 

It  will  be  perceived  that  this  judgment  turns  upon 
the  demonstration  that  Hamilton  fought  lest  he  should 

1 Republic,  vii.  818. 

2 On  the  public  opinion  of  the  time  about  duelling,  see  the 
“ American  Register”  for  1807,  part  ii.  S5,  where  it  is  asserted 
that  if  Hamilton  had  killed  Burr,  he  would  have  suffered  no 
condemnation. 

3 Federalism,  170 


250 


ALEXANDER  HAMILTON. 


lose  chances  to  gratify  his  ambition.  The  demonstra- 
tion is  not  conclusive.  If  a man  fights  that  he  may 
not  lose  a chance  to  serve  his  country  in  crises  which 
he  foresees,  it  is  not  self-evident  that  his  motive  is 
ambition.  He  may  be  sacrificing  his  conscientious 
opinions  to  the  highest  patriotism,  not  to  ambition. 
While  such  alternative  is  open,  the  last  part  of  Adams’s 
judgment  appears  censorious  and  affectedly  high. 
Hamilton’s  faults  in  public  affairs  were  lack  of  policy, 
too  little  willingness  to  temporize  and  yield  to  cir- 
cumstances, excess  of  frankness,  and  too  great  wil- 
lingness to  force  a direct  issue.  If  the  faultlessness 
of  his  rectitude  and  moral  consistency  was  called  in 
question,  it  would  be  necessary  to  consider  the  evi- 
dence that  when  he  swerved  it  was  from  a base 
motive.  The  duel  does  not  furnish  that  evidence. 

He  died  on  the  12th  of  July,  1804.  Gouverneur 
Morris  delivered  a brief  address  at  the  funeral,  on  a 
platform  in  the  portico  of  Trinity  Church,  four  of 
Hamilton’s  sons  being  on  the  platform,  — the  oldest 
sixteemyea^s  of  age,  the  youngest  about  six.  Morris 
said  : ‘^Hamilton  disdained  concealment.  Knowing 
the  purity  of  his  heart,  he  bore  it,  as  it  were,  in  his 
hand,  exposing  to  every  passenger  its  inmost  recesses. 
The  generous  indiscretion  subjected  him  to  censure 
from  misrepresentation.  His  speculative  opinions 
were  treated  as  deliberate  designs.”  1 

Hamilton  left  his  family  really  unprovided  for.  His 
investments  were  chiefly  unimproved  land  in  western 

1 Notes  to  the  Hamiltoniad,  71,  where  the  whole  oration  is 
given. 


COMMENTS  OF  FRIEND  ANT  FOE.  251 


New  York.1  His  debts  were  $55,000.  A subscrip- 
tion was  made  by  his  friends.  A number  of  leading 
federalists  at  Boston  had,  a few  years  before,  bought 
lands  in  Pennsylvania,  owned  by  Pickering,  as  a mode 
of  relieving  him  of  the  investment  and  setting  him 
free  to  take  office.  They  now  transferred  these 
lands  to  Hamilton’s  executors  for  the  benefit  of  his 
family.2 

We  hesitate  whether  it  is  proper,  for  the  purpose  of 
showing  the  party  spirit  which  prevailed  in  the  public 
life  of  the  time,  to  quote  here  the  disgraceful  com- 
ments which  were  published  even  about  his  funeral ; 
but  as  we  desire  to  quote  some  of  the  eulogistic  judg- 
ments which  have  been  passed  upon  his  character  and 
career,  it  seems  necessary  to  include  also  comments 
of  another  character. 

Paine  published  a review  of  Morris’s  funeral  oration, 
in  which  he  carped  at  the  grammar  and  rhetoric  of 
it,  and  gratified  a venomous  dislike  of  Morris.s  The 
Hamiltoniad,  without  being  scurrilous,  is  indecent, 
considering  the  fact  that  Hamilton  was  dead,  and  the 
mode  in  which  he  died.  It  shows  the  bitter  and  in- 
tense feeling  about  monarchy  and  aristocracy.  It  is 
not  stated  who  wrote  the  articles  given  in  the  notes, 
but  they  appear  to  be  from  other  writings  of  the 
author  of  the  poem.  “ We  have  solid  evidence  to 
believe  that  Mr.  Hamilton  wished  to  introduce  an 
established  church  in  the  United  States,  and  so  inter- 

1 On  the  general  topic  of  these  land  investments  at  that 
time,  see  the  “ Life  of  Robert  Morris.” 

2 Lodge’s  Cabot,  304.  3 Hamiltoniad,  Notes,  74. 


252  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON. 

twine  it  with  the  government  as  to  form  that  odious 
monster  in  confederation,  called  the  Church  and  State 
interest.”  1 The  evidence  is  that  Hamilton  took  the 
communion  from  the  Bishop  of  New  York  before  his 
death.  The  writer  goes  on  to  give  his  opinion  of 
bishops,  and  thinks  that  this  fact  proves  that  Hamilton 
carried  veneration  for  aristocracy  “ to  the  mortal 
bourne.” 

There  are  but  two  or  three  places  in  his  works 
where  Hamilton  speaks  personally  of  himself.  In  a 
letter  to  Laurens,  in  1779,  he  declared  himself  “cold 
in  my  professions,  warm  in  my  friendships,”  and  goes 
on  to  profess  very  warm  affection  for  Laurens.  He 
makes  a playful  sketch  of  the  wife  he  wants,  and  then 
describes  himself.  He  mentions  his  small  size  and 
his  big  nose.  The  banter  is  not  very  well  done, 
and  seems  out  of  character.  He  becomes  tired  and 
ashamed  of  it  at  the  end.2 *  Writing  to  Knox,  in 
1 799,  he  said  : “ My  heart  has  always  been  the 
master  of  my  judgment.”  8 

Of  the  opinions  of  Hamilton  by  his  enemies,  we 
may  note  the  following : Callender  called  him  Calig- 
ula,4 and  Alva,6  on  account  of  a story  which  he  often 
repeated,  that  Hamilton  regretted  that  the  insurgents 
did  not  burn  Pittsburg  in  1794.  “In  the  convention 
of  1787  [Hamilton]  and  some  other  conspirators  had 
planned  the  foundation  of  American  monarchy.  A 
design  so  hateful  should  have  debarred  him  from  the 

1 Hamiltoniad,  Notes,  57.  2 Works,  vii.  585. 

3 Works,  viii.  531.  4 Prospect,  36. 

5 History  of  1796,  292. 


COMMENTS  OF  FRIEND  AND  FOE.  253 


confidence  of  the  new  government.  He  is  the  first 
and  only  favourite  whom  General  Washington  ever  had. 
He  became  instantly  dictator  of  the  federal  adminis- 
tration. On  every  question  before  Congress  he  van- 
quished the  Virginian  representatives.  ...  For  the 
sake  of  raising  a standing  army  as  the  first  step  in  the 
ladder  of  despotism,  he  wantonly  provoked  the  war 
with  the  northwestern  savages.  To  support  it  he 
abstracted  from  the  treasury,  without  permission  from 
Congress,  and  in  contempt  of  the  Constitution,  some 
hundred  thousands  of  dollars.  . . . Profligate  and  in- 
solent in  his  private  manners,  but  plausible  and  delib- 
erate in  his  financial  projects,  an  aristocrat  from  the 
dictates  of  his  understanding  as  well  as  from  the 
views  of  his  ambition,  this  man  had  then  obtained, 
and  still  seems  to  possess  [1800],  an  almost  absolute 
ascendency  over  our  public  counsels.”  1 

John  Adams  said  that  Hamilton  was  the  greatest 
organist  who  ever  played  on  the  caucus,3  and  de- 
clared that  he  was  the  greatest  intriguer  in  the  coun- 
try.8 He  also  quotes  a letter  of  Stoddert,  who  did 
not  rate  Hamilton’s  discretion  or  the  solidity  of  his 
judgment  very  high,  and  thought  it  a harm  to  the 
federal  party  that  his  opinions  were  deemed  so 
“ oracular.”  4 Maclay  mentions  him  to  say  : “ Ham- 
ilton has  a very  boyish,  giddy  manner.”  5 

After  his  death,  nobody  published  anything  in 
eulogy  of  him  which  was  more  distinctly  to  the  point 

1 Prospect,  106.  2 Adams,  vi.  543. 

8 Adams,  x.  124.  4 Ibid.,  ix.  301. 

5 Maclay,  23S  (1790). 


254 


ALEXANDER  HAMILTON. 


than  Greetham,  who  was  a political  opponent,  but  ' 
being  a j ettersOnian,  was  at  the  time  perhaps  more^ 
hostile  to  Burr  than  to  Hamilton.  V He  who  for  a^> 
moment  reflects  that  out  of  the  Revolutionary  contest, 
that  chaos  of  clashing  elements,  arose  a world  of  free- 
dom, cannot  but  venerate  the  memory  of  those  who, 
as  it  were,  created  it.  In  this  most  glorious,  most 
useful,  most  splendid  of  earthly  scenes,  Hamilton  per- 
formed a conspicuous,  shall  I not  say,  a disinterested, 
a patriotic  part.  ‘ Scarcely  arrived  at  the  gristle  of 
manhood,’  glowing  with  patriotic  fire,  with  military 
ardor,  he  joined  the  creative  phalanx,  and  signalized 
himself  by  constancy,  by  perseverance,  and  by  valour. 

. . . His  Revolutionary  sendees  entitle  him  to  our 
affection,  and  will  endear  his  memory  to  all  who  are 
sincerely  attached  to  our  independence.”  1 

When  Hamilton  resigned,  Washington  wrote  to 
him  : 2 “In  every  relation  which  you  have  borne  to 
me  I have  found  that  my  confidence  in  your  talents, 
exertions,  and  integrity  has  been  well  placed.  I the 
more  freely  tender  this  testimony  of  my  approbation 
because  I speak  from  opportunities  of  information 
which  cannot  deceive  me  and  which  furnish  satis- 
factory proof  of  your  title  to  public  regard.’’^ 

On  the  relations  of  Washington  and  Hamilton, 
Bancroft  writes : “ While  the  weightiest  testimony 
that  has  ever  been  borne  to  the  ability  of  Hamilton 
is  by  Washington,  there  never  fell  from  Hamilton’s 
pen  during  the  lifetime  of  the  latter  one  line  which 
adequately  expressed  the  character  of  Washington, 

1 Coleman,  64.  2 Washington,  xi.  16. 


COMMENTS  ON  HIS  CAREER. 


255 


or  gave  proof  that  he  had  had  the  patience  to  verify 
the  immense  power  that  lay  concealed  beneath  the 
uniform  moderation  and  method  of  his  chief.”  1 
There  is  some  ground  for  the  blame  on  Hamilton 
implied  in  this  passage,  but  it  seems  to  be  exag- 
gerated. In  reply  to  Washington’s  letter  above, 
Hamilton  wrote  : “ Whatsoever  may  be  my  destina- 
tion hereafter,  I entreat  you  to  be  persuaded  (not 
the  less  from  my  having  been  sparing  in  professions) 
that  I shall  never  cease  to  render  a just  tribute  to 
those  eminent  and  excellent  qualities  which  have 
been  already  productive  of  so  many  blessings  to 
your  country ; that  you  will  always  have  my  fervent 
wishes  for  your  public  and  personal  felicity,  and  that 
it  will  be  my  pride  to  cultivate  a continuance  of  that 
esteem,  regard,  and  friendship  of  which  you  do  me 
the  honour  to  assure  me.”  2 

The  evidence  seems  conclusive  of  good  under- 
standing and  high  esteem  between  the  two  men 
after  1790.  Hamilton  adopted  the  habit  of  signing 
himself,  in  uniting  to  Washington,  “With  sincere 
respect  and  affectionate  attachment,”  which  is  such 
a selected  expression  that  it  must  be  taken  as  signi- 
fying more  than  any  of  the  ordinary  formulas.  Still 
it  is  true  that  the  record  contains  no  evidence  that 
he  appreciated  Washington.  The  things  which  he 
said  about  him  were  rather  expressions  of  the  use- 
fulness of  Washington  to  himself.  When  Washington 
died  he  wrote  : “ He  was  an  hEgis  very  essential  to 
me;”3  and  to  Mrs.  Washington  : “ There  can  be 
2 Works,  viii.  335.  3 Ibid.,  538. 


1 History,  x.  410. 


256 


ALEXANDER  HAMILTON. 


few  who  equally  with  me  participate  in  the  loss  you 
deplore.  In  expressing  this  sentiment,  I may,  with- 
out impropriety,  allude  to  the  numerous  and  distin- 
guished marks  of  confidence  and  friendship  of  which 
you  have  yourself  been  a witness ; but  I cannot  say 
in  how  many  ways  the  continuance  of  that  confi- 
dence and  friendship  was  necessary  to  me  in  future 
relations.”1 

Gouverneur  Morris  wrote  extended  comments  on 
Hamilton’s  career  and  character  in  his  diary : “ One 
marked  trait  of  his  character  was  the  pertinacious 
adherence  to  opinions  he  had  once  formed.  . . . 
The  extent  of  the  United  States  led  him  to  fear  a 
defect  of  national  sentiment.  . . . He  heartily  as- 
sented, nevertheless,  to  the  Constitution,  because  he 
considered  it  as  a band  which  might  hold  us  together 
for  some  time,  and  he  knew  that  national  sentiment 
is  the  offspring  of  national  existence.  . . . He  was  of 
that  kind  of  man  which  may  most  safely  be  trusted, 
for  he  was  more  covetous  of  glory  than  of  wealth  or 
power ; but  he  was  of  all  men  the  most  indiscreet. 
He  knew  that  a limited  monarchy,  even  if  estab- 
lished, could  not  preserve  itself  in  this  country.  . . . 
He  very  well  knew  that  no  monarchy  whatever  could 
be  established  but  by  the  mob.  . . . He  never  failed 
on  every  occasion  to  advocate  the  excellence  of,  and 
avow  his  attachment  to,  monarchical  government.  . . . 
He  was  indiscreet,  vain,  and  opinionated.  . . . Our 
poor  friend  Hamilton  bestrode  his  hobby  to  the  great 
annoyance  of  his  friends,  and  not  without  injury  to 
1 Works,  viii.  541. 


COMMENTS  ON  HIS  CAREER. 


257 


himself.  More  a theoretic  than  a practical  man,  he 
was  not  sufficiently  convinced  that  a system  may  be 
good  in  itself,  and  bad  in  relation  to  particular 
circumstances.”  1 

J.  Q.  Adams  said  of  him  that  “ the  characteristics 
of  his  mind  and  conduct  ” were  that  they  were  “ in- 
direct and  hesitating,”  2 — an  exceedingly  incorrect 
judgment,  unless  we  have  entirely  failed  to  understand 
the  record. 

Madison,  having  outlived  the  fiercer  passions  of 
their  early  warfare,  wrote  of  him,  in  1831  : “That  he 
possessed  intellectual  powers  of  the  first  order,  and 
the  moral  qualifications  of  integrity  and  honour  in  a 
captivating  degree,  has  been  decreed  to  him  by  a 
suffrage  now  universal.  If  his  theory  of  government 
deviated  from  the  republican  standard,  he  had  the 
candour  to  avow  it,  and  the  greater  merit  of  co-opera- 
ting faithfully  in  maturing  and  supporting  a system 
which  was  not  his  choice.”  3 The  Due  de  Liancourt 
recorded  of  him  that  he  had  firmness  and  boldness 
of  character,  with  fine  manners.  His  disinterested- 
ness is  universally  admitted.  He  had  used  none  of 
the  chances  which  his  position  in  the  treasury  gave 
him.  His  professional  charges  were  moderate.  “ Mr. 
Hamilton  is  one  of  the  first  men  of  America,  at  least 
of  those  whom  I have  yet  seen.  He  has  breadth  of 

1 Morris’s  Morris,  ii.  456,  474,  523.  He  said  so,  however. 
“ A government  must  be  fitted  to  a nation  as  much  as  a coat 
to  the  individual ; and  consequently,  what  may  be  good  at 
Philadelphia  may  be  bad  at  Paris,  and  ridiculous  at  Petersburg.” 
(To  Lafayette,  1799;  Works,  viii.  522.) 

2 Diary,  ix.  350.  8 Madison’s  Letters,  iv.  176. 


17 


258 


ALEXANDER  HAMILTON. 


mind,  and  even  genius,  clearness  in  his  ideas,  facility 
in  their  expression,  information  on  all  points,  cheer- 
fulness, excellence  of  character,  and  much  amiability. 
I believe  that  even  this  eulogy  is  not  adequate  to  his 
merit.”  1 . 

Sullivan  writes  of  him  : 2 “ He  was  under  middle 
size,  thin  in  person,  but  remarkably  erect  and  digni- 
fied in  his  deportment.  His  hair  was  turned  back 
from  his  forehead,  powdered,  and  collected  in  a club 
behind.  His  complexion  was  exceedingly  fair,  and 
varying  from  this  only  by  the  almost  feminine  rosi- 
ness of  his  cheeks.  His  might  be  considered,  as  to 
figure  and  colour,  an  uncommonly  handsome  face. 
When  at  rest,  it  had  rather  a severe  and  thoughtful 
expression,  but  when  engaged  in  conversation,  it 
easily  assumed  an  attractive  smile.  When  he  entered 
a room  it  was  apparent,  from  the  respectful  attention 
of  the  company,  that  he  was  a distinguished  person. 
His  appearance  and  deportment  accorded  with  the 
dignified  distinction  to  which  he  had  attained  in  pub- 
lic estimation.  . . . The  eloquence  of  Hamilton  was 
persuasive  and  commanding,  the  more  so  as  he  had 
no  guide  but  the  impulse  of  a great  and  rich  mind, 
he  having  had  little  opportunity  to  be  trained  at  the 
bar  or  in  popular  assemblies.  Those  who  could  speak 
of  his  manner  from  the  best  opportunities  to  observe 
him  in  public  and  private,  concurred  in  pronouncing 
him  to  be  a frank,  amiable,  high-minded,  open-hearted 
gentleman.  He  was  capable  of  inspiring  the  most  af- 

1 Liancourt,  iii.  260;  vii.  149. 

2 Public  Men,  260. 


COMMENTS  ON  HIS  CATE  EE.  259 

fectionate  attachment,  but  he  could  make  those  whom 
he  opposed  fear  and  hate  him  cordially.” 

Bancroft 1 sums  up  his  judgment  upon  Hamilton, 
that  he  was  fond  of  authority ; had  creative  power ; 
had  in  his  nature  nothing  mean  or  low ; was  disinter- 
ested ; had  a somewhat  mean  opinion  of  his  fellow- 
men,  therefore  lacked  sympathy  with  the  masses  and 
was  unfit  to  lead  a party.  He  thinks  that  he  never 
understood  or  appreciated  Washington.  “ He  had 
a good  heart,  but  with  it  the  pride  and  the  natural 
arrogance  of  youth,  combined  with  an  almost  over- 
weening consciousness  of  his  powers,  so  that  he  was 
ready  to  find  fault  with  the  administration  of  others, 
and  to  believe  that  things  might  have  gone  better  if 
the  direction  had  rested  with  himself.  Bold  in  the 
avowal  of  his  own  opinions,  he  was  fearless  to  pro- 
voke, and  prompt  to  combat  opposition.  It  was  not 
his  habit  to  repine  over  lost  opportunities.  His  na- 
ture inclined  him  rather  to  prevent  what  seemed  to 
him  coming  evils  by  timely  action.” 

The  previous  writer  who  has  most  nearly  adopted 
that  view  of  the  key  to  Hamilton’s  career  which  is 
presented  in  this  book  is  Hildreth  : 2 “ Much  less  of 
a scholar  or  a speculatist  than  either  Jefferson  or 
Adams,  but  a very  sagacious  observer  of  mankind, 
and  possessed  of  practical  talents  of  the  highest 
order,  Hamilton’s  theory  of  government  seems  to 
have  been  almost  entirely  founded  on  what  had 
passed  under  his  own  observation  during  the  war 
of  the  Revolution  and  subsequently,  previous  to  the 
1 History,  x.  409.  2 History,  iv.  296. 


260 


ALEXANDER  HAMILTON. 


adoption  of  the  new  Constitution.  As  Washington’s 
aide-de-camp,  and  as  a member  of  the  Continental 
Congress  after  the  peace,  he  had  become  very 
strongly  impressed  with  the  impossibility  of  duly 
providing  for  the  public  good,  especially  in  times  of 
war  and  danger,  except  by  a government  invested 
with  ample  powers,  and  possessing  means  for  putting 
those  powers  into  vigorous  exercise.” 


LIST  OF  AUTHORITIES. 


[Full  titles  of  books  referred  to  in  this  volume,  in  the  alphabetical  order  of 
the  short  designations  by  which  they  have  been  cited.] 


Adams  : Works  of  John  Adams,  with  Life  and  Notes  by  Charles 
Francis  Adams.  Boston,  1S56. 

Adams  to  his  Wife:  Letters  of  John  Adams  addressed  to  his 
Wife;  edited  by  Charles  Francis  Adams.  2 vols.  Boston,  1841. 

J.  Q.  Adams’s  Diary  : Memoirs  of  John  Quincy  Adams,  comprising 
Portions  of  his  Diary  from  1795  t0  *848  > edited  by  Charles  Francis 
Adams.  12  vols.  Philadelphia,  1S74. 

Adams's  Federalism:  Documents  relating  to  New  England  Fed- 
eralism, 1S00-1S15 ; edited  by  Henry  Adams.  Boston,  1877. 

Almon’s  Remembrancer:  The  Remembrancer;  or,  Impartial  Re- 
pository of  Public  Events.  J.  Almon : London.  Period  of  the 
Revolution. 

Amer.  Arch.:  American  Archives;  published  by  M.  St.  C.  Clarke 
and  Peter  Force.  4th  and  5th  series.  9 vols.  Washington,  1837- 
lS53- 

Amer.  Register:  The  American  Register;  or,  General  Repository 
of  History,  Politics,  and  Science,  1S07-1S14.  Philadelphia. 

L’ami  des  hommes:  ou,  Traite  de  la  population.  [V.  R,  Mirabeau.] 
Avignon,  1756-175S. 

Anburey:  Journal  d’un  Voyage  fait  dans  l’interieur  de  l’Amerique 
septentrionale.  2 vols.  [Thomas  Anburey.]  Paris,  1793.  French 
version  ; original  in  English. 

Annals  of  Cong.  : Debates  and  Proceedings  of  Congress,  from  17S9 
to  1S24.  Washington,  1S34-1856. 

Balch,  Penn.  Letters:  Letters  and  Papers  relating  chiefly  to 
the  Provincial  History  of  Pennsylvania,  with  some  Notices  of  the 
Writers.  [Thomas  Balch.]  Privately  printed.  Philadelphia,  1S55. 

Bancroft  : History  of  the  United  States.  10  vols.  Boston,  1845- 
1874. 


LIST  OF  AUTHORITIES. 


2&2 

Baxcroft's  Constitutx'n  . History  of  the  Formation  of  the  Con- 
stitution of  the  United  States  of  America  : by  George  Bancroft,  a 
vois.  New  York,  aSSu. 

Bent>.,-.x  : The  Works  of  Jeremy  Bentham : edited  by  John  Bow- 
ting.  Edinburgh.  1S45. 

Bingham  : A Letter  from  a a American,  etc.,  to  a Member  of  Parlia- 
r.'or.t  on  the  Subject  of  the  Restraining  Proclamation,  etc.  [William 
Bingrsm.J  Philadelphia,  17S4. 

B::;ney  : n Ino/airy  into  the  Formation  of  Washington’s  Farewell 
Address : by  Horace  Binney.  Philadelphia,  1S59. 

Blax:  Paters  : The.  being  a Selection  from  the  MSS.  of  Col.  The- 
odor, ci  Ticnc.  Jr. : edited  by  C.  Campbell.  2 vols.  Petersburg.  Yu.. 
1S40. 

CAlirihiS';  History  : The  History  of  the  United  States  for  iyor  : 
by  J . T.  Callender.  Philadelphia.  i~;~.  See  Prospect. 

Catejcdish  : Debates  of  the  House  of  Commons  in  the  Year  1774.  on 
the  Quebec  Act : by  Sir  H.  Cavendish.  London.  3S30. 

Caxttthecs:  Revsluhonary  Inadents  end  Sketches  of  Character, 
chiefly  in  the  *•  Old  North  State : " by  the  Rev.  E.  W.  Caruthers.  D.D. 
Philadelphia.  1S54. 

Chalkers:  The  Strength  cf  Great  Britain,  by  Ge.rge  Chalmers. 
London.  1S04. 

Cheetham's  Narrative ; A Narrative  of  the  Suppression  by 
CoS.  Burr,  of  the  History  of  the  Administration  f John  Adams; 
written  by  John  Wood,  ad  ed.  [James  Cheetham.]  New  York, 
iSon. 

Ciecc  vsr  : Histoire  de  PActicn  Commune  de  la  France  et  de  i'Ame- 
ricue  pour  Tin  dependence  des  Etats  Unis  ; par  Ge:.  Bancroft, 
traduite  et  annotee  pm  le  comte  de  Circocrt.  3 vois.  [Pol.  HI. 
containing  me  Documents/]  Paris,  1S76. 

Tee  Correspokbsx ce  of  George  III. : with  Lord  North  : edited 
by  W.  B.  Donne,  n vois.  London,  tSsy. 

Crr.Tis's  C:  ssnrrT: : x : Const! rub onai  History  of  the  United 
States  from  their  ITetnururion  of  Independence  to  the  Close  of  their 
Ci"T  War:  by  George  P.  Curtis.  New  Y'ofk.  lSSa. 

D AT.t.ss  : Reports  of  Cases  Ruled  and  Adjudged  In  the  Courts  of 
Pennsylvania  before  and  since  the  Revolution ; by  A.  J.  Dallas, 
ad.  ed.  Philadelphia.  iSod. 

Dawson  - The  Sens  of  Liberty  in  New  York : by  Henry  E.  Dawson. 
N ot  published.  3 S3 

DawsoK : Westchester  County,  New  York,  during  the  Revolution; 
by  H.  B.  Dawson.  Morrisania,  1SS6. 

XfeCXENSC x ; Letters  from  a Parmer  an  Pennsylvania  to  tbs  Inf— bi- 


LIST  OF  AUTHORITIES.  263 

tents  of  tne  British  Colonies.  [John  Dickinson.]  Philadelphia, 
1784.  [First  published  in  1768.] 

Dip.  Cork.  Rev.:  The  Diplomatic  Correspondence  of  the  Amer- 
ican Revolution;  edited  by  Jared  Sparks.  Boston  and  New  York, 
1829. 

Dip.  Corr.  U.  S. : The  Diplomatic  Correspondence  of  the  United 
States  of  America  from  1783  to  1789.  7 vols.  Washington,  1S33- 

**34- 

Do  : :ol  : Histoire  de  la  Participation  de  la  France  i I’etablissement 
des  Fitats  Unis  d'Amerique ; par  Henri  Doniol.  Paris,  tS36, 

Drayton  : Memoirs  of  the  American  Revuiution  as  relating  to  South 
Carolina;  by  John  Drayton.  LL.D.  2 vols.  Charleston.  rSar. 

Durand  : New  Materials  for  the  History  of  the  American  Revolution; 
by  John  Durand-  New  York,  1889. 

Findley:  History  of  the  Insurrection  in  the  Four  Western  Counties 
of  Pennsylvania  in  1794  ; by  William  Findley.  Philadelphia,  1796. 

Folio  State  Papers:  American  State  Papers. — Documents.  Leg- 
islative and  Executive,  of  the  Congress  of  the  United  States.  Wash- 
ington. 1839.  Subdivisions  : Finance,  Indians,  etc. 

F rankles:  The  Works  of  Benjamin  Franklin;  edited  by  Jared 
Sparks.  Boston,  1836. 

F L'THEY  and  Cope:  History  of  Chester  County,  Pennsylvania:  by 
J.  S.  Futhey  and  G.  Cope.  Philadelphia.  r33i. 

Gallatin's  Writings:  The  Writings  of  Albert  Gallatin ; edited  by 
Henry  Adams.  3 vols.  Philadelphia,  1879. 

Gallo  way  Examination  : The  Examination  of  Joseph  Galloway 
by  a Committee  of  the  House  of  Commons  [1779]  : edited  by  Thomas 
Balch.  Printed  for  the  ’76  Society.  Philadelphia.  1835. 

Gibbs  : Memoirs  of  the  Administrations  of  Washington  and  John 
Adams  ; edited  from  the  Papers  of  Oliver  Wolcott,  by  George  Gibbs. 
2 vols.  New  York,  1S46. 

Gordon  : History  of  the  Rise,  Progress,  and  Establishment  of  Inde- 
pendence by  the  United  States  - by  William  Gordon.  4 vols.  Lon- 
don, 17SS. 

Graydon  : Memoirs  of  his  own  Time,  with  Reminiscences  of  the 
Men  and  Events  of  the  Revolution,  by  Alexander  Graydon : edited 
by  J.  S.  Littell.  Philadelphia.  1846.  [First  published,  iSri.J 

Hamiltoniad  : The  Hamlltoniad ; by  John  Williams.  [Anthony 
Pasquin.]  New  York.  Printed  for  the  Hamilton  Club.  1865. 

Historical  Magazine  : The;  edited  by  H.  B.  Dawson.  Morrisania. 

Hudson's  Journalism  : Journalism  in  the  United  Stares  from  1690 
to  1S72;  by  Frederic  Hudson.  New  York,  1873. 


264 


LIST  OF  AUTHORITIES. 


Hutchinson  : The  History  of  the  Province  of  Massachusetts  Bay 
from  1749  to  1774,  by  Thomas  Hutchinson;  edited  by  John  Hutch- 
inson. London,  182S. 

Johnson’s  Greene:  Sketches  of  the  Life  and  Correspondence  of 
Nathaniel  Greene;  by  William  Johnson.  Charleston,  1822. 

Johnston's  Jay  : The  Correspondence  and  Public  Papers  of  John 
Jay;  edited  by  H.  P.  Johnston.  1 vol.  New  York,  1S90. 

Jones’s  Letters:  Letters  of  Joseph  Jones  of  Virginia,  — Depart- 
ment of  State  ; edited  by  W.  C.  Ford.  Washington,  1889. 

Journ.  Cong.:  The  Journals  of  Congress,  from  Folwell’s  Press, 
Philadelphia,  1800. 

Kalb:  The  Life  of  John  Kalb;  by  Friederich  Kapp.  New  York, 
1884. 

Kemble  : Kemble’s  Journal,  — Collections  of  the  New  York  Histori- 
cal Society,  1SS3. 

Kidder,  The  Boston  Massacre:  History  of  the  Boston  Massacre, 
March  5,1770;  by  Frederic  Kidder.  Albany,  1S70. 

Letters  to  Washington  : Correspondence  of  the  Revolution,  — 
Letters  to  Washington  ; edited  by  Jared  Sparks.  Boston,  1S53. 

Lodge:  Alexander  Hamilton.  Boston,  1882. 

Lodge’s  Cabot  : Life  and  Letters  of  George  Cabot ; by  Henry  Cabot 
Lodge.  Boston,  1S77. 

Laurens  Correspondence:  in  Materials  for  History;  by  Frank 
Moore.  1st  series.  New  York,  1861. 

Lauzun:  Memoires  du  Due  de  Lauzun.  Paris,  1S62.  Bibliot.  des 
Mem.  du  i8me  siecle;  par  Barriere.  Vol.  25. 

Lee’s  Lee  : L:fe  of  Richard  H.  Lee;  by  Richard  H.  Lee.  2 vols. 
Philadelphia,  1825. 

Lee’s  Southern  War:  Memoirs  of  the  War  in  the  Southern  De- 
partment of  the  United  States;  by  Henry  Lee.  2 vols.  Philadel- 
phia, 1S12. 

Letters  to  R.  Morris  : in  the  Collections  of  the  New  York  Histor- 
ical Society  for  1878. 

Liancourt  : Voyage  dans  les  Iitats  Unis  d’Amerique  fait  en  1795, 
1796,  and  1797;  par  la  Rochefoucauld-Liancourt.  Paris,  1799. 

Long  Island  Hist.  Soc.  : Memoirs  of  the  Long  Island  Historical 
Society,  II.  and  III.,  — The  Battle  of  Long  Island.  Brooklyn,  1S69, 
1870. 

Maclay  : Sketches  of  Debate  in  the  First  Senate  of  the  United  States, 
1789-1790-1791;  by  William  Maclay.  Harrisburg,  1S80. 

Madison’s  Letters:  Letters  and  other  Writings  of  James  Madison. 
4 vols.  Philadelphia,  1865. 


LIST  OF  AUTHORITIES 


265 


Madison  Papers:  The  Papers  of  James  Madison;  edited  by  H,  D. 
Gilpin.  3 vols.  Washington,  1840. 

Marshall’s  Diary  : Extracts  from  the  Diary  of  Christopher  Mar- 
shall, kept  in  Philadelphia  and  Lancaster  during  the  American  Revo- 
lution, 1774  to  1781 ; edited  by  William  Duane.  Albany,  1877. 

Massachusetts  Papers  : Papers  relating  to  Public  Events  in 
Massachusetts  preceding  the  American  Revolution.  Printed  for 
the  ’76  Society.  Philadelphia,  1S56. 

McMaster  and  Stone  - Pennsylvania  and  the  Federal  Constitution, 
1787-17SS;  by  J.  B.  McMaster  and  F.  D.  Stone.  Published  for 
subscribers  by  the  Pennsylvania  Historical  Society,  iSSS. 

Mentor  : Mentor's  Reply  to  Phocion.  Philadelphia,  17S4- 

Monroe’s  View:  A View  of  the  Conduct  of  the  Executive  in  the 
Foreign  Affairs  of  the  United  States,  connected  with  the  Mission  to 
the  French  Republic  during  the  Years  1794-1795-1796;  by  Janies 
Monroe.  Philadelphia,  1797. 

Moore’s  Diary:  Diary  of  the  American  Revolution,  by  Frank 
Moore.  2 vols.  New  York,  i860. 

Morris’s  Morris:  The  Diary  and  Letters  of  Gouverneur  Morris; 
edited  by  A.  C.  Morris.  2 vols.  New  York,  1S8S. 

Onderdonk’s  Suffolk  and  Kings  County  : Revolutionary  Inci- 
dents of  Suffolk  and  Kings  Counties;  by  H.  Onderdonk,  Jr.  New 
York,  1S49. 

Onderdonk’s  Queens  Co.  : Documents  and  Letters  intended  to 
illustrate  the  Revolutionary  Incidents  of  Queens  County,  by  II. 
Onderdonk,  Jr.  New  York,  1S46. 

Onderdonk’s  Queens  Co.  in  Olden  Times:  by  Henry  Onder- 
donk, Jr.  Jamaica,  1865. 

Paul  Jones:  Memoirs  of  Paul  Jones.  2 vols.  [Mackenzie  (?).] 
London,  1843. 

Penn.  Arch.  : Pennsylvania  Archives.  Philadelphia,  1854,  2d  series. 
Harrisburg,  1S76. 

Penn.  Packet:  The  Pennsylvania  Packet,  — three  times  a week, 
period  of  the  Revolution. 

Plumer’s  Plumer  : Lifeof  William  Plumer;  by  his  Son.  Boston, 1S56. 

Poore’s  Constitutions  : The  Federal  and  State  Constitutions, 
Colonial  Charters,  and  other  Organic  Laws  of  the  United  States  ; 
compiled  by  Ben  Perley  Poore.  Washington,  1S78. 

Pownall  Administration  : The  Administration  of  the  British 
Colonies ; by  Thomas  Pownall,  late  Governor  of  Massachusetts  Bay 
and  South  Carolina,  and  Lieutenant-Governor  of  New  Jersey. 
(5th  ed.)  2 vols.  London,  1774. 


266 


LIST  OF  AUTHORITIES. 


Prior  Documents  : A Collection  of  Papers  relative  to  the  Dispute 
between  Great  Britain  and  America.  London,  1775.  [John  Almun, 
publisher.] 

Proceedings  of  the  Provincial  Congress  of  New  Jersey  : 
Trenton,  1S79. 

Proceedings  of  the  Council  of  Safety  of  New  Jersey: 
Jersey  City,  1S72. 

Proceedings  of  the  Provincial  Congress  of  New  York  : in 
New  York  in  the  Revolution,  State  Archives,  vol.  i.  [This  volume 
contains  hardly  any  of  the  records  cited  by  Dawson,  and  referred  to 
in  the  present  volume,  concerning  the  treatment  of  tories  and  recon- 
struction of  the  State  government.] 

Pkospecti  The  Prospect  before  the  United  States;  by  J.  T.  Callen- 
der. Vol.  1.  Richmond,  1S00. 

Reed’s  Reed  : Life  and  Correspondence  of  Joseph  Reed ; by  William 
B.  Reed.  2 vols.  Philadelphia,  1S47. 

Report  on  Trade.-  between  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States, 
of  1791 ; edited  by  W.  C.  Ford.  Brooklyn. 

Republic  : History  of  the  Republic  of  the  United  States  as  traced  in 
the  Writings  of  Alexander  Hamilton  and  his  Contemporaries.  7 
vols.  New  York,  1S57-1864. 

Riedesel,  Mad.  : Letters  and  Memoirs  relating  to  the  War  of 
American  Independence  and  the  Capture  of  the  German  Troops  at 
Saratoga;  by  Madame  de  Riedesel.  Translated  from  the  German. 
New  York,  1S27. 

Riedesel,  Gen.  : Leben  und  Wirken  des  Gen. -Lieut.  F.  A.  Riede- 
sel ; von  M.  von  Eelking.  3 bde.  Leipzig,  1S56.  [Eng.  by  W.  L. 
Stone.  Albany,  1S68.] 

Sabine:  The  Loyalists  of  the  American  Revolution;  by  Lorenzo 
Sabine.  2 vols.  Boston,  1S64. 

Saint  John  de  Crevecceur  : Lettres  d’un  Cultivateur  Americain , 
par  M.  Saint  John  de  Crevecoenr.  Paris,  17S7. 

Seaburv  (?)  : The  Congress  Canvassed;  or,  An  Examination  into  the 
Conduct  of  the  Delegates  at  their  Grand  Convention  held  in  Phila- 
delphia, Sept.  1,  1774,  addressed  to  the  Merchants  of  New  York; 
by  A.  W.  Farmer.  1774.  [Samuel  Seabury  ;?).] 

Seabu ry  (?) ; Free  Thoughts  on  the  Proceedings  of  the  Continental 
Congress,  held  at  Philadelphia,  Sept.  5,  1774;  by  a Farmer.  1774. 
[Samuel  Seabury  (?).] 

Sec.  Journ.  Cong.  : The  Secret  Journals  of  Acts  and  Proceedings  of 
Congress,  1775-17SS.  4 vols.  1821. 

Seybert:  Statistical  Annals,  by  Adam  Seybert  Philadelphia,  1S1S. 


LIST  OF  AUTHORITIES.  267 

Sheffield,  Lord:  Observations  on  the  Commerce  of  the  American 
States:  by  John,  Lord  Sheffield.  2d  ed.  London,  17S4. 

Sparks’s  Morris  : The  Life  of  Gouvemeur  Morris,  with  Selections 
from  his  Correspondence  and  Misceilaneous  Papers  ; by  J ared  Sparks. 
3 vols.  Boston,  1S32. 

Staples:  Rhode  Island  in  the  Continental  Congress,  1765-1790,  by 
W.  R.  Staples;  edited  by  R.  A.  Guild.  Providence,  1S70. 

Sullivan’s  Public  Men:  The  Public  Men  of  the  Revolution;  by 
W.  Sullivan.  Philadelphia,  1S47. 

Taylor:  An  Inquiry  into  the  Principles  and  Tendency  of  Certain 
Public  Measures.  [John  Taylor.]  Philadelphia,  1794. 

Thomson  Papers:  The  Papers  of  Charles  Thomson,  in  the  Collec- 
tions of  the  New  York  Historical  Society  for  1C73. 

Turgot:  A.  R.  J..  CEuvres , Daire  et  Dussard  2 vols.  Paris,  1S44. 

103  U.  S.  : Reports  of  Cases  decided  in  the  Supreme  Court  of  the 
United  States. 

Wait  ; State  Papers  and  Public  Documents  of  the  United  States. 
12  vols.  2d  ed.  Boston,  1817. 

Walpole’s  George  Ilf. : Memoirs  of  the  Reign  of  George  III.,  by 
Horace  Walpole ; edited  by  Sir  Denis  le  Marchant.  2 vols.  Phila- 
delphia, 1845. 

Walpole’s  Last  Journals:  Journal  of  the  Reign  of  King  George 
the  Third  from  1771  to  1783,  by  Horace  Walpole;  edited  by  Dr. 
Doran.  London,  1859. 

Washington  : The  Writings  of  George  Washington  ; by  Jared 
Sparks.  12  vols.  Boston,  1837 

Weester,  P-  : Political  Essays  on  the  Nature  and  Operation  of 
Money,  Public  Finances,  and  other  Subjects  ; by  Pelatiah  Webster. 
Philadelphia,  1791. 

Winsor : Narrative  and  Critical  History  of  America;  edited  by  Justin 
Winsor.  8 vols.  Boston. 

Works  : The  Works  of  Alexander  Hamilton  ; edited  by  H.  C.  Lodge 
9 vols.  including  the  “Federalist.”  New  York,  1S85-1S86. 

Wraxhall  . Posthumous  Memoirs  of  his  own  Time;  by  Sir  N.  W. 
Wraxhall,  Bart.  Philadelphia,  1836. 


INDEX 


Academy,  military,  125. 
Accountability,  financial,  85. 
Adams,  John,  passim;  character 
of,  232,  235. 

Adams,J.  Q.,  132,  134,  142,  179, 
226,  237,  243,  244,  249,  250,  257. 
Adams,  S.,  43. 

Address  to  the  People  of  Eng- 
land, 6,  7. 

Adet,  P.  A.,  5,  221. 

Affairs,  military,  227,  229. 

“ Africa,”  the,  219. 

Agitation,  n. 

Agriculture,  148. 

Albany,  104. 

Algerine  pirate,  240. 

Algerines,  222. 

Allen,  William,  76. 

Alva,  Duke  of,  252. 

Ambassadors,  21 1. 

America,  34,  35,  42,  68,  r8i,  182, 
204,  205,  239 ; destiny  of,  33- 
36;  indifference  to,  201-204. 
American  society,  244. 

“ Americanus,”  212. 

Ames,  Fisher,  218. 

Anarchism,  13,  52,  122,  135,  187, 
194,  I95i  2o8»  2I3- 
Anburey,  T.,  97,  100. 

Andre,  ].,  105. 

Annapolis,  129. 

Anticipations,  71,  120. 


Antifederalism,  130,  131,  134,  137, 
142. 

Appropriation,  fixed,  161. 

Arabian  Nights,  70. 

Aristocracy,  139,  170,  251,  252. 

Army,  116,  117,  120,  123,  124,236, 
253;  as  creditors,  116,  1 1 7 ; dis- 
order in  the,  92,  96,  97 ; the 
French,  105;  hostility  to  the, 
1 16;  mutiny  in  the,  121,  139; 
organization  of  the,  227,  229; 
proposed,  1794,  212,  222  ; pro- 
visional, 1798,  225-229,  232. 

Arnold,  B.,  105. 

Arrall,  Mrs.,  75. 

Artillery,  8 ; company,  8. 

“ Asia,”  the,  8. 

Association,  41 ; the  Continental, 
51,  57,  58,  66-68. 

Assumption,  154-160,  172,  186, 
1 91;  additional,  187. 

Astor  vs.  Carver,  128. 

Attainder,  126. 

Authority,  weakness  of  civil,  41. 


Bache,  R.,  159,  199. 

Balcarres,  Lord,  100. 

Balch,  T.,  15,  28. 

Ball,  proposed,  So. 

Bancroft,  G.,  244,  254,  259. 

Bank,  167-170  ; auxiliary,  114  ; of 


270 


INDEX. 


England,  no;  national,  109,  113, 
146,  149,  162-165,  172,  1S6,  iSS; 
of  North  America,  115 ; of  Penn- 
sylvania, no  ; plan,  107,  no. 
Bank  notes,  16S. 

Bankruptcy,  77. 

Barbadoes,  57. 

Bargain,  corrupt,  159. 

Barter,  37,  192. 

Bastard,  1. 

Bayard,  James  A.,  240. 

Bayard,  John,  76. 

Bentham,  J.,  2S. 

De  Berdt,  43. 

Bernard,  Governor,  41. 

Bills,  protested,  121. 

Bimetallism,  171. 

Bingham,  William,  203. 

Bishops,  252. 

Blustering,  national,  217. 
Book-keeping,  159,  168. 

Books  read  in  America,  44. 

Boston,  56,  251;  federalist  meet- 
ing at,  244 ; Massacre,  43  ; Port 
Bill,  45. 

Boundary,  126. 

Bounties,  69,  173. 

Bowdoin,  J.,  43. 

Boycott,  39,  40,  57,  58,  65,  192. 
Brandt,  Colonel,  55. 

Brandywine,  107. 

Bryan,  Samuel,  135. 

Burgoyne,  General,  49,  105  ; his 
campaign,  100. 

Burke,  E.,  44. 

Burr,  A.,  234,  238,  244-249,  254. 

Cabinet,  26,  219,  236  ; the  Amer- 
ican, 210,  231  ; and  the  Presi- 
dent, 232. 

Cabot,  G.,  221. 

Caesar,  246. 

Caligula,  252. 


Callender,  J.  T.,  1,  136,  142,  159, 
190,  21 1,  214,  217,  222,  230,  252. 
Cambridge,  49. 

Campaign  stories,  140. 

Canada,  6,  7, 15,  18,  24,  55,  65,  86, 
209. 

Canadians,  6,  7,  iS. 

Cape  Breton,  15. 

Capita],  148-154,  167-169,  174, 
180,  218. 

Carlisle,  57. 

Carrington,  E.,  1S6. 

Carroll,  J.,  7. 

Carrying  trade,  iS. 

Carthage,  25. 

Carting,  57. 

Caruthers,  E.  W.,  58,  60. 

Catiline,  246. 

Caucus,  253. 

Cavendish,  Sir  H.,  7,  24. 

“ Centinel,”  136. 

Century,  the  seventeenth,  21,  45; 

the  eighteenth,  3,  17,  19,  21,  1S0. 
Chalmeis,  George,  32. 

Charleston,  74. 

Charters,  5,  6,  27,  28. 

Chatelet,  32. 

Cheetham,  James,  254. 

Chesapeake,  129. 

Chester  County,  Penn.,  96. 

Child,  Sir  J.,  21. 

De  Choin,  97. 

Choiseul,  30,  32. 

Church,  an  established,  251;  and 
State,  252. 

Circulation,  113,  166. 

City,  the  Federal,  142,  159. 

Clark,  Dr.,  56. 

Classes,  49,  50,  98,  99. 

Clinton,  George,  125. 
Clownishness,  98. 

Coffee,  37. 

Coleman,  W.,  248. 

College  of  New  York,  3. 


INDEX. 


Colonial  interests,  7,  21,  22,  23. 

Colonies,  5,  11,  12,  21,  25,  33,  34, 
200  ; cliques  in,  48  ; common 
sentiment  of,  15  ; crown,  27  ; 
exploitation  of,  16,  25 ; value  of, 

1 7>  3!j  32,  204- 

Colonization,  12. 

Colossus,  1 89. 

Combination,  159. 

Commerce,  148,  173,  179,  203  (see 
Trade ) ; freedom  of,  34, 1S1  (see 
Trade,  free)  ; policy  of  America, 
200-204,  °f  England,  204,  of 
France,  200;  regulation  of,  129  ; 
restriction  of,  213,  219  (see  As- 
sociation , Non-importation) . 

Commission  to  Canada,  7. 

Committee  on  Commerce,  85,  89, 
no;  of  Foreign  Affairs,  89;  of 
Investigation,  86 ; on  Rights, 
etc.,  28. 

Committees,  Executive,  84  ; of 
Safety,  51,  56,  58,  73-81,  197. 

“Common  Sense,”  82,  1S9. 

Commons,  House  of,  26,  38. 

Condorcet,  109. 

Confederation,  the,  13S,  141,  155, 
233;  the  Articles  of,  82,  84,  hi, 
112,  114,  116,  122,  123,  130,  139. 

Confiscation,  53,  59,  127. 

Congress,  the  Continental,  4-142 
passim,  260  ; besieged,  121:  and 
the  Council  of  Pennsylvania,  121  ; 
factions  in,  88,  117;  fear  of  the 
States,  118;  Journal  of,  82; 
leaves  Philadelphia,  139  ; and 
Massachusetts,  125  ; methods  of, 
86;  power  of,  112,  116,  123; 
prejudices  of,  84 ; respect  for, 
82;  and  Rhode  Island,  122,  124. 

Congress,  the  Federal,  140,  146, 
155,  195-253  passim  ; treaty- 
making power  of,  217 

Congress,  the  Stamp-act,  39,  65,  66. 


271 

Connecticut,  55  124,  192. 

Consolidation,  132,  139,  158. 

Constitution,  the  English,  5,  10, 
27,  46,  47,  I31,  J32,  1S9. 

Constitution  of  the  United  States, 
131,  134-140,  142,  158,  208,  211, 
217,226,  240,  242,  253,  256,  260; 
amendments  of  the,  139,  241  ; 
moulded  by  precedent,  141,  231  ; 
ratification  of  the,  134-139. 

Constitutionalists,  136. 

Constitutionality,  139. 

Constitutions,  State,  13. 

Continent,  the,  15  ; the  faith  of,  72, 
148. 

Continental,  in, 

“ Contincntalist,”  109,  in. 

Conventicles,  social,  11. 

Convention  at  Annapolis,  129;  at 
Boston,  in;  at  Pittsburg,  192; 
of  1787,  130-136,  252. 

Conventions,  price,  in. 

Cornwallis,  Lord,  107. 

Corrupt  cohort,  159,  18S. 

Corruption  useful  109,  131,  189. 

“Cotton  is  King,”  65. 

Counter-revolution,  208. 

Courier  de  1’ Europe,  206. 

Court  party,  the,  158. 

Court,  the  Spanish,  182. 

Credit,  13,  79,  80,  115,  119,  120, 
144,  157,  160,  166,  18S,  1 9 ; and 
capital,  J49,  150. 

Creditors,  public,  117,  123. 

Crisis,  financial,  163. 

Crown,  the,  45. 

Currency,  Continental,  51,  70-73, 
no,  151  ; forced  circulation  of, 
78-80 ; refused,  78. 


Dana,  R.,  201. 
Darden,  Amy,  94. 
Dawson,  H.  B.,  39,  60. 


272 


INDEX. 


Deane,  Silas,  gi. 

Debates,  publicity  of,  82,  83. 

Debt,  169;  the  public,  124,  135, 
137,  138,  I44-I56)  158,  163,  164, 
174,  18S,  202,  207,  210;  a bless- 
ing, 149,  150,  159;  payment  of, 
15S-162 ; State,  154. 

Debtor  and  creditor,  169. 

Debtors,  40,  47,  48,  51. 

Debts  to  Englishmen,  refusal  to 
pay,  39,  40,  127,  213. 

Delaware,  129. 

Democracy,  132,  133,  243. 

Depreciation,  72,  77,  151,  152. 

Derivatives,  176. 

Despatches,  Colonial,  22. 

Despotism,  253. 

Diagnosis,  political,  204. 

Dickinson,  John,  21,  129. 

Diplomacy,  90. 

Directory,  the  French,  222. 

Discipline,  9,  197,  230,  238,  245; 
lack  of,  88,  91,  92,  93,  94,  101, 
104. 

Disintegration,  social,  9,  13,42,  47, 
48,  51,  56,  60,  95. 

Disobedience,  93,  94. 

District  of  Columbia,  42. 

Disunion,  14,  137,  226,  230,  243, 
244- 

Doctrine,  of  resistance,  8,  10,  27, 
28;  economic,  19,  22. 

Documents,  Prior,  39. 

Dollar,  Spanish,  170;  of  the  United 
States,  1 71. 

Dominion,  sole,  25,  31. 

Dorchester,  Lord,  209. 

Duane,  James,  109,  112. 

Duane,  William,  136,  159. 

Duel  of  Coleman  and  Thompson, 
248 ; of  Philip  Hamilton,  248 ; 
of  Hamilton  and  Burr,  243,  247- 
250  ; of  John  Laurens  and  Gen- 
eral Lee,  105. 


Duelling,  248. 

Dunkirk,  31. 

Dupont  de  Nemours,  109. 

Duties  on  imports,  37,  38, 114, 122, 
145,  181-1S3  ; discriminating, 

202,  209;  on  exports,  179. 

Economists,  French,  109. 

Egyptians,  66. 

Election,  Presidential,  221  ; of 
1800,  234-238. 

Electors,  13 1. 

Elizabeth,  Queen,  177. 

Embargo,  65. 

Embezzlement,  94,  100. 

Emigration,  7,  182. 

Empire,  7,  9,  12,  22,  23,  2S,  200- 
204. 

Encampment,  97. 

“ Energy,”  8,  87-91,  1 11-115, 132> 
137,  204,  225-228,  233. 

Energy  of  Americans,  9S. 

England,  passim ; attitude  of,  to 
the  United  States,  203;  expected 
decline  of,  205,  214,  220;  hatred 
of,  31,  205,  215,  218,  220. 

Engrossers,  72. 

Episcopate,  American,  43. 

Equivalence,  law  of,  101. 

Essex,  Lord,  22. 

D’Estaing,  97. 

Europe,  16,  17,  26,  33-35,  182, 
202. 

Exchange,  169. 

Excise  tax,  38,  156,  191—199 ; im- 
moral, 195  ; unpopularity  of,  38, 

191- 

Executive,  131,  133,  242. 


Faction,  British,  239. 

Faith,  national,  220;  pledged,  71 
148. 


INDEX 


273 


Fallacies,  financial,  114,  167. 
Falmouth,  54. 

Fanning,  Colonel,  96. 

Farmer,  a Westchester,  4,  5. 
“Farmer  Refuted,”  51,  109. 
Fauchet,  219. 

Federalism,  142,  193. 

Federalist(s),  112,  223,  224,  232- 
238.  243>  246,  247,  251,  253; 
epitaph  of,  238;  faults  of,  233. 

“ Federalist,”  the,  38,  109,  136, 
138,  166. 

Fenno’s  “Gazette,”  189. 

Fields,  meeting  in  the,  4. 

Finances,  116-118,  122. 

Findley,  William,  191-19S. 
Fisheries,  6S,  126. 

Fishkill,  77. 

Fitz,  Captain,  96. 

Florida,  86,  209,  226. 

Ford,  Mr.  Paul,  136. 

Forestallers,  72,  77. 

Fortifications,  125. 

France,  passim ; mission  to,  221- 
223,  235,  236;  relations  to  the 
United  States,  207-213,  216, 219, 
237;  seeks  revenge,  31. 

Franklin,  Benjamin,  15,  21,  27,  31, 
38,  59,  65,  83,  90,  91,  98,  109, 
117,  11S,  120,  126,  1S1,  206. 
Frederick  the  Great,  26,  27,  30,  31, 

ICO. 

Freebooters,  96. 

Free  ships,  free  goods,  219. 
Freneau,  186,  188. 

Fries,  229,  235,  236,  238. 

Fund,  117,  166,  191. 

Funding,  117,  145— 1 54,  172,  186. 


Gage,  General,  44. 
Gallatin,  A.,  1 5 7—159,  197. 
Galloway,  ].,  50. 

Gates,  General,  105. 


Gee,  J.,  21. 

Genet,  5,  210,  211. 

Georgia,  68,  122. 

Gerard,  89,  126,  248. 

Giles,  W.  B.,  185,  186. 

Gillon,  Commodore,  93. 

“ Give  and  grant,”  24. 

Globe,  the,  6,  17,  33. 

Godwin,  W.,  247. 

Godwinism,  247. 

Gold  and  silver,  166,  170,  180. 

Gordon,  W.,  74. 

Government,  arbitrary,  6 ; dislike 
of  splendid,  141  ; efficient,  in, 
1 14,  1 1 5,  1 1 7,  130,  133,  138,  260 
(see  Energy );  Republican,  131, 
242. 

Grand,  118. 

Graydon,  A.,  49,  51,  57,  60,  76, 
93.  97,  98- 

Greene,  General,  50,  99,  119. 

Grenville,  George,  22,  26. 

Grievances,  6,  7,  21,  22,  25,  44, 
46,  50. 


Half-truths,  ii. 

Hamilton,  Alexander,  affairs,  2, 
251 ; ambition,  3,  244,  249,  250, 
255 ; apologizes  for  zeal,  138, 
for  duel,  248 ; arrival  in  United 
States,  4;  artillery  officer,  104; 
aunt  of,  3 ; autobiography  of,  3, 
252  ; browbeats  accused,  198  ; 
career,  8,  clew  to  it,  103  ; char- 
acter. 184,  250-260  ; charges 
against,  185,  188,  253 ; death, 
250;  debts,  251;  destiny,  240; 
disgusted  at  politics,  243  ; dread 
of,  189,  259;  eloquence,  258; 
family,  250,  251  ; faults  and  mis- 
takes, 17S,  184,  185,  190,  23S, 
239,  250  ; fearlessness  of  respon- 
sibility, 228;  filial  affection,  2; 


18 


INDEX. 


274 

funeral,  250,  251  ; in  1800,  234- 
239;  industry,  227  ; investments. 
250;  and  Jefferson,  170, 171,  1S9, 
190,202;  letters,  1 ; Lodge’s,  r; 
loses  leadership,  238  ; Louisiana, 
views  about,  209,  225,  226;  man- 
ners, 257,  258;  masterfulness, 
178;  methods,  178,  184, 190,214, 
227,  238  ; military  services,  225- 
229,  254;  minister  without  port- 
folio, 231;  mother  of,  3;  motto 
for  foreign  relations,  216  ; opin- 
ions, 149,  150,  213,  227,  criti- 
cism of,  1 5 1 ; person,  252,25s; 
plan  for  Union,  230;  political 
principles,  1S7,  193,  194,  228; 
political  testament,  243 ; quarrel 
with  Washington,  106;  reading, 
109,  178,  1S0  ; resignation,  186, 
215;  sons,  250  ; suspicion  of,  229; 
temper,  228 ; theories  of  com- 
merce, 178,  179,  180,  rSr  ; theo- 
ries of  finance,  114;  theories  of 
statesmanship,  178-1S0,  233, 

239-244,  257,  259;  theories  of 
taxes,  180,  181 ; vanity,  3;  and 
Washington,  106,  254;  wife,  3, 
107,  243,  248,  252.;  writes  for 
newspapers,  138,  194,  212,  216. 

Hamilton,  James,  2. 

Hamilton,  J.  C.,  107. 

Hamilton,  Philip,  248. 

Hamiltoniad,  238,  251. 

Hamiltonism,  21 1. 

Hancock,  Mrs.,  80. 

Hartford,  56. 

Heard,  Colonel,  58. 

Henry,  Patrick,  135. 

Pleresies,  political,  133,  147. 

Plighland  forts,  96. 

Hildreth,  R.,  259. 

History,  the  suppressed,  128. 

Holland,  16,  17,  32,  6S,  202  ; bank- 
ers in,  121. 


Honour,  national,  220. 
Ilorse-race,  95. 

House  of  Representatives,  238. 
Howe,  General,  78,  92. 

Huddy,  Captain,  54. 

Hume,  David,  109,  131,  177. 
Hunt,  I.,  56,  57,  75. 

Hunt,  Leigh,  57. 

Hutchinson,  Governor,  41,  74,  82. 


Immigration,  240. 

Impeachment,  217. 

Impost,  the  five  per  cent,  122. 
Impressment,  94,  95,  219. 
Indebtedness,  certificates  of,  120. 
Independence,  9,  12, 13,  22,  28,  29, 

33.  34,  35,  5L  53,  5s,  11 5,  M4, 
148,  156,  183,  208;  of  foreign 
influence,  218,  223. 

“ Independent  Gazetteer,”  136. 
Indians,  21. 

Indolence,  98. 

Inflation,  71. 

Ingersoll,  41. 

Inglis,  Mrs.,  128. 

Inspection  laws,  175. 

Institutions,  13. 

Instruments,  negotiable,  168. 
Interest  of  the  rich,  no,  156,  163. 
Intervention,  5,  30-32. 


Jacobinism,  6,  197, '219. 

Jay,  John,  4,  6,  90,  102,  135,  180, 
1S2,  204,  205,  206,  214,  215, 
216-221,  237. 

Jealousies,  106,  116. 

Jefferson,  T passim. 

Jenkinson,  Charles,  202. 

Jobs,  146. 
j ones,  Joseph,  123. 

Jones,  Paul,  93. 

J ubilee,  J ewish,  146. 


INDEX. 


Judges,  disrespect  to,  47. 
Judiciary,  15S  ; Act,  241. 
Jurisdiction,  12,  17,  18,  27. 


Kalb,  J.,  30,  31,  38,  85,  86,  93, 
96,  97- 

Kearsley,  Dr.,  56,  57,  75. 

Kemble’s  J oumal,  60. 

Kidder,  F.,  43. 

Kidnapping,  8. 

King,  the,  26,  27,  46 ; of  England 
(George  III.),  26,  140,  204,  218; 
of  France,  33;  of  the  United 
States,  140. 

King,  Rufus,  218,  244. 

Knox,  General,  225,  252. 

Ku  Klux,  56. 


Labour,  dear,  173,  183. 

Lafayette,  99,  106,  257. 

Lakes,  the,  6. 

“ L’Ami  des  Hommes,”  25. 

Lancaster,  Penn.,  58,  T2r. 

Land,  it4,  160,  rS2,  250;  office, 
145,  r46. 

Lands,  Western,  28. 

Laurens,  Henry,  76,  86,  207. 

Laurens,  John,  68,  102,  ro5,  ro6, 
H5>  252- 

Laurens  correspondence,  58. 

Lauzun,  99. 

Law,  195 ; administration  of,  ar- 
rested, 41 ; alien,  234 ; canon,  43 ; 
constitutional,  139;  English,  7: 
feudal,  43;  French,  6,  7 ; of  na- 
tions, 2ro;  of  nature,  6;  study 
of,  44. 

Law,  John,  109,  no. 

Law  books,  44. 

Lawlessness,  r4,  4%,  46,  50,  76,  195. 

Laws,  natural,  T9. 

Lawyers,  44,  45. 


275 

Laxness,  88-92,  101. 

League,  r32. 

Lee,  A.,  43. 

Lee,  Gen.  Charles,  94. 

Lee,  R.  H.,  22,  41,  42,  46,  78. 
Lenity,  92,  94. 

Letters  seized,  75,  195. 

Lexington,  69,  74. 

Liancourt,  de  la  Rochefoucauld-, 
i42»  198,  257. 

Liberty,  131,  135,  208,  212,  213, 
219,224,  234,  242;  declamation 
about,  52,  84,  188. 

Life,  colonial.  9,  14. 

Lincoln,  General,  T35. 

Literature  of  resistance,  ro. 
Livingston,  Edward,  217. 
Livingston,  Robert,  59,  201. 

Loan,  foreign,  no,  ri3,  120,  166. 
Loan-office  certificates,  59. 

Lodge,  H.  C.,  1,  107,  147. 

Logic  of  trade,  i8r  183,  203. 

Long  Island,  54  ; battle  of,  96  ; 

Historical  Society,  58. 

Lords,  House  of,  t32. 

Loss  by  Revolution,  49. 

Louis  XVI.,  212. 

Louisiana,  209,  22;,  226. 

Loyalist.  (See  Tory.) 

Loyalty,  53. 

De  la  Luzerne,  87. 


MacDuffie,  George,  177. 
Maclay,  Win.,  145,  146,  158,  253. 
Madison,  James,  137, 185-189,  201, 
202,  221,  226,  257. 

Madison  Letters,  257. 

Madison  Papers,  T30. 

Maine,  136. 

Manufactures,  33,  14S,  i8r,  1S3 ; 
Report  on,  149,  160,  1 72-1 77, 
1S5. 

“ Marcellus,”  1S9. 


276 


INDEX. 


Market,  38,  63,  64,  72;  a sole,  16, 
25  ; the  world's,  37. 

Marshall,  C.,  58,  77-79,  95. 

Martin,  Luther,  134. 

Martinique,  91. 

Maryland,  129,  198. 

Massachusetts,  22,  27,  34, 125,  191 ; 
Assembly  of,  43,  82;  Congress 
of,  56. 

Massacre,  the  Boston,  43  ; the 
Paoli,  96;  the  Wyoming,  55,  60. 
Maxims,  political,  46. 

McGirth,  96. 

McHenry,  215,  225,  227. 
Medical  department,  100,  101. 
Medium,  insufficient,  151. 

Melon,  109. 

“ Mentor,”  166,  179. 

Mercantilism,  19,  20,  32,  175,  180, 
181. 

Metals,  37  ; precious,  20. 

Methods,  social,  n. 

Mifflin,  Governor,  198. 

Militia,  41,  99,  100,  132,  194,  197, 
226,  227. 

Mingo  Creek  Association,  197. 
Ministry,  28. 

Mint,  170-172. 

Miranda,  F.,  226. 

Mississippi,  the,  6,  126. 

Mob,  7,  8,  40,  41,  43,  46,  47,  51, 
75,  121,  196,  197,  199,  216,  256. 
Monarchism,  139,  140,  170,  187, 
1S9,  219,  229,  251,  252,  256. 
Money,  37,  38,  42,  165-171,  192; 

and  wealth,  113. 

Monmouth  County,  N.  J.,  96. 
Monopolists,  72,  77. 

Monopoly,  24,  72,  170. 

Monroe,  James,  185,  186,  219  ; 

his  “ View,”  220. 

Montesquieu,  109. 

Montmorin,  201. 

Moody,  96. 


Moore’s  Diary,  54-57. 

Moore’s  Mountain,  58. 

Morris,  Gouverneur,  1,  46,  70,  109, 
1 16,  209,  240,  250,  251,  255- 
257- 

Morris,  Robert,  77,  82,  84,  85,  89, 
101,  107,  108,  113-124,  150,  166. 
Morris,  Roger,  128 ; Mrs.,  128. 
Morristown,  107. 

Murray,  W.  V.,  223. 

Mutiny.  (See  Army.) 


Napoleon,  223. 

Nations,  family  of,  33. 

Navigation  Acts,  5,  18,  21,  2i, 
203. 

Navy,  19,  125. 

Neckar,  13 1. 

Negroes,  205. 

Neutral,  neutrality,  208,  210,  212, 
214,  215,  218,  220,  223,  225. 

Nevis,  1. 

Newcastle,  Duke  of,  22. 

New  England,  234,  237  ; hatred  of, 
98,  99. 

New  Hampshire,  137, 

New  Haven,  8,  41,  55. 

New  Jersey,  34,  54,  96,  129,  191; 
Council  of  Safety,  60 ; Provin- 
cial Congress,  60. 

News,  transmission  of,  74. 

Newspapers,  8,  82, 149  ; party,  248; 
war,  186,  188. 

New  York,  50,  55,  68,  124,  127, 
129;  antifederalism  in,  137;  bal- 
ance against,  157;  Bishop  of, 
252  ; convention  of  1777,  57,  59; 
convention  of  1788,  136;  “Even- 
ing Post,”  248  ; Governor  of,  247 ; 
Historical  Society,  60 ; Legisla- 
ture, 127;  Provincial  Congress, 
8, 60,  70 ; Supreme  Court  of,  128  ; 
Western,  251. 


INDEX. 


New  York  City,  137;  meeting  at, 
216. 

“Nocturnal  societies,”  76. 
Non-consumption,  40,  66,  68. 
Non-exportation,  66. 
Non-importation,  4,  62,  66. 
Non-intercourse,  213. 
Non-interference,  172,  174,  177- 
1S3. 

North  Carolina,  58,  68. 

Nova  Scotia,  86. 

Nullification,  14. 

Numerary,  109. 

“ Nursery  for  seamen,”  19. 


Offices  in  colonies,  48. 

Ohio,  the,  6. 

Oliver,  Judge,  47. 

Onderdonk,  H.,  58,  60. 

Opera  bouffe,  140. 

Opinion,  popular,  199. 
Organization,  9;  industrial,  66,  167; 

need  of,  Si,  87. 

Osnaburgh,  Bishop  of,  140. 
Outrages,  8,  54-61. 


Paine,  T.,  251.  (See  Common 
Sense.) 

Paper  money,  38,  69,  83,  114,  136, 
150,  15 1,  166-168  ; effects  of, 

83,  85. 

Papers,  Massachusetts,  43. 

Paris,  90,  257. 

Parliament,  23,  24,  26-29,  44,  45, 
46,  66,  204. 

Particularism,  112. 

Parties,  in  the  United  States,  208, 
210,  213-218,  223,  224,  230,  234, 
237-240;  fate  of,  232,  246-248, 
251 ’ 

Patriotism,  spurious,  61. 

Peace,  116,  127;  commission,  17S2, 


277 

206 ; establishment,  142,  229  ; 
federal  justices  of  the,  230. 
Peculation,  146. 

Pedler,  1,  26. 

Peerage,  135. 

Pennsylvania,  6,  49,  129,  140,  191- 
193,  198,  236,  251  ; Assembly  of, 
27 ; Committee,  58 ; Constitu- 
tion, 136  ; Council,  121 ; politics, 
136 ; population,  39;  taxes  in,  38. 
Period,  the  Nullification,  177;  the 
pre-Revolutionary,  9,  15,  194; 
the  Revolutionary,  15. 
Perpetuities,  27. 

Persecution,  253. 

Peters’s  Reports,  128. 

Petersburg,  257. 

Philadelphia,  15, 42,  47,  57,  75,  121, 
198,  257;  meeting  at,  77. 
Philipse  manor,  128. 

“ Phocion,”  126,  166,  179. 
Pickering,  Timothy,  1,  132,  215, 
221,  234,  242,  251  ; Papers,  1. 
Pickets,  96. 

Pinckney,  Charles,  221,  223,  237. 
Pitfall,  178. 

Pitt,  W.,  23. 

Pittsburg,  195,  252. 

“ Plain  Truth,”  189. 

Plumer,  William,  243. 

Plundering,  94. 

Poland,  26. 

Police,  41,  196. 

Policy,  systems  of,  19. 

Political  Economy,  16,  20,  20,  36. 
Political  philosophy,  36. 

Politics,  continental,  117. 

Pontleroy,  31. 

Poor  in  America,  182. 

Popularity,  84,  115,  188,  240. 
Portugal,  16,  17,  86. 

Posterity,  146,  148,  186. 

Power,  dread  of,  128. 

Pownall,  Thomas,  26,  28,  34,  183. 


INDEX. 


2 78 

President  of  the  United  States, 
231,  232. 

Prices,  regulation  of,  66. 

Princeton,  121. 

Principle,  29,  44,  43. 

Principles,  10,  n. 

Prior  Documents,  23,  45. 

Progress,  49. 

Promotion,  8. 

Proscription,  53,  54. 

Protection,  177-1S3. 
Protectionism,  174-177. 

Public  life,  1. 

Putnam,  General,  78,  105. 


Quaker,  59,  76. 

Quebec  Act,  6,  7. 

Queens  County,  N.  Y.,  57,  58,  60. 
Quincy,  J .,  45. 


Raguet,  Condy,  177. 

Rebellion,  55,  60;  Dorr’s,  14; 
Fries’s,  229,  235,  238  ; Shays’s, 
14,  135,  136 ; the  whiskey,  6, 
14,  191-199. 

Reciprocity,  treaty  of,  180. 

Reconciliation,  51  ; plans  of,  28. 

Reed,  Joseph,  28,  59,  93-95. 

Religion,  the  Christian,  242  ; the 
Roman  Catholic,  6,  7. 

Representation,  12,  24. 

Republic,  the,  229. 

Republicanism,  140,  187,  242,  247. 

Republicans,  English,  45. 

Repudiation,  13,  39,  40,  135,  145. 

Requisitions,  157. 

Resistance,  doctrine  of,  8,  10,  27, 
28,  42,  45.  I34,  191-199;  fac- 
tious, 43  ; methods  of,  39.  41, 
42,  191-199. 

Restraining  Act,  6,  7. 

Retaliation,  54,  58,  62,  2037  220. 


Revenue,  23,  25,  26,  118,  120; 
plan  of,  124,  127. 

Revolt,  significance  of  the,  26,  27, 
3°.  33.  35.  48- 

Revolution,  53;  the  American,  13, 
31,  34.  36,  48-51.  53.  60,  81, 
i36.  T44.  15°.  181,  200,  233,  254, 
259;  the  French,  205,  207,  208; 
social,  48. 

Rhetoric,  n. 

Rhode  Island,  22,  122,  124,  179. 

Rice,  68. 

Riedesel,  General,  100. 

Riedesel,  Madame,  49,  60. 

Rights,  of  man,  52  ; of  nations,  33; 
natural,  5,  6,  n,  28,  45;  per- 
sonal, 56. 

Riots.  (See  Mob.) 

Rivalry  of  France  and  England,  24. 

Rivington,  8,  55. 

Roberdeau,  77. 

Robinson,  Mrs.,  128. 

Royalist.  (See  Tory.) 

Rush,  Benjamin,  78,  10 1. 

Rush,  Benjamin,  179. 

Russians,  242. 

Rutgers  vs.  Waddington,  128. 


Sabine,  50,  128. 

Saint  J ohn  de  Crevecoeur,  60. 
Salt,  77. 

Satrapies,  26. 

Schuyler,  General,  106. 
Scouts,  96,  97. 

Sea,  dominion  of,  24,  25. 
Seabury,  Samuel,  4,  8. 

Sears,  Isaac,  8,  55. 

Secession,  12,  14. 

Sectional  prejudice,  98. 
Sedition,  82,  191-199. 
Self-government,  6,  22,  46. 
Selfishness,  101,  102. 

Senate,  131,  242. 


INDEX.  279 


Sheffield,  Lord,  68,  202,  203. 
Shelburne,  Lord,  28. 

Shippen,  E.,  15  ; Dr.,  10c,  101. 
Ships,  18,  33. 

Sinking  fund,  160,  172,  1S4;  fal- 
lacy of,  161,  162. 

Slavery,  169. 

Slowness,  97. 

Smith,  Adam,  108,  180. 

Smith,  William,  202. 

Society,  the  Christian  Constitu- 
tional, 242. 

Soil,  property  in,  12,  27. 

South,  the,  65. 

South  America,  226. 

South  Carolina,  56,  58,  66,  237; 
frigate,  93. 

Spain,  16,  17,  31,  32,  85,  144,  209, 
2TI,  226. 

Specie,  151,  166,  168,  169. 
Speculation,  147,  163. 

Speculators,  72. 

Stamp  Act,  41,  62,  192,  199. 

State,  the,  20. 

State  balances,  157,  158,  160. 
Statecraft,  n,  15,  16,  20,  21,  26. 
Staten  Island,  54. 

State  rights,  187. 

Statesman,  19,  102. 

Statesmanship,  114,  233,  245. 
States  of  the  Union,  51,  59,  71,  82, 
112,  141,  155, 157,  158,  182, 1S7, 
205,  230;  large  vs.  small,  131: 
paper  issues  by,  72.  (See  Debts.) 
Stedman,  86. 

Stevens,  3. 

Stock-jobber,  1S8. 

Stock  notes,  164. 

Stoddert,  B.,  253. 

Stony  Point,  100. 

Storms,  social,  48. 

Su?ar,  34,  37,  77. 

Sullivan,  General.  137. 

Sullivan,  W.,  258. 


Supreme  Court  of  the  United 
States,  138. 

Sylla,  213. 

System,  the  Colonial,  8,  12,  16-18, 

21.  24,  32,  183,  200,  203,  project 
to  overthrow,  32 ; the  federal, 
116,  134,  141  ; the  funding,  147, 
J48  ; governmental,  244;  the  mer- 
cantile, 20;  the  navigation,  iS, 

22,  1 81 , 202-204  i I*16  protec- 
tive, 176,  183. 


Tar  and  feathers,  47,  61,  193,  195. 

Tariff  of  prices,  73,  77,  80. 

Tartars,  97. 

Taylor,  J.,  146,  169. 

Tax,  by  depreciation,  15 1 ; system 
of  New  York,  115. 

Taxes,  83,113,  114,  120,  122,  135 
151,  161,  166,  167,  179,  180 
internal,  23;  land,  38,  114;  on 
paper,  paints,  and  glass,  24  ; op- 
posed to  liberty,  193  ; opposition 
to,  135;  poll,  38,  114;  protec- 
tive, 12,  175-183;  revenue,  12, 
23  ; stamp,  39 ; on  Tories,  76. 
(See  Duties , Excise.) 

Tea,  37,  76,  77 ; destruction  of, 
42>  45- 

Technicalities,  10. 

Tender  laws,  73,  80,  136. 

Tenure,  242. 

Territories,  11,  12. 

| Terrorism,  197. 

Test  oath,  76. 

Test  of  political  theories,  11,  13. 

Thomson,  Charles,  21,  47,  207  ; 
Papers,  21. 

Thurman,  8. 

Tories,  8,  46,  49.  5U  53.  75.  95. 
113,  126-128,  195;  proportion 
of,  50;  treatment  of,  54-61,  75. 

Town-meeting  plan,  S4. 


28o 


INDEX. 


Townshend,  T.,  Jr.,  24. 

Tracts,  44. 

Tracy,  U.,  243. 

Trade,  166,  167;  “at  a loss,”  180; 
balance  of,  19,  20,  34,  177,  179; 
carrying,  203;  free,  5,  31,  174, 
181-183,  201,  203;  “follows  the 
flag,”  24;  illicit,  18,  25;  incon- 
sistency as  to,  181-183  i logic  of, 
181-183  ; notions  of,  17  ; philos- 
ophy of,  63,  175,  177,  200  ; regu- 
lation of,  21,  22;  West  India, 
215. 

Trading  company,  no. 

Tragedy,  classical,  246. 

Tramps,  116. 

Transportation,  175. 

Treason,  55,  128,  197,  199. 

Treasury,  in,  144. 

Treaties,  211,  217. 

Treaty,  of  1783,  126-128,  206,  209, 
violations  of,  205  ; with  France, 
1778,210,219;  1801,240;  Jay’s, 
215,  216-220  ; of  reciprocity,  180. 

Trenton,  225,  236. 

Trinity  Church,  250. 

Troops,  American,  99  ; number  of, 
93  ; quality  of,  99,  100. 

Troops,  British,  44  ; transit  of,  209. 

Trumbull,  J.,  135. 

Tryon,  Governor,  55. 

Turgot,  24,  25,  33,  109. 

Ungenerosity,  ioi. 

Union,  passim. 

Unit,  political,  20 ; of  account,  170. 

Valley  Forge,  85-87. 

Van  Rensselaer,  J.  R.,  244. 

Vatican,  90. 

Vehmgericht,  42. 

Vergennes,  33,  89,  102,  126,  201. 


Vermont,  135. 

Veto,  12,  131,  132. 

Virginia,  7,  129,  184,  187,  191; 

arming,  230 ; Convention,  137. 
Virginians,  253. 

Virulence,  230. 

Vituperation,  186. 


Wages,  33,  181,  182. 

Wagons,  95. 

Wallingford,  Conn.,  74. 

Walpole,  Horace,  22,  26,  39. 

War,  17,  42,  69,  222,  224;  Articles 
of,  92;  civil,  137;  the  Civil,  99, 
141,  245  ; commercial,  4,  5,  30, 
62-69,  187,  204,  210,  213,  214; 
devastation  of,  49  ; between  Eng- 
land and  France,  15,  38;  with 
France,  225-230,  232;  of  French 
Revolution,  208 ; with  Indians, 
253;  of  the  Revolution,  15,  no, 
155,  156,  191,  205,  206  (see  Revo- 
lution)-, second,  with  England, 
15,  142,  229. 

Washington,  George,  passim ; 
Mrs.,  80,  255. 

Washington  City,  43. 

Waste,  85-87. 

Watchwords,  n. 

Waterbury,  Colonel,  58. 

Wayne,  General,  96. 

Webster,  D.,  62,  177. 

Webster,  P.,  72,  80. 

Wedderbum,  7. 

Western  posts,  205. 

West  Indies,  68,  180,  203,  214. 

Westmoreland,  Va.,  41. 

Wethersfield,  Conn.,  41. 

Whigs,  46,  49,  50,  54,  55,  58,  59, 

76,  95- 

Whiskey-poles,  193. 

Wilkes,  John,  51. 

Wilkinson,  General,  225. 


INDEX. 


281 


Wilson,  James,  83. 

Winsor’s  History,  16. 

Wolcott,  Oliver,  215,  218,  234, 246. 
Wolfe,  General,  15. 

Worcester,  56. 

Wraxhall,  Sir  N.  W.,  202. 
Wyoming,  55. 


X Y Z Papers,  222. 


Yates,  R.,  134. 
Yellow  fever,  225. 
Yorktown,  107. 
Youthfulness,  88,  102. 


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